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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Forest and tribes in India 
Issues of deforestation and forest degradation are central to the environmental debate in India. 
With a percentage of forest cover to land area of only 15.7%, and a per capita forest area of 
0.06 ha, India ranks very low in comparison to many regions and countries of the world (State 
of World Forest, FAO 1999, in Forest Survey of India 1999).1  
 
Map 1: Distribution of Forest Cover in India (State of Forest Report, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun 1999) 
                                                           
1 According to Poffenberger (1996:19) it has been estimated that India’s forest-dependent populations minimally 
require 0.5 hectare of forest land per capita. 
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The causes of forest degradation are manyfold and are interlinked in complex ways. The envi-
ronmental history of India reveals changing man-nature relations, in a broad context of eco-
nomic, political, demographic and ecological transformations. Gadgil and Guha (1992) local-
ise central causes of environmental degradation in India’s recent past in the predominance of 
the ‘industrial mode of resource use’, which started to change resource use patterns with Brit-
ish colonialism. The industrial mode of resource use including fossil-fuel based agriculture 
has more far-reaching ecological impacts than the preceding modes of resource use of gather-
ing and shifting cultivation, pastoralism and settled agriculture. Colonialism is seen by many 
environmental historians as an ‘ecological watershed’ (Gadgil and Guha 1992:116) in South 
as well as in Southeast Asia (Grove et al. 1998). It has been linked with increased rates of ex-
ploitation of natural resources in the context of growing “resource flows across different geo-
graphical regions and across different levels of any political/economic system” (Gadgil and 
Guha 1992:64) and increasing commoditisation of natural resources, once mainly used for 
subsistence or smaller scale markets. These economic transformations were accompanied by 
processes of dismantling control over natural resources of pre-colonial local political bodies 
and communities in the form of state control and privatisation. The end of the British colonial 
rule in India has not altered this trend. With independence, efforts to modernise and develop 
India, following the model of the West, continued, albeit with some ambivalence towards 
capitalism. 
Changing consumption and lifestyle patterns, with effects on production technologies and 
natural environment, population growth and an erosion of community resource management 
systems by statization and privatisation, are also seen by Agarwal (1997:23) as the main 
causes of increased problems of environmental degradation in contemporary India. 
The ecological consequences of these economic and political processes with regard to for-
ests, have been diagnosed as large-scale deforestation and forest degradation, overuse of vari-
ous forest resources resulting in a reduction of habitat and biodiversity, increasing soil erosion 
and water run-off resulting in decreasing water holding capacity, increasing siltation, down-
stream sedimentation and floods, in addition to climatic changes (Poffenberger 1996:259ff). 
For several reasons tribal peoples2 of India are given special attention in academic and 
political debates on environmental issues. They are often perceived as the forest dwellers par 
excellence, living in close association in and with the forest, with its resources being their 
central source of livelihood (compare map 1 with map 2). 
They are seen as the representatives of less destructive patterns of livelihood than the 
population of the so-called ‘mainstream society’ of India, whose economy has largely devel-
oped in lowland areas of permanent and mostly irrigated agriculture, and who have been 
much more affected by processes of modernisation. Living in the hilly and forested areas, 
tribal peoples subsist on hunting and gathering, shifting cultivation and settled agriculture, 
and they are considered to be less integrated into markets. Tribal communities are perceived  
 
                                                           
2 These various ethnic groups are officially distinguished from the society of the national majority by culturally 
loaded terms such as ‘scheduled tribes’, ‘adivasi’ and ‘primitive tribal groups’ (Colchester 1994:72). The com-
monly used terminology of ‘tribe’, ‘tribal people’ is heavily debated in academic discourses (e.g. by Dumont, 
Bailey) due to the difficulties of finding adequate criteria with which to distinguish tribes from castes, and due to 
the broad range of their economic, social, cultural and political situations. Criteria such as territorial control, po-
litical autonomy and economic self-sufficiency in most cases no longer apply to the reality of tribal societies in 
India. In many cases the term ‘tribe’ is used as “a sort of shorthand expression with only an approximate mean-
ing, not one implying a rigorous definition” (Parkin 1992:9). For the history of the terminology of tribal peoples 
as ’adivasi’ in India see Bates 1995. 
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Map 2: India’s tribal concentration areas (Poffenberger 1996:51) 
 
to represent many of the prerequisites for sustainable and non-destructive use of natural re-
sources. As such they provide a matrix for alternative systems of management of natural re-
sources based on principles of sustainability. Their assumed harmonic relationship with na-
ture is thought to be based on small, homogenous and non-stratified communities endowed 
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with an intimate knowledge of their local environment and with efficient institutions, often 
backed by social and religious values that control access to natural resources and rates of ex-
ploitation at a sustainable level. Moreover, tribal communities, at least in the past, were 
thought to control and manage large parts of their natural environment as common property 
resources3, in contrast to forms of centralised state or private control over natural resources. 
The erosion of such common property regimes has been attributed to political processes of 
centralisation and state control. Controlled and restricted access for tribal forest dwellers to 
forest resources by the forest departments all over India, has weakened indigenous common 
property regimes and resulted in degradation of forests.  
Proponents of participatory approaches to development and environmental policies thus 
demand that local control over local resources be given back to these communities, or that ef-
forts of co-management by local communities and the state be linked with traditional institu-
tions of common property resource management. 
A further reason why Indian tribes play a central role in environmental discourses is their 
vulnerability. They are seen as the main victims of environmental degradation.4 Given their 
direct and high dependence on forest resources, degradation and reduction of these resources 
have far-reaching economic, social and cultural consequences for tribal communities. They 
often bear the consequences of large development projects such as dams, mines and planta-
tions, which substantially change their habitats, or even deprive them of their homelands 
through resettlement, thus leading to their social and cultural erosion. However, tribes are not 
only perceived as the natural custodians of forest resources, endowed with local institutions 
protecting the forest from overexploitation or as sheer victims of exogenous interventions. 
Conversely, in some discourses they are made the scapegoats for forest degradation. They are 
accused of burning the forest for shifting cultivation, and of depleting the forest of whatever 
they need for their own use. Labelled as ‘poor’, ‘backward’, ‘primitive’, ‘underdeveloped’ 
and ‘isolated’ communities, they are targeted as needing to be integrated into the more ‘de-
veloped’ and ‘civilized’ Indian mainstream society. 
In between these perceptions of Indian tribes as representatives of an ecologically sound 
past and as victims on the one hand, and as representatives of backwardness, environmental 
destruction and inefficient resource use on the other, there are many positions.5 Academic dis-
courses relating to tribal and environmental issues in India, are often closely linked to issues 
of development, and also aim to affect development policies. There are interlinks between en-
vironmental movements, scholars and policy makers, all of whom have their own specific in-
terests and agendas. Thus, there are currently rich and lively debates on the above issues, 
which have intensified since the 1970s (Gadgil & Guha 1994) and find their expression in a 
broad range of studies. 
Considerable attention is given to the negative impact of British and post-colonial forest 
policies on tribal societies, which mainly controlled and restricted access to forest resources, 
but also provoked protest, conflict and acts of resistance (e.g. Anderson and Huber 1988, Fer-
                                                           
3 ‘Common property’ or ‘common property regime’ is used to refer to the specific social institutions attached to 
the management of common pool resources: it refers to “a property rights arrangement in which a group of re-
source users share rights and duties towards a resource” (McKean and Ostrom 1995:3). This study will use the 
term ‘common property resources’ as a short term to indicate the management of common pool resources (in this 
study mainly forest) by groups of users, sharing rights and duties in contrast to open access, state or private con-
trol. 
4 They share this status of special environmental vulnerability with other marginalised sections of the Indian so-
ciety such as Scheduled Castes, the poor, landless, small and marginal farmers and among these especially 
women. 
5 For a broad and general review of these discourses see Jewitt 2002.  
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nandes 1992, Gadgil and Guha 1996, Ghate 1992, Hardimann 1996, Pathak 1994, Poffen-
berger 1996b, Rangarajan 1996, Saldanha 1998, Shiva 1991, Sivaramakrishnan 1999). In 
these, and other studies, there is a strong focus on the many material and socio-cultural mean-
ings of forest resources for tribal communities. They include descriptions of local or indige-
nous knowledge and management systems (Fernandes 1988, Jena et al. 2002, Seeland 2000 
and 2003, Thakur 1994), several of them with a special focus on tribal women (Fernandes 
1987, Gera 2002, Jewitt 2002, Kelkar 1991). Linked to issues of ‘traditional’ or ‘indigenous’ 
systems and institutions of management of forest and other natural resources, are studies ana-
lysing past and current forest policies with regard to aspects of participation and sustainability 
(Fernandes 1996, Locke 1999, Poffenberger 1996c, Sarin 1996). Among participatory ap-
proaches the strategy of the so-called Joint Forest Management (JFM) has been given special 
consideration. These studies have been backed by general critiques of top-down development 
strategies, and the popularity of the concept of ‘community’, which gained central importance 
for the management of common property resources in recent years6. Thus, a wide range of as-
pects relating to tribes, forest environment and forest policies and their interrelations in India 
is covered. However, there are several issues which have not been given sufficient importance 
in the broad discussion about tribes and management of forest resources so far. 
One of these is the lack of an approach, which looks at the local use and management of 
forest resources within an integrated system of other natural resources. Environmental studies 
usually focus on one specific resource such as forest, land or water. The close interrelation-
ship between land and forest use for example, is rarely looked at systematically, with the 
exception of forest used for shifting cultivation7. Linked to such a uni-dimensional focus is 
the tendency to perceive tribal people such as those under study here, as mainly ‘tribals’, 
‘forest dwellers’ or sometimes as ‘shifting cultivators’. Rarely are they studied as ‘peasants’ 
who have strategies for coping with various conditions of their natural, economic and political 
environment, and who combine the use of various natural resources such as land for 
cultivation and forest for other purposes in interlinked and interdependent ways. A further 
weakness is the omission of the monetary aspects of forest resources for tribal communities. 
While the material aspects of forest resources for subsistence (food, fuel, fodder, construction 
material etc.), together with socio-cultural (religious, political) aspects are given due 
importance, the provision of a cash income from the forest is given less attention. Few serious 
analyses are made to evaluate the cash value of forest resources for tribal forest dwellers and 
the economic rationale behind the sale of forest resources in the broader context of 
subsistence and market economy. 
Moreover, in many of these studies, tribal villages are represented as communities consist-
ing of rather homogeneous households, the only general differentiation possibly being made 
between men and women. Little or no consideration is given to individuals, to inter- and intra-
household relations, gender relations within the household, and aspects of bargaining power 
and conflicts embedded in larger socio-economic and political structures. In addition, the 
dominant perception of tribal communities as victims of colonial and post-colonial processes, 
often assigns them either a passive, or at best, a reactive attitude. 
                                                           
6 For a critical few of this approach see Agrawal et al. 2001. 
7 For a critical review of a long established divide between agrarian studies and environmental studies in India 
and elsewhere see Agrawal et al. 2000: agrarian studies focus on agriculture while environmental studies focus 
on an environment constructed as ‘nature’ in opposition to ’culture’. Forest in environmental studies often fig-
ures as ’nature’ par excellence. Agrawal introduces the concept of ’agrarian environment’ to focus on “the inter-
woven dynamics between the agrarian and the environmental worlds” (p.5).  
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Linked to a perception of tribal communities as homogeneous groups, are unquestioned as-
sumptions of well functioning common property management institutions, eroded by almighty 
exogenous (state) interventions and processes. Tribal communities are often portrayed as hav-
ing all the necessary requirements to fulfil Ostrom’s design principles for sustainable man-
agement of common pool resources as common property (Becker and Ostrom 1995). Tradi-
tional institutions moreover are thought to have the purpose of sustainable resource use, as 
though the ultimate purpose of every institution to direct resource use would be sustainability. 
Thus, certain religious taboos and restrictions, with regard to the collection of selected forest 
products are interpreted as barriers, which impede the overuse of these resources. There is, 
however, little data to substantiate the assumption that without such taboos these resources 
would be overused; to provide such data would require detailed quantitative research in the 
context of complex ecological settings.  
 
This study analyses the situation of two tribal villages, highlighting issues considered impor-
tant for dealing with the problems of environmental degradation and with strategies for in-
volving the local communities in problem solving. The focus of this research is on the eco-
nomic and political framework of the use of forest and land resources of two villages in 
Keonjhar District8, Orissa. Wage labour, as a further means of income generation is also in-
cluded in the study of the local economy. 
The starting point of the economic analysis is the assumption of the rational behaviour of 
peasants. They act in an economically rational manner, opting for economic strategies which 
satisfy their needs best under certain given conditions. However, their needs are not solely of 
an economic nature; they include aspects of social status and identity. Thus, economic deci-
sions made by peasants, are conditioned not only by aspects of economic efficiency, but also 
by norms and values linked to ideologies of social status, identity and gender (see Lipton 
1982).  
Although households are considered to be the main and most central economic units, this 
study takes into account intra-household relations structured by household composition, gen-
der and age. Such an approach reveals the strategies of individual members who possess vary-
ing opportunities, different bargaining power and fallback positions, so that the economic be-
haviour of a household is not necessarily the result of a joint economic strategy, but the 
outcome or result of the strategies of its individual household members. 
In contrast to assumptions of socio-economic homogeneity of tribal villages and communi-
ties this study covers aspects of heterogeneity and difference among households and ethnic 
groups, as well as their economic interrelations within the village community. Such an ap-
proach is even more appropriate in the context of a village with a mixed population of three 
different tribes and one caste, as is the case of one of the two villages under study. 
Thus, individuals, households, ethnic groups and village communities, as different and in-
terlinked social units are analysed with regard to various aspects of use and management of 
land and forest resources. Wage labour as a further source of income is also given due consid-
eration. 
With regard to forest resources, special attention is given to timber and fuel wood carried 
to the market for sale. I assume that the monetary value of forest resources is of crucial im-
portance to the understanding of the forest resource use patterns of the villagers, although so-
                                                           
8 The district sometimes is also named Kendujhar: For the purpose of this study, Keonjhar will be used except 
where it is quoted in literature otherwise. The district capital has the same name and sometimes it is referred to 
as Kendujhargarh. 
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cio-cultural values of forest resources should not be neglected. I suppose that the economic 
value of forest resources determines local resource use patterns more than socio-cultural val-
ues; especially in the context of poverty. 
The analysis of the local economy is a pre-condition for the study of local village forest 
politics in chapter 5, where issues of forest management as a common property regime are 
elaborated. The history of forest policy in the study area, relativises the predominant narrative 
of an almighty state control over forests in tribal areas since British colonialism. I also call 
into question general assumptions of well functioning local institutions to control access to, 
and use of, forest resources by the forest dwellers. Instead I focus on questions of why and 
how villagers try to create new institutions to control and protect their village forest and on 
problems of collective action. The dilemma of forest protection and destruction by local users 
is studied by using the analytical framework of Ostrom’s design principles for sustainable 
management of common property resources. Also studied are the chances and risks taken by a 
local community, in its endeavour to protect its local forest, without intervention from the 
state.  
Chapter 1 includes information about the methodology of the study as well as general data 
on the research setting. Chapter 2 gives some preliminary information on the two villages un-
der study and indicates aspects of heterogeneity and homogeneity, which play a major role in 
resource management of common property as discussed by Ostrom and others. Chapter 3 
comprises the study of the local economy: agriculture, wage labour and wood selling are ana-
lysed with regard to variables such as quality and availability of agricultural land, wage la-
bour, forest resources and returns to labour of these various economic activities. Chapter 4 
evolves around economic strategies of individuals, households and ethnic groups in the given 
context. Chapter 5 deals with state forest policy and with local village forest politics. Conclu-
sions are outlined in chapter 6. 
 
 
1.2 Material & Methods 
1.2.1 Literature  
There is a broad spectrum of social and anthropological literature relating to tribal peoples in 
India and also Orissa. Regrettably, a few well-researched and substantiated studies are far 
outnumbered by a large amount of superficial literature about a broad range of aspects of 
tribal life, society and culture. 
Research for literature about the Juang, the main tribal population in the two villages under 
study, was also carried out at the Tribal Research Centre in Bhubaneshwar. This institute edits 
a journal called ‘Adibasi’. Although the Juang are well represented in a number of articles, 
most have little or no factual information to add, to that produced by McDougal and Bose 
several decades ago. Few Indian anthropologists appear to have a genuine interest for serious 
fieldwork among tribal peoples, including the Juang. Repeatedly, the Juang figure as one of 
the ‘most primitive tribes’ of Orissa in such articles, a statement which possibly demonstrates 
a lack of field experience on the part of the authors – had they spent some time with the Juang 
they would most probably have come to a different conclusion. 
Few other ethnographic studies have new data to add, but elaborate on one or other known 
aspect of Juang society and culture. 
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1.2.2 Selection of the research area 
For two main reasons I decided to follow up my research questions in Orissa. Firstly, from 
1995 to 1998 as a scientific assistant, I was, involved in a research project on ‘Indigenous 
Knowledge on Forest’ conducted by the Chair of Forest Policy and Forest Economics, Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology. One region chosen for the project was Orissa, where two 
teams of Indian anthropologists and botanists carried out research in several tribal areas, in-
vestigating various aspects of the interrelation of tribal communities and forest environments. 
Due to my work, which also included journeys to Orissa, I became more familiar, not only 
with the subject, but also the area. Secondly, Orissa combines a high percentage of tribal 
population with a comparatively high percentage of forest, making it not only an ideal region 
for studying the connections between indigenous peoples, forests and state control, but also 
for testing controversial assumptions, in the more general academic and political debates on 
this subject. 
My decision to carry out fieldwork among the Juang in Keonjhar District, was based on the 
fact that their social organisation and traditional institutions had been comparatively well 
documented in the 1960s, by the American anthropologist McDougal. The Indian anthropolo-
gist Saradindu Bose, had in the same period, completed an analysis of the carrying capacity of 
land under shifting cultivation in three Juang villages. Based on these studies, which con-
tained valuable information about the local situation some forty years prior to my own re-
search, I decided to select villages predominantly inhabited by Juang. Moreover a team of lo-
cal anthropologists and a botanist of the above mentoned research project ‘Indigenous Knowl-
edge on Forest’ carried out ethnobotanical research in the core Juang area under the guidance 
of Dr. Nityananda Patnaik. To have data based partly on similar research interests as my own 
was an additional incentive to do field work among the Juang. 
 
1.2.3 Fieldwork 
1.2.3.1 Village Selection 
During my initial stay in Orissa, in 1996, I visited several Juang and Bhuiya9 villages in 
Keonjhar District and had brief discussions with some of the inhabitants about the situation of 
their local forest. It transpired that these villages varied with regard to several factors such as 
tribal and caste composition, the availability, quality and quantity of forest, agricultural prac-
tices (shifting cultivation, permanent paddy cultivation or a combination of both), distance to 
markets (making wood selling a viable economic option), as well as the presence or absence 
of local forest protection activities. 
During a second field trip in 1997, I visited some additional Juang villages in Banspal 
Block10 and I finally opted to carry out fieldwork in the villages of Kodipasa and Upper 
Kansa, for several reasons. The two villages differed with regard to their size, ethnic composi-
tion, agricultural practices and micro-environmental conditions, as well as local forest protec-
tion activities. However, both had relatively easy access to the district capital and were in-
volved in commercial wood selling. As the purpose of my research was to analyse the man-
agement and significance of forest resources in a changing environment and as changes near 
                                                           
9 The Bhuiya are tribal neighbours of the Juang. Spelling of names of tribes varies considerably in literature: the 
Bhuiya also figure as Bhuya, Bhuyan and Bhuinya. In this study, the term Bhuiya will be used except in quota-
tions. 
10 In Keonjhar, the Juang are mostly concentrated in Banspal, Telkoi and Harichandanpur Blocks. 
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the towns are more pronounced, these two villages fitted these criteria. The fact that one vil-
lage had initiated village forest protection activities some years ago, while the neighbouring 
village bordering it took no measures to protect its forest, was another reason to select this 
area for study. The comparison of these two villages allowed me to consider problems of for-
est use, management and protection in different contexts and in a comparative manner. 
An initial attempt to start field research in these two villages, towards the end of 1997 
failed due to problems of obtaining the necessary research visa. The villages were located in a 
so-called ‘tribal area’. ‘Tribal areas’ are defined by the Orissa State Government and, as such, 
special rules apply to them. One such rule is restricting access to the villages by foreigners. 
Finally, my research proposal was given approval by the Indian State Government including 
the two villages I had selected for fieldwork.  
Circumstances for my fieldwork became again difficult when in January 1999 an Austra-
lian missionary was killed in Keonjhar District. For my protection, two policemen were 
posted in the villages where I carried out field research. This situation not only made it diffi-
cult for me to carry out my research, but also caused unrest among the villagers. Conse-
quently, it was then necessary for me to leave the villages for several weeks until the political 
situation had calmed down. 
1.2.3.2 Finding a guide 
While waiting for several months in Cuttack for my research visa, I searched for literature and 
introduced my interpreter and local guide Champak Kumar Sahu into my research project. He 
had an M.A. in Anthropology. And as a peasant’s son he was familiar with life in a village. 
Belonging to a caste of OBC (Other Backward Classes), he had no reservation towards the 
tribal villagers. His local knowledge and practical know-how were of inestimable value to me. 
After some time he became much more than a local guide and interpreter; he became a scien-
tific assistant with a genuine interest in the research that I was involved in. In 2007 he has 
submitted his own thesis on "Use and ownership of land among the Juang of Keonjhar Dis-
trict, Orissa." 
The lingua franca of the villagers is Oriya, although each of the three tribal groups has its 
own language. Conversations with the villagers were conducted in Oriya and translated by my 
guide into English. After some time I acquired some understanding of Oriya which helped me 
to follow conversations. 
1.2.3.3 In the villages 
Finally, field research in the villages was undertaken between November 1998 and July 1999. 
I had visited Kodipasa and Upper Kansa twice already during short exploration trips in 1996 
and 1997 in Keonjhar. During my third visit to Kodipasa and Upper Kansa, I told the villagers 
about my plan to stay for several months in their villages, and asked for their permission. 
They were rather indifferent, if not to say reluctant to welcome me, although I was no longer 
a newcomer. I realised that it would not be easy to convince them as they seemed rather sus-
picious of foreigners and hid their curiosity for a foreign woman who looked quite different 
from other outsiders. 
However, the former political head (sarpanch) of Kodipasa Gram Panchayat (village 
council of several villages) agreed to check if there was a possibility of us renting a room in 
Kodipasa. Finally, Nila Juang, a widow, agreed to let us live in a small vacant house. The fact 
that there was no tea stall in the village, together with our efforts to invite the villagers to 
drink tea on our forecourt, helped us to break the ice. However, it took quite a long time for 
the villagers to become accustomed to our presence and make us feel welcome. We had ex-
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plained to the villagers that we would like to study agriculture and forest use in their area and 
learn how people lived in this village. They understood this because it was obvious that I 
came from a rather different area, but it was difficult for them to believe that we did not be-
long to either any NGO or government agency. Linked to such speculations there were expec-
tations, sometimes mixed with mistrust and disappointment, that we did not solve their prob-
lems. As we were collecting data on land issues for example, some villagers believed that 
these data would be used as criteria for selection in development programmes or exclusion 
from the benefits of such programmes. 
With my interpreter and research assistant, I lived in the Juang quarter of Kodipasa; the 
traditional centre of the village. All other hamlets from the village were easily accessible from 
this point. Within approximately 40 minutes walk we were able to reach the other village 
(Upper Kansa), which we visited regularly for several hours or a whole day at a time. Villag-
ers from Upper Kansa frequently visited or passed through Kodipasa. This gave us the oppor-
tunity to gain information about what was going on in Upper Kansa without having to be 
there on a permanent basis. 
From the outset, we made sure that we gave equal attention to all villagers, regardless of 
their ethnic or caste affiliation.  
During September and October 2003, I revisited the two villages and collected additional 
data. I was again assisted by Ch.K. Sahu; now accompanied by his wife and their three-year-
old daughter. The reception by the villagers this time was cordial in comparison to our first 
stay and our research was far easier to carry out, as the villagers had overcome their initial 
distrust of us.  
 
1.2.4 Data collection 
1.2.4.1 Participant Observation 
While visiting families in their compounds, discussing with the men in the majang (men’s 
house), meeting people in their fields, in the forest or at the market in the town, we observed 
and also discussed various aspects linked to my main research interests. We also had the op-
portunity to attend several rituals and participated as guests in such events in both villages. 
After general and loosely structured conversation with several villagers, we then focused on 
more specific issues. It soon became apparent to us who it was that had extensive knowledge 
of certain topics and was also willing to spend time with us, so that we visited some houses 
and villagers more than others. 
In Kodipasa we were close to the every-day life of our neighbours including the widow 
who had rented her house to us. This allowed us to observe and discuss what was going on in 
several households. As our house was situated on the main road, in the centre of the Juang 
area, it was easy to chat with villagers who passed by. In the mornings and evenings we often 
shared tea with visitors at our house. There were no apparent barriers for the villagers, as to 
who could enter our house, and we therefore spent considerable time with children and mar-
ried and unmarried men and women of all age groups and ethnic groups. Such contacts were 
however more intensive with the villagers of the Juang hamlet including the Gouda; the caste 
of milkmen. Villagers from other hamlets as well as villagers from Upper Kansa visited us 
less frequently. 
Accompanied by Juang from Kodipasa or Upper Kansa, we also visited neighbouring vil-
lages and collected some basic information by discussing with the villagers aspects which 
were closely linked to central issues of this research. Although such visits, without collecting 
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quantitative data, yielded rather impressionistic information, they indicated differences or 
similarities to the villages of Kodipasa and Upper Kansa. 
1.2.4.2 Household Census 
Basic data on demographic and socio-economic issues were collected by conducting a census 
covering all 136 households of the two villages. This was a time-consuming and challenging 
exercise. The questionnaire included closed and open questions. Closed questions mainly re-
lated to household composition (number, sex and age of household members), clan member-
ship and occupational activities (agriculture, wood selling, wage labour) of the various house-
hold members. Questions relating to land tenure turned out to be too complex to be covered 
by the census alone and required additional data collection. Open questions related to issues 
of migration, land transfer and use of land and forest. 
We visited and spent some time in every household, several of which had to be visited 
more than once to clarify data. The census not only yielded information to specific questions, 
but additional insights into household situations.  
1.2.4.3 Other Sources 
Data collection was also carried out at government and development agencies. The land regis-
ter at the Tahsildar office of the Revenue Department yielded valuable information about the 
land settlement, quality of the land and land tenure in the two villages. Government institu-
tions such as the Integrated Tribal Development Agency (I.T.D.A.) and the Block Develop-
ment Office held some general data on the Juang and other marginalised groups. Information 
about forest related aspects were collected from the district forest department. In discussions 
with the staff and officials of these agencies, quantitative data was supplemented with addi-
tional information from those who were involved in the issues of land, forest and tribal devel-
opment in the research area. 
A valuable source of a wide variety of general and detailed information about the district 
was the Orissa District Gazetteers, Kendujhar (1986). The District Statistical Handbook from 
the Directorate of Economics & Statistics, Orissa also offered data on a broad range of issues. 
1.2.4.4 Data Analysis 
During fieldwork, occasional trips to Cuttack were made, so that data collected could be 
roughly analysed. Based on our preliminary findings decisions about further proceeding of 
field research were made. Upon returning to Switzerland, quantitative data from the census 
was processed, using Excel. Diaries kept during fieldwork provided a central basis for data 
analysis and written reports.  
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1.3 Environment and people of the research area 
 
Before giving general data about Keonjhar District, some geographical information about 
Orissa will help to situate the area of fieldwork in a broader context. 
 
 
Map 3: Orissa in India (source: Jena et al. 2006; p. xxiii) 
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1.3.1 Geography 
The State of Orissa is situated on the East Coast of India and extends from 17°49’N to 
22°34’N latitude and from 81°27’E to 87°29’E longitude, with a total geographical area of 
155,707 sq. km.11 It is surrounded by West Bengal and Jharkhand to the North, Andhra 
Pradesh to the South, the Bay of Bengal to the East and Madhya Pradesh to the West. Al-
though situated on the coast with a coastline of about 500 km, the bulk of the state area is 
hilly and mountainous.  
Based on physical features and agro-climatic conditions, Orissa can be roughly divided 
into four zones: (1) The northern plateau which is an extension of the Chotanagpur Plateau 
covering Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar and the eastern Sundergarh area. It constitutes 23% of the 
state’s total geographical area. The central portion of this plateau contains many small hills 
and forests. (2) The central tableland constitutes another 23%. (3) The Eastern Ghats, consti-
tuting 36% of Orissa’s landmass, run along the length of the state and then merge with the 
Chotanagpur plateau. (4) The coastal plains in the east make up the remaining 18%. 
Orissa is located in a climatic region known as tropical wet-dry (or tropical savanna). It has 
a tropical monsoon climate, with erratic distribution of rainfall, often resulting in floods, 
droughts and cyclones. Temperatures average about 26ºC, with the lowest average tempera-
ture in January at 20ºC and the highest mean temperature rising to 33ºC in May. Average an-
nual rainfall in the state is about 1800 mm (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2002). 
Data on Orissa’s forest coverage are contended for various reasons (technical, political) 
and by various stakeholders. In 1971-72 it was estimated to be of 43.5% of the whole area. 
According to the Statistical Branch, Office of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, 
Orissa (1993) the forest area declined to 36.27% of the total geographical area. But forest on 
paper does not necessarily correspond to actual forest cover and the forest department itself 
estimated in 1990 that the percentage of actual forest cover to recorded forest cover was only 
79.1%, i.e. 30.3% of the total geographical area (A Decade of Forestry in Orissa, 1981-1990). 
Other estimates indicate actual forest cover to be no greater than 20% of the total geographi-
cal area (Fernandes 1988:15). This evidence suggests that there is an overall decrease in forest 
vegetation. 
The main types of forests are dry deciduous (approx. 50%) and moist deciduous (approx. 
30%), the remaining 20% consist of various types such as semi-evergreen, littoral and tidal 
swamp forests. Dry and moist Sal (Shorea robusta) forests are predominantly found (Fernan-
des 1988:15). Forest vegetation is concentrated mostly in the hilly and mountaineous hinter-
land, while flat tablelands, plains and river valleys are sparsely endowed with forests but 
more intensively used for cultivation; mainly of rice.  
1.3.1.1 Topography of Keonjhar 
Keonjhar District is bounded in the north by the Singbhum District of the new State of Jhark-
hand (previously southeastern part of Bihar), in the east by the districts of Mayurbhanj and 
Baleshwar, in the south by the districts of Cuttack and Dhenkanal and in the west by the dis-
tricts of Dhenkanal and Sundargarh. It is a land locked district lying between 21°1’N and 
22°10N latitude and 85°11’E and 86°22’E longitude, extending over an area of 8303 sq. km.12 
Its extreme length from north to south is nearly 145 km and the average breadth from east to 
west is about 65 km. 
                                                           
11 Statistical Branch, Office of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests 1993. 
12 District Statistical Handbook Keonjhar, 1993:1. 
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Map 4: Forest Cover of Orissa (State of Forest Report, Forest Survey of India, Dehradun 1999) 
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Map 5: Districts of Orissa (http:/www.mapsofindia.com/maps/orissa/districts / kendujargarh.htm) 
 
Topographically the district is divided into two different tracts - referred to as ‘Upper 
Keonjhar’ and ‘Lower Keonjhar’ - approximately extending along a line from a northwesterly 
to southeasterly direction. 
Upper Keonjhar, or the western tract, consists of a range of hills including mountainous 
highlands, with a general slope from north to south, extending the length of the western part 
of Keonjhar District in an arc from northwest to southeast. This hill range forms the water-
shed between the BaitaRani and Brahmani rivers, and the average elevation of the central part 
of the highlands is about 500 m. Although the mountain tops “appear from the low lands to be 
sharply ridged or peaked (....) they have extensive table-lands on their summits, fit both for 
pasture and for tillage” (Government of Orissa, ODG 1986:4). The hills of western Keonjhar 
are the homeland of the Juang and the Hill Bhuiya. This area is described by McDougal as: 
“(...) a region of flat topped hills separated by V-shaped valleys, containing little level bottomland, although 
there are exceptions, particularly in the northern part of the region. (...) The underlying rock formation of the 
table land is basalt of Archaic age; the surface soils contain a high percentage of laterite. There are numerous 
outcroppings, and the soil is very rocky, the rocks being chiefly of limonite, containing a low percentage of 
poor grade iron ore. The ground surface is hard, particularly in the hot months prior to the rains” (McDougal 
1963:22-23). 
Extensive flat tops are mainly to be found in the higher tracts, whereas the tops of the lower 
hills are limited “and look like conical hills from a distance, particularly from the plain” 
(Bose 1967:89). This landscape is well dissected by headwaters and upper tributaries of vari-
ous rivers and hill ranges running in various directions and aligned in a variety of forms. The 
largest river of Keonjhar District, the BaitaRani, rises in the heartland of the Juang, at Gona-
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sika, and flows due north as a hill stream until it reaches the Sighbhum border, where it 
abruptly turns to the south.  
The eastern tract or Lower Keonjhar emerges in a gentle slope from the belt of the hills of 
Upper Keonjhar, and then spreads into an open plain towards Cuttack District. It is a region of 
valleys, lowlands and fertile plains. Lower Keonjhar contains little jungle, and is dotted with 
only a few low isolated hills. It is well cultivated and thickly populated; mainly inhabited by 
Oriya peoples (ODG 1986:4-5). 
The two villages under study are situated in the transition zone of these two tracts. 
1.3.1.2 Forest vegetation 
According to the Statistical Branch, Office of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, 
Orissa (1993), the forest area of Keonjhar District, with 2,494 sq. km, amounts to 30% of the 
total geographical area. However, these data are open to contention for the same reasons men-
tioned above for the general forest situation in Orissa. The general pattern of higher forest 
concentration in hilly areas, in comparison to plain land of Orissa, is repeated within Keon-
jhar District itself: Upper Keonjhar has more forest areas than Lower Keonjhar. 
The forests of Keonjhar are: 
“(...) of monsoon type locally classified as (a) tropical moist deciduous forest and (b) tropical semi-evergreen 
forest. The Sal (Shorea robusta) forest with mixed community of species represents the climatic climax 
whereas the dry deciduous vegetation and thorny xerophytic communities characterise various stages of deg-
radation or edaphic climaxes. Within these broad divisions of monsoon forest occur characteristic vegetation 
types depending upon local habitat or niche.  
Tropical moist deciduous forest is chiefly characterised by Shorea (Sal: O), Terminalia, Diospyros and 
Schleichera. The species largely comprise Shorea robusta, Terminalia tomentosa, Diospyros melanoxylon, 
Schleichera oleosa, Anogeissus latifolia, Ougeinia cojenensis, Adina cordifolia and Protium serratum. 
Tropical semi-evergreen forest is confined to hilly area and characterised by Diospyros, Macaranga, Dil-
lenia, Mesua and Strychnos.The association comprises Diospyros peregrina, Macaranga peltata, Dillenia 
pentagyna, Mesua ferrea, Strychnos potatorum, Syzygium cumini, Terminalia belerica, etc. ” (ODG 1986: 
16-33). 
The forest areas of the Bhuyia and Juang pirhs13 are classified as ‘moist peninsular low level 
sal’ by Champion and Seth and come under sub-group 3C.-North Indian Tropical Moist De-
ciduous Forests (Champion and Seth 1968:120). Mainly inhabited by tribal shifting cultiva-
tors, forests in this area have been exposed to human interference for some considerable time. 
According to Champion and Seth (1968:121) the dominance of Sal (Shorea robusta) has been 
intensified by human activities: 
“(...) wherever the population has been dense enough to press on the forest. Sal is very generally more ag-
gressive than any of its associates and competitors in natural gregarious habit, coppicing power, resistance to 
burning, regeneration under burning and grazing, adaptability to soil and site conditions, and longevity”. 
However, too much pressure prevents the Sal population from producing sal sprouts and to 
form high forest with a top canopy of 25 to 40 metres in height. Sal trees in the Bhuiya-Juang 
pirhs thus mainly consist of young pole crop with a small girth only. 
                                                           
13 In the past western Keonjhar was divided for administrative purposes into pirhs as territorial units, each con-
taining a number of villages. Four of these pirhs were referred to collectively as Juang pirh (sing.). The group of 
pirhs inhabited by the neighbouring Hill Bhuiya were called Bhuya pirh. (McDougal 1963:58) The tribal area 
inhabited by the Bhuiya and the Juang is sometimes referred to as Bhuya-Juang Pirh (sing.). Sometimes the term 
Bhuyanpirh even includes the Juang pirhs. 
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The deciduous period of Sal is very short, with only five to fifteen days at the beginning of 
the hot weather. Shade from the new foliage keeps the sal forests cool, in contrast to fully de-
ciduous forests. 
1.3.1.3 Soil, erosion 
With regard to soil conditions in Upper Keonjhar, Bose (1967:89-90) gives the following 
characterisation: 
“The basalt is decomposed but the soil cover is not sufficiently thick for ploughing anywhere, except in the 
valley bottom. Flat tops generally have black soils but the soil cover is too thin for successful cultivation. 
Laterite and red soil are common and generally cover the hill slopes. The minerological composition of the 
soil collected from different sites and situations is fairly uniform. Sesqui-oxides are most prevalent and is in 
the order of 25% though in locations it may be as low as 11% and as high as 35%. The percentage of Fe2O3 
varies from 5-14%, the average being 10%. Other minerals present to a small quantity are CaO, K2O, P2O5 
and nitrogen.” 
According to the forest department erosion is a ‘common feature’ of Keonjhar and the prac-
tice of shifting cultivation is perceived to be one of its main causes: 
“Erosion and eroded lands are a common feature of Kendujhar District. This is due to extensive shifting cul-
tivation in certain areas resulting in frequent flood and soil loss. The hill-sides, particularly in the Bhuyan 
and Juang pirhs, have in many cases been completely stripped of vegetation and present merely expanses of 
barren rock. Shifting cultivation goes right upto the hill-top unconcerned regarding its effects down below” 
(Mahapatra 1984/85:5).14 
However, the same report admits, that the problem of erosion is not only confined to areas of 
shifting cultivation, but 
“(...) it is noticed all over the district. (...) The process of erosion is progressive and each year fresh ground is 
broken up by this process to add to the vast area of unproductive land. Heavy encroachments into the re-
served forests particularly in Palasapal and Rebna, contribute considerably to the process of soil erosion” 
(ibid.) 
The issue of mining leases in reserved forests is judged to be another reason for soil erosion in 
the district: 
“Not only the forests have been seriously honey-combed but also the excavated earth after the mining opera-
tions is left dumped in heaps to be gradually eroded during rains every year.” (ibid.) 
“Besides shifting cultivation, there are large areas around Suakati, Joda and Barbil which are prone to accel-
erated soil erosion due to wide scale exploitation of minerals from the mines. The agencies which are mainly 
responsible for the soil erosion in the district have scant regard for soil conservation practices like contour 
bounding and terracing. Large scale exploitation of natural forest in the last two decades, improper land hus-
bandry, unprotected pasture, are many factors which are responsible in bringing about two fifth of the area of 
the district under various types of soil erosion” (ODG 1986:112). 
 
1.3.2 Climate 
1.3.2.1 Seasons 
In the District Gazetteer of Keonjhar (1986:33), the year is divided into four seasons: 
                                                           
14 According to the Orissa District Gazetteer of Keonhjar (1986:112), out of a total District area of 8,329 sq. km, 
1,191 sq. km “are suffering from active soil erosion due to shifting cultivation. From recent satellite survey of 
the State of Orissa and from an imagery map it has been estimated that 40,638.2 ha [406.382 sq. km] of the dis-
trict have been affected by shifting cultivation.” 
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– the hot season lasting from March to May 
– the southwest monsoon season lasting from June to September 
– the post-monsoon season lasting from October to November 
– the cold season from December to February 
 
McDougal (1963:23) distinguishes only three seasons: 
– the rains lasting from June to October 
– the winter, from November to February, with cool nights and no rain 
– the summer, from March to May with hot temperatures and no rain 
 
May is the hottest month with the mean daily minimum temperature of about 25°C and the 
mean daily maximum temperature of about 38°C. The maximum temperature may sometimes 
reach 46°C. With the onset of the monsoon in early June, the daytime temperature drops. 
Both day and night temperatures decrease again progressively after the end of the monsoon in 
October. December is usually the coldest month of the year, with the mean daily minimum 
temperature of approximately 12°C. During this month the minimum temperature may drop to 
approximately 3°C (see also Statistical Handbook Keonjhar 1993:16). 
The relative humidity is generally high, i.e. about 75 per cent during the southwest mon-
soon and post-monsoon months (i.e. from June to November). In other months, the afternoons 
are comparatively drier. On summer afternoons (March to May) the relative humidity varies 
by between 35 to 40 per cent.  
1.3.2.2 Rainfall 
The average annual rainfall for the district is officially given as being 1534.5 mm. Compari-
son of data of annual and monthly rainfall over recent years, shows considerable annual and 
monthly variations, indicating the uncertainties of the rainfall. Rainfall is one of the most im-
portant and critical factors for local agriculture, which is mainly based on rain fed cultivation. 
Even the small amount of irrigated paddy cultivation in the district depends on the use of sur-
face water. 
According to Bose (1967) the average annual rainfall in Keonjhar District varies from be-
tween 1300 mm to 1800 mm.15 Between 1981 and 1998, the deviation from the normal aver-
age rainfall varied from between 364.5 mm above the normal average to 407.5 mm below the 
normal average, indicating a larger variation than assumed by Bose in the 1960s. However, 
statements of a general decline of rainfall as stated by Nayak et al. (1993:4) cannot be con-
firmed, considering the statistical data since the 80s. 
 
Table 1: Annual rainfall in mm in the research area (available years) 
Year Keonjhar District Banspal Block 
1981 1277  
1982 1363  
1983 1788  
1984 1656  
1985 1899  
1986 1631  
1987 1127  
                                                           
15 There was no observatory as such in the district before 1957. Only rainfall data of three stations within the dis-
trict were available for a period ranging from 27 to 63 years (Bose 1967:90). 
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1988 1539  
1989 1504  
1990 1860  
1993 1461 1195 
1994 1292  
1995 1184 1166 
1997 1447 1328 
1998 1193 1105 
(Data for the years 1982-1987: District Statistical Handbook Keonjhar 1989-90; pg. 12 / Data for 1986-90: Dis-
trict Statistical Handbook Keonjhar 1990-91; pg. 9 / Data for 1993: District Statistical Handbook Keonjhar 1993: 
pg. 15 / Data for the years 1994-1995: District Statistical Handbook Keonjhar 1995: pg. 18 / Data for 1997-1998 
personally collected at the District Statistical Office Keonjhar on 02. June 1999) 
 
About 75 per cent of the annual rainfall occurs during the southwest monsoon season (June to 
September). The hills have generally more rainfall than average for the district. The average 
annual rainfall, in the hilly region of Upper Keonjhar, is indicated by Bose as 1651 mm 
(65 in.). 
Monthly variations, both in the quantity and timing of rainfall clearly show the unpredict-
ability of rainfall, which is a crucial factor for agricultural production. Thus 1998 was consid-
ered as a “drought” by the people in the research area, whereas the year before, 1997, was a 
fairly good year with regard to agricultural yields. Moreover, the same amount of annual rain 
may result in a good or bad harvest for the farmers, depending on the rigth or wrong time of 
rain or no rain, too much or too little rain.  
 
Table 2: Monthly rainfall variation in Banspal Block (rainfall in mm) 
Month 1993 1995 1997 1998 
January 0 51 0 48 
February 0 34 0 12 
March 0 0 43 12 
April 64 0 95 21 
May 112 157 37 31 
June 255 83 290 237 
July 230 209 302 228 
August 247 318 285 140 
September 218 177 134 252 
October 58 69 56 97 
November 11 65 41 27 
December 0 3 45 0 
Total 1195 1166 1328 1105 
 
1.3.3 Administrative setting 
Orissa is divided into 30 districts. The Collector and District Magistrate “is in overall charge 
of the general, revenue and development administration of the district” (ODG 1986:239). As 
the District Magistrate, he is also responsible for the maintenance of law and order. He is as-
sisted by several officers in various other departments. The district-wise administrative set-up 
of Keonjhar contains 3 Divisions, 8 Tahsils, 13 Blocks and 286 Gram Panchayats. Tahsils are 
administrative units for efficient revenue administration, while Blocks are administrative units 
created to implement the so-called Community Development Programme. Gram Panchayats 
are councils of several villages with elected ward members and a sarpanch as the political 
head of this body. Although introduced in the 1950s in order to promote local self-govern- 
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Map 6: Keonjhar District 
 
Map 7: Blocks in Keonjhar (source: http://ws.ori.nic.in/gis/html/keonjhar/keon.htm) 
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ment and to support decentralisation, the Gram Panchayats mainly function as links for gov-
ernment officials from various Departments and Blocks, to implement programmes and poli-
cies in a rather top-down manner. 
The two villages, Kodipasa and Upper Kansa, belong to Keonjhar Division, Keonjhar 
Tahsil, Banspal Block and Kodipasa Gram Panchayat. 
1.3.4 Social and ethnic background 
The society of Orissa is a complex patchwork of an enormous variety of ethnic groups with 
various origins, histories, languages, occupations and religious affiliations, embedded in an 
equally complex web of interrelations which have been subject to many historical changes. 
Caste organization is still a prominent feature of the society of Orissa. Tribal societies in 
Orissa, as in other parts of India, are not beyond the caste system although tribes are com-
monly opposed to castes as a separate social category. Differences between various tribes, or 
between various sections of the same tribe (e.g. endogamous subsections) may be perceived 
in principles of caste organization. The same applies to perceptions of differences between 
tribal and non-tribal groups. 
 
Map 8: Distribution of tribal population in Orissa as per Census 1991 
 
The strong representation of tribal communities is a characteristic feature of Orissa. This 
region belongs to the so-called ‘tribal belt’ extending from the western to the eastern coast of 
Central India: a broad strip of sal, teak and acacia forests transecting the subcontinent from 
Bengal to Gujarat shelters the majority of India’s tribals, who exceed 84 million in total. Ac-
cording to the 2001 census, Orissa’s tribals account for approximately 23% of its total popula-
tion16, which is a relatively high percentage compared to the average of 8.2% per cent for In-
dia as a whole. The tribal population of Orissa consists of more than 60 so-called ‘Scheduled 
Tribes’; an administrative category created by the Indian Government to take into considera-
                                                           
16 In the Census of India in 2001, Orissa had a total population of 36,706,920. 
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tion the specific conditions of tribal communities. Their geographical distribution in Orissa is 
uneven, but they tend to be concentrated in the hilly areas of the hinterland. The coastal dis-
tricts in the plain (Balasore, Cuttack, Puri) show low percentages of tribal population, 
whereas hilly and mountainous districts such as Koraput, Mayurbhanj, Sundergarh, Sam-
balpur, Keonjhar, Phulbani and Kalahandi represent higher percentages of tribal population 
(Sinha & Mishra 1987:81). 
According to the Census of 1991, the tribal population of Keonjhar District (595,184) 
amounted to 44.52% of the total district population (1,337,026). Again, this shows an uneven 
distribution of the tribal population, with a higher concentration in the hilly and forested areas 
of Upper Keonjhar. The two villages under study belong to Banspal Block, where tribal 
population, according to the 1991 census, was the highest, in comparison to other blocks, with 
a total of 79.29%. The majority of the tribal population in Banspal Block belong to the Juang 
and Bhuiya. 
The 1991 census also revealed that there were 46 Scheduled Tribes in the district. The 
principal sixteen tribes, which constituted 96.12% of the total tribal population of the district 
were: the Bathudi, Bhuiya, Bhumij, Gond, Ho, Juang, Kharwar, Kisan, Kolha, Kora, Munda, 
Oraon, Santal, Saora, Sabar and Sounti. Of these tribes, the Juang, Munda and Santal form 
part of the population under study here.  
In 1991, 11.49% of the district’s population belonged to more than 40 Scheduled Castes; 
the remaining 43.99% were General Caste people. Since census data no longer includes in-
formation on membership to a specific General Caste, no quantitative data on the demo-
graphic composition of the various General Castes are available. The Orissa District Gazet-
teers of Kendujhar lists 24 General Castes, but this list is incomplete. In Kodipasa, there are 
some families belonging to the General Caste of Gouda. No other General or Scheduled Caste 
are represented in the two villages.  
1.3.4.1 The Juang and Bhuiya 
By linguistic classification the Juang belong to the Munda speaking tribes of India. Munda 
speakers in India consist of around six million individuals divided into a number of separate 
ethnic groups. These populations are located in the Chotanagpur Plateau and its extensions 
(southern Bihar, northern Orissa, eastern Madhya Pradesh and western Bengal), with others 
centred in the Koraput district of southern Orissa and the Nimar district of western Madyha 
Pradesh (Parkin 1992:1). The Munda-speaking tribes of India are generally thought to repre-
sent part of an ancient Indian population stratum referred to as ‘Pre-Dravidian’, who at one 
time occupied a far greater area than they do today. It has been suggested that this population 
was absorbed or displaced by successive waves of Dravidian and Indo-European speaking 
peoples, who arrived at a later date, so that the present day representatives of the Pre-
Dravidian population are largely confined to refuge areas (McDougal 1963:3).17 
The theory of the Austrian scholar Pater Wilhelm Schmidt (1868-1954), that Munda is lin-
guistically connected with the Mon-Khmer languages of Southeast Asia, which he called Aus-
troasiatic, has come to be accepted, although with some modification, by most scholars work-
ing on Munda languages. However, theories claiming that the Munda tribes originated from 
south-eastern India have not been substantiated, as most of the evidence cited to prove Munda 
origin from Southeast Asia refers to material culture and economic methods, which may eas-
                                                           
17 Sarat Chandra Roy (1871-1942), “the pioneer proper of Munda ethnography” (Parkin 1992:13) not only classi-
fies the Munda speaking tribes as ’pre-Dravidian’, but also the Dravidian-speaking hill tribes, their indigenous 
languages most probably being supplanted by Dravidian ones. 
INTRODUCTION 25 
 
ily be transferred between essentially alien cultures and not necessarily by waves of migration 
(Parkin 1992:3). 
Parkin, whose work is essentially an account of Munda social organization, does not at-
tempt “to argue in favour of any sort of linguistic determinism in cultural matters – quite the 
contrary, for it is clear that the Munda share many, if not most of their values with neighbour-
ing low-status groups who speak Indic or Dravidian languages instead” (1992:ix). Neverthe-
less his analysis indicates similarities between different Munda tribes with regards to econ-
omy, descent and kinship, village organization and territoriality. McDougal (1963:3) also 
mentions “broad cultural similarities among most of the Munda-speaking tribes”, although he 
does not give any further information as to shared cultural traits.  
Dependent upon the classification of individual Munda languages as either dialects or 
separate languages, there are between ten and nineteen Munda languages. They are broadly 
classified into the two sub-groups of North Munda and South Munda. South Munda again is 
subdivided into Central Munda, North Koraput and South Koraput. According to this classifi-
cation scheme the Juang belong to the Central Munda (Parkin 1992:18). The Juang speak 
their own Munda dialect, known as Juang. Like many other tribes in Orissa they use Oriya to 
communicate with non-Juang Speakers. 
With a population of 35,665, as per the 1991 Census, the Juang are a rather small Munda 
tribe. 
Keonjhar is believed to be the original home of the Juang in Orissa, and traditional Juang 
culture is to be found mainly here, whereas the Juang of neighbouring Dhenkanal district are 
more hinduized (Parkin 1992:33-34). The Juang of Keonjhar are known as ‘thaniya’ or 
‘original dwellers’ in contrast to those living elsewhere, who are called ‘bhagudiya’, i.e. 
“those who have fled”. The bhagudiya, more influenced by Hindu ideology, consider them-
selves superior to the ‘thanya’ and according to Bose (1929:51) there is no intermarriage or 
commensality between these two groups. The Juang of Dhenkanal have, to a large extent, be-
come assimilated into the regional Oriya society. They live mostly in mixed villages along-
side caste Hindu. They are primarily dependent on the cultivation of permanent, irrigated rice 
fields in the plains, whereas the Juang of Keonjhar are mainly dependent on shifting cultiva-
tion in the hills. The Juang of Pal Lahara, in the northern part of Dhenkanal, by contrast, have 
adopted basket-making as a mode of livelihood (McDougal 1963:5). 
McDougal (1963:6) suggests that the migration of the Juang from their homeland in Keon-
jhar to Dhenkanal, was probably a result of overpopulation. E.T. Dalton, visiting the Juang of 
Keonjhar for the first time in 1866, mentions a local Juang tradition, according to which “very 
long ago, nine hundred Juangs left the country of their birth and went to Dhenkanal, and the 
Bhuyas came, and took up the lands of the brethren who had left them” (1872/1973:156). 
However, Dalton suggests, that the migrating Juang “were driven out by the Bhuyas who are 
now in those hills the dominant race” (ibid.). According to Nayak et al. (1993:8) the Juang of 
Keonjhar explain the root cause of their migration as being down to their legal system: 
“Those who deviated from the Juang code of conduct were punished by their village assembly 
usually through expulsion. Not finding acceptance in neighbouring Juang villages, those sent 
out travelled far out to as far as Palalahara and Dhenkanal to resettle”. Patnaik (1989a:3) re-
fers to another assumption made in relation to a tribal rebellion of the Bhuiya in 1861; part of 
the Juang having participated in that rebellion against the then feudatory ruler of Keonjhar 
fled to the neighbouring district “to take shelter there”. Although this explanation for the 
Juang migration into Dhenkanal is less plausible, as the process of migration seems to have 
begun at a much earlier date, it is possible that some Juang may have escaped punishment by 
joining the Juang who had already migrated to Dhenkanal. 
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The Juang of Keonjhar inhabit the southern half of Upper Keonjhar. According to Juang 
mythology, they originated in the vicinity of Gonasika, a village near the source of the Baita-
Rani river. It lies in the northern part of southern Upper Keonjhar. From there they spread 
into the neighbouring plains, the hills of southern Keonjhar and into other regions where they 
are presently found (McDougal 1963:5). 
 
The other tribe, which mainly inhabits the range of hills in the north of Upper Keonjhar, are 
the Pauri Bhuiya, an Oriya speaking tribe. The Juang claim some mythological kinship rela-
tions to this neighbouring tribe: they believe the two tribes to be descended from two broth-
ers, one of which ate beef and became Juang. The Bhuiya, who have a taboo against eating 
beef, consider the Juang as ‘untouchables’, and neither eat nor intermarry with them, although 
according to McDougal (1963:6) a few cases of intermarriage have been recorded. According 
to McDougal the Bhuiya “are the more dominant and powerful tribe” (1963:6). He refers to 
local traditions which state that the Bhuiya were responsible for the investiture of the first in-
dependent King of Keonjhar. “Whenever a king died, his successor had to be ritually invested 
with the symbols of the kingship by representatives of the Bhuya tribe” (1963:7). Although 
the Juang attended these ceremonies, their participation was of a more passive nature. E.T. 
Dalton similarly refers to the Bhuiya as the more powerful tribe: “It is probable that they [the 
Juang, N.O.] have been ousted by the Bhuyas from the fertile valleys, and are thus compelled 
to restrict their cultivation to the steep sides of hills (1973:156).” The prerogative of the Hill 
Bhuiya to install every new Raja was admitted by all inhabitants of the Keonjhar kingdom 
and gave them prestige. An efficient communication system helped the chiefs of the Bhuiya 
highlands to organize rapidly to defend their interests. This gave them considerable political 
power within the kingdom (Dalton 1973:146). The Pauri Bhuiya combine shifting cultivation 
with permanent paddy cultivation where possible. 
1.3.4.2 The Munda and Santal 
Both Munda18 and Santal belong to the North Munda subgroup of the Munda speaking tribes. 
The Munda are the second largest Munda speaking tribe with a population of more than 
750,000, most of who live in Jharkhand, parts of northern Orissa and northern Madhya 
Pradesh (Parkin 1992:23f). Before migrating over a long period of time, in either a southerly 
or south-easterly direction, they are believed to have lived in the southern part of what is to-
day known as Uttar Pradesh (Roy in Parkin 1992:24). Their specific Munda language is 
Mundari. According to the Orissa District Gazetteer of Kendujhar they are primarily agricul-
turalists (1986:86). 
The Santal are the largest Munda speaking tribe, and with a population of approximately 
four million, are also one of the largest tribes in India: 
“They, like other Munda, may once have occupied parts of the Gangetic plain, having been pushed into Cho-
tanagpur subsequently by Hindu expansion; but their history before the mid-eighteenth century is obscure” 
(Parkin 1992:21). 
Nowadays, the Santal are widely distributed between Bihar, Bengal and Orissa, but are also to 
be found in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, southeast Nepal, northwest Bangladesh and southern 
Bhutan (Gautam in Parkin 1992:21). In Orissa, they are mainly concentrated in Mayurbanjh, a 
                                                           
18 The term Munda is used to designate the Munda language, but at the same time it refers to one specific tribe of 
the many Munda speaking tribes. In order to avoid confusion Parkin uses the term Mundari for this specific tribe 
as well as for their language. This study will use the term Munda to describe the Mundari speaking Munda in the 
Juang area. 
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neighbouring district of Keonjhar, where they make up about 50% of the population. They 
have also settled in the districts of Keonjhar and Baleshwar. The Santal have their own 
Munda dialect known as Santali. However, most Santal in Orissa speak and understand Oriya. 
The Santal are known for their “strong tribal identity marked by hostility to Hindus, ad-
vancement of the Santali language and traditional culture (...)” (Parkin 1992:21). They pri-
marily focus on agriculture. 
1.3.4.3 The Gouda 
Apart from the Hill Bhuiya, Oriya people have settled in the hilly areas of Upper Keonjhar. 
According to McDougal, the settlement of Oriya people in the hill region is a relatively recent 
development, as the hills offer few attractions to settled agriculturists from the plains. He re-
fers to the immigration of the ‘Gouro’19 as having taken place “within the last 75 years” (i.e. 
around the turn of the 20th century): 
“Most of the Oriya settlers belong to the Gouro (herdsmen) caste. Since their status in caste hierarchy is high, 
they regard the Juang as Untouchables. At least one Gouro family, occasionally two or three, reside within 
the territory of every Juang village. They utilize the fallow land of the village and the adjacent forest for 
grazing herds of cattle and water buffalo. They invariably live in separate hamlets at some distance from the 
village. Although they cultivate a small amount of land in the vicinity of their settlements, they are primarily 
dependent agriculturally on lands which they own in the plains. They normally do not sell or barter their 
dairy products to the Juang, but dispose of them at the market” (McDougal 1963:12-13).  
However, as early as in 1872, Dalton, in his description of the Juang area, mentions the ‘Goa-
las’ as occupying a major part of the area inhabited by the Juang. By the ‘Goalas’ or ‘Gopas’ 
he refers to the same caste also known as Gouda, Gauda or Gouro. According to McDougal 
the Gouda recognize the Juang as being the rightful owners of the land, and pay them regular 
tributes. They provide milk and ghee for use as offerings in Juang rituals, and once a year 
they give the Juang a buffalo, or goats as a suitable substitute, for ritual sacrifice. The Juang 
ownership of land, used and inhabited by Gouda people, also finds its expression in the per-
formance of a ceremony at each Gouda marriage. However, McDougal describes the relation-
ship between the two groups as “often strained”, since the Gouda herds frequently destroy 
Juang crops (McDougal 1963:13). 
The Orissa District Gazetteer Kendujhar (1986:69) describes the general caste of the 
‘Gauda’ as “(...) generally well-to-do. Besides extensive lands, they also possess large herds 
of cattle.” Thus it is a combination of agriculture, with cattle keeping for the purpose of pro-
ducing milk and milk products, which characterizes the occupational pattern of Gouda. 
Patnaik and Bose (1976:61) refer to the same caste as ‘Gouda’ and translate this as ‘milk-
men’ or ‘cattle keepers’. They add an interesting economic attribute to the Juang-Gouda rela-
tionship by indicating that the picture of the Gouda as well-off milkmen and farmers does not 
entirely fit with the complex reality of the Gouda living among the Juang: 
“These cattle keepers migrated to the Juangpirh long ago to tend cattle of the Juang. Later, they developed in-
terest in agriculture. To begin with they tried cultivation of niger [an oilseed variety; N.O.], mustard and 
paddy in a limited area by acquiring the lands of the Juang. As they found agriculture more profitable than 
animal husbandry, they expanded the area of cultivation by further encroaching upon tribals land and re-
claiming fallow land in the available vicinity of their settlements and in valley-bottom. They raised dams 
across hill streams and utilized water from such sources for irrigating their lands. With the application of fer-
tilizer and manure they increased the yield from land substantially. In the result, the cattle keepers became 
rich farmers and the Juangs their cattle keepers and agricultural labourers.” 
                                                           
19 The Gouda also figure as Gouro, Gauda, Goala or Gopa. This study will use the term Gouda except in quota-
tions. 
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This indicates that in addtion to well-to-do Gouda using the territory of the Juang to graze 
their own cattle and to cultivate, there was also immigration of Gouda families to herd the cat-
tle of the Juang. This was most likely an option for poorer Gouda. Initially they were without 
land for own cultivation in Juang territories, but successfully improved their economic situa-
tion by reclaiming and cultivating land. 
The mother tongue of the Gouda is Oriya, which belongs to the Eastern Indo-Aryan Lan-
guages. However, Oriya is considerably influenced by both the Austric and Dravidian lan-
guages.20  
 
                                                           
20 Modern Oriya vocabulary is 70% Sanskrit, 2% Hindustani/Persian/Arabic with the remaining 28% of mainly 
Australoid (’Adivasi’) origin (http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Ithaca/1335/Lang/prakrit.html) 
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Map 9: Research area with Kodipasa (4 hamlets, incl. Lower Kansha) and Upper Kansa (Kansha) 
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The research area is located about 12 kilometres in a south-easterly direction from the district 
capital, Keonjhargarh. It is part of the border zone connecting the plain of Lower Keonjhar to 
the hilly area of Upper Keonjhar. The transition from the plain to the hills in this area is 
sharply marked by the rise of the outermost hill range belonging to Bhuiya-Juang Pirh, the 
homeland of the Juang and Bhuiya, which covers a total area of 1260 sq. km. The research 
area varies in altitude from between 500 metres to 800 metres above sea level. However, the 
hills in the interior rise up to 1100 metres above sea level. The plain, which lies to the east of 
the hilly area, rises slightly towards the foot of the hill range. The landscape in the plain is 
dominated by slightly terraced paddy fields, numerous village settlements, a rather dense 
network of roads, a railway line under construction and by a few canal systems fed by small 
dams to irrigate part of the paddy fields. 
The villages on the outskirts of Keonjhargarh and on the road leading to the town, are 
much more ‘urban’ in appearance, with the presence of small-scale businesses, workshops 
and small hotels which cater for the numerous lorry drivers who use this route. 
Towards the foot of the hill range, the landscape is enriched by an increased display of 
trees, which are either dispersed in the paddy fields or clustered in small patches of forest. 
The trees in the paddy fields are mostly of the mango species: (Mangifera indica), mahul 
(Madhuca indica) and jackfruit (Artocarpus heterophyllus), whereas the rather open forest 
patches consist mainly of Sal (Shorea robusta). 
Kodipasa is situated at the edge of the plain which ends at the foot of Barrasi; a hill form-
ing part of the range which separates Lower Keonjhar from Upper Keonjhar. To reach the vil-
lage one has to pass a small dam, which provides the area below it with some irrigation facili-
ties. However, the villagers of Kodipasa do not profit in any way from the dam as their 
agricultural fields are located behind it. The reservoir is partly supplied with water from the 
Ardai river, as well as with water from several small rivulets from the hills, which dry up dur-
ing the hot season. 
The hill range is covered with more or less dense forest, with Sal being the dominant spe-
cies on the lower part. Forest vegetation turns into a more mixed forest towards the upper part 
of the hills. However, parts of the hill slopes are covered with bushy growth only. In a few 
places, the hill forest stretches out onto the plain. Most of the flat area below the hill range is 
used for paddy cultivation. 
To reach Upper Kansa (Bindridi Kansa), the other village, one has to climb up the hill 
range, through the forest by means of a footpath, which follows a small brook. This brook 
dries out during the summer months. The top of the hill is characterised by several flat areas 
interconnected by small slopes and hillocks. The landscape here is a patchwork of rocky out-
crops, forest, cultivated fields, open pastures, bush fallow and once cultivated swidden areas 
recovered with tree growth. Where the view is uninterrupted for some distance, this patch-
work of cultivated and uncultivated nature is repeated on the surrounding hilly area of the 
Bhuiya-Juang Pirh. 
 
Before going into more detail about the management of natural resources within the research 
area, a brief introduction is given regarding the two villages, which focuses on their social 
composition and general aspects of the coexistence of its various social groups. 
 
TWO VILLAGES 31 
 
Table 3: Population of both villages (census data 1998/99) 
Ethnic 
group 
Number of 
households 
Total popu-
lation per group 
% of total 
population 
Male 
adults 
Female 
adults 
 
Boys 
 
Girls 
Juang 86 436 61.23 124 148 76 88 
Munda 28 146 20.51 39 47 37 23 
Gouda 16 92 12.92 25 26 24 17 
Santal 6 38 5.34 11 11 6 10 
Total 136 712 100.00 199 232 143 138 
 
2.1 Kodipasa 
2.1.1 Population 
Kodipasa is a mixed village inhabited by people belonging to three different tribes and one 
caste; the Juang, Munda and Santal form the tribal population while the Gouda are classified 
as a caste. According to the household census of 1998/99, the Juang, with 66 households, con-
stitute the majority of the local population, amounting to 54.5% (331 inhabitants). The 28 
Munda households make up 24% (146 inhabitants) of the local population, while the 16 
Gouda households form 15.2% (92 inhabitants). The Santal with only 6 households are the 
smallest group and make up 6.3% (38 inhabitants) of the local population. This heterogeneous 
social composition is a rather recent phenomenon; bearing in mind that immigration into this 
previously homogeneous Juang village dates back to the 1930s when two Gouda families set-
tled in Kodipasa. The Juang population today is rather small, although they are still in the ma-
jority. 
The average household size is 5.23 persons. 
 
Table 4: Population of Kodipasa (census data 1998/99) 
Ethnic 
group 
Number of 
households 
Total popu-
lation per group 
% of total 
population 
Male 
adults 
Female 
adults 
 
Boys 
 
Girls 
Juang 66 331 54.5 98 112 54 67 
Munda 28 146 24 39 47 37 23 
Gouda 16 92 15.2 25 26 24 17 
Santal 6 38 6.3 11 11 6 10 
Total 116 607 100.00 173 196 121 117 
 
2.1.1.1 Clans and kinship groups 
Descent rules of all ethnic groups are patrilineal and patriclans are exogamous. In all four 
groups most households are interlinked by affinal and/or consanguineal ties with some other 
households in the village. If, and by how far, clan and kinship ties do play a role in the social, 
political and economic contexts of households and the various groups remains to be analysed 
in later chapters. 
The Juang population consists of several exogamous clans. The majority of the 66 Juang 
households of Kodipasa, i.e. 40 households (60%), belong to the founder clan; the barcha 
bok. This means that either the family head himself is a member of this clan, or the household 
includes children belonging to the barcha bok. Thus thirteen households, headed by widows 
belonging to other clans are included here, where the women in question had been married to 
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members of the barcha bok. The membership of the majority of the Juang to the same clan, 
indicates close kinship relations and long-standing family history within the village. The 
claim of this clan to ritual and political leadership is based upon the criteria of being the foun-
ders of the village in the distant past. On average, the economic status of Juang families who 
belong to the founder clan, in respect to access to land, is higher than that of the other Juang 
clans in the village (see chapter 4.4.1.1). 26 Juang households belong to seven other clans, 
who originated from villages other than Kodipasa. Half of these are Juang families who be-
long to the kansa bok; the founder clan of Upper Kansa. The remaining thirteen Juang house-
holds belong to six other clans. There are various reasons why clans, other than the founders 
are present in Juang villages; for example, a son-in-law may be requested by his parents-in-
law to settle in the village of his wife, particularly if they have no sons, i.e. male heirs. Land 
scarcity is mentioned as another reason for men to leave their village. Divorce or widowhood 
combined with the return of women to their native village with their children, may result in an 
additional clan here, if the sons of a divorced or widowed mother remain in the mothers vil-
lage and subsequently marry there. Resettlement is another mechanism resulting in a mix of 
clans in Juang villages. Thus the families of the kansa bok had been relocated from Upper 
Kansa to Kodipasa, from the forest to the plain where they now reside in a hamlet of Kodi-
pasa called Lower Kansa (Koratadihi Kansa). 
45 households from the 66 Juang households have affinal and/or consanguineal kinship 
ties to members of other households in the village. Of these, the largest Juang kinship group 
consists of six related households. Two other groups each consist of five related households. 
Three groups include three households each, two groups consist of four related households 
each and six groups consist of two households related by kin. The remaining 21 households 
do not have recognized kinship relations in the village. From these, three households have 
kinship relations with Upper Kansa. However, the Juang do not remember genealogies far 
back, and it may well be that some of these households do have kinship relations going back 
several generations. 
The 28 Munda households belong to seven exogamous clans. There are five kinship groups 
related to each other by affinal and/or consanguineal ties. The largest of these groups consists 
of eleven households (Gagrai clan), followed by a group of five households (Chatar clan), a 
group of four households (Champia clan) and two groups of two related households (Lugun 
and Soren clan). Of the remaining four households, two belong to the Hesa clan and have 
very distant kinship relations, and two have no kinship relations at all in the village (one be-
longing to the Chatar and the other to the Sidhu clan). 
The six Santal households all belong to the Hembram or Hansada clans. All are linked by 
affinal and/or consanguineal kinship ties to each other. 
The sixteen Gouda households consist of two groups, all of which have affinal and/or con-
sanguineal links. Of these, the largest kinship group is composed of eleven households, while 
the other is made up of five households. These two groups differ from each other with regard 
to alcohol consumption. The larger group abstains from alcohol consumption, as it is consid-
ered impure by these Gouda, whereas the smaller group, known as the Maghada Gouda, drink 
mahul as well as handia, and thus is considered to be of a lower status by the abstinent Gouda 
group. Some of the Maghada Gouda herd the cattle of the Juang. In the past, the larger Gouda 
group also carried out this role, but as their economic situation improved, the roles became 
reversed and now some Juang herd the cattle of these Gouda. 
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Map 10: Kodipasa with 4 sahi 
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2.1.1.2 Settlement pattern 
The settlement pattern reflects the village history, which is one of transition from a homoge-
neous Juang village to a village also containing the Gouda, Munda and Santal. With the ex-
ception of a few Gouda families, the newcomers settled in three separate hamlets (sahi) at 
some distance from the core village Kodipasa sahi which is easily identified as a Juang vil-
lage by the presence of a majang; the men’s house. This is a building with an open side-wall 
In a small cluster, adjacent to the majang, are some houses of the local descent group. They 
shelter families belonging to the barcha bok, who claim their ancestors to be the founders of 
this Juang village. Nearby this area is a grove of large old mango trees belonging to members 
of the barcha bok. Also nearby, a short distance from the village street and the houses, is a 
small sacred grove, the sala, which is another place of religious significance for the Juang. 
Other Juang houses are situated along the street leading away from this core area, towards the 
upper end of the hamlet. This is the residential area of the milkmen; the Gouda. They were the 
first immigrants, several decades ago, at which time they were employed mainly as cattle 
herders for the Juang.The Munda and Santal families of Kodipasa reside in two other hamlets. 
The first, Sologhoro Sahi consists of fifteen Munda and six Santal households, which are 
grouped together, along a short street, which branches off from the main street at the begin-
ning of the village. The second, Masani Sahi is a hamlet of twelve Munda compounds, situ-
ated in the midst of paddy fields, a little apart from the main street. Neither of these two ham-
lets have a public place comparable to the men’s house of the Juang. But in Sologhoro Sahi 
there is a sacred forest; a small patch of Sal trees (Shorea robusta) encircled by erected 
stones. It belongs to the Santal. The Munda perform part of their rituals in another forest 
patch adjoining the sala of the Santal. 
The fourth hamlet consists exclusively of fourteen Juang households, situated at the upper 
end of the village. Lower Kansa (Koratadihi Kansa) is an offshoot of Upper Kansa (Bindiridi 
Kansa); a Juang village in the forest, on the top of the hill range. In the 1970s this village was 
relocated by the government, down to the plain, in order to stop shifting cultivation in the for-
est. However, the resettlement project partially failed and after a number of years, several of 
the families returned to the forest. Lower Kansa has its own majang. However, the annual 
rituals, which are mainly connected to the agricultural cycle of the Juang, take place in Kodi-
pasa Sahi. Therefore, the majang in Lower Kansa lacks one of its central ritual functions to 
make this hamlet an independent and autonomous Juang village. The karat tree, as well as 
erected stones to indicate the presence of the village goddess, in front of the majang are ab-
sent. There is no sacred grove to perform annual rituals in this hamlet. 
The social heterogeneity of Kodipasa village is also reflected in the various architectural 
patterns of the houses, which not only indicate differences between the various social groups, 
but also between the Juang themselves. Traditional Juang houses are tiny buildings, with 
mainly one room, no windows, a small veranda and a roof made of jungle grass and paddy 
straw. Some of the Juang houses are somewhat larger and clearly resemble the houses of 
many Oriya villages in the area. Roofs may have a covering of jungle grass, paddy straw, lo-
cally produced earthen tiles or even tiles made from cement purchased and carried from out-
side the village. There are also houses provided by the Government, as part of a housing 
scheme for poor people. Up until now, Juang families were the only beneficiaries of this pro-
gramme, and as such, these houses are only to be seen in the two hamlets inhabited by Juang. 
They are constructed from cement, with walls covered with white lime plaster, instead of 
mud, which gives the latter, more traditional houses, their reddish brown colour. These ‘mod-
ern’ houses are supplied with windows to ventilate the rooms and to provide daylight to the 
interior; an element not to be found in traditional Juang architecture. However, the windows 
are not used by the inhabitants, as a rule they remain closed. The fact that the Juang have been 
TWO VILLAGES 35 
 
partially provided with additional housing has contributed to the loss of one of the functions 
of the Juang men’s house; traditionally it was also used as a dormitory for boys and young 
unmarried men. 
Whereas the majority of Juang compounds are of an open structure, giving free access to 
the houses and forecourts, by contrast, the compounds of the Gouda and Santal are sur-
rounded by fences providing them with more privacy. They are generally larger, and only ac-
cessible by passing through a narrow corridor between two buildings. The houses of the 
Munda share similarities with Juang houses. 
2.1.1.3 Living together separately 
The co-existence of the various social groups in Kodipasa is characterised by differences and 
similarities in various respects. They are separated by rules of endogamy and caste, and they 
have different languages and religious traditions. However, they inhabit a common territory, 
share the same environment and are all part of a village community, involving them in a cer-
tain degree of social, economic and political cooperation. 
Rules of endogamy within a group are part of the caste rules, which govern social life in 
Indian society in general, and these rules apply to tribal societies as well. The Juang, Santal, 
Munda and Gouda are strictly endogamous groups. In our survey of 1998/99 we came across 
only one case of intermarriage, which crossed ethnic/caste boundaries; a Munda man who had 
married a Santal woman. Intermarriage between the Santal and Munda, although uncommon, 
is permitted. However, any such union requires specific rituals to be carried out.  
Rules relating to food are another way of regulating the social relationship between mem-
bers of different castes and tribes. The Gouda of Kodipasa do not accept boiled rice or other 
cooked food from any of the other groups, while their food, conversely, is accepted by the 
members of all the other groups. The Gouda, unlike the Juang, Munda and Santals, do not 
consume pork, which they consider to be impure; nor do they keep pigs. The Gouda belong to 
the official category of General Caste, indicating a higher social and economic status than 
groups belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Other ‘Backward’ Classes. 
They are mainly farmers and cattle herders. They worship Lord Krishna, and their attachment 
to cows is not just an economic one, but is interlinked with their religious attitude toward 
them. They consider it their appropriate work to cultivate land and to sell milk. The majority 
of the Gouda abstain from the consumption of alcoholic beverages, be it handia (rice beer) or 
mahul (liquor produced from the flowers of Madhuca indica), both of which are highly ap-
preciated by the Juang, Munda and Santal. The Gouda consider the Juang to be unclean, be-
cause they eat pork, drink alcohol and sacrifice animals to gods and goddesses. However, the 
Gouda provide milk and ghee for various rituals performed by the Juang, thus contributing to 
the ceremonial management of the general well-being of the village, although in a more pas-
sive manner. In this way they recognise the Juang as being the original inhabitants of the vil-
lage and its territory. If the rules which apply to the giving and receiving of food are used as 
indicators of social status, the social status of the Maghada Gouda, (although they do drink 
mahul and handia like all three tribes), is nevertheless higher than the status of the tribes,. The 
relationship between the Maghada Gouda and the other Gouda is a somewhat ambivalent one 
– members of the other Gouda may accept food from the Maghada Gouda, but intermarriage 
does not take place. 
The Munda and Santal do not accept boiled rice from the Juang, whereas the Juang will 
accept cooked food from Gouda, Munda and Santal. Thus, if the rules which relate to the giv-
ing and receiving of food are applied, the social status of the Juang may be considered the 
lowest of all the groups in the village,. The Munda and Santal accept food from each other 
and they have common religious rituals performed by a Santal priest. They have a similar so-
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cial status; an indication of this is the possibility of intermarriage between the two groups, al-
though special rituals have to be performed in such a case. 
Oriya is the mother tongue of the Gouda. The Juang, Munda and the Santal all have their 
own languages, but also speak Oriya fluently. As a rule, communication among members of 
one group takes place in their mother tongue. Communication between members of different 
groups is in Oriya. However, Oriya is sometimes used even among speakers of another com-
mon mother tongue. I witnessed meetings of Juang people where they conversed in Oriya, al-
though there were no outsiders present. To a varying degree, the members of one group may 
speak, or at least understand, the language of other groups. This depends upon the age and 
family history, which is connected to the time spent in the village. Members of the Gouda 
families who have lived in Kodipasa for several decades even speak Juang, although this does 
not apply to Gouda women who came to Kodipasa through marriage and who originate from 
areas where there are no Juang residents. 
Spatial segregation among the different groups is highlighted by the various sahis (ham-
lets) or clusters of neighbouring houses and compounds belonging to the same group. The 
general perception from each of the different groups is that they do not “mix” with people 
from other groups because they belong to different jatis (castes). However, they all interact on 
a daily basis and are all known to each other. There are friendly relationships among people 
from various groups and in such cases, they even invite each other to marriage ceremonies. 
On such occasions gifts and financial contributions may be given. The consumption of handia 
and mahul provides the opportunity for them to sit together for hours to discuss and some-
times quarrel with each other, especially if they have over indulged. 
There are, however, indications for closer every-day interaction with people from their 
own groups than with villagers from other groups. People go to the market in the district’s 
capital in groups and often these groups are composed of members of the same sex and of the 
same group. The same is also valid for groups going to the forest to collect timber and fire-
wood and for people going for wage labour outside the village, be it farm wage labour or 
other wage labour. But there are several economic relations within the village which crosscut 
the various groups, as will be shown below. 
2.1.2 Economy 
With the exception of a few households, the majority of families living in Kodipasa cultivate 
rice on permanent paddy fields. However, only a small minority manage to produce enough 
rice in a year for their own needs, and almost every household has to buy additional rice at the 
market. Additional income is provided by wage labour, wood selling, selling of other agricul-
tural products (milk, vegetables, oil seed, small animals such as pigs, goats, fowls) and small 
scale business. As will be shown later, in more detail, certain economic activities are linked 
with traditional occupations connected with caste. 
A variety of other factors combine to design the pattern of economic activities of the vari-
ous groups, as well as to result in the differences between households within the same social 
group. However, generally, it may be said that there is a low level of economic integration be-
tween the various groups, with households being the main focus of economic activities, and 
the main units of production and consumption. Wage labour for other households in the vil-
lage is irregular and mainly undertaken during farming periods. Some Juang are employed by 
the Gouda on a more regular basis. The only regular form of economic cooperation between 
the different social groups is with respect to cattle herding: two of the Maghadu Gouda fami-
lies herd the cattle for most of the Kodipasa villagers, for which they receive payment in the 
form of rice and paddy. 
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Besides the exchange of labour between households, access to land for paddy cultivation 
brings households into economic relations of selling, mortgaging and renting. Land is a scarce 
resource in Kodipasa as will be demonstrated later. 
Most of the activities from which income is derived are connected with the world outside 
the village; be it wage labour in local mines or road and house construction, farm wage labour 
for the more prosperous farmers in other villages, or selling firewood and timber in the vicin-
ity or at the local market of Keonjhar Town. 
2.1.3 Politics 
The political status of the Juang somehow contrasts with the social status that they hold 
within the framework of the local caste-system. They are unanimously recognised as the 
original inhabitants of the village by the Munda, Gouda and Santal and this gives them a cer-
tain status of religious and political pre-eminence. The office of the village priest (bwita) and 
his assistants (ordhano) is always represented by Juang men who belong to the barcha bok 
clan, the local descent group. As an exception this position may also go to the widow of a de-
ceased priest, as was actually the case during the time of field research. These village priests 
perform all the rituals necessary, not only to promote the general well-being of the villagers, 
but also for a favourable course of the agricultural cycle. This does not exclude the perform-
ance of additional and other pujas by members of the Gouda, Santal and Munda, but is seen 
as a prerequisite for the general well-being of all villagers. 
The men’s house, the majang, although a traditional institution of the Juang, is in fact open 
to all male villagers to a certain degree, and it is up to the members of the various social 
groups to join a meeting. It gives the opportunity for the male villagers to discuss village mat-
ters and, in a pre-structured way, to influence decisions to be taken on a village level, al-
though. During our stay in the field it was observed, that besides the Juang men, it was pre-
dominantly the Gouda men who actively participated in meetings and discussions in the 
majang. This may have been due to not only their relatively long established presence among 
the Juang, but also their spatial proximity. The Santal and Munda who reside in separate ham-
lets are more recent newcomers in comparison to the Gouda. 
The Juang men also hold the political offices in the context of the Panchayat system. The 
village belongs to the Kodipasa Grama Panchayat. This administrative and political unit 
comprises ten villages, with a total population of 3,329 according to the 1991 census. These 
ten villages are mainly inhabited by the Juang, but include a considerable number of other tri-
bals and non-tribals. The Panchayat ward members (village delegates) of Kodipasa village 
are all Juang. The former political head (Sarpanch) of the Kodipasa Grama Panchayat was 
also a Juang from Kodipasa village. Several years ago he was replaced by a Juang Sarpanch 
from another village.  
However, such religious and political priorities favouring the Juang do not automatically 
provide a basis for exercising power over members of other social groups. Although symboli-
cally recognised as “king” (raja) of the land by the newcomers, the area of Kodipasa is no 
longer under the exclusive control of its original inhabitants: land is either privately owned, or 
belongs to the state. Political institutions such as the Panchayat are rather weak. Religious 
and political offices held by the Juang are not even a strong basis for exercising authority, let 
alone power, over members of the Juang community itself, as will be shown in chapter 5.5. 
Within the broader context of state-level administration, the Juang, Munda and Santal are 
treated as Scheduled Tribes (ST), whereas the Gouda come under the category of General 
Caste people. The concept of “tribe” or “adivasi” (first inhabitants) has been adopted by the 
Juang, Munda and Santal, who in certain situations refer to themselves as adivasi, when mak-
ing comparisons between themselves and non-tribals. 
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Kodipasa in the plain 
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Juang women carrying bundles of paddy through the village street of Kodipasa 
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Mahakud Gouda, grazing Kodipasa villagers’ cattle 
 
 
 
 
 
Mukta Behera (Gouda) of Kodipasa, with her sons Utkal and Rangit and their milk cow 
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2.2 Upper Kansa (Bindridi Kansa) 
2.2.1 Population 
Upper Kansa nestles against a hillock at the edge of a small plain on top of the hill range. 
During the rainy season, when maize and rice are growing in the fields adjacent to the village, 
it is hardly visible. The tiny houses, covered by jungle grass are grouped around the majang, 
which is situated in the centre of the settlement of twenty Juang households. According to the 
1998/99 census, the population of Upper Kansa was 105.  
The village of Upper Kansa is inhabited exclusively by Juang families. With the exception 
of one, all of the households belong to the same clan, i.e. the kansa bok; the founder clan of 
the village. The fact that female members of the kansa bok carry the same name as female 
members of the barcha bok from Kodipasa – i.e. sarrai – indicates the common origin of the 
clan of the two villages, and also explains why marriages between these two clans are forbid-
den. The only household that belongs to a different clan (gungi) originates from the fact that a 
Juang woman, who had married into another Juang village, returned to Upper Kansa after the 
death of her husband and brought her son with her. He stayed in the village. 
The biggest kinship group consists of four households linked by affinal and/or cansanguin-
eal ties. One kinship group is composed of three households and four kinship groups consist 
of two related households each. Six households with relatives in Upper Kansa have some ad-
ditional kinship ties to households in Lower Kansa. 
Five households do not have any affinal and/or consanguineal kinship ties in Upper Kansa. 
Out of these five households, only one has relatives in a household in Lower Kansa. 
As an outsider, this village gave me the impression of greater homogeneity than the village 
on the plain. The houses are all built in the traditional manner: small huts constructed with 
poles and sticks and plastered with mud, the thatches covered in jungle grass, with a slightly 
elevated veranda along the front wall. There are no houses provided by the government, no 
tiled roofs and no obvious differences between the buildings with regard to size and architec-
tural style. 
 
Table 5: Population of Upper Kansa (census data 1998/99) 
 Number of 
households 
Total 
population  
Average house-
hold size 
Male 
adults 
Female 
adults 
 
Boys 
 
Girls 
Juang 20 105 5.25 26 36 22 21 
 
2.2.2 Economy 
In contrast to Kodipasa, the Juang of Upper Kansa still practise shifting cultivation. This 
technique requires the cooperation of households for the clearing of new swiddens. Weeding 
is partly done in a rotation system by the women, who work in a group on the fields in turn. 
Rice produced in Upper Kansa is not sufficient to feed the population, and thus wood selling 
and wage labour add to the income of the households. However, there is no scarcity of land so 
it would be possible for the villagers to cultivate more land than they actually do. Therefore, 
the reason for their high dependence on wood selling must be linked to other factors. 
Unlike in Kodipasa, here the cattle of the Juang are grazed in a system of rotation, by the 
men and boys of the village. Goats and fowls are kept for the purpose of rituals, or may be 
sold at times of financial need. During my stay the villagers decided to dispense with their 
pigs, as they caused too much damage in the fields behind the houses as well as in the nearby 
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swidden plots. To avoid conflict among the villagers, the decision was taken to ban pigs com-
pletely from village life. 
2.2.3 Politics 
With regard to its own affairs, Upper Kansa is a politically and ritually autonomous commu-
nity. Under the old remains of a rotten Karat tree is the seat of the village goddess represented 
by a group of erected stones. The majang’s forefront here is fully open and visually it leads to 
the fireplace in the centre of the men’s house. Coming to the village as a foreigner, during my 
first visits I was always welcomed by the male villagers in the majang, where I was offered a 
seat on a mat. Women and small children looked at me from the distance of their houses. 
Even later on, when I became a regular visitor to the village, the women never joined me at 
the majang, which is clearly a male space where women have access only under certain cir-
cumstances. In sharp contrast to the majang in Kodipasa, the men’s house in Upper Kansa 
gave the impression of a lively place, visited by the male villagers several times a day. The 
fire in its centre rarely went out, and was used to light the locally prepared cigarettes, which 
the men smoked during their discussions and talks. 
Historically Upper Kansa is an offshoot of a village community named Kansa, which in the 
past was situated nearby Tangarpada (approx. 8 km by air from Upper Kansa). This whole 
village community then relocated to a new place nearby Sanpokhari, the area where Upper 
Kansa (Bindridi Kansa) is now situated. From there, a number of the villagers separated and 
moved to a new area, which became known as Jirpani Kansa. From Jirpani Kansa, part of the 
villagers left again, and their new settlement became known as Handiduha Kansa, also named 
Chaulduha Kansa. 
At the end of the 1970s, the whole village community of Upper Kansa (Bindridi Kansa) 
was resettled by the government in the plain of Kodipasa, and this new hamlet of Kodipasa 
became known as Koratadihi-Kansa (Lower Kansa). Several of the families, however, later 
returned to the forest, and reconstructed Upper Kansa (Bindridi Kansa). 
Apart from being aware of their relocation from Upper Kansa (Bindridi Kansa) to Lower 
Kansa (Koratadihi Kansa), the villagers did not know, when and why these various move-
ments took place. They happened “in the past”, “in our father’s time”, “long ago”. These were 
typical comments made by the villagers. However, processes of fission and relocation of 
Juang villages are well described by McDougal (1963:76-80). The fact, that Upper Kansa vil-
lage has its own separate rituals and village headmen, indicates an advanced degree of a fis-
sion process. For administrative purposes however, these various Kansa villages, with the ex-
ception of Lower Kansa (Koratadihi Kansa), are considered to be one – thus official data on 
Kansa does not specify the various Kansa villages. 
Upper Kansa belongs to the same Grama Panchayat as Kodipasa (i.e. Kodipasa Grama 
Panchayat), but no one from the village is invested with a Grama Panchayat office (Sarpanch 
or ward member). Upper Kansa belongs to the same Development Block as Kodipasa, to 
Banspal Block. 
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Upper Kansa in the hills 
 
 
 
 
 
Juang woman in Upper Kansa 

  
3 VILLAGE ECONOMY 
“Best work is work on our own land. If we work in our own fields we will have paddy for a longer period. If 
we do wage labour, this will only last one or two days. I prefer wage labour to wood selling. But wage labour 
is not always available”.  
Parvati (Juang widow)  
 
“The best work is our own farm work. But to work on others people’s fields is better than selling wood. 
Sometimes foresters catch us.”  
Sita (Juang woman)  
 
“Wood selling or wage labour is the same. Now we are selling this wood for 50 Rupees [the income for two 
days work, N.O.]. For wage labour we get 20 Rupees plus meal per day.”21  
Basanti (Juang widow)  
 
“Farming our own land is best. You will have some paddy in your house, so you will not have to go to the 
fields of others. Wage labour is better than wood selling. If you sell wood, you never know, how much you 
will get. For wage labour you know the salary, it is fixed. If you sell wood, you have to bargain.”  
Mahakud (Gouda man)  
 
“We only sell wood in times of need, when there is no money in the house. Selling wood is hard labour and 
you do not know how much you get. I prefer wage labour.”  
Sanatan (Munda man)  
 
“The best work is work on our own fields. I prefer wage labour to wood selling. Wood selling is hard work. 
But if no wage labour is available, I sell wood. The income is the same, for timber I may get 70 Rupees for 
two days work, for wage labour 35 Rs. per day.” 
 “I do not like to do farm work for other people. You are told ‘do this’, ‘do that’, ‘be faster’. After you have 
taken food they immediately send you to work again. That’s why I prefer to sell wood.”  
Bharata (Juang man)  
 
“When work on our own land is over, we do not sit in the house and look at our own paddy. We do some 
work and buy rice, so that our own paddy will last for a long time.” 
Bhagirati (Munda man) 
For the purpose of economic analysis, I consider both the tribal and non-tribal villagers of the 
two villages, to be primarily peasants, who have strategies with which to cope with various 
environmental and economic conditions, and who combine the use of various natural re-
sources and other economic opportunities in interlinked and interdependent ways. To concep-
tualise the villagers as peasants, allows us to incorporate both the shifting cultivators of Upper 
Kansa, as well as the cultivators of permanent paddy fields in Kodipasa. It also allows us to 
include the minority of households belonging to the Gouda caste. Peasants belonging to vari-
ous social groups, from two different, although neighbouring landscapes (hilly forest area and 
plain area), and with diverse cultivation techniques (shifting and wet rice cultivation) can thus 
be compared. 
The economic importance of wood selling in the two villages has to be assessed in the con-
text of other economic opportunities, which are basically agriculture and wage labour (farm 
and off-farm wage labour). The main aim of this chapter is to provide a general analysis of 
these three economic activities, in order to gain an understanding of how and why peasants 
                                                           
21 In 1998/99, 40 Rupees were equivalent to 1 US$. The price of 1 kg rice was 10 Rupees. (100 Rupees = 2.7 
CHF) 
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make use of them. One crucial question in this context is: Which is the most economically vi-
able activity?  
Economic efficiency, measured by comparing the input and output of labour, however, is 
only one criterion with which the various economic options can be evaluated. Other factors 
such as land productivity, quality of and access to natural resources (land and forest), aspects 
of slack season and risk in agriculture, as well as seasonal fluctuations in the supply and de-
mand for wage labour, fuel wood and timber must also be considered. Finally, knowing the 
best economic options and having clear preferences with regard to various criteria still does 
not indicate anything about their availability for individual households. 
Besides providing a general analysis of the various economic activities, chapter 3 illus-
trates the general economic situation in the two villages under study, with regards to agricul-
ture, farm and off-farm wage labour, as well as wood selling activities. In chapter 4 the eco-
nomic differences between the households and ethnic groups in both villages are presented. It 
adds further economic and non-economic factors which help to understand and explain the 
mix of local peasants’ strategies.  
3.1 Agriculture and cultivation methods 
The aim of this chapter is to consider various elements of local agriculture, in order to evalu-
ate its economic meaning for the villages and households under study. The agricultural factors 
dealt with in the following sections are: various cultivation techniques, forms of labour divi-
sion and cooperation, harvest rates and productivity of land and labour. In chapter 3.1.5, a 
comparison between the various cultivation techniques, with regard to harvest rates, and pro-
ductivity of land and labour, indicates which type of land and cultivation technique are the 
most productive. The question of why other, and less productive methods of cultivation are 
still important, has to be discussed on top of factors other than optimal productivity of land 
and labour. Two of these are the availability of and access to land. 
General land availability and the degree of local self-sufficiency with regard to rice, the 
staple food crop in the area, will be estimated for the two villages in chapter 3.2. Patterns of 
ownership and land distribution among households in the two villages will also be analysed. 
This analysis will indicate the range of economic differences, with regard to agriculture, be-
tween households. 
All these data will allow us to ask, whether, under the given conditions, it would be possi-
ble for the smallholders in the two villages to grow more paddy in their area, and if so, why 
they choose instead, to sell wood and/or opt for wage labour. It will be shown, that despite the 
fact that local institutions redistribute land among the households, land deficiency remains a 
problem, in Kodipasa, under conditions of current cultivation techniques. In fact several of 
the villagers have to supplement their income from agricultural activities, by other means, 
such as wood selling. In Upper Kansa, it would be possible to cultivate larger areas, but low 
labour productivity and low land productivity together with factors such as natural risks make 
wood selling a reasonable alternative. 
State control over land resources, in the form of land settlement, distribution of land in the 
context of development, and the legal determination of land use, also have to be studied in or-
der to understand the contemporary agricultural situation. It becomes clear that this situation 
is the result of a combination of endogenous and exogenous economical and political factors. 
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Table 6: Local patterns of cultivation and ownership 
 
Type of field 
 
Technique of cultivation 
 
Crops 
Traditional land 
tenure system 
Modern land  
tenure system 
Toila 
 
Shifting cultivation with 2 
years cultivation, mixed 
cropping and crop rota-
tion, fallow periods of  
8-10 years, use of plough 
and hoe, no additional fer-
tilizer to ash 
1st year: oil seeds 
(sesamum), beans and 
other pulses 
2nd year: paddy, 
pulses, millet  
Private property of 
field produce – 
common property 
of land:  
new distribution, 
redistribution 
Government land, 
but traditional land 
tenure still  
operates 
Guda  Short fallow periods of  
2-5 years, no additional 
manure during cultivation, 
use of plough, crop rota-
tion and mixed cropping 
Similar to toila fields 
 
Private property of 
field produce – 
common property 
of land:  
new distribution, 
redistribution 
Private land  
Badi  Permanent cultivation, use 
of dung and other manure, 
use of plough, crop rota-
tion und mixed cropping 
Paddy, pulses, maize, 
millet, mustard 
Private Private land 
Bila  Permanent paddy fields, 
application of dung, slight 
terracing, bounds to retain 
water, use of plough 
Paddy Private Private land 
Garden Permanent application of 
manure, mixed cropping 
Vegetables, spices, 
tubers 
Private Private land 
 
The Juang cultivate different types of fields (toila, guda, bila and badi), using different culti-
vation techniques. Crops, sexual division of labour, forms of labour cooperation, and owner-
ship patterns of land also vary to a certain degree with the type of land cultivated. It is appro-
priate to consider agriculture in the research area under the aspect of the coexistence of 
several cultivation systems, although one or the other system may be predominant. The coex-
istence of cultivation systems is partly to do with environmental facts and partly with the 
transformations taking place in agricultural production due to various other factors. 
If a comparison is made between the agricultural systems of the two villages with data 
from other Juang villages, together with general data on the agricultural production of the 
Juang, there are no significant differences. However, the combination of the cultivation sys-
tems varies in different villages and areas, depending on topography, demographic situation, 
natural environment and irrigation facilities. Mainly referring to my own research area, I will 
include data from other areas, in order to complement or contrast with my own findings. 
The farming techniques used by the other three groups (Munda, Santal, Gouda) are similar, 
except that none of these practises, or has ever practised shifting cultivation. 
3.1.1 Toila land: Shifting cultivation 
“The biotic factors especially human interference, direct or indirect, have considerable modified the pristine 
vegetation and are solely responsible for the present degraded condition of the forests. The Bhuyans and the 
Juangs are a people of very primitive instincts. Their chief instinct is hunting and a craving for unfettered 
freedom. They consider themselves to be the lords of the soil and live in a simple arcadian fashion. Shifting 
cultivation is an immemorial and traditional custom with these aboriginal tribes which had been followed by 
them uninterruptedly. The areas of shifting cultivation may rightly be termed as ‘Jhumers’s Paradise’. The 
jhuming represents truly the aboriginal method of shifting cultivation followed by the Bhuyans and the 
Juangs” (ODG 1986:20).  
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“Agriculture is the main occupation of the Adivasis of the district, but due to extreme poverty they often take 
to podu cultivation which is extremely harmful. To stop this harmful practice the Adivasis are now given 
various agricultural aids and loans. Some minor irrigation projects and digging of tanks and wells have now 
been undertaken in the tribal areas” (ODG 1986:392). 
Toila is the Juang term for shifting cultivation. In Oriya this cultivation technique is known as 
podu or jhum. Despite efforts from the forest department and other state agencies to stop this 
cultivation method, as it is considered to be the main cause of forest degradation in the 
Bhuiya-Juang Pirh, the clearing and burning of forest vegetation for the cultivation of a vari-
ety of crops, is still widely practised by the Juang. While judged as ecologically detrimental to 
the environment, shifting cultivation is also considered, by the local development agents, to 
be both economically inefficient and technologically behind the times.  
Shifting cultivation was practised by both villages in the past, although, as far as the Juang 
of Kodipasa are concerned, it has been in decline since the 1970s. This, along with pressure 
from the forest department to stop this method of cultivation, has led to the expansion of 
paddy cultivation on permanent fields on the plain. However, the Juang of Upper Kansa still 
clear forest patches for cultivation, as do most of the Juang and Bhuiya in the villages and 
hilly areas of the interior, where due to topographic factors, they have little potential for 
growing crops on permanent fields. 
Following the classification of Boserup (1998:15), the Juang of Upper Kansa practice a 
type of bush-fallow cultivation, which is of greater intensity than forest-fallow cultivation. 
The main difference between these two types of shifting cultivation is the length of the fallow 
period, which is much shorter in bush-fallow than in forest-fallow cultivation. According to 
Boserup, forest-fallow cultivation requires a fallow period of at least twenty to twenty-five 
years, whereas with bush-fallow cultivation, this period is much shorter, “usually somewhere 
between six and ten years” (ibid.) This is the case in Upper Kansa. Within this period, only 
bushy vegetation and small trees recover the swidden. This is described by Boserup as a vege-
tational stage which does not justify the term “true forest”. 
Taking into consideration data taken from various periods and Juang locations, there ap-
pears to have been a tendency by the Juang, to decrease the fallow periods. This has been 
documented by various authors. This tendency is partially attributed to population growth and 
restrictions by the forest department. McDougal (1963:29) estimates the average rotation cy-
cle in the Juang area to be about ten years. However, 
“ (...) in some cases it is as low as seven years, but where there is a large amount of arable land in relation to 
village population, the cycle may extend to 15 or 20 years” (ibid.). 
According to McDougal, the length of the rotation cycle depends primarily on the ratio of ar-
able land in the village territory to its population: 
“The greater the population in relation to available land, the shorter the rotation cycle which is observed. 
Moreover, the rotation cycle is not precise; the various sections of land are not invariably re-used by the vil-
lage in exactly the same order each time the cycle is repeated, although there is a strong tendency to do so” 
(ibid.). 
Bose (1967:96) too mentions a tendency of decreasing fallow periods for swidden plots in 
Juang area:  
“It is very difficult to tell correctly the cycle of regeneration of forest as the local tribals have no idea of 
counting years. However, the number of people who can give a comprehensive idea of the regneration cycle 
is greater here than in the Abujhmar. Again, in the Juang area this regeneration cycle varies to some extent 
from village to village. Previously, where there was not much pressure of population, the cycle was said to be 
22 years but gradually with the increase of population and increased pressure on land, the cycle has now been 
reduced to 12 years.” 
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With regard to the 1970s, Patnaik and Bose (1967:62) mention a fallow period lasting be-
tween nine and twelve years, after two years of cultivation. Approximately ten years later, 
Mohanty (1986:23) refers to a case study with a seven year fallow period in Kadalibadi. Re-
ferring to field research carried out in the 1990s, N. Patnaik mentions a fallow period of be-
tween five and seven years, based on observations in the Gonasika Panchayat region (unpub-
lished research report: 68). 
As has been already mentioned, the fallow period in the area of Upper Kansa is estimated 
to be between six and ten years. The vegetation after this period consists of bushes and small 
trees of up to three metres in height; creating rather open and bushy forest patches. However, 
in the case of Upper Kansa, land scarcity does not seem to be the main reason for these rather 
short fallow periods. As demographic growth in this village has been considerably reduced by 
the resettlement of part of the original village to the plain at the end of the 1970s, population 
growth cannot be responsible for the short fallow periods. The villagers of Upper Kansa ex-
plained that it would be possible for them to lengthen the fallow periods. They did not per-
ceive that they suffered from any scarcity of forestland for shifting cultivation. Instead they 
pointed out that the process of clearing and de-bushing the area after shorter fallow periods 
was in fact easier. Therefore, the reason for short fallow periods in other Juang villages may 
well be due to less work invested in clearing and not necessarily scarcity of land. Thus the 
correlation between available forest area, population size and fallow period does not seem to 
be very clear. In order for this to be clarified, further and more detailed investigation would be 
necessary, taking into account additional factors such as intensity of labour, quality of soil, 
distance to the village, planted crops etc. 
Juang terminology distinguishes swidden plots in various stages of cultivation by referring 
to cultivated crops and the activities involved in preparing swidden plots: 
– 1st year swidden plots: surilok (sulur = Phaseolus mungo; O = biri; black gram, pulse vari-
ety): although the main crop of first year swidden plots is niger, an oilseed variety (Guizo-
tia abyssinica /J = ramtila, O=rasi;), the Juang name these plots with reference to the cul-
tivation of sulur: oilseed is sold or bartered, while sulur is cultivated for their own 
consumption. 
– 2nd year swidden plots: bualok (bua = paddy, lok = place) 
– 3rd year swidden plots: nala (nala = old in Juang terminology) 
 
The Juang term ekan is a general term for swidden plots, regardless of the year of cultivation. 
The term kaman is used to refer to the felling of trees and bushes on hill slopes; in preparation 
for swidden plots.  
Several authors refer to the cultivation of swidden plots, in the third year, in the Juang area. 
According to them, oilseed (niger) is cultivated during the third year. McDougal, for example, 
mentions that if a swidden plot is used for a third year, it is again sown with sesamum (niger), 
occasionally rice or more rarely, exclusively with millet (McDougal 1963:27). However, the 
Juang of Upper Kansa do not cultivate swidden plots in the third year, due to a copious 
growth of weeds. According to them, a swidden plot is getting nala (old) after the harvest of 
all of the crops from the second year cultivation. 
3.1.1.1 Cultivation techniques, sexual division of labour and labour cooperation 
In the research area, swidden plots are cultivated for two years, followed by a fallow period of 
approximately eight to ten years, some times even shorter. The clearing of tree cover is car-
ried out on the lower and upper slopes within a wide range of slope degrees. The average 
slope degree in the area is about twenty degrees; hillslopes rarely exceed 45 degrees (McDou-
gal 1963:22). But even rather steep slopes are not exempt from cultivation. Felling is carried 
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out starting at the lower part of the patch to be cleared, with the working party moving up-
wards towards the top of the hill. Swidden plots may also be made on the flatter areas (to be 
found on the top of some hills), as well as in the valleys and adjoining plains at the foot of 
hills. 
The following description is based on the observation of shifting cultivation in Upper 
Kansa in 1999: 
 
1st year swidden plots – surilok: 
The clearing of a forest patch after fallow starts during the second half of March, and is done 
mainly by small working groups of four to five men, belonging to different households. These 
groups work in rotation on the swidden plots of their members. Smaller bushes are removed 
and the branches from the lower parts of the trees are cut with axes. Smaller size trees are 
felled at the height of about 20cm. Larger trees with a girth of about 30cm or more are left un-
touched. They will be killed by heaping dried twigs and branches at their foot which will then 
be set alight. These dead trees serve as poles for creepers planted during the first year of culti-
vation, and they are removed from the swidden plots, before the second year of cultivation. 
Only large trees survive the practice of burning and continue to grow during the first and sec-
ond year of cultivation. 
However, the forest patches cleared in Upper Kansa contain hardly any trees with a greater 
girth size than 50cm. Thus, large trees, on second year swidden plots are rare. Newly cleared 
forest patches are open mixed forests with bushy undergrowth, which within a period of six to 
ten years have partially recovered from previous shifting cultivation. They are, however, con-
tinuously exposed to interference from the grazing of cattle and goats and the collection of 
firewood. Such mixed forest patches still contain more than 25 species of tree. The following 
trees have been specified by name, during clearing operations by the Juang of Upper Kansa:22 
Katanguru (J) (Gardenia latifolia), Ale (J) (Mangifera indica), Bija (J) (Pterocarpus marsu-
pim), Antanak (J) (Terminalia alata), Teren (J) (Diospyros Melanoxylon), Bagrut (J) 
(Schleichera Oleosa), Utui (J) (Artocarpus lacucha), Sisu (O & J) (Dalbergia Sp.), Koimo 
(O) = Colombo (J) = Adina cordifolia or Mitragyna Parviflora), Chaoli (J) (Elaeodendron 
glaucium), Singabajani (J) (Canthium Dydymum), Karat (J) (Plumeria rubra), Jambu (J) 
(Syzygium cumini), Sargiya (J) (Shorea robusta), Kuklap (J) (Aegle marmelos), Silim (J) (In-
digofera cassioides), Kiring (J) (Hollarhena antidsenterica), Sidom (J) (Lagerstroemia parvi-
flora), Utikulikak (J) (Nyctanthes arbor tristis), Bara (J) (Ficus bengalensis), Sundru (?), Mu-
rucha (O) = Kundulu (J) (?), Haldiani (=O) = Jelai (J) (?), Gangaseuli (O) (?), Dhatingi (O) = 
Sinang (J) (?), Kuchai (O) = Rabu (J) (?). Sal (Shorea robusta) is not the dominant species in 
forest patches selected for shifting cultivation in Upper Kansa. 
Clearing is hard work, under the scorching sun during the months of March and April. A 
working day on a swidden plot lasts between four and five hours, plus resting periods total-
ling approximately one hour. Dependent upon the size of a new plot, a working group takes 
several days to clear it. To clear a one-hectare plot takes about twenty days for one man or 
four days for a working group of five. McDougal (1963:31) estimates that to clear one hectare 
takes eighteen man-days of labour, based on a six hours working day. Additional days may be 
spent by the male members of the household, clearing any of the remaining swidden area, 
which has not been cleared by the working group. After clearing, the site is left to dry for be-
tween two weeks and one month. It is then set on fire, in order to burn all the dried organic 
matter, before the heavy monsoon rains start usually towards the middle of June. Burning is 
                                                           
22 J = Juang term, O = Orya term, ?: botanical term not found 
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done individually, by male members of a household, and does not involve much labour. A site 
is burnt twice as the first fire does not usually convert all the organic matter to ash. No other 
fertilizer is added to the swidden plots. 
Bush-fallow cultivation is less labour-intensive by comparison to forest-fallow cultivation; 
only small trees and bushes have to be cut before burning. When asked, why they do not clear 
the denser forest patches which exist in their proximity, the Juang men of Upper Kansa ar-
gued that this would constitute a greater expenditure of labour. However, they also men-
tioned, that the forest guards would not tolerate the clearing of denser forest. A further reason 
is their preference of having the fields nearby the village, for easier control; especially as ele-
phants have become a serious problem in recent years. Other villagers may be more easily 
mobilised to help when elephants threaten to destroy the paddy yields and endanger the lives 
of the people. However, the bushy forest allows the growth of wild grass; their roots are not 
destroyed by fire, and considerable work for hoeing and weeding is involved in the prepara-
tion of the new swiddens for cultivation. 
“When shortening of fallow leads to the clearing of bush instead of secondary forest and hoeing and weeding 
become necessary, the latter operations add more to labour requirements per hectare than is saved by the fact 
that bush rather than secondary forest has to be cleared away. In addition, yields per hectare are likely to de-
cline considerably. Hence, there is a strong presumption that that the transition from the system of forest fal-
low to that of bush fallow will be accompanied by a decline in output per man-hour” (Boserup 1998:30). 
The fact that the Juang use the plough wherever possible, and thus reduce labour for weeding, 
may explain their preference for shorter fallow periods. Declining fertility, in relation to a 
shorter fallow period, seems to be acknowledged by the Juang.Land which gives a good yield 
is called pakalo jumi (mature soil), and its features are described as follows: the fallow period 
of such land has been more than twelve years, the area was covered by dense forest, hence no 
grass grew under the trees and during the rainy season, after the rainfall, a special “smoke” 
comes out from the soil (which means that the soil is heavily saturated with water, which it 
retains well). The fact that the Juang know about the advantages and disadvantages of shorter 
and longer fallow periods, indicates that they take into account various factors before deciding 
upon the actual length of fallow periods. 
After the rain starts, there is a rapid growth of weeds and sprouts in the new swidden plots, 
which makes weeding necessary, while broadcasting the niger seed (Guizotia abyssinica; 
J=ramtila); the main product cultivated on first year swidden plots in the months of July-
August. This takes place approximately two to three months after burning, and after about 
two months of rainfall. Suturi seed (Vigna umbellata, a pulse variety) is dibbled at the foot of 
the dried trees, which have been left uncut. Sulur (Phaseolus mungo; O=biri; black gram, a 
pulse variety) is also cultivated on first year toila land. 
Where possible, during the month of July, the men use the plough after the rain has sof-
tened the soil, to facilitate cleaning before sowing. If the terrain and slope make ploughing 
difficult, de-bushing and weeding, while sowing, is done by means of an axe and gonat 
(goronda=O), a small hand hoe. By removing the weeds, the soil is softened and used to 
cover the seed. Weeding by hand takes almost three times longer than with the plough. 
Cultivation of oilseed (niger) is mainly men’s work, while women are busy with weeding 
the second year swidden plots. However, women may also help on first year fields. After ni-
ger is sown, no more work is done until the harvesting of all the crops, which is done by both 
men and women, during the month of December. 
Considering the expenditure of work in Upper Kansa, neither time for clearing nor avail-
able area were limiting factors for the size of the new swidden area. The men from the village 
could have cleared more forest than they did. They were not limited by any other agricultural 
activities, during the time of clearing, and they would have had enough time to clear and burn 
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a larger area before the rain started. The clearing of bush and forest is only possible after the 
performance of a ritual called pus puni, which takes place during the month of January, and 
which initiates the annual subsistence cycle. The men of Upper Kansa started clearing to-
wards the middle of March, and four weeks later, the main work had been done by three 
working teams. The Juang men in Panasanasa, an interior village, started clearing towards the 
end of February, had longer working days (six to seven hours) and continued clearing well 
into the month of April. A Juang village such as Upper Kansa, with relatively easy access to 
the market of fuelwood and timber, can afford to put less emphasis on shifting cultivation. 
 
2nd year swidden plots: bualok (bua = paddy, lok = place): 
Work on 2nd year swidden plots starts in the month of April, with the removal, mainly by the 
women, of weeds, roots and small bushes, which have grown on the first year fields together 
with oilseed (niger); these continue to grow after the oilseed harvest. While removing the 
vegetation, the soil is softened and loosened. The organic waste is burnt in the fields. No other 
fertiliser is added. After the first light rains, during May and June, the weeds grow rapidly 
again. Thus, during sowing which starts in June, the weeds have to be removed again. Where 
the terrain permits, a plough is used, to uproot weeds and soften the soil. This is an exclu-
sively male activity. The use of the plough is dependent more upon the degree to which the 
plot slopes, and less upon the condition of the ground: the men even master the art of plough-
ing fields full of stones; it is only where the slope does not allow ploughing, that the work is 
done by hand-hoe (goronda). Broadcasting of paddy seed (Oryza sativa) mixed with the pulse 
varieties senai (Cajanus cajan / O = harada) and sulur (Phaseolus mungo / O = birhi), goes 
hand in hand with weeding; while removing the weeds, seeds are covered with soil. Two 
types of millet, Akayang (Pennisetum italicum; O = kangu) and kudu (Eleusine coracana / O 
= mandia) together with kalar (Vigna unguicalata / O =ruma) are sown at the edge of the 
field.  
A second weeding has to be carried out during July and August; some weeks after sowing. 
Weeds are removed before they grow larger than the paddy plants. They are uprooted by 
hand, and as rainfall continually softens the soil, they come out easily. Weeding is a laborious 
process, and is carried out by groups of women in rotation. However, part of the weeding is 
carried out by individual male and female members of a household. The harvesting of paddy 
begins towards the end of September. Kudu (millet) is harvested in early October, followed 
by kalar (beans) later in the month. In November sulur (pulse variety) is harvested and in De-
cember senai (pulse variety). 
Again, a comparison with the agricultural cycle of the more interior village of Panasanasa, 
shows that the clearing of second year swidden plots could be started earlier. In this village 
the women begin their work on second year plots in the month of February and provided that 
there is sufficient rainfall during May, they then start to sow. However, early sowing carries 
the risk of the seeds drying up in the soil due to the lack of moisture. There is some flexibility 
over when second year plots may be cleared, as work may be distributed over several months. 
However, bottle necks with regard to labour may be a problem for the second weeding as it 
must be carried out in due course (within a limited period); thus there has to be a balance be-
tween the area cleared and availability of labour to weed this area later. 
The swidden plots are then abandoned for several years. According to the Juang, it is the 
excessive growth of weeds which prevents them from cultivating for a third year. Therefore, 
each household cultivates two swidden fields annually; one first and one second year plot. 
With the exception of clearing and burning new forest patches and ploughing the first and 
second year swidden plots, all other work is performed by both men and women, albeit not to 
the same extent. The women carry out more and longer working days on the swidden plots; in 
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the activities of clearing second year toila fields and weeding them during the growth of 
crops. Co-operation between households mainly takes place among the men for the clearing 
of new forest patches, and among the women for the weeding of the second year swidden 
plots. Very little wage-labour is involved. The women and men of Upper Kansa reduce their 
labour input for shifting cultivation and compensate for the lower yields of smaller cultivated 
areas by the sale of wood and by undertaking wage labour. It will be shown that women bear 
the greater responsibility for obtaining rice from the market than from their own fields. 
The use of the plough in shifting cultivation among the Juang seems to have expanded 
within the twentieth century. Based on his observations, on a tour of Keonjhar in 1942, Elvin 
Verrier (1948:59) mentions that only a few of the Juang have ploughs and cattle and that the 
main agricultural implement is the goronda hoe. Twenty years later McDougal writes: 
“At present most families use the plow, some which do not own bullocks, and can only borrow them tempo-
rarily from other families for plowing, must hoe part of the field, while a few families hoe the entire field. 
The plow (siluk) is constructed of wood: it has a shovel-shaped point into which a metal plowshare is usu-
ally, but not invariably, fixed” (McDougal 1963:33). 
He considers the use of the plough as reducing labour in cultivation, but increasing negative 
effects on land resources, however, without giving further details (ibid. 56). Elwin Verrier 
drew the same conclusion in the 1940s: 
“The Juang method of axe cultivation resembles that of the Bhuya and is very harmful to the jungle. Clear-
ings are made, the trees are felled and fired, and then the ground is dug up either with the hoe or with the 
plough. This represents a much more serious attempt at cultivation than that practiced by the Baiga, for ex-
ample, or by the Maria of the Abujhmar Hills who simply sow the seed in the ashes or at the most dibble a 
little for their pulses. The introduction of the plough onto the hill slopes greatly increases the danger of ero-
sion, delays recovery and is the real cause of the prodigious devastation of the Bhuya Pirh of Keonjhar, 
where the people have begun to keep plough cattle on a large scale. The danger is less among the Juang, for 
comparatively few have ploughs, but in the neighbourhood of a large and prosperous village like Balipal 
great damage has been done. (...) The Juang have no taboo on the use of the plough, nor do they share the 
Baiga belief that if they tear the breast of the earth they will be eaten by tigers. But they certainly regard axe-
cultivation as having divine authority and as established from the foundation of the world” (1948:59-60). 
In 1998/99, out of the twenty households in Upper Kansa, eighteen families had both a plough 
and cattle. One old widow had no cattle and no plough. One family had only one cow and de-
pended on the borrowing of a bullock from a brother of the household head. The topography 
of the terrain in Upper Kansa allows the use of the plough in parts of the swidden plots as has 
been shown above. The plough is also used in other types of fields. The total number of cattle 
in Upper Kansa during data collection in 1998-1999 was 71; of these 31 were bullocks, 40 
were cows. The number and composition (cows and bullocks) of cattle are unevenly distrib-
uted among the households; some use only cows for ploughing, whereas others harness one 
cow and one bullock together. There are various advantages to a household in having numer-
ous cattle: the more cattle they own, the more dung is produced, the cows may produce off-
spring, and for ploughing purposes bullocks are better than cows. There is always the possi-
bility of losing cattle due to sickness and death and it is therefore advisable, in such a case, to 
have some surplus animals. There are no extra costs incurred by individual families, in having 
more cows or bullocks, as the cattle of the whole village are taken care of, in rotation, by the 
Juang men and boys. 
Cattle graze either nearby, or at some distance, on village territory or even on neighbouring 
village territories. To estimate the effects of such grazing on the natural environment is diffi-
cult. Grazing cattle on guda fields, which are used as pastures during fallow periods, adds 
manure to the soil. Dung is carefully collected from the cowsheds and applied to nearby 
fields, thus supporting farming activities. Conversely, cattle and goats, which are partly fed in 
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and from forest vegetation, may result in lowering the regeneration rate of the vegetation; this 
is even perceived to be so by the villagers. They explain the slow regeneration of swidden 
plots as being down to human and animal interference, in that firewood is collected and the 
animals search for fodder in this area. In addition to their own cattle, herds of both cattle and 
goats belonging to outsiders from the plain are driven into the forest area of Upper Kansa in 
order to keep them away from the paddy fields. 
In comparison to cattle belonging to the richer peasants in Orissa, those of the Juang are 
generally in a rather poor condition; many animals are small, meagre and often sick. 
3.1.1.2 Productivity of land 
McDougal gives a harvest rate of 1:5.5 for short-term (fast-growing) rice and a harvest rate of 
1:7 for long-term rice on swidden plots. Thus: 
“Yields from swidden cultivation are very low, with considerable variability in the yield per unit of seed 
from year to year, and between different fields in the same year. Productivity is directly affected by climatic 
fluctuations and variations in local conditions within the same small area. Moreover, due to their location in 
the forest and their relatively large area, swidden fields are difficult to protect from the depredations of wild 
animals” (McDougal 1963:49). 
He does not give any figures for paddy yields on swidden plots. Bose (1967:118) calculates 
between eight and twelve khandi 23 paddy per acre (160-240 kg paddy) and assumes an aver-
age of ten khandi paddy, i.e. 200 kg paddy per acre for second year swidden plots. This is a 
yield of 494 kg paddy per hectare and corresponds to approx. 346 kg rice per hectare. 
Divided by six, if assuming a harvest rate of 1:6, about 82 kg seed per hectare is needed. 
This is approximately 20% less seed than the amount required for permanent rice fields (bila 
land). 
3.1.1.3 Productivity of labour for paddy cultivation 
The cultivation of approximately one hectare of toila land with paddy in the second year re-
quires the following labour input in man-days, if the use of the plough is not possible:  
 
Table 7: Labour input for paddy in 2nd year shifting cultivation land 
Activities Man-days per ha 
Clearing of bushy area (kajalok) 40 
1st weeding and sowing by hoe (goronda) 80 
2nd weeding 80 
Harvesting, threshing and transport 70 
Total  270 (189*) 
* As these numbers are based on calculations of man-days of labour under conditions of family labour, they have 
to be reduced in order to be comparable to labour input under conditions of farm wage labour for wet rice culti-
vation (bila) (see 3.1.4.3) I estimate that a man-day of family labour is about 30% shorter than a man-day of 
farm wage labour. Thus the 270 man-days will equate to 189 man-days of farm wage labour. This estimation is 
based on observations of working days and rhythm in the two villages. In the following tables of labour input the 
days of family labour are converted into days of farm wage labour (number in brackets). 
 
If an average yield of 494 kg paddy per hectare is assumed, this results in an output of 2.61 kg 
paddy or 1.83 kg rice per man-day, i.e. two times less than the output of bila paddy produc-
                                                           
23 khandi is a local measure of capacity of crops: 1 khandi paddy = 20 kg paddy = 14 kg rice 
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tion under less favourable conditions (see below). However, additional crops are cultivated on 
2nd year toila land. They add to the agricultural output per man-day. 
The productivity of labour per hectare is higher if the plough is used. It reduces the labour 
input for 1st weeding plus sowing by approximately four times: 
 
Table 8: Labour input for paddy in 2nd year shifting cultivation land with plough 
Activities Man-days per ha 
Clearing of bushy area (kajalok) 40 
1st weeding and sowing by plough 20 
2nd weeding 80 
Harvesting, threshing, transport and storage 70 
Total  210 (147*) 
* As these numbers are based on calculations of man-days of labour under conditions of family labour, they have 
to be converted in days of wage labour in order to be comparable to labour input under conditions of farm wage 
labour for wet rice cultivation. 
 
If an average yield of 494 kg paddy per hectare is assumed, this results in an output of 3.36 kg 
paddy, i.e. 2.35 kg rice per man-day. This is still 1.5 times less than in wet rice cultivation 
(bila) under less favourable conditions (see below). However, in many cases the plough may 
only be used on part of the cultivated toila land. If it is assumed that the plough is only used 
on half of the area, this results in the following labour input in man-days per hectare: 
 
Table 9: Labour input for paddy in 2nd year shifting cultivation land with plough on half of the area 
Activities Man-days per ha 
Clearing of bushy area (kajalok) 40 
1st weeding and sowing of 0.5 ha by plough  10 
1st weeding and sowing of 0.5 ha by hoe 40 
2nd weeding 80 
Harvesting, threshing, transport and storage 70 
Total  240 (168) 
* As these numbers are based on calculations of man-days of labour under conditions of family labour, they have 
to be converted in days of wage labour in order to be comparable to labour input under conditions of farm wage 
labour for wet rice cultivation. 
 
Output per man-day now is approximately 2.94 kg paddy (2.05 kg rice). This is 1.7 times less 
than in wet rice cultivation (bila). 
When discussing labour involved in paddy cultivation on swidden fields (toila) and on 
permanent fields (bila), it is generally agreed that the preparation of land for cultivation, as 
well as weeding and harvesting, is much more laborious in toila cultivation than in any other 
type of cultivation, as there is more of an abundance of weeds. The harvesting of paddy in a 
toila field is done by cutting the stalks individually, whereas in bila fields paddy stalks may 
be cut in bundles. Transport in the hilly area is more strenuous than on the plain. Thus, part of 
the paddy yield is threshed on the spot on small stony areas.  
3.1.1.4 Productivity of labour for niger cultivation 
According to local informants approximately 8 pai niger seed is required to cultivate ap-
proximately one hectare of toila land. The weight of 1 pai niger is 1 kg. Assuming a low har-
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vest rate of 1:10, the yield is approximately 80 pai niger, i.e. 80 kg niger. The local exchange 
rate of niger to rice is 1:2, resulting in 160 kg rice as per the local exchange rate.24  
Without the use of the plough, labour input per hectare is estimated as follows: 
 
Table 10: Labour input for niger on 1st year shifting cultivation land 
Activities Man-days per ha 
Clearing 20 
Burning 7 
Cleaning, weeding and sowing by hand 42  
Harvesting 16 
Total  85 (60*) 
* As these numbers are based on calculations of man-days of labour under conditions of family labour, they have 
to be converted in days of wage labour in order to be comparable to labour input under conditions of farm wage 
labour for wet rice cultivation. 
 
This is an output of 1.33 kg niger per man-day or 2.67 kg rice per man-day respectively. If as-
suming a higher harvest rate of 1:15, output per man-day is 2 kg niger or 4 kg rice. If assum-
ing a harvest rate of 1:20, output per man-day is 2.67 kg niger or 5.33 kg rice respectively. 
Therefore, even in cases of low harvest rates, the productivity of labour on toila land is 
higher for niger than for paddy cultivation. Under favourable conditions it is close to, or even 
exceeds labour productivity of bila cultivation as will be shown below.25 With the use of the 
plough, labour productivity increases: 
 
Table 11: Labour input for niger on 1st year shifting cultivation land with plough 
Activities Man-days per ha 
Clearing 20 
Burning 7 
Cleaning, weeding and sowing by plough 15  
(2nd weeding) Not done in  
Upper Kansa 
Harvesting 16 
Total  58 (41*) 
* As these numbers are based on calculations of man-days of labour under conditions of family labour, they have 
to be converted in days of wage labour in order to be comparable to labour input under conditions of farm wage 
labour for wet rice cultivation. 
 
                                                           
24 1kg niger can be exchanged for 2 kg rice. However, this exchange rate may change as per the bargaining 
power of the two parties involved in bartering 
25 S. Bose reports 2 maunds niger yield per acre (1 maund = 2 khandi). This will give a yield of 5 maunds per 
hectare, which is equal to 10 khandi or 200 pai niger, i.e. 200 kg niger. If exchanged with paddy (not rice) for an 
exchange rate of 2.5 as in his time (the exchange rate of niger to rice is indicated by him as 1:1.75), 500 pai 
paddy could be bartered from 1 hectare niger cultivation. This corresponds to 500 kg paddy or 350 kg rice. Out-
put per man-day calculated in rice is then 7 kg per day and exceeds the calculations based on data from Upper 
Kansa even under very good conditions. A yield of 200 pai niger per hectare is higher than possible yields under 
very good conditions reported by the Juang of Upper Kansa. Unfortunately Bose does not give any data on la-
bour input for niger cultivation. Fallow periods, however, in his Juang village seemed to be longer, with 12 
years, than in Upper Kansa. Therefore greater yields per hectare could be as a result of better soil fertility after 
longer fallow periods. 
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Output per man-day of labour with various harvest rates now varies between 3.9 kg rice 
(5.57 kg paddy), 5.85 kg rice (8.35 kg paddy) and 7.8 kg rice (11.14 kg paddy). 
With the use of the plough in half of the area, labour input is as follows: 
 
Table 12: Labour input for niger on 1st year shifting cultivation land with plough on half of the area 
Activities Man-days per ha 
Clearing 20 
Burning 7 
Cleaning, weeding and sowing 0.5 ha by plough 7.5 
Cleaning, weeding and sowing 0.5 ha by hand 21 
(2nd weeding) Not done in  
Upper Kansa 
Harvesting 16 
Total 71.5 (50*) 
* As these numbers are based on calculations of man-days of labour under conditions of family labour, they have 
to be converted in days of wage labour in order to be comparable to labour input under conditions of farm wage 
labour for wet rice cultivation. 
 
Under these conditions output per man-day of labour varies between 3.2 kg rice (4.57 kg 
paddy), 4.8 kg rice (6.85 kg paddy) and 6.4 kg (9.14 kg paddy) rice. 
3.1.1.5 Ownership 
In literature about the Juang ownership of toila land, it is generally described as alternating 
between private ownership of cultivated land by individual households, to common property 
of land by the village community (McDougal 1963:287; Rout 1969:30f). As long as swidden 
plots are cultivated for a period of two or more years, they are regarded as the property of the 
households who work them. In reality, it is the produce of the field, as opposed to the land 
that is privately owned, which is expressed as follows by Bose (1967:6): 
“In fact, in areas of shifting cultivation, land is not owned permanently by any individual, but is treated as 
communal property. When a plot of land is, however, alloted to him for a season, he enjoys the full fruits of 
his labour.” 
New plots are redistributed among the households, according to their needs and requirements, 
after villagers decide to resume shifting cultivation on the same forest patch years later. The 
annual redistribution of new swidden plots is flexible accomodating the current composition 
and situation of the family, with regard to age, sex and number of household members. Selec-
tion of forest patches for shifting cultivation, as well as distribution of new swidden plots, are 
embedded in the general pattern of common decision making among the male family heads. 
After cultivation, the abandoned area regains its status as common property of the village. 
The performance of rituals by the village priest, together with a unanimous decision by all of 
the family heads, about the new site for 1st year cultivation, reinforces this representation of 
swidden land as being common property of the village. 
However, when the villagers of Upper Kansa were questioned about their swidden fields, it 
transpired that a family usually cultivates the same field, even after they have abandoned it for 
several years. They perceive the land that they have previously cultivated as belonging to 
their household and this claim is not denied by other villagers. Thus, in practice, there seems 
to be a customary right to swidden fields. It is possible that the length of the fallow period is 
linked to the type of ownership; as fallow periods are rather short in Upper Kansa, claims to 
land are more pronounced than under conditions of long fallow periods. 
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An even stronger concept of ownership, regarding swidden plots, was observed in a neigh-
bouring Juang village; Kundei, which like Kodipasa, is situated at the foot of a range of hills. 
It is a mixed village, mainly inhabited by the Juang, and to a lesser extent, the Munda, Santal, 
Gouda and Mohanto (a caste). Shifting cultivation is exclusively carried out by the Juang, on 
the slopes of the hill, in combination with guda and some bila cultivation. However, the fal-
low period in Kundei is even shorter than in Upper Kansa. After two years cultivation, the 
swidden plots are left for only five to six years, resulting in bushy vegetation only. Here, the 
ritual distribution of the swidden plots has disappeared; each household selects its own area 
for cultivation, and individual households return to the same plot, after a fallow period of be-
tween five to six years. This indicates a growing sense of private land ownership in connec-
tion with the intensification of farming. 
As the size of a new swidden plot in Upper Kansa is not limited by the scarcity of land for 
shifting cultivation, every household may choose an area of viable size for cultivation. The 
villagers of Upper Kansa do not recall any conflict regarding land distribution and they claim 
that there is sufficient land for everyone, for the purpose of shifting cultivation. The partial re-
settlement of the village to the plain, in Kodipasa, may well have reduced the pressure on for-
est resources for shifting cultivation: with an additional fourteen Juang households, now re-
siding in Lower Kansa, land scarcity might well be an issue in Upper Kansa. 
During our visit, in 1999, it was observed that not all of the area, which had been distrib-
uted among the households, at the beginning of a new cycle of shifting cultivation, had been 
cultivated. Some households did not clear the whole patch of forest that they initially claimed 
and received for cultivation. It is worth noting, however, that even after clearing, part of a plot 
may not be sown due to various factors such as scarcity of seed, bad timing, climatic distur-
bances or social factors (sickness, conflicts within the family). This also applies to 2nd year 
swidden plots. 
As already mentioned, women in Upper Kansa started their work on 2nd year swidden 
fields later than the Juang women of the more remote villages such as Panasanasa. Again, nei-
ther land nor time were limiting factors for the area cultivated with paddy in the 2nd year. In-
stead of starting agricultural work earlier, the women of Upper Kansa combined working in 
the fields, with collecting and selling wood, for as long as was possible . 
3.1.2 Guda land 
Guda cultivation refers to cultivation of land bare of forest vegetation, or in the words of Bose 
(1967:145) to a “temporarily captured field for cultivation but need not require felling of 
trees. This land is generally covered by bushes, which are cut down for firing”. Using the 
length of fallow periods as a measure of intensity, this type of cultivation is more intensive 
than shifting cultivation. It may be classified as a type of semi-permanent cultivation, with 
fallow periods of between two and five years. As with shifting cultivation, it is restricted to 
rain-fed land and is therefore highly dependent upon rainfall. 
Typically, such land is to be found in flat areas or areas with a low slope degree, which al-
lows the use of the plough. There is a clear tendency towards permanent cultivation of guda 
land in Kodipasa, due to a growing scarcity of land. In Upper Kansa, fallow periods of up to 
four to five years allow the regeneration of this type of land. During the fallow period, guda 
land is used as pasture for cattle and goats, and in this way some organic manure is added to 
the land. However, during cultivation there is no additional fertiliser applied to guda fields, 
except ash, which results from the burning of cut vegetation before cultivation. It has been 
observed that swidden plots in Upper Kansa sometimes border on guda land, i.e. where swid-
den plots are cultivated they merge into adjoining guda land. Besides guda fields next to the 
swidden plots, a household usually also cultivates guda fields in other areas.  
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3.1.2.1 Cultivation techniques, sexual division of labour and labour cooperation 
The pattern of cultivation resembles toila cultivation: in the first year oilseed (niger) is grown, 
followed by paddy cultivation in the second year. Second year cultivation may be mixed with 
other crops, as observed in second year toila fields.  
De-bushing and ploughing of guda fields for the cultivation of niger goes hand in hand 
with the cultivation of first year toila land, during the month of August. As it involves 
ploughing, it is mainly men’s work. Like in first year toila cultivation, there is no weeding af-
ter the sowing of niger. The harvesting of niger takes place at about the same time as the har-
vesting of niger in first year swidden plots.  
For second year guda cultivation, weeding has to be done before the sowing of paddy. A 
first ploughing is carried out after the first slight rainfall, towards the end of April, to break 
the earth and soften the soil. A second ploughing follows some weeks later. While sowing at 
the beginning of June, a third ploughing together with weeding is done. While the men 
plough, the women remove the weeds uprooted by the plough by hand. However, priority is 
given to the work on second year toila fields, where the preparation of land for paddy cultiva-
tion is more laborious than work on second year guda fields. The third ploughing, including 
sowing of paddy on guda fields, is done at about the same time as the sowing of paddy on 
second year toila fields. Only a few days after sowing guda paddy, a fourth ploughing takes 
place. A second weeding, which is done mainly by the women, is carried out from mid July 
till mid August. This partially overlaps with the weeding to be done on second year toila 
fields. Guda paddy is harvested from the middle of September onwards. 
3.1.2.2 Productivity of land 
Harvest rates of guda land mainly depend upon the length of fallow periods. According to the 
villagers of Upper Kansa, oilseed as well as paddy yields of guda land are usually lower than 
the yields of toila land. Oilseed yields, by comparison, are considerably lower, whereas paddy 
yields may be similar to those of 2nd year toila plots. 
The harvest rate for oilseed on guda land drops to approximately 1:5 and the harvest rate 
for paddy is about 1:5. Thus, niger yields per hectare are only about 40 kg, corresponding to 
80 kg rice. Paddy yields are around 400 kg per hectare (i.e. 280 kg rice). 
However, if labour input is calculated, labour productivity of guda cultivation is rather 
high, which helps to explain why guda land is cultivated, even when land productivity is 
rather low. 
According to Nayak et al. the fertility of guda land lying at the bottom of hills, where shift-
ing cultivation is practised, is greater than that of toila land “due to the deposit of eroded soil 
from the hill slopes” (1993:129). However, this is unconfirmed by the inhabitants of Upper 
Kansa and guda land is not always situated in such a position. 
3.1.2.3 Productivity of labour for paddy and niger cultivation  
Less labour is involved in guda cultivation than in 1st year toila cultivation, as it requires less 
effort to clear the fields after shorter periods of fallow, especially if a plough has been used on 
the entire field. Although Guda fields may be rather stony, it is still possible to use the plough 
on them. 
The cultivation of one hectare of guda land for niger in the 1st year requires approximately 
the following labour input in man-days: 
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Table 13: Labour input for niger on 1st year guda land 
Activities Man-days per ha 
Clearing 7 
Cleaning, weeding and sowing by plough 15  
Harvesting 8 
Total  30 (21*) 
* As these numbers are based on calculations of man-days of labour under conditions of family labour, they have 
to be converted in days of wage labour in order to be comparable to labour input under conditions of farm wage 
labour for wet rice cultivation. 
 
Labour input varies with the length of fallow period; the shorter the fallow period, the less la-
bour input is required, but also yields decrease. However, the output per man-day of labour is 
still high, with niger yields corresponding to 3.81 kg rice (or 5.44 kg paddy). 
The cultivation of one hectare of guda land for paddy cultivation in the 2nd year requires 
approximately the following labour input in man-days: 
 
Table 14: Labour input for paddy on 2nd year guda land 
Activities Man-days per ha 
1st ploughing 10 
2nd ploughing 10 
3rd ploughing incl. sowing and 1st weeding 5 
4th ploughing 5 
2nd weeding 70 
Harvesting and transport 10 
Threshing and storage 10 
Total  120 (84*) 
* As these numbers are based on calculations of man-days of labour under conditions of family labour, they have 
to be converted in days of wage labour in order to be comparable to labour input under conditions of farm wage 
labour for wet rice cultivation. 
 
Assuming a yield of 400 kg paddy (280 kg rice), the output per man-day is 4.76 kg paddy or 
3.33 kg rice per man-day. 
Calculating the average labour productivity of guda cultivation (1st and 2nd year) per man-
day, it equates to 3.57 kg rice (5.1 kg paddy) per man-day of labour, which is still higher than 
the average labour productivity of toila cultivation. 
3.1.2.4 Ownership 
Today, guda land in Upper Kansa, as well as in Kodipasa, is owned by individual households. 
While in Kodipasa, it is mainly registered as private land, in Upper Kansa it is de jure gov-
ernment land. In Upper Kansa, the villagers cultivate various areas of guda land in rotation 
and all the individually cultivated guda fields lie in the same area. As with swidden fields, 
there is continuous shifting between various guda areas, as there is a fallow period of between 
four to five years. Again, in Upper Kansa, there is no indication of a shortage of guda land. 
During my stay it was observed that the villagers left large potential guda areas uncultivated. 
The exodus of several of the villagers down to the plain has certainly reduced any potential 
pressure on this type of land in Upper Kansa. The scarcity of labour and the possibility of ob-
taining income by means other than farming, seem to be the determining and decisive factors 
in explaining the extent to which cultivation of guda land in Upper Kansa is practised. 
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In Kodipasa the situation is quite different. Land scarcity here has resulted in a shortening 
of fallow periods to between two and three years, and a process of definite privatisation took 
place in the last few decades. However, this process has now come to an end, and there is no 
more “free” guda land, each and every plot belongs to a particular household. 
With the official land settlement since the beginning of the 1970s, land rights have been 
fixed and fields have been officially registered. The villagers in Kodipasa recall conflicts 
among the Juang households over guda land: during the land settlement, patches of guda land 
had been claimed by various households and several people were accused of having given or 
even sold guda land to immigrants, without the consent of the previous owners. Typically, in 
such cases, the disputed land had not been cultivated for several years and the last tiller of the 
plot, before it had lain fallow, could not assert his right of ownership on the basis that he had 
cultivated the land. 
It appears that long fallow periods have weakened the incontestable right of a family to 
cultivate the same patch of guda land. This has applied in particular to widows with small 
children, who have been forced to reduce agricultural activities due to the scarcity of labour 
(loss of ploughmen) and in this way lost uncultivated guda land. This was an irrevocable 
process at the time of land settlement and registration. Nowadays a private owner may keep 
guda land fallow for many years, without fear of someone else cultivating it. Moreover, the 
government, during land settlement, seems to have taken advantage of the vague ownership 
structure with regard to guda land in traditional Juang communities. It was mainly guda land, 
which was redistributed by the government among the poorer Juang families of Kodipasa, 
among resettled villagers of Upper Kansa in Lower Kansa and among the households of the 
Munda, Santal and Gouda immigrants. For this purpose guda land had been converted into 
bila land with the help of external wage labour, which was employed for the purpose of level-
ling it and to making the necessary embankments. 
 
3.1.3 Badi land 
3.1.3.1 Cultivation techniques, sexual division of labour and labour cooperation 
The land adjacent to a house is referred to as badi land. As it is nearby, cow and goat dung, 
ash from the hearth and other organic waste from the household are carried and used as fertil-
iser on this land before cultivation. This allows permanent cultivation. Badi land behind the 
house is usually subdivided into two plots: one plot is cultivated with juani (Zea Mays Linn; 
O=maka; maize) in June and some other crops such as baitalu (Cucurbita maxima; 
O=boitalu; yellow gourd, a pumpkin) and other pumpkins. At the border of the plot kudu 
(Eleusine coracana; O=mandia; finger millet) and jinjari (Sorghum vulgare; O=Gangei: sor-
ghum) are sown. After the harvesting of maize in the second half of August, the plot is culti-
vated with soriso (Brassica campestris; mustard) during the second half of September. 
Leaves of the young mustard plants are used as greens. Mustard is harvested from the end of 
December until the middle of January. Harvesting of finger millet (kudu) and sorghum (jin-
jari) takes place during November and December. 
The second plot is cultivated with paddy in June, sometimes mixed with the pulse varieties 
senai (Cajanus cajan; O= harada) and sulur (Phaseolus mungo; O=biri). Paddy harvesting 
starts in the middle of September, sulur in October and November and senai in November and 
December. 
After rainfall, badi land provides a number of wild growing greens consumed as green 
vegetables in addition to rice. 
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Badi land is ploughed twice. During the second ploughing, sowing and weeding is carried 
out on the area of land where paddy is cultivated. In Upper Kansa, women join together to 
weed their badi fields a second time, as this needs to take place at the same time as the weed-
ing of the second year toila fields, starting at the middle of July. Due to the application of 
fertiliser there is an abundant growth of weeds.  
3.1.3.2 Productivity of land 
Harvest rates of badi land for paddy are higher than for guda and toila land, but lower than 
for wet paddy cultivation; around 1:8 in a normal year. 
None of the other crops cultivated on badi land are a substitute for rice as a staple food in 
the villages under study. Maize is only grown by the Juang, and the small roasted corn cobs 
are consumed as snacks. Pulse varieties are boiled in water and consumed as a supplement 
with rice. Millet is prepared as gruel.  
3.1.3.3 Productivity of labour for paddy cultivation  
The cultivation process is the same as for guda cultivation. Less labour is required for plough-
ing; as badi land is permanently cultivated. But weeding requires a lot of work. Thus, the total 
labour required is about the same as for guda paddy cultivation, but as yields are higher, la-
bour productivity is higher, equating to 7.62 kg paddy (5.33 kg rice) per man-day of labour in 
a good year. However, the size of badi land is restricted by the amount of available cow and 
goat dung from a household and usually only a small amount of land is cultivated behind each 
house. 
The cultivation of the other crops does not require much work. No weeding is done after 
ploughing. 
3.1.3.4 Ownership 
Badi land is privately owned. 
 
3.1.4 Bila land: Wet rice cultivation  
This type of land is used exclusively for the cultivation of wet paddy. Bila land allows for 
permanent cultivation, which is common in the lowland and plain areas of Orissa. However, 
the number of crops harvested on bila land varies between one and three per year. This is 
mainly dependent upon irrigation facilities; water being one of the most critical factors in rice 
cultivation. Thus, in contrast to dry or upland paddy cultivation (on swidden plots, guda land 
and badi plots), cultivation of low land involves manipulation of water resources. 
3.1.4.1 Cultivation techniques, sexual division of labour and labour cooperation 
In Kodipasa, bila cultivation is monsoon-fed mono-cultivation of wet rice, which to a high 
degree is still dependent upon annual rainfall. There are no systems for pumping and using 
groundwater for irrigation, no large water storage systems and no efficient canal systems for 
irrigating the rice fields. 
To retain the rainwater, the bila fields are levelled and small bunds (embankments) are 
constructed. The levelling of bila fields in uneven or slightly rising terrain, results in a ter-
raced structure of the landscape. As the area of Kodipasa is rather flat and the plain rises gen-
tly towards the foot of the hill, terracing here is on a low level. However, this is not to say that 
there are no differences with regard to the quality of various bila plots. As water scarcity is 
more often a problem than water abundance, fields lying at a lower level are more preferable 
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than upper fields, as they are provided with a better water supply, due to the natural flow of 
water, even if the fields lying at a higher level are not opened. The regulation of the water 
level in a field is carried out by the opening or closing of its bunds and only the owner of the 
field has the right to do this. Where possible, the water supply may be regulated by deriving 
water from the small rivulets which descend from the nearby hills. However, this method is 
also dependant upon the annual rainfall; in years of scarce rainfall these small rivulets do not 
supply enough water guarantee one harvest. After the monsoon period they run dry. 
Only a few households in Kodipasa sometimes harvest paddy twice a year. It is risky to 
plant rice a second time. Unfavourable weather conditions may result a loss of the crop and a 
waste of seed and labour. In 1996, the Integrated Tribal Development Agency (I.T.D.A.) had 
planned and financed an irrigation canal, which was to have been fed by the Ardei Nadi (a 
perennial river which forms the natural boundary between Kodipasa and the neighbouring vil-
lage of Jamudiha) and would have supplied water to part of the bila fields of Kodipasa vil-
lage. This would have added water to the paddy fields, at times of insufficient rainfall, and 
under good weather conditions would even have allowed for a second paddy crop. The con-
tract was given to a contractor and the canal was constructed by using the villagers as day la-
bourers. Due to poor workmanship by the contractor, two years later the canal was useless; it 
leaked at several points and the supply at the river dam itself was completely destroyed.26 
Low-scale irrigation facilities, managed by the individual households, are therefore mainly 
used to reduce the risk of crop failure and to maximize the use of rainwater. Such facilities do 
not allow for the cultivation of two or even three paddy crops a year as in other areas; in fact 
they cannot even guarantee a successful annual paddy harvest.  
Scarce, excessive or untimely rainfall endangers successful paddy cultivation. What is 
called “drought” in the context of paddy cultivation in Orissa, refers to low precipitation at a 
time, when more rain is needed for paddy cultivation. A drought does not necessarily mean 
that the total amount of precipitation is less than in normal years, but its timely and spatial 
distribution adversely affects paddy cultivation. 
The making of a bila field requires considerable labour input to level the land and set up 
the banks. Usually it is guda land that is transformed to bila land. Once established, annual 
maintenance however, does not require a high input of labour, compared to the initial input of 
labour (see also Bailey 1971:65). It mainly consists of repairing and keeping intact the bunds, 
which may be damaged by heavy rainfall. However, during the initial years, productivity of 
new bila land is lower than on other bila land, as the levelling process changes the soil struc-
ture and exposes subsoil.  
Bila fields are classified according to their location and water retaining capacity; paddy 
fields in low land with good water retaining capacity are called beda, fields in medium land 
belong to the category of dhipa and fields at higher levels belong to the category of duma. 
This classification follows a regional classification of bila fields and all are Oriyan terms. 
Most of the bila fields in Kodipasa are dhipa; few are beda and duma. Most of the fields on 
the upper lands are guda.  
After the first slight rainfall, bila fields are ploughed, for a first time, to break and soften 
the soil. A second ploughing is carried out prior to sowing, and dung from the cows and 
                                                           
26 Small scale irrigation projects are an important part of the development strategies of Government Agencies as 
well as NGO’s in the backward areas of Orissa and they respond to a strongly felt need by the rice farmers. 
However, their technical construction often suffers considerable deficiencies. In the above mentioned case of the 
canal system for the Kodipasa rice farmers, the contractor responsible for the canal construction enlarged his 
personal profit by reducing necessary construction materials to such an extent, that the system never functioned 
at all. 
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goats, which has been stored behind the house, is carried to the fields by the girls and women. 
However, as most households only have a few cattle, the dung is mainly used for badi cultiva-
tion behind the house. 
After heavier rainfalls, from the middle of June onwards, the bila plots are ploughed a third 
time and paddy seed is broadcast. There is no line sowing and seed is sown without maintain-
ing any specific distance between plants. Just after the third ploughing and sowing, women 
remove the weeds and refine (harrow) the soil with a hoe. Towards the end of July, the next 
weeding of the bila fields begins. This goes hand in hand with replanting and putting in order 
the rice seedlings. For this purpose a fourth ploughing is done in the fields, which have to be 
in a submerged condition. This ploughing softens the soil again and loosens the plants. Weeds 
can be easily uprooted, paddy seedlings are put back into the soil with the necessary distance 
to each other and surplus plants are removed. If the technique of transplanting is used, the 
seedlings are transplanted now. 
Therefore, the cultivation requires four lots of ploughing and two weeding, before harvest-
ing takes place. 
Apart from ploughing, all other work is mainly carried out by the women. Weeding of bila 
plots continues until the beginning of September. Harvesting starts in middle of October and 
continues until the end of November. Both men and women are involved in harvesting and 
carrying the bundles of paddy to the house. If the threshing is done by bullocks, it is men’s 
work. If it is done by foot treading, it is women’s work. Winnowing is women’s work; the 
fixing of the paddy in baskets made from ropes of paddy straw is men’s work. 
 
Broadcasting or transplanting: 
If there is too much water in a paddy field during the time of broadcasting, there is a risk that 
the seed may rot due to too excess water. This not only depends upon the quantity of rainfall, 
but also on the situation in the paddy field. A plot situated in a low-lying area may be too wet 
to be broadcast, whereas there is no such risk for a plot at a higher level. If transplanted, seed-
lings are nursed in a separate plot where there is less water and transplanted later.  
Another reason for transplanting instead of broadcasting, may be the lack of enough rain 
for the first ploughing. Preparing the soil for growing paddy can then only be done later, 
when normally second ploughing is carried out. Instead of ploughing three times, the fields 
are ploughed only twice, and under such circumstances it is better to transplant during the 
second ploughing. Finally, if there is some certainty that a bila plot will have sufficient water, 
a farmer may decide to transplant anyway, as less seed is required than for broadcasting. 
However, transplanting requires more labour input than broadcasting. Last, but not least, 
transplanting gives the farmer some scope for dealing with social constraints; if ploughing 
and broadcasting may not be done in the due course of time, a field may still be cultivated at a 
later stage. Paddy seedlings are nursed on a small patch of land with a nearby water supply, or 
on land with appropriate conditions of humidity. 
However, the method of broadcasting clearly dominates, among the farmers of Kodipasa. 
The main reasons are probably the small portion of lowland paddy fields (only they bear the 
risk of being too wet at the time of broadcasting) and the higher labour input required by 
transplanting. 
The varieties of paddy sown in bila fields are long-term varieties, i.e. they require more 
time to grow and to ripen and need more water for a longer period than paddy varieties grown 
on guda or toila fields, where the run-off of water does not allow the cultivation of long-term 
varieties. 
The application of chemical fertiliser is rare in Kodipasa. Only 47 households use it, al-
though on an irregular basis, depending on their annual financial situation. 
VILLAGE ECONOMY 65 
 
3.1.4.2 Productivity of land 
The harvest rate for bila cultivation of local rice varieties in Kodipasa is given by various 
farmers as approximately 1:9; 1:10 in a good year. This information has been given as data on 
the quantity of seed in khandi to the resulting quantity of paddy in khandi.  
According to local farmers, High Yielding Varieties (HYV) with fertiliser, have a harvest 
rate of 1:12 in a good year up to 1:15 in a very good year. McDougal (1963:49) gives a har-
vest rate of 1:13 for irrigated bila land. 
The yield of lowland local paddy varieties is approximately 850 kg paddy, i.e. 595 kg rice 
per hectare in a good year. This is 1.7 times higher than paddy cultivation on swidden fields. 
If using HYV, 1500 kg paddy per hectare, i.e. 1050 kg rice may be harvested in a very 
good year on very good quality land, which is three times higher than the yield on a swidden 
plot. However, as will be analysed below, there is very little land of such quality in the area, 
and due to the scarcity of money, few households can afford HYV, chemical fertiliser, her-
bicides and pesticides in order to get exceptional output under favourable weather condi- 
tions. 
3.1.4.3 Productivity of labour for wet rice cultivation 
Wet rice cultivation is more intensive than shifting cultivation, because bila land is cultivated 
permanently and the yield per hectare is higher. Also labour productivity of this type of culti-
vation is higher than that of shifting cultivation: the cultivation of one hectare of wet rice on 
bila land requires more labour input than the cultivation of one hectare on toila land, but the 
increase of the output per man-day of labour is higher than the increase of labour input. This 
calculation is based on the average yields from swidden fields over a two year cultivation pe-
riod However, when comparing the labour input and yield of paddy cultivation of a 2nd year 
toila field, with wet rice cultivation, this gives a completely different picture: much more la-
bour input is required for the cultivation of one hectare of 2nd year toila land than for one hec-
tare of bila land, while labour productivity is still much smaller than for wet rice cultivation 
(see table 16). 
The following data on labour input for bila cultivation in Kodipasa, are based on the expe-
rience and calculations of a Gouda household, which cultivates all its bila fields exclusively 
with wage labour. The fact, that no family members of this household contribute farm labour 
to the paddy production, makes it easier to calculate the labour input. Other households using 
their own family labour, or combining it with wage labour are not able to give such detailed 
information about the total labour input per area, because they do not count the number of 
days and people used for bila cultivation and only give very rough estimations of labour in-
put. On the contrary, those who pay, count. A man-day of farm wage labour lasts from ap-
proximately 9 a.m. till 5 p.m. (8 hours) including a one hour rest period. Ploughing is done 
from approximately 6 a.m. to 12 p.m. due to the heat later in the day.  
Data has been collected on the number of man-days labour needed for an area cultivated 
with one khandi seeds, i.e. 20 kg and than converted into labour input per hectare. 
The cultivation of one hectare of bila land requires the following labour input in man-days: 
 
Table 15: Labour input for bila paddy 
Activities Man-days per ha 
1st ploughing 10 
2nd ploughing 10 
3rd ploughing incl. sowing, 1st weeding 5 
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4th ploughing incl. replanting and 2nd weeding 15 
2nd weeding continued 50 
Harvesting and transport 20 
Threshing and storage 20 
Work on embankment 5 
Total  135 
 
However, a man-day of farm wage labour cannot be considered equal to a man-day of labour 
of somebody working on his own field: unwaged people do have certain freedom to come and 
go at their will and according to their needs, and work less regularly than wage labourers. 
Thus, calculations based on wage labour do not reflect the actual man-days worked on bila 
land using household labour: man-days in this case are shorter, but more numerous. 
Therefore, output per man-day with an optimum output of 1500 kg paddy (1050 kg rice) is 
approximately 11 kg paddy (7.8 kg rice). Taking into account less favourable conditions and a 
lower yield of only 700 kg paddy (490 kg rice), output per man-day is 5.2 kg paddy (3.6 kg 
rice). 
(Not included here is the initial labour required to make bila fields.) 
3.1.4.4 Ownership 
Bila fields are privately owned. It is the most valuable land in Kodipasa. Private ownership of 
land which had been cultivated on a permanent basis, was already common prior to the offi-
cial land settlement in the research area. 
 
3.1.5 Comparison of cultivation methods 
The dominant cultivation system in Upper Kansa is shifting cultivation, with semi-permanent 
cultivation of guda fields. Bila cultivation is not possible on the hilltops. In Kodipasa, wet 
rice cultivation is dominant in combination with dry cultivation on guda fields, with shorter 
fallow periods than in Upper Kansa. The method of reducing the run-off of water, by bund-
making, reduces the risk of crop failure, to a large extent, in comparison to dry cultivation and 
results in better yields. However, the low degree of irrigation (which mainly consists of regu-
lating the water retention capacity by bund making), which remains dependent upon rainfall, 
is by no means a guarantee against crop failure. 
The use of cattle and plough is prominent in both areas. However, more human labour is 
required for handwork in toila as opposed to wet rice cultivation. Shifting cultivation requires 
the felling of trees and the clearing of bush and the plough can only be used to a certain ex-
tent. However, the ownership of cattle for ploughing is necessary in both places and the lack 
of cattle is a critical factor for agricultural production; a household, with only one bullock, or 
none, faces difficulties in getting the necessary work done in time. The taboo for women to 
touch the plough, renders agricultural production for widows with no or only small sons diffi-
cult or impossible, if they are unable to pay male workers on their fields or get the coopera-
tion of male relatives. Weeding is more time consuming on toila than on bila land, as the 
plough for weeding can only be used in submerged bila fields. Harvesting paddy on toila land 
also requires more labour than it does on bila land. 
The following table shows land and labour productivity per hectare of paddy and niger cul-
tivation under various conditions (niger converted in paddy): 
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Paddy swidden fields in Upper Kansa 
 
 
 
 
A young Juang woman of Upper Kansa, harvesting paddy in a swidden field 
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Shifting cultivation in Upper Kansa 
 
 
 
 
 
A Juang boy ploughing a 2nd year shifting cultivation field in Upper Kansa 
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Kodipasa village with surrounding cultivation 
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Bila paddy fields in Kodipasa 
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Amina Juang of Upper Kansa, winnowing paddy 
 
 
 
 
Niziri Juang of Upper Kansa with bundles of paddy from swidden fields, to be prepared for storage 
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Paddy storage in Upper Kansa: Bino Juang with his daughter Suobali and Godadhara Juang 
 
 
VILLAGE ECONOMY 73 
 
Table 16: Land and labour productivity per ha of paddy and niger  
Type of cultivation  
 
Harvest rate 
Labour input 
per hectare  
in man-days* 
 
Yield per hectare 
in kg paddy  
Labour productivity in 
kg paddy per man-day 
(in kg rice in brackets) 
1st year toila niger 1:10 
1:15 
1:20 
50 (71.5) 
228.5 
342.7 
457 
4.569 (3.2) 
6.854 (4.8) 
9.139 (6.4) 
2nd year toila paddy 1:6 168 (240) 494 (500) 2.94 (2.06) 
Average productivity of 
1st and 2nd toila land  
calculated in paddy 
 
109 
361.2 
418.4 
475.5 
3.31 (2.32) 
3.84 (2.69) 
4.36 (3.05) 
Guda paddy 1:5 84 (120) 400 4.76 (3.33) 
Guda niger  1:5 21 (30) 114.2 5.44 (3.81) 
Average productivity of 
1st and 2nd guda land 
calculated in paddy 
 52.5 (75) 257.1 5.1 (3.57) 
Bila 1:10, 1:15 135 (193) 1000-1500 7.41-11 (5.18-7.7) 
Badi 1:8 84 (120) 640  7.62 (5.33) 
* Number of man-days in brackets: man-days labour under conditions of family labour  
 
Labour productivity of toila paddy cultivation is lower than that of toila niger cultivation, 
and, from this point of view, it would be reasonable for the Juang to invest most of their la-
bour in the cultivation of niger. However, the Juang of Upper Kansa, as with all Juang shift-
ing cultivators, follow the strategy of mixed production; paddy mixed with other crops for 
their own consumption and niger for exchange. Although rice is their staple food, other crops 
from toila land supplement their diet, or replace paddy meals during the lean season. The risk 
of crop failure is minimized by annually cultivating two types of swidden fields. Moreover, 
niger can only be cultivated for one year on the same plot and it therefore makes more sense 
to cultivate paddy after niger on the same land. Much more bush or forest would have to be 
cleared every year, if the Juang were to follow the strategy of mainly producing niger. 
Moreover this would increase their dependency on outsiders (who barter niger for rice or buy 
it), and on the market: they would have to buy more rice to compensate for the decrease in 
their own paddy production. 
Considering the average labour productivity of a two year cultivation cycle, despite low 
land productivity for niger, surprisingly, with regard to labour productivity, guda cultivation 
does reasonably well. The fact that most households in Upper Kansa use a similar amount of 
paddy seed for guda cultivation as for toila cultivation, indicates that they take into account 
the positive economic performance of guda cultivation. However, crops other than niger and 
paddy grow better on toila than on guda land. Guda cultivation only does well, if the fallow 
period is several years. If the fallow period is only about two years, as in Kodipasa, land pro-
ductivity decreases considerably. 
Yields per hectare as well as labour productivity27 are highest on bila land. Occasionally, 
under good conditions they may be approximated or even exceeded by toila niger cultivation. 
But if one considers the average of a two year agricultural cycle of toila cultivation, yields 
and labour productivity are lower. 
                                                           
27 Hunt (2000) in his analysis of traditional rice agriculture in Southeast Asia has shown in several cases that la-
bour productivity is higher in wet rice production in comparison to with rice production in swiddens. 
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The history of the agricultural development of Kodipasa shows that over time bila cultiva-
tion, replaced shifting cultivation. The process of transition is analysed in more detail in chap-
ter 3.2.1. Higher yields per hectare and higher labour productivity, combined with population 
growth and increasing land scarcity, are probably the reasons for this shift towards intensifi-
cation of land use. Contrary to Boserup’s model of declining labour productivity accompany-
ing intensification of land use (Boserup 1998), a comparison between the various systems of 
cultivation in the case of the Juang, clearly shows that permanent and irrigated paddy cultiva-
tion is accompanied by increasing labour productivity. Although wet rice cultivation requires 
a higher input of labour than shifting cultivation, or short-fallow guda cultivation, the increase 
of land productivity is higher than the increase of labour: with relatively little increase in la-
bour input per cultivated area, the output per man-day of labour increases considerably. Thus 
the transition from extensive to more intensive paddy cultivation in Kodipasa is not surpris-
ing. However, an initial input of labour in order to transform the land for permanent paddy 
cultivation is required for this shift. Once the land is totally cleared, levelled and terraced, the 
benefits of permanent paddy cultivation become apparent. The benefits are even greater when 
combined with the input of capital - if HYV and chemical fertiliser can be afforded. 
 
Table 17: Comparison shifting cultivation – wet rice cultivation 
 Average 1st 
and 2nd toila 
cultivation 
 
 
Wet rice cultivation 
Comparison of toila 
with wet rice cultiva-
tion: increase in % 
Labour input per ha in 
man-days 
109 135 + 23.85% 
Yield per ha in kg paddy 
361.2 
418.4 
475.5 
1000 
1250 
1500 
+ 176.85% 
+ 198.76% 
+ 216.46% 
Labour productivity in kg 
paddy per man-day 
3.31 
3.84 
4.36 
7.41 
9.21 
11.00 
+ 123.87% 
+ 139.84% 
+ 152.29% 
 
However, when there is a lack or scarcity of land for permanent paddy cultivation, adhering to 
the system of shifting cultivation is still a reasonable strategy for a household, which other-
wise would be restricted in its capacity to produce paddy for subsistence. This may explain 
why efforts in the early 1980s to shift the forest dwellers of Upper Kansa down to Kodipasa 
partly failed and why, after several years, half of the villagers returned to the forest and re-
sumed cultivation of toila land, due to the scarcity of bila land. Moreover, toila land allows 
for mixed cropping. Besides the main crops (oilseed and rice), various kinds of pulses, beans, 
millet and vegetables are grown: although they yield small amounts and do not replace paddy 
as the staple food, they supplement the diet of the Juang. These crops can also be cultivated 
on fertilised land behind the house (badi land) and on guda land, but badi land is restricted 
and yields on guda land are small. The peasants of Kodipasa therefore have to buy these or 
other additional foods at the market. 
It is accepted that there are reasons other than economic ones which encourage people to 
take the decision to return to the forest. However, to label the Juang shifting cultivators as 
‘backward’ and perceive them as pursuing an economically inefficient system of cultivation 
does not withstand closer examination.  
Ownership structures regarding various types of land are less permanent and rigid among 
the villagers of Upper Kansa than among the villagers on the plain. In Upper Kansa, access to 
land is not the limiting factor for agricultural production; it is rather labour which limits the 
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size of the area cultivated each year: especially limited availability of female labour which is 
absorbed by wood selling activities, as will be shown later. 
On the plain, almost all of the land is privately owned. Land scarcity here is definitely a 
limiting factor for agricultural production, although the practices of selling, renting and mort-
gaging imply some flexibility among the households. As will be shown, a combination of en-
vironmental, economic and social factors cause a dependency of most households on income 
activities other than farming their own fields; be it farm wage labour, other wage labour or, to 
a certain extent wood selling. 
 
Table 18: kg seed per ha for various types of cultivation 
 
Type of cultivation 
 
Kg Seed per hectare 
Man-days of labour input 
per kg seed 
2nd year toila paddy 80 2.1 
Guda paddy 80 1.3 
Bila paddy 100 1.4 
Toila niger 8 6.3 
Guda niger 8 3.8 
 
 
3.1.6 Other 
3.1.6.1 Kitchen garden 
A small patch just beside or behind the house is fenced for the cultivation of some vegetables, 
spices and tubers: eggplants (Solanum melongena esculentum; O=baigan), various cucumbers 
(kengrat), lady’s fingers (Abelmeschus esculentum), various beans, dumkari (Capsicum an-
num: chilli), sasang (Curcuma longa; O=haladi; turmeric) and saru (Colocasia esculenta: 
coco-yams / Dioscorea sp.). A small amount of tobacco may also be cultivated, although this 
is mostly purchased at the market. However, such gardens are of a small size and the Juang do 
not give much importance to them. In Upper Kansa there are no fenced gardens at all. 
Like badi land, kitchen gardens are privately owned. 
3.1.6.2 Trees 
Gardens may include fruit trees; ale (Mangifera indica; O = amba; mango), anasam (Arto-
carpus heterophyllus; O = panasa; jackfruit) banana and one or more sazana trees (Moringa 
oleifera lam.), whose leaves are used as greens. 
Behind the house on badi land, jackfruit, mango and mahul trees may be found. Here and 
there such trees grow on bila and guda fields. They are privately owned.  
 
3.1.7 Agricultural cycle 
Agricultural work in the two villages begins with moderate labour input during March and 
April. It intensifies in the months of May and June and reaches a peak firstly, during July and 
August, due to extensive weeding, and secondly, towards the end of September, when har-
vesting of paddy begins. The main agricultural season, which focuses on paddy cultivation 
lasts about nine months from the middle of March until the middle of December, followed by 
a low season of about three months. 
Many of the agricultural activities are closely linked to the time and amount of rainfall. 
Late rainfall, at the beginning of the monsoon, may postpone sowing. Conversely, late rain-
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fall, at the end of the monsoon, may delay the start of the harvest. Some activities have to be 
carried out within a limited period of time: weeding at the right time and within a limited pe-
riod is crucial for supporting good growth of the crops; weeds have to be uprooted before they 
deprive the seedlings of valuable nutrients. However, other activities, such as preparing the 
soil for cultivation, can be handled with more flexibility and be distributed over longer peri-
ods. Thus, even under certain ecological constraints imposed by nature and climate, the small 
farmers do have some flexibility in the organization of their activities. 
When the farmers start preparing their land, how much land they cultivate and the amount 
of time they spend on other economic and/or non-economic activities, depends mainly upon 
the availability of land, labour and capital, together with their priorities and any other oppor-
tunities that they may have for obtaining income. 
The tables on pages 78 and 79 illustrate the agricultural cycle of the two villages under 
study. Although the cycle is bound to the local climate, it differs from the agricultural cycle of 
other Juang villages with regard to shifting cultivation: villages under greater pressure to pro-
duce for their subsistence, i.e. villages with little or no easy access to a market where the vil-
lagers could sell wood, and with less opportunities for wage labour, do cultivate larger swid-
den plots. In these villages men start clearing operations on 1st year toila fields in February, 
i.e. about two months earlier then in villages such as Upper Kansa with access to nearby mar-
kets. Women also start their work on 2nd year toila fields earlier. Harvesting paddy carries on 
until December, if long-term paddy varieties are sown. Thus Juang of other villages work 
harder and for a longer period of the year on their swidden plots and cultivate larger areas. 
The critical bottleneck is probably caused by the necessity for weeding: this labour intensive 
work has to be done within a limited period and thus limits the area which may be cultivated. 
Comparing the labour needed for the cultivation of various types of land, it is obvious that 
the combined cultivation of bila and toila land requires a high input of labour within the same 
time periods. In the two villages under study here, this combination does not exist. However, 
in the past, both shifting and bila cultivation were carried out in Kodipasa. Households, which 
combined these two techniques of cultivation either, had enough family labour, or the means 
to pay for additional labour. Wealthier households also tried to increase the amount of bila 
land and gave less importance to the cultivation of toila land. 
In Upper Kansa the scarcity of family labour, rather than scarcity of land, limits the culti-
vation activities of the Juang households. Most households look for the assistance of members 
of other households, for the performance of certain agricultural activities. However, any la-
bour received by non-household members, has to be either returned as labour, or reimbursed 
in kind, regardless of whether non-household members are kin or not. Cooperation in the 
form of rotating working groups is mainly used among the men for clearing, and the women 
for weeding. These forms of cooperation intensify labour input on a family’s land over a re-
stricted time period, when the group is working on the family’s land. But family labour is 
withdrawn when the group moves to the land of the other group members’ land. Based on the 
principle of balanced reciprocity somebody from the family has to contribute his share to the 
rotating working group.  
With rather low rates of productivity per man-day with shifting cultivation, it does not pay 
to use wage labour, which costs 3 pai, i.e. 3 kg paddy (2.1 kg rice) plus a meal. If wage labour 
is used at all, it is the wealthier households that use and pay for it. Help from close relatives 
may be received, but not for free, although the compensation in kind is not regarded as pay-
ment; but rather as a gift. Thus, larger households with a favourable consumer-producer rate 
have advantages over smaller households, or households with an unfavourable consumer-
producer rate. 
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However, opportunities to obtain an income by wage labour and / or wood selling, for the 
Juang, may also reduce the incentive to expand toila cultivation; thus even if a household 
could cultivate more toila with its own labour, it does not necessarily do so. Nineteen out of 
twenty households in Upper Kansa do follow a strategy of mixed economic activities, i.e. they 
combine shifting cultivation, wage labour and wood selling, although the importance of the 
various activities varies among the households. 
In Kodipasa, the situation is quite different: cultivation of the households can be limited by 
the scarcity of land as well as labour. Unlike in Upper Kansa, access to land is restricted and 
almost all of the land is privately owned. A general analysis of the availability of land and its 
distribution among the households is provided in chapter 3.2. 
With regard to the mobilisation of labour from outside the household, there is no difference 
among the various groups in Kodipasa: all households, be they Juang, Munda, Santal or 
Gouda obtain additional labour, only on the basis of strictly balanced reciprocity or as wage 
labour. Kinship relations beyond the household do not imply a free supply of labour for 
cultivation in any of the four groups. Thus, in all four groups, the household, as the central 
unit of production and consumption has to pay, mostly in kind, for extra-labour if confronted 
with a scarcity of family labour. To use wage labour is viable, if it is used on bila land and 
under conditions of good yields: the daily wage is between seven (3.5 kg / 2.45 kg rice) and 
twelve (6 kg /4.2 kg rice) mano paddy plus a meal for women, and up to fifteen (7.5 kg / 
5.25 kg rice) mano paddy plus a meal for men, depending on the bargaining power and type 
of work. However, if yields are low, wage labour does not pay. While occasional wage labour 
for a few days is used by many households, regular wage labour or wage labour for several 
people can only be afforded by wealthier households, i.e. households with substantial 
additional sources of income and/or the capacity to produce a surplus which is high enough to 
pay wage labour with part of it. 
3.1.8 Households and cultivation 
With individual households being the central units of production and consumption in all four 
groups under consideration, it is necessary to have a closer look at them. An additional analy-
sis, with regard to the development cycle, consumer/producer ratio and sexual division of la-
bour for individual households and for the various groups, will follow in chapter 4. 
The average household size of all the 136 households is rather small, with 5.24 persons per 
household. Of these households, only four consist of ten or more members (one Juang, two 
Munda and one Santal).The various household types of the 136 households under considera-
tion in 1998-1999 are as follows: 
 
Table 19: Household types of both villages 
Household Type Number In % 
Married couple with no children 4 2.9 
Nuclear family 62 45.6 
Sub-nuclear family with widow 14 10.3 
Sub-nuclear family with widower 1 0.7 
Joint family 43 31.6 
Joint family with widowed son 2 1.5 
Joint family with divorced son 1 0.7 
Extended family 1 0.7 
Widows single 3 2.2 
Single (unmarried man) 1 0.7 
Others 4 2.9 
Total 136 100.0 
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A nuclear family is defined here as a conjugal pair with their unmarried offspring. It is the 
dominant type of household in the two villages. If the sub-nuclear families, with a widow or 
widower as household head, were to be included under the category of nuclear family, the 
percentage would rise to 56.6%. There is a remarkably higher proportion of widows com-
pared to widowers.  
A joint family is, for the purpose of this study, defined as a family containing three genera-
tions, i.e. father or mother, or both, with one or more married children and their spouse and 
offspring. Unmarried sons and daughters may also be included. In twenty-four cases, there 
were no unmarried daughters or sons included in the family, i.e. they consisted only of par-
ents, or one of them, one married child (mostly son) with spouse and offspring. Thus, a joint 
family, in many cases, may be defined as a nuclear family, plus one or two persons (father, 
mother) and they are not much bigger than nuclear families. In nineteen cases, unmarried sons 
and/or daughters were included. However, in only one case, the joint family included two 
married brothers. In fifteen cases, both parents were still alive, in twenty-seven cases the 
mother was widowed. In one case only the father was widowed. In three cases, relatives other 
than those mentioned above were included in the family. There were two families consisting 
of a widowed mother, a widowed son and a grandson. In one family a widowed father lived 
with an unmarried son, his divorced son and his grandchildren. 
An extended family is a household of two or more married couples from the same genera-
tion (usually brothers) including their offspring. There was only one household of this type. 
There were a few families composed of relatives, other than those mentioned so far. One 
family included a husband and wife, their married nephew and the children of this nephew. 
Another consisted of a widow and the son of her late co-wife. A third one was composed of a 
husband, his wife plus the unmarried brother of the husband. The fourth included a widow, 
her children and the brother of her late husband.There were no striking differences between 
the household structures of the two villages, as is shown below: 
 
Table 20: Households in Kodipasa 
Household Type Number In % 
Married couple with no children 4 3.4 
Nuclear family 53 45.7 
Sub-nuclear family with widow 12 10.3 
Sub-nuclear family with widower 1 0.9 
Joint family 36 31.0 
Joint family with widowed son 2 1.7 
Joint family with divorced son 1 0.9 
Extended family 1 0.9 
Widows single 2 1.7 
Single (unmarried man) 1 0.9 
Others 3 2.6 
Total 116 100.0 
 
Table 21: Juang households in Upper Kansa 
Household Type Number In % 
Nuclear family 9 45 
Sub-nuclear family with widow 2 10 
Joint family 7 35 
Widow single 1 5 
Others (husband, wife, nephew, niece) 1 5 
Total 20 100 
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In six out of the seven joint families in Upper Kansa, one of the parents was widowed. In one 
case the joint family consisted of a widowed mother, her married son with children, plus the 
mother’s sister-in-law. 
In all the groups, the nuclear family is the most common household type, followed by the 
joint family. There was only one extended family in 1999. In all the groups, there is a pattern 
of sons separating from their family, rather soon after marriage, and settling down with their 
own household. Parents will eventually live with one of their sons, his wife and their off-
spring. Married sons are given part of their inheritance and they become independent house-
holds. Daughters, valuable labour within the family, are married at an early age. This pattern 
keeps the families rather small. 
A favourable consumer/producer ratio within a household can be reached if the separation 
of a married son from his father’s family takes place at a later stage, and if the unmarried 
brothers and sisters are already at an age when they can contribute their labour towards the 
family income. However, it is common, that when the second brother marries, or even before, 
the family separates.  
Under conditions of shifting cultivation, with no scarcity of land, as in Upper Kansa, one 
would expect households to pool their labour, for reasons of economic efficiency, by cooper-
ating as joint or extended families. However, this is not case for Upper Kansa. The reasons for 
this are discussed in chapter 4.1. Although larger households would be more efficient from an 
economic point of view, other costs counteract against family models of larger units. How-
ever, there is a significant correlation between the number of household members and the 
amount of seed for the households in Upper Kansa (r2 = 0.505), while this correlation is only 
0.282 for the households in Kodipasa. Thus, the amount of land that the households in Upper 
Kansa cultivate depends to a certain degree on the size of the household. This is not the case, 
however, in Kodipasa, where the access to land is much more restricted than in Upper Kansa, 
as will be shown in following chapters. 
3.2 Specific conditions of land and people 
In this chapter, I will present data on the availability and quality of agricultural land in the 
two villages. Institutional aspects of land tenure, as well as data on land distribution among 
the various households, are also dealt with. These interlinked aspects of agricultural produc-
tion in the two villages are not fix variables, but they are embedded in a context of a changing 
natural, socio-economic and political environment.  
3.2.1 Changing patterns of land use in Kodipasa 
Discussing the history of land use in Kodipasa with the older villagers, a shift in the past from 
shifting cultivation to permanent wet rice cultivation is recognizable. Village elders remember 
that there were once large areas with bushy or woody vegetation, which were cultivated by 
the method of swiddening. These have since been transformed into permanent paddy fields. 
The shortening of fallow periods and the gradual disappearance of forest and bush have taken 
place in the lower and more level areas. An increasing amount of land, predominantly guda, 
had been converted to permanent paddy cultivation by some of the Juang households, a proc-
ess which continued with the arrival of Gouda families who started paddy cultivation them-
selves. Shifting cultivation on the hill slopes, an area unsuitable for bila cultivation, contin-
ued. Guda fields were to be found between lower areas suitable for bila cultivation and the 
hill slopes which were good for shifting cultivation. 
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This transition was accompanied by a socio-economic differentiation within the Juang so-
ciety; several families appropriated the bulk of potential bila land, while others continued to 
cultivate the upper lands by shifting cultivation. The Juang from the poorer households were 
used as wage labour on the bila fields belonging to the richer Juang families. They received 
their salary in the form of paddy and daily meals. Crops from their own toila and guda fields 
supplemented their income. In those days neither the men nor the women worked as farm la-
bourers outside the village and the sale of timber and firewood was not yet a main source of 
income. Girls and women did not visit the market at Keonjhar to sell firewood, while the men 
mainly sold timber, from time to time, to get some cash. 
According to elder informants, approximately forty years ago, there were about five 
wealthy Juang families with large land holdings and several families with medium size land 
holdings, whereas the majority of the Juang households belonged to the poorer families who 
were employed as farm labourers by other households. The Juang families who did not belong 
to the local descent group, barcha bok, were all among the poorer households, whereas the 
richest households were all descendants from barcha bok.  
According to McDougal (1963:39ff) such a process of transition to permanent rice cultiva-
tion in the Juang area had begun several decades before his research, albeit in a very slow 
manner and to a marginal extent only: 
“Throughout most of the Juang hills there is little available land for permanent irrigated rice cultivation. 
Nevertheless, within the last 40 years [since 1920: N.O.] some of the Hill Juang have adopted the cultivation 
of permanent, irrigated rice land, involving the construction of special terraced fields, called bilo, in stream-
beds or valley-bottoms. This type of cultivation is relatively rare. Some villages have no bilo lands; in most 
of the cases where bilo fields do exists, they are owned and cultivated by less than half the families of the vil-
lage. These lands are extremely rare in the southern half of the region. The V-shaped valleys characteristic of 
this region provide only a small amount of level land for use by a village, although there are exceptions. The 
construction of terraced fields requires considerable expenditure of time and manpower; the surface of the 
plot must be levelled and an embankment built to retain water. If a narrow streambed is used, the plots are 
successively stepped from end to end, in a single row down its course - this is quite common. If the valley 
widens, lateral terracing may also be practiced. Due to the labour involved in construction, irrigated cultiva-
tion is frequently not practiced even where suitable land is available.  
This type of land represents a capital investment. Less labour is expended in its cultivation than on a swidden 
field yielding an equivalent crop; there are fewer basic tasks required in production. The yield is more uni-
form and predictable and less subject to the vagaries of nature. If the plots are properly maintained. Never-
theless, embankments are occasionlly washed out during the monsoon, resulting in partial or total crop loss. 
At the present time there is a tendency for some of the Juang to increase the extent of this type of cultivation 
where the land permits. They do not view irrigated cultivation as a means of replacing shifting cultivation, 
but rather as supplementing it. Only in exceptional cases would the development of available land resources 
permit a village to subsist exclusively by irrigated rice cultivation.” 
McDougal does not refer to any social transformation within the Juang community, which 
might be necessary to allow the transition to the more intensive bila cultivation. However, 
data from Kodipasa indicates that additional labour was required for households with bila 
fields; being provided by members of poorer households with little or no bila land. They were 
prepared to carry out such labour for other Juang, when production from other categories of 
land, especially swidden fields, diminished. Thus a process of socio-economic differentiation 
among Juang households was accentuated in a new way. This is not to say that there were no 
socio-economic differences among the Juang households, while they were mainly swidden 
cultivators; family size, sickness, individual characteristics, misfortune etc. allowed enough 
margin for differences. However, such differences were mitigated: 
“The periodic redistribution of land by the village, which allows any family to utilize as much as desired, and 
the consequent lack of individual land ownership or even perpetuity in its use, minimizes the possibility of 
stabilizing wealth difference” (McDougal, 1963:320). 
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In the 1960s, Bose (1967:93) refers to “some villages” which have adopted the system of wet 
cultivation and “are hence supposed to be rich in comparison with those who have not 
adopted this system”. Comparing the economic situation of three Juang villages, in the central 
zone of the Keonjhar Hills, he concludes that the amount of available bila land is among other 
factors (population density and general availability of agricultural land) important for their 
economic status: the village with the largest area of bila land per consumer is the richest vil-
lage (Raidiha: 0.7 acre/consumer, i.e. 0.2833 ha/consumer), the village with hardly any bila 
land is the poorest village (Kadalibadi; 0.052 acre/consumer, i.e. 0.021 ha per consumer), 
whereas the village with 0.33 acre (0.1335 ha/consumer) bila land (Hatisila) is considered as 
“semi-rich”. Bose (1967:110) concludes from his study “that the economic status of the vil-
lages are [sic] mainly controlled by the scope and limitation of permanent rice fields”.  
“‘Rich’ villages are those which produce sufficient food for the consumption of the villagers all the year 
round and provide scope for employing hired labour in their fields (...) These villages have more level and 
terraced land under permanent cultivation. Now-a-days there is a tendency of changing land for shifting cul-
tivation into permanent cultivated land. The rich condition of the village is naturally related to permanent 
cultivation.  
‘Well-to-do’ villages are those which are more or less self-sufficient in food. These villages have level and 
terraced fields under permanent cultivation and hill slopes under the jhum form of cultivation [i.e. shifting 
cultivation; N.O.]. They depend equally on both of these types of land. (...) There are some villages (...) 
which possess little or no plain or terraced fields under permanent agriculture, yet produce sufficient food 
from jhum lands on account of their relative abundance of good soil.  
‘Poor’ villages are deficient in food. Villagers supplement their economy by working in rich villages as hired 
labourers and by collecting root crops from the jungles” (Bose 1961:173). 
Self-sufficiency in this context does not mean that everything is produced for self-
consumption; some crops are bartered in exchange for paddy. 
Without going into detail about the differences among the households within each village, 
Bose points out that, as a whole, the inhabitants of the poorest village are not solely depend-
ent upon their own land for income, but also work as hired labourers in rich villages. There is 
a migration of part of the inhabitants to some richer villages. The rate of consumption of food 
is lower than in other villages. Many inhabitants are in debt. In an attempt to improve their 
situation, the inhabitants of Kadalibadi changed their land-use system, by capturing some land 
to have more bila land and by diverting a small stream in order to solve the water problems 
related to this type of land (Bose 1967:121). The richest of the three villages is mentioned as a 
village to which the poor from Kadalibadi either migrate to, or work as hired labourers. Thus, 
Bose describes a situation between a poor and a rich Juang village, which seems to parallel 
the situation between a poor and rich household within the village of Kodipasa. 
According to Patnaik and Bose (1976:61), in the 1970s, the interest in wet rice cultivation 
among the Juang was “a recent phenomenon” supplementing the produce from shifting culti-
vation, “the primary source of livelihood of the tribals”. However, these authors indicate an-
other reason why the Juang rarely cultivate bila land; a survey of the Juang area shows that 
land suitable for bila cultivation, in many cases, has been appropriated by immigrant cattle 
keepers who have developed an interest in farming and who have occupied land in the valley-
basins and at the confluence of hill-streams. Such land is more fertile and suitable for wet cul-
tivation than land at the top of the hills or on the slopes (ibid.). The building of dams across 
hill streams, in order to utilize water for irrigation purposes, the application of fertilizer and 
manure results in higher yields from such fields This, however requires a capital investment, 
which the Juang were not able or not interested mobilizing. 
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3.2.2 Demographic trends of the Juang 
Various authors have considered population growth, to be a reason for changing land use pat-
terns among the Juang. Reduction of the fallow period for swidden fields, as well as the tran-
sition to a more intensive agricultural production of wet land paddy cultivation, have been at-
tributed to demographic growth. With the exception of the case study of Saradindu Bose 
(1967), relating to three Juang villages and the carrying capacity of their area, there are no 
studies regarding the general carrying capacity of the area inhabited by the Juang and mi-
grants from other groups. Furthermore, Bose’s study mainly considers the carrying capacity 
of land under shifting cultivation and not the general carrying capacity of land. 
Taking into consideration available data, the growth of the Juang population, since the end 
of the 19th century is confirmed as a long-term trend. Between 1891 and 1981, the Juang pop-
ulation tripled in size. As migration into new areas is not a prominent feature of the Juang, the 
assumption of growing pressure on natural resources is supported by the demographic data. 
Immigration of peoples other than the Juang into their territories, added increased pressure on 
the natural resources. The population of the Juang, as estimated by the Census of India over a 
period of time is stated below.  
 
Table 22: Juang population (Census of India) 
Year Total Juang population Keonjhar District Dhenkanal District Other Districts 
1857 n.a. n.a. 1005 n.a. 
1877 9659 4592 4120 947 
1891 9173 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1901 11159 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1911 12823 n.a n.a. n.a. 
1921 10454 n.a n.a. n.a. 
1931 15024 7029 6760 1235 
1941 17032 8424 n.a. n.a. 
1951 12559 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1961 21890 9768 11551 571 
1971  24384  12372 (10881*) 12867 n.a. 
1981 30875 15467 14573 835 
1991 35665 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1996 n.a. 21146 n.a. n.a. 
Data for 1857 given by E.A. Samuells, quoted in (Rout 1969:2); census data from 1877 by W.W. Hunter, ”A 
Statistical Account of Bengal”, quoted in (Rout 1969:2); census data from 1891-1961 quoted in (Rout 1969:3); 
census data from 1971 quoted in (ODG 1986:81); census data from 1996/97, personal information ITDA Keon-
jhar 1999. 
* This data relating to the Juang population in Keonjhar District in 1971 given by Patnaik & Bose (1976:59) is 
contradictory to the data of the ODG) 
 
However, this data raise questions, which have not yet been answered. Although a trend of 
Juang population growth is clearly indicated, the data shows two significant population set-
backs within the decades of 1911-1921 and 1941-1951, both followed by population growth. 
The decade 1951-1961 is characterised by an extraordinarily sharp rise in population (74.3% 
population growth within ten years; an annual growth of 7.43). None of these unusual demo-
graphic developments have been analysed or explained by any of the authors who have writ-
ten about the Juang. The extreme variation, from time to time, may be partly explained by 
methodological problems and differences in data collection for the census, every ten years, 
which has resulted in rather unreliable data. 
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Early data may be unreliable due to restricted access to the areas, as well as sparse meth-
odology of census data collection. However, looking at the general demographic trends in 
Keonjhar District, one finds parallel peaks and troughs, which probably help to explain the 
large variations. According to the ODG of Kendujhar (1986:57-58): 
“The growth [in Keonjhar District as a whole: N.O.] between the years 1911 and 1921 was very small, i.e. 
14,794 and this slow growth was primarily due to widespread influenza and other epidemics. (...) The decade 
1921-1931 was a period of quick recovery. The crop condition was satisfactory and the public health im-
proved beyond expectation. (...). The decade 1931-1941 was a period of ups and downs but the population 
growth was not very much affected (...). The bumper crops of 1936 and 1937 were accompanied by smallpox 
and cholera. (...) There was also partial drought in the years 1938 and 1939. Thus the agricultural prosperity 
noticed earlier disappeared. (...) In the years 1941 to 1951, the harvests were moderate. There was deficient 
rainfall in 1942 and from 1947 to 1950. Smallpox and cholera broke out in the year 1947 in 89 villages caus-
ing many deaths. (...) The decade 1951-61 was more favourable than the previous decade because agriculture 
and industry made considerable progress. The whole district was covered by by Community Development 
Blocks. (...) The decade 1961-1971 has recorded the highest growth of population, i.e. 28.55% and has 
crossed the State average of 25.05 per cent. The reasons for the growth of population are generally the excess 
of births over deaths and the general improvement in public health and personal hygiene.” 
Thus, the decline of the Juang population, during various periods, can be explained by epi-
demics and droughts. 
Data from the last three decades indicates a rather stable annual population growth of 
around 2.2%, slightly decreasing since the 1970s. This is consistent with the statement from 
an officer of the I.T.D.A. (Integrated Tribal Development Agency) according to whom the 
rate of population growth of the Juang is slightly decreasing (personal information I.T.D.A 
Keonjhar).  
 
Table 23: Demographic trends of the Juang 
 
 
Years 
General growth of 
the Juang popula-
tion in % 
 
Annual rate of 
growth in % 
Growth of the Juang 
population in  
Keonjhar in % 
Annual rate of growth of 
the Juang population  
in Keonjhar in % 
1877-1891 n.a. -0.37 n.a. n.a. 
1891-1901 21.65 1.98 n.a. n.a. 
1901-1911 15.00 1.40 n.a. n.a. 
1911-1921 -18.47 -2.02 n.a. n.a. 
1921-1931 43.70 3.69 n.a. n.a. 
1931-1941 13.36 1.26 19.85 1.83 
1941-1951 -26.26 -3.00 n.a. n.a. 
1951-1961 74.30 5.71 n.a. n.a. 
1961-1971 11.40 1.08 26.66 2.40 
1971-1981 26.62 2.39 25.02 2.26 
1981-1996 n.a. n.a. 36.70 2.11 
Sources: Census of India 1971 in ODG 1986:83 / I.T.D.A. / Juang Handbook for Development 1993:6 / Juang 
Development Agency 
3.2.2.1 Kodipasa population 
Unfortunately, census data on the population of the two villages under study here equally 
shows considerable inconsistencies. Furthermore, in the census of these villages there is no 
distinction made between the Juang and other Scheduled Tribes, such as Munda and Santal. 
There are several confusing statistical facts regarding the data about Kodipasa. There is a 
decrease in population between 1971 and 1981, which contradicts the assumption of a grow-
ing population. However, as the land settlement process was going on in that area during this 
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decade, it may be that the village boundaries were changed and that hamlets previously 
belonging to the village were reallocated to a neighbouring administrative unit. 
 
Table 24: Kodipasa population 
 1961 1971 1981 1991* 1998** 
Total population 227 378 351 537 (608) 607 
Male n.a. 188 172 287 (355) 294 
Female n.a. 190 179 250 (253) 313 
ST (Scheduled Tribes)  n.a. 353 310 471 (519) 515 
ST male n.a. 175 150 254 (304) 245 
ST female n.a. 178 160 217 (215) 270 
SC (Scheduled Castes) n.a. 0 0 0 (12) 0 
GC (General Castes) n.a. 25 41 66 (77) 92 
General caste male n.a. 13 22 33 (n.a.) 49 
General caste female n.a. 12 19 33 (n.a.) 43 
Total Households n.a. 74 82 108 (105) 116 
Households ST n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 
Households GC n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 16 
1961-1991: official census data 
* Official data, particularly from the 1991 census (numbers given in brackets), are highly debatable; an extraor-
dinary population growth of 73% within a decade, a male-female ratio of 1.4; twelve members of Scheduled 
Castes not existing earlier and later. After re-examination, the population data for Kodipasa registered at Banspal 
Block alternative figures have been found, which seem to be more reliable than the official census data of 1991. 
** Data from own census 1998 
 
A reason for the unusual sex ratio in 1991 of 1:1.17 (female to male, calculated with the more 
reliable numbers) contradicting other data, which shows a higher female population, could be 
the inclusion of the school in Kodipasa (with a high percentage of boys) into the census. 
The considerable population increase between 1981-1991 probably results from including the 
inhabitants of Lower Kansa into the Census of Kodipasa. 
The population of the General Caste shows a steady increase since 1971 and within three 
decades it has more than tripled. 
Despite all the confusion, there is trend of population growth in the village, although popu-
lation growth of the Juang, in comparison to the rest of the population, cannot be calculated 
from this data. However, the assumption that the process of intensification of agriculture in 
this case, is linked to population pressure, is supported by the demographic data. 
3.2.2.2 Kansa population 
Official census data for Kansa, in fact applies to three Kansa villages, which have separated in 
the past, into Jirpani Kansa, Bindridi Kansa (Upper Kansa) and Handiduha Kansa. The popu-
lation of Koratadihi Kansa (Lower Kansa), which was integrated into Kodipasa village, as a 
Juang hamlet at the beginning of the 1980s, is included in the population data of Kodipasa vil-
lage. Data from my own census in 1998/99 refers to Upper Kansa and Lower Kansa only. 
Thus, the irregular shifts in the population of Kansa are most probably to be explained by 
the resettlement of part of its inhabitants to the village of Kodipasa, towards the end of the 
1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s. For that reason, hardly any population growth is dis-
cernible in the various villages officially named Kansa. Without resettlement, it is assumed 
here that the Juang population growth is similar to that of Kodipasa. However, population 
growth in Kansa village, in general, is smaller during the same period, as there is no immigra-
tion of General Caste people into this hilly area. 
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Table 25: Kansa population 
  
 
1961 
 
 
1971 
 
 
1981 
 
 
1991 
 
 
1996* 
1998  
Upper Kansa  
(Bindridi Kansa) 
1998  
Lower Kansa  
(Koratadihi Kansa) 
Total population 232 283 254 238 241 105 75 
Male ? 133 125 122 120 48 40 
Female ? 150 129 116 121 57 35 
Households ? 63 60 54 58 20 14 
Average size  
of household 
 4.49 4.23 4.41 4.15 5.25 5.35 
1961-1991: official census data 
* Data from TDA (Tribal Development Agency) 
** Own census data 1998 
 
As the population in 1996 is almost the same as 35 years ago in 1961, this does not indicate a 
growing scarcity of natural resources due to demographic factors. However, the fact that bila 
land is not cultivated in this area cannot be solely explained by an abundance of forest area, 
due to a lower population density – there is no bila land available due to topographic reasons. 
Relatively short fallow periods of swidden land, on the other hand, cannot necessarily be ex-
plained by a shortage of land fit for this type of cultivation, due to population growth– it is 
possible that short fallow periods are maintained because they require less labour for clearing 
secondary forests. In addition, the opportunity of obtaining income from the sale of wood is 
an incentive to reduce the labour input in shifting cultivation. 
3.2.3 Official land categories 
The land settlement in the two villages under study, as in other villages of the Juang and 
Bhuiya pirhs, inhabited mainly by the Juang and Bhuiya, involved two different stages and 
purposes. The first stage was to survey and settle the hitherto unsurveyed tribal area of the 
Juang and Bhuiya pirhs. Before this settlement, nobody had land titles (patta) or any docu-
ment for any type of land. The survey aimed at determining the area of each ryot (landowner), 
to locate it and to confer title over his holdings (Patnaik and Bose 1976:74-82). On the basis 
of the quality of land, revenue was fixed. All other (non-private) land had to be classified, ac-
cording to the official land classification system. 
The second stage was linked to development purposes in the 1980s, and included redistri-
bution of land to landless and poor households. 
Previous systems of revenue and taxation in the tribal areas of the Princely State of Keon-
jhar were not directly based upon individual assessment of landed property. Tribal villages 
were taxed according to their size, i.e. number of houses, and according to the numbers of 
ploughs. Additional tributes and services had to be offered by the tribal villagers or their offi-
cials during certain ceremonies or on various occasions (see also chapter 5.5.1). 
The pradhans (headmen of the villages) were responsible for collecting from their villag-
ers what was demanded by the revenue officers of the princely state from the village as a 
whole. Such rates were fixed from time to time and consisted of cash and kind. However, 
there has been a difference in the manner of revenue collection between the Bhuiya and Juang 
villages since 1931-32. At that time, in Bhuiya villages, a revenue register, called an Aeka-
padia, was introduced, containing the names of the ryots and the amount of revenue that each 
one had to pay to the Government. This register was kept by the village headman (pradhan). 
This system was not introduced in Juang villages; here revenue and tax continued to be de-
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manded for the village as a whole and it was up to the village pradhan to collect it from the 
various villagers to meet the demands of the State (Patnaik and Bose 1976:75). 
It was only in 1970, that the process of land survey and settlement – with the aim of regis-
tering landholdings – began in the Juang area. The Revenue Department published the details 
of the rules to be followed for this purpose, in their notification No. 58.54, dated 23.10.1970 
(Patnaik and Bose 1976:76): Without the existence of any revenue register (Aekapadia) in the 
Juang villages, the surveyors were instructed to gain information about the land of those vil-
lagers that paid revenue, from the former Sardar and Pradhan, and “to find out what lands 
they possess” (ibid.) at the time of the survey and settlement. “Based on these proofs the lands 
which they possess as cultivators and residents shall be recorded as ryoti in their names.” 
(ibid.) However, as has been shown, the traditional system of land rights and land use in the 
area of the Juang, renders difficult any clear cut property rights for certain types of cultivated 
land. Swidden plots, as well as guda fields, are left fallow for several years and are periodi-
cally redistributed. It is mainly badi and bila land, which is the long-term private property of 
individual households, in a narrow sense. To prove that land has been in the undisputed pos-
session of a Juang is not easy in such a context. Furthermore sardars and pradhans, as infor-
mants for the surveyors, could take advantage of their position and give information about 
land to benefit themselves. According to N. Patnaik, an additional difficulty was, that in many 
villages the post of pradhan had become extinct, and in other villages men of younger genera-
tions acting as pradhan did not have adequate knowledge with which to inform the surveyors. 
Regarding the practice of shifting cultivation, the land settlement instructions were not 
very clear. It had been acknowledged, that shifting cultivation was “an old age practice fol-
lowed by the Juang” and “the primary source of livelihood of the Juang” (in Patnaik 1976: 
78). To abolish it completely, despite the assumed negative consequences of deforestation and 
erosion, therefore was not perceived to be a proper solution. The conclusion based on this ob-
servation is surprising however; that it is not necessary to survey and prepare records about 
lands under shifting cultivation. The top portions of hills and mountains, where shifting culti-
vation was practised, should be reserved as ‘village forests’ and their bases as grazing lands, 
for “proper utilization of mountains belonging to different villages” (ibid.). 
Therefore, land under shifting cultivation came to be recorded as village forest (grama jungle) 
and grazing area under Rakhit Khata and/or as jungle of Abad Jagya Anabadi (cultivable 
waste) or Abad Ajagya Anabadi (non-cultivable waste land). 
While the documentation and settling of existing land use and land rights was the duty of 
the land settlement officer, this process was later accompanied by a development scheme by 
the Tribal Development Agency (T.D.A.) with the aim of giving land to landless families in 
the villages. This partly led to conflict between the then settlement officer and the T.D.A. Ac-
cording to the settlement officer (personal conversation in 1999), there was no legal back-
ground to expropriate Juang families who had cultivated land before the settlement and to 
give it to others. By law, the Government could distribute land to the so-called “landless peo-
ple”, i.e. to households possessing less than one standard acre28 land and with an annual in-
come below a certain ceiling. However, the Government could only give land under the cate-
gory of “cultivable waste land” (Abad Jagya Anabadi) to the landless; thus the redistribution 
from land previously cultivated by the Juang to other Juang, Munda, Santal and Gouda was 
                                                           
28 Standard acre means the unit of measurement of land equivalent to: 
1 acre of class I land (0.4047 ha): irrigated land on which two or more crops can be grown in a year; 
1.5 acre of class II land (0.60705 ha): irrigated land on which not more than one crop can be grown in a year; 
3 acres of class III land (1.2141 ha): land, other than irrigated land, on which paddy can be grown in a year; 
4.5 acres of class IV land (1.82115 ha): any other land. 
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considered illegal by the then settlement officer. Thus during the second phase of land settle-
ment, in the late 1970s, land was not only settled, but partly redistributed also to the new set-
tlers, i.e. to the Gouda, Munda and Santal. 
In the same period, the village of Upper Kansa was relocated from the hill down to the 
plain. The inhabitants of the newly created Lower Kansa integrated into Kodipasa village and 
were given land by the Government, which had partly been taken from the previous owners of 
Kodipasa. In this process, some of the old established Juang families in Kodipasa, who had 
larger areas of land, lost part of their traditionally owned land. However, they were still given 
land titles (patta) for considerably larger areas than other families. In all probability, good 
connections with the administrative machinery handling the settlement were helpful in secur-
ing legal land rights; it was the sarpanch (head of panchayat) of that time who got more than 
five hectares of land; part of it of best quality. His only son today is the richest Juang in 
Kodipasa and he not only inherited the land of his father, but also the office of the sarpanch 
for several years.  
However, part of the distributed land was also “reclaimed” by the Government through the 
Department of Soil Conservation; so-called wasteland was converted into bila land. The work 
to convert wasteland into agricultural land was done by machines and with wage labourers 
from other villages paid for by the government.  
According to the then settlement officer of the Juang and Bhuiya29, there were no maps 
from the time of the princely-state, and the boundaries of Kodipasa and Kansa were ascer-
tained with the help of the villagers, who explained the running of the boundaries of their vil-
lage territory. The following data on the two villages under study are given to show the total 
size of the area, its composition according to official land categories and the size of the vari-
ous types of land at the end of the settlement in 1981. This data also includes institutional as-
pects of ownership.  
The Revenue Department operates with various categories of land in order to administer 
and tax land. “Private Land” is legally and officially owned by individuals who are in posses-
sion of patta documents for their land, i.e. whose land is registered in the land register at the 
Tahsildar office. Such land may be agricultural land or homestead. All other land within the 
village territory comes under the category of “Government Land”, which is again subdivided 
into the following categories: 
– Rakhit Khata is village area covered by canals, roads, ponds, grazing areas and land for 
development purposes. Such land is “leasable” but not sellable by the government. 
– Sarbha Sadharana is land for common public use, such as the village cremation ground 
and places of entertainment. 
– Abad Jagya Anabadi is “cultivable waste land”, i.e. land which may be cultivated after its 
quality has been improved by various measures. This category may also include degraded 
forest area with a certain potential to improve its condition, although such forest, by law, 
cannot be converted into agricultural land. 
– Abad Ajagya Anabadi refers to land, which is classified as “non-cultivable waste land” and 
is therefore judged as not appropriate for cultivation. It includes hilly forest areas. 
Not included in the area of a revenue village is forest that comes under the category of “Re-
served Forest”. However, up until now there has been no Reserved Forest in the area of the 
two villages under consideration. 
The administration of any forest area within the village territory is shared between the For-
est Department and the Revenue Department. Whereas land covered by forest vegetation 
                                                           
29 I collected this information in a personal conversation with Mr. Barik, the then settlement officer of this area. 
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comes under the control of the Revenue Department, forest vegetation itself is regulated by 
the Forest Department. Any official conversion of once classified forest area into agricultural 
farming area has to be approved by the Government. 
 
The following data for the two villages under study was collected at the Revenue Inspector 
Office (R.I. Office) in Suakati. It illustrates the situation after the finalising of the land settle-
ment, which commenced in 1972 and was concluded in 1981. All villages registered at the 
R.I. Office, Suakati, are classified as “class III” villages, i.e. they belong to so-called remote 
and less developed villages, with lower rent rates than “class I” and “class II” villages. 
3.2.3.1 Kodipasa Revenue Village 
Government Land 281.8695 ha (2.819 km2) 
Private Land 97.7385 ha  (0.977 km2) 
Total area 379.6080 ha (3.796 km2) 
 
Government Land includes the following categories: 
 
Rakhit Khata 59.5120 ha 
thereof Village Forest (Grama Jungle) 28.5520 ha 
thereof Grazing area 4.1600 ha 
“Jungle”: non-cultivable land consisting of trees, bushes, creepers and bamboo. 
The category of Rakhit Khata also includes canals, roads, ponds and land for development purposes which are 
not specified in detail here; such land is “leasable”, but not sellable by the government. 
 
Sarba Sadharana 2.6650 ha 
This category refers to government land for common public use such as like road, cremation grounds, and places 
of entertainment. 
 
Abad Jagya Anabadi (cultivable waste land) 211.8075 ha (2.118 km2) 
1988 under encroachment, according to I.T.D.A. 20.396 ha   
thereof “Jungle” 113.376 ha  
The category of Abad Jagya Anabadi refers to wasteland which may be improved in quality by taking measures 
to reclaim it for cultivation or other purposes. Degraded forest area with a certain potential to improve its condi-
tion is included in this category; however, conversion into farmland is neither intended by the government nor 
permitted by law. 
 
Abad Ajagya Anabadi (non-cultivable wasteland) 7.8850 ha (0.079 km2) 
The category of Abad Ajagya Anabadi refers to non-reclaimable wasteland, i.e. it is either uneconomical to re-
claim such land or not possible at all. It includes the Aradai river, small rivers and stony areas. 
 
Population density in Kodipasa: Population density in Keonjhar District: 
1981: 92.5 inhabitants / km2 1961: 90 inhabitants / km2 
1991: 142.5 inhabitants / km2 1971:116 inhabitants / km2 
1998: 160.0 inhabitants / km2 1981:136 inhabitants / km2 
 1991:161 inhabitants / km2 
 2001:190 inhabitants / km2 
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On average, less than one hectare of private land is available for cultivation per household: 
private land in this village is divided among the 102 households with landed property. In 1998 
this results in an average area of only 0.9582 ha per household. If landless households are in-
cluded, the average area goes down to 0.8425 ha per household. 
Divided by the 82 households in 1981, 1.1919 hectares of private land per household were 
available at this time. 
More than 50% of so-called “cultivable waste land” are classified as “jungle” and as such 
are not to be reclaimed for agricultural purposes. If forest and encroached areas are deducted, 
only 78 ha “cultivable waste land” is theoretically available. Since the end of the land settle-
ment in 1982, it is likely that the amount of encroached land has increased further and avail-
able wasteland has significantly reduced. Land scarcity and land distribution among house-
holds is discussed in more detail below. 
141.928 ha is classified as forest area, i.e. 37.38% of the total area. This figure, however, 
does not provide accurate information about the qualitative state of this forest area. Parts of 
the forest registered during the land settlement more than twenty years ago, have degraded or 
even disappeared in the meantime. The decrease in forest area is commonly acknowledged by 
the local people, when discussing the history of the landscape. 
3.2.3.2 Kansa Revenue Village 
Kansa (consisting of three villages: Upper Kansa, Jirpani Kansa and Handiduha Kansa) as per 
the settlement, finalised in 1981, includes the following areas: 
 
Government Land 779.4800 ha (7.795 km2) 
Private Land 22.3850 ha (0.224 km2) 
Total area 801.8650 ha (8.019 km2) 
 
Government Land includes the following categories: 
 
Rakhit Kata 27.0400 ha 
thereof Grazing Area 6.4000 ha 
thereof Village Forest (Grama Jungle) 20.4000 ha 
 
Sarbasadharana 0.7550 ha 
 
Abad Jagya Anabadi (cultivable waste land) 0.8100 ha (0.008 km2) 
 
Abad Ajagya Anabadi (non-cultivable waste land) 750.8750 ha (7.509 km2) 
thereof “hilly area” (Parbat: larger hills with forest) 740.1340 ha  
thereof “stony area” (Patro Boni) 10.7410 ha  
“Parbat”: larger hills covered with forest (Parbat), smaller hills covered with forest (Pahar) and rocky hills (with 
or without tree cover) are classified as “Parbat”. This type of area is subdivided into Parbat I (the majority of the 
trees have a girth which is greater than one foot) and Parbat II (the majority of the trees have a girth of less than 
one foot) (1 foot = 30.48 cm). In the Tahsildar documents for Kansa, it is not mentioned whether the area classi-
fied as “Parbat” relates to Parbat I or II. However, data mentioned in the Kendujhar Working Plan, along with 
my own observations, confirms that the forest in this area mostly consists of “pole crops”, poles having an aver-
age size between 30 and 60 cm girth or less.  
“Patro Boni”: flat stones, stony area, small stony hills or rock formations come under Patro Boni. 
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Podu land (swiddens) is not registered as private land. Thus the shifting cultivators have no 
legal backing for their agricultural practice and are completely dependent upon the forest set-
tlement officers, who may or may not exclude podu land from protected/reserved forest. 
Land classified as forest (grama jungle, parbat), within the village area, is under the joint 
control of the Revenue and Forest Departments. The territory belongs to the Revenue De-
partment, the vegetation to the Forest Department. Rights of use of such forest by the villag-
ers are at the discretion of the Forest Department. It will be discussed later, how far the Forest 
Department implements its policies, rules and regulations in the forest areas of the villages in 
the research area. 
 
Population density in Kansa: Population Density in Keonjhar District: 
1981: 31.67 inhabitants / km2 (60 households) 1961: 90 inhabitants / km2 
1991: 29.67 inhabitants / km2 (54 households) 1971: 116 inhabitants / km2 
1996: 30.05 inhabitants / km2 1981: 136 inhabitants / km2 
 1991: 161 inhabitants / km2 
 2001: 190 inhabitants / km2 
 
Population density is much less in Kansa than in Kodipasa, and than the average population 
density for the district as a whole. Also, the population has been relatively stable for the last 
twenty years. 
In 1981, the 60 households in Kansa, owned on average only 0.373 ha of private land. In 
1991, among 54 households, this figure rose slightly to 0.4145 ha., which was still less than 
half of the average land property per household in Kodipasa. 
93.64% of the total area of Kansa has been classified as non-cultivable wasteland, and less 
than one hectare is classified as cultivable wasteland. Almost all of the land is hilly forest 
area. However, because the land used for shifting cultivation is not registered as private land, 
the above figures do not tell us much about the de facto use of land belonging to the villagers 
that live in the forest. 
3.2.4 Private agricultural land 
Let us now consider the most important official land category, for the purpose of an analysis 
of the importance of farming, in the area under study. This is agricultural land considered as 
private property by the government. 
During the settlement of the area in the Juang and Bhuiya pirhs, settlement officers used 
various categories by which to classify cultivable land. Such categories were based on criteria 
of the number of yields per year, the quality of the land and the type of crops cultivated. 
Based on such classifications land revenue was levied. The rates of rent per hectare of these 
categories, were therefore an indication as to the value of the land (see table 26 below). Land 
categories, as documented in the land registry office, give some indication of the quality and 
size of the land, when the settlement took place. 
Based on the following analysis of official data, two statements can be made: firstly, the 
bulk of the land registered as private agricultural land is of rather low productivity, partly ex-
plaining and confirming the problem of local food scarcity from local agricultural production. 
Secondly, it is not of a sufficient enough size to feed the population. If one takes the actual 
number of consumers in 1999, and multiplies it by the size of agricultural land necessary to 
feed one consumer for one year (including seed), this indicates the scarcity of land and thus 
rice in the villages.  
The categories of agricultural land and rates of rent per hectare, in the land registers, for 
the two villages are as follows:  
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Table 26: Agricultural land categories and rates of rent per ha 
Sarada I 4.00 Rs 
Sarada II 3.50 Rs 
Sarada III 2.50 Rs 
Taila 2.50 Rs 
Bajefasal 4.50 Rs 
Biali 2.50 Rs 
(Actually, no land rent is collected; the above numbers are given as an indicators of the value of the land.) 
 
Sarada: this refers to single crop paddy fields with one annual paddy harvest. This category is 
subdivided into three classes, Sarada I, Sarada II and Sarada III. Sarada I is low land with 
good water conditions that enable the growth of long-term paddy, which is harvested during 
the month of December. Sarada II and Sarada III fields are of lower productivity than Sarada 
I fields, due to their location on medium and higher levels of the terrain and therefore they 
have a higher run-off of water. Midterm varieties of paddy are cultivated on these fields, 
which are harvested in November. 
The size and distribution of these three land types, for the two villages, are as follows: 
 
Sarada I in Kodipasa  3.76 ha 
Sarada I in Kansa*  5.42 ha 
Sarada I in Upper Kansa  0 ha 
(* All of this land lies in Jirpani Kansa, there is no land classified as Sarada I in Upper Kansa.) 
 
Sarada II in Kodipasa  7.4195 ha 
Sarada II in Kansa  1.6850 ha 
Sarada II in Upper Kansa 0 ha 
 
Sarada III in Kodipasa  66.6274 ha 
Sarada III in Kansa  1.0800 ha 
Sarada III in Upper Kansa  0 ha 
 
Total Sarada land in Kodipasa  77.8069 ha 
Total Sarada land in Kansa  8.1850 ha 
Total Sarada land in Upper Kansa  0 ha 
 
The bulk of the agricultural land in Kodipasa (81.5%) is classified by the settlement records 
as Sarada land. However, more than 85% of Sarada land, at medium and higher levels of the 
terrain, belongs to the lowest quality category. 9.5% of the land comes under the category of 
second class Sarada land, and only 4.8% comes under first class Sarada land. Thus, the ma-
jority of local Sarada land is characterised by low productivity. 
There is no Sarada land of any category available in Upper Kansa. 
 
Yield data (in kg paddy per hectare) for non-irrigated paddy cultivation in Kodipasa Gram 
Panchayat for the year 1997/98 (considered as a good year) is as follows: 
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Lowland paddy, local varieties: 850 kg 595 kg rice 
Lowland paddy, HYV30 1500 kg 1050 kg rice 
Medium land paddy, local varieties 800 kg 560 kg rice 
Medium land, HYV 1200 kg 840 kg rice 
Upland paddy, local varieties 700 kg 490 kg rice 
Upland paddy, HYV 1000 kg 700 kg rice 
(Source: Junior Agriculture Officer, Suakati, Banspal) 
 
Data on the area of Kodipasa Gram Panchayat, as per categories of agricultural land situation, 
in hectares, clearly indicates that the majority of agricultural land is high land with lower pro-
ductivity: 
 
High land: 309.4 ha 
Medium land 42.2 ha 
Low land 28.4 ha 
 
Based on this data, it is assumed that there are yields of between 595 and 700 kg rice per hec-
tare, from the majority of cultivable land in the area under study, for further general calcula-
tions. 700 kg rice may be produced with HYV on Sarada III land. This figure is also the aver-
age yield for all the types of land mentioned above. Rice yields per hectare, on all other types 
of land are lower than the figures quoted.  
Assuming a good harvest of 595 kg rice per hectare, 0.4 ha yields 238 kg rice per year. Di-
vided by 365 days, this gives 650 gr. rice, a sufficient quantity for an adult consumer. This 
calculation does not include seed. Taking a harvest rate of 1:10, 23.8 kg rice (approx. 33 kg 
paddy) per consumer has to be produced additionally as seed. Thus, an area producing 262 kg 
rice is necessary to feed one consumer for one year. In a good agricultural year; this requires 
an area of 0.4386 ha per consumer under local conditions. Therefore, for the 545 consumers31 
in 1998/99, an agricultural area of 239 ha would be required. 
As some farmers apply chemical fertilizers and use HYV, a more “optimistic” yield of 
700 kg rice per hectare may also be assumed: this is the yield calculated using the locally 
given harvest rate of 1:10 in a good year. With 100 kg paddy seeds, one hectare of bila land 
may be culivated, yielding 1000 kg paddy, i.e. 700 kg rice. Under this condition, only 
0.3728 ha per consumer unit would be necessary. Thus, for 545 consumers an agricultural 
area of 203.176 ha would be required.  
 
Biali: this refers to single crop paddy fields with one annual harvest of short term paddy 
which is harvested before the middle of October. If such land is cultivated after the paddy 
harvest, with a second crop other than paddy, it is called Biali do Fasal. Biali land refers to 
unbounded medium or upland paddy fields.  
 
Kodipasa 2.915 ha 
Kansa 0.560 ha 
Upper Kansa 0 ha 
 
                                                           
30 High Yielding Variety 
31 The number of the total population under study and the number of consumers are not identical: a person aged 
twelve and above is considered in this study as one consumer unit, whereas a person aged between three and 
eleven is considered as half a consumer unit. See “definition of variables” in the appendix. 
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Taila: this refers to land, which is cleared from bush jungle in order to cultivate short-term 
hill paddy, oil seed, pulses, millets etc. Taila fields are unbounded medium or upland fields. 
Most of the swiddens in both villages have not been legally acknowledged as private taila 
land. It is assumed that taila land ascribed to specific households was land with short fallow 
periods, cultivated by the same households in the years prior to and during settlement. 
 
Kodipasa: 5.386 ha 
Kansa: 7.095 ha 
(Upper Kansa) 2.255 ha 
 
Bajefasal: this refers to dry land on which crops other than paddy can be grown (maize, mil-
let, oilseed, pulses, or vegetables (potatoes, tomatoes, cucumbers, cabbages, egg-plants). Us-
ing the local land categorisation, this corresponds to badi land, which is, however, partly cul-
tivated with paddy (see village section map). 
 
Kansa:  6.035 ha 
(Upper Kansa) 3.7 ha 
Kodipasa: 9.345 ha 
 
However, the terminology used by the local farmers in the villages does not correspond with 
all of these categories of the official land settlement. Land locally classified as bila land 
mainly comes under the category of Sarada. The term bila is probably derived from the word 
bera; an old term used to describe low-lying fields with sufficient moisture (ODG 1986: 254) 
in contrast to goda land, an old term in Orissa for so-called “uplands” (ibid.). 
In the land settlement of Keonjhar in 1914/15 upland or goda land was subdivided into 
three classes: 
“The first class goda land comprised (...) homestead lands which were heavily manured every year and pro-
duced crops like maize, mustard and vegetables. Second class Goda were ordinary uplands situated at a dis-
tance from the homestead lands and were seldom manured, and grew goda Dhan (Biali; autumn rice sown in 
May-June and harvested in August-September), Rasi [niger; N.O.] or Surguja. These lands were not capable 
of bearing crops every year and were therefore, cultivated normally every alternate year. The third class 
Goda lands were generally high and dry for their situation near the foot of the hills. The soil was mostly 
rocky and covered with gravel and small pieces of stones and therefore produced poor crops once or twice in 
in two or three years and sometimes four years”. 
The two local categories of badi and guda in the Juang area are included in the general use of 
the term goda. However, this term no longer appeared as a land category in the settlement of 
1971-1981, although the Juang and other local farmers still use it. 
The term taila refers to the practice of clearing “bush jungle”, without further information 
as to the length of the fallow period, or regrowth, at all. However, it clearly is related to the 
term toila used locally by the Juang. Although there is an official land category for swidden 
fields, very little land has been classified as taila in the two villages. 
Due to the different terminology used for the classification of agricultural land during the 
settlement of 1972-1981, compared with local terminology, the following observations have 
to be considered: 
– Land coming under the category of Sarada III, may be cultivated as local guda land; if it is 
of poor quality and in an unfavourable location. Thus, part of the Sarada III land in fact is 
guda land. 
– Land coming under the official category of Taila may equally be of varying quality: keep-
ing guda land fallow for more than four years results in “bushy” vegetation, which is 
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cleared and burnt, before becoming “forest”. Thus, what is recorded as Taila may be con-
sidered to be guda, by the local people. 
– The category of Biali refers to land considered by local farmers as guda land (unbounded 
medium or upland field). 
– The category of Bajefasal may include land, which is considered by local farmers as badi 
land. 
3.2.4.1 Local scarcity of agricultural land 
The availability of land for agricultural production, and the access to it, are the main factors 
by which an understanding can be gained about the situation and economic strategies of the 
villagers, not only with regard to agricultural production, but also with regard to other eco-
nomic opportunities such as wood selling and wage labour. However, the availability of agri-
cultural land has several dimensions: its institutional availability is not necessarily congruent 
with its physical availability, as is shown in the following: 
 
Table 27: Agricultural land in both villages as per the settlement records 
 Private 
land ha 
Agricultural 
land ha 
Sarada 
I 
Sarada 
II 
Sarada 
III 
 
Taila 
 
Bajefasal 
 
Biali 
Kodipasa 97.7385 95.4529 3.9% 7.77% 69.8% 5.64% 9.79% 3.05% 
Upper Kansa -* 5.9550  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 37.87% 62.13% 0% 
Kansa 22.3850  21.8750  24.77% 7.7% 4.94% 32.43% 27.58% 2.56% 
* Data not available. 
 
The total nominal agricultural land in Kodipasa and Upper Kansa, as per the settlement re-
cords, is an area of 101.4079 ha. Taking the population of 1999, this is an average area of 
0.7456 ha per household and 0.1861 ha per consumer. This is insufficient to produce enough 
rice for own consumption, as will be shown below, and the nominal area is too small to feed 
the local population. 
The area required to produce enough rice to feed one consumer depends upon the con-
sumption rate per consumer, as well as on the productivity of agricultural land. Both variables 
are not fixed. The daily consumption rate of rice, per consumer, varies between households, 
per season and per age. Productivity is dependent upon the quality of land, climate, cultiva-
tion techniques and labour input. The following calculations are based on various assumptions 
of consumption rates and productivity. 
A rather optimistic assumption of 0.65 kg rice daily, per consumer unit, will be taken as 
the basis for calculation in the first case. In the second case, an average consumption of 
0.54 kg rice will be calculated and in the third case a calculation of a poor daily consumption 
of 0.45 kg rice per day will be used.32 
The assumption of 700 kg rice per hectare in the research area is the average yield for vari-
ous types of soil quality and rice varieties. However, this is a rather optimistic assumption, as 
                                                           
32 The average consumption, as per the census of 1998/99 was 0.54 kg rice per consumer. The question about the 
daily consumption of rice was, whenever possible, directed to the women of a household, because they are re-
sponsible for cooking. Answers by them were usually given in the measurement of a local brass vessel, called 
mano; this corresponds to approx. 0.65 kg rice. Daily consumption varies between 0.35 to 0.74 kg rice per adult 
consumer. This partly reflects the difference of the economic status of the households. Rice consumption, 
moreover, varies seasonally according to the availability of other food, which adds to the daily rice consumption 
(e.g. mango, jackfruit, maize, millet). However, rice is the most important staple food and to have little or no rice 
is a sign of poverty. 
VILLAGE ECONOMY 97 
 
local conditions are not very favourable to high yields and few households have the means 
with which to buy HYV and chemical fertilizer. Thus a lower yield of 595 kg rice per hectare 
is also used to estimate the local rice production, under less favourable conditions. 
The area required to produce rice including seed for one consumer, for one year, under 
these various conditions is as follows (for the calculation see appendix: “Area required per 
consumer”): 
 
0.65 kg rice per consumer / 595 kg rice per hectare:  0.4386 ha per consumer 
0.65 kg rice per consumer / 700 kg rice per hectare: 0.3728 ha per consumer 
0.54 kg rice per consumer / 595 kg rice per hectare: 0.3644 ha per consumer 
0.54 kg rice per consumer / 700 kg rice per hectare:  0.3097 ha per consumer 
0.45 kg rice per consumer / 595 kg rice per hectare:  0.3037 ha per consumer 
0.45 kg rice per consumer / 700 kg rice per hectare:  0.2581 ha per consumer 
 
Therefore, using these calculations, the area recorded as private agricultural land at the end of 
the settlement in 1981, is not enough to feed the local population of the two villages under 
study. Only by cultivating a larger area or by raising the productivity per area, would it be 
possible to yield sufficient rice with which to feed the local population. 
 
Table 28: Private agricultural land and required land 
Various rates of rice consumption 
and yields 
 
Necessary land for 545 consumers 
 
Deficit of required land 
0.65 kg daily cons. / 
700 kg rice per ha 
203.0 ha 50.0% 
0.65 kg daily cons. / 
595 kg rice per ha 
239.0 ha 57.6% 
0.54 kg daily cons. / 
700 kg rice per ha 
168.8 ha 39.9% 
0.54 kg daily cons. / 
595 kg rice per ha 
198.6 ha 48.9% 
0.45 kg daily cons. / 
700 kg rice per ha 
140.7 ha 27.9% 
0.45 kg daily cons. / 
595 kg rice per ha 
165.5 ha 38.7% 
 
However, there are two reasons why the above data on officially registered agricultural land is 
not a good indicator of local agricultural production: on one hand, land not recorded as private 
property nevertheless may be cultivated, as is the case with areas of shifting cultivation and 
part of guda land. On the other hand, land registered as “cultivable waste” may be encroached 
and transformed into agricultural land. Even land registered as uncultivable waste can be cul-
tivated by the method of shifting cultivation. Thus, in chapter 3.2.5, local production of rice 
will be estimated using seed and not “land on paper” as an indicator of the de facto agricul-
tural production in the two villages and their degree of self-sufficiency with rice. 
3.2.4.2 Private land property by households 
The total amount of cultivable land, which is registered as private land, does not yet tell us 
anything about land distribution among the households. Land, as well as land scarcity, are un-
evenly distributed among the households, as well as among the various groups of Juang, 
Munda, Gouda and Santal, as will be shown in chapter 4. The uneven distribution of agricul-
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tural land is a certain indicator of the uneven dependency upon other sources of income with 
which to feed the household members. 
Operational holdings (OH) in the District of Keonjhar are classified officially into five 
categories according to the size of the holdings: 
 
Marginal 0.02-1 hectares 
Small 1-2 hectares 
Semi-Medium 2-4 hectares 
Medium 4-10 hectares 
Large > 10 hectares 
 
The criterion of the size of the operational holding does not imply any specific quality of the 
cultivated land and is therefore of only restricted value for a socio-economic evaluation of the 
peasants in the district. However, the application of this criterion to a smaller area, with simi-
lar natural conditions for the farmers concerned, as in the study area, is admissible. 
Based on data of the settlement of 1981, the situation of the 136 households, with regard to 
private land property, is as follows: 
 
Table 29: Private land property of the households in both villages 
 
Category 
Number of households 
(total 136) 
Private land  
per household in ha 
Landless 16 0 
Marginal 10 0.01-0.19 
Marginal 26 0.2-0.39 
Marginal 28 0.4-0.59 
Marginal 18 0.6-0.79 
Marginal 7 0.8-0.99 
Small 12 1.0-1.19 
Small 6 1.2-1.39 
Small 4 1.4-1.59 
Small 3 1.6-1.79 
Small 2 1.8-1.99 
Semi-medium 1 2.125 
Semi-medium 2 2.435 
Medium 1 5.475 
 
The size of the privately owned land, at the end of the settlement, varied between 5.475 ha in 
the case of the richest household, to 0.133 ha belonging to the poorest household. However, 
not mentioned in the Revenue Inspector documents are those households with no privately 
owned land.  
In 1999, the average amount of private agricultural land per household is 0.6577 ha; 
0.1797 ha per consumer. 
11.8% of the 136 households are landless, 65.4% are marginal farmers, 19.8% are small 
farmers and only 3% belong to the category of semi-medium and medium farmers. 
If the landless households are left out of the calculation, the situation of the peasants is as 
follows: 74.2% of the cultivators are marginal farmers, 22.5% are small farmers and 3.3% are 
semi-medium and medium farmers. 
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Diagram 1: land per household 
 
The official categories of cultivators (Tripathy 1997:975) used by the Census of 1991 for the 
whole of Orissa were: 
 
1. Marginal farmers:  less than 1 ha (largest group in Orissa) 
2. Small farmers: 1- 2 ha (second largest group in Orissa) 
3. Medium farmers: 2-4 ha (third large group in Orissa) 
4. Large farmers: 4 or more ha (smallest group in Orissa) 
 
Marginal and small farmers generally have no margin for agricultural surplus. Medium farm-
ers can be termed self-sufficient. Large farmers generate an agricultural surplus. 
In Keonjhar District, operational holdings are categorised in a slightly different manner 
(District Statistical Handbook 1993:20): 
 
Marginal Operational Holdings: less than 1 ha 
Small Operational Holdings: 1-2 ha 
Semi-Medium Operational Holdings: 2-4 ha 
Medium Operational Holdings: 4-10 ha 
Large Operational Holdings: 10 ha and above 
 
‘Medium farmers’ in the census for the whole of Orissa are classified as ‘semi-medium opera-
tional holdings’ in Keonjhar; the category of ‘large farmers’ in the census for Orissa is subdi-
vided into ‘medium operational holdings’ and ‘large operational holdings’ in Keonjhar. 
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According to the 1991 Census, as well as my own data on the two villages, the situation of 
land ownership in the whole of Orissa, in Keonjhar District and in the two villages, was as 
follows: 
 
Table 30: Percentage of various operational holdings in Orissa, Keonjhar and the two villages 
 
Size of operational holding 
 
All Orissa 
 
Keonjhar District 
Kodipasa  
and Upper Kansa  
Marginal: up to 1 ha 53.7% 52.2% 74.2% 
Small: 1-2 ha 26.3% 28.9% 22.5% 
Semi-Medium: 2-4 ha 15.0% 14.6% 2.5% 
Medium: 4-10 4.1% 0.8% 
Large: 10 ha and above 5.0% 0.2% 0.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
Compared to the general situation in Orissa, the two villages show a much higher percentage 
of marginal farmers, together with a lower percentage of all other categories of small farmers, 
semi-medium farmers, medium and large farmers.  
Also in comparison to the situation within the District of Keonjhar, farmers of the two vil-
lages under study are worse off. This is explainable by the high percentage of tribal popula-
tion in the two villages. 
This data clearly shows that the overwhelming majority of the farmers, in the two villages 
under study, belong to the marginal and small farmers, who have no agricultural surplus and 
are not even considered to be self-sufficient. This means that they are dependent upon addi-
tional income either by wage labour, small business or wood selling. The precarious situation 
of the farmers, in the villages under study, is further aggravated by the uncertainties of rain 
fed paddy cultivation, little possibility of irrigation and low quality soil. 
Data on the availability of land, per consumer, of the 136 households under study in 1999, 
illustrates the situation with regard to household size. Assuming a daily consumption of 
0.5 kg rice per consumer unit and a rice yield of 700 kg rice per hectare, a minimal area of 
0.2868 ha per consumer is required, to feed one consumer, for one year, including seed for the 
next agricultural cycle. 
In Kodipasa, only twenty households (17.3%) had enough private land per consumer in 
1999 and 55 households (47.4%) possessed less than half of the minimal area required, per 
consumer. 
In Upper Kansa all of the households, except one, owned less than the minimal area re-
quired, per consumer and fourteen households (70%) owned less than half of the minimal area 
required per consumer.  
 
However, land tenure on paper for the various households, does not necessarily correlate with 
the area cultivated by them: they may cultivate more land than they own; they may encroach 
government land and/or pledge, rent or informally buy land from other land owners. They 
may also cultivate less land than they own, by keeping land fallow, by mortgaging, renting or 
informally selling it to other people. 
Thus, in the following section, data on seed available for the households, in 1999, is used 
as an additional indicator of the agricultural production of the households and their degree of 
self-sufficiency with rice. 
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3.2.5 Comparison of registered and de facto cultivated land 
By comparing the use of seed, in 1999, with the nominal land (i.e. private agricultural land) 
owned by the local population and the various households, it is possible to estimate the area 
actually under cultivation, as well as the differences between nominal and cultivated agricul-
tural land of the entire population and the various households (see chapter 4). It can be shown 
that although the estimated cultivated area is larger than the agricultural area on paper, there is 
still a considerable land and food scarcity to be compensated for by other sources of income 
such as wage labour and/or wood selling. 
To estimate the size of the area sown with paddy seed in hectares in 1999, seed per house-
hold was converted in mana land: to cultivate one mana land, 20kg paddy seed is necessary. 
Two mana are approximately equivalent to one acre of land. Thus, the amount of seed was 
divided by 20 kg to obtain the number of mana. The number of mana were then divided by 
two, to obtain the number of acres: finally the number of acres were multiplied by 0.4047 to 
obtain the area in hectares (or roughly, kg seed divided by 100). 
 
Kodipasa: 
Estimating the actual cultivated land in Kodipasa, by converting paddy seed into cultivated 
area results in 106.4057 ha land being cultivated with paddy. Comparing the estimated culti-
vated land with land registered as private agricultural land, in 1999, approximately 8.47% 
more land has been cultivated by the villagers than there is agricultural land on paper: This 
figure is not surprising, as since the land settlement, additional government wasteland has 
been encroached by the farmers. If fallow guda land, together with land cultivated by several 
outsiders, in the village territory of Kodipasa, were to have have been included in the census, 
the additional de facto agricultural land in 1999, would have been even more than the esti-
mated area of 8.47%. The following table illustrates the estimated scarcity of land, under 
various conditions of daily rice consumption and land productivity in Kodipasa, by estimating 
the difference between cultivated and necessary land:  
 
Table 31: Scarcity of land under various conditions of daily rice consumption and land productivity  
in Kodipasa 
 
Rice consumption and yields 
Necessary land for 
461.25 consumers in ha 
Difference between cultivated  
and necessary land in % 
0.65 kg daily cons. / 
700 kg rice per ha / 
0.3728 ha per cons. 
171.9540 38.12* 
0.65 kg daily cons. / 
595 kg rice per ha / 
0.44 ha per cons. 
202.9500 47.57 
0.54 kg daily cons. / 
700 kg rice per ha /  
0.3097 ha per cons. 
142.8491 25.51 
0.54 kg daily cons. / 
595 kg rice per ha /  
0.3644 ha per cons. 
168.0795 36.69 
0.45 kg daily cons. / 
700 kg rice per ha / 
0.2868 ha per cons. 
119.0486 10.62 
0.45 kg daily cons. / 
595 kg rice per ha / 
0.3374 ha per cons. 
140.0816 24.04 
* Thus an additional 38.12% of the cultivated land would have to be cultivated in order to feed all consumers. 
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Upper Kansa: 
Because toila land is not registered as private agricultural land, the difference between culti-
vated land and nominal land here is even larger than in Kodipasa. Land for cultivation is not 
perceived as a scarce resource by the shifting cultivators of Upper Kansa. The reason why the 
peasants do not produce more, is not because they do not have access to sufficient land. The 
scarcity of locally produced rice here, is linked partially to high labour input for shifting cul-
tivation, restricting the size of swiddens. Also, these shifting cultivators do not produce more 
because they realise that wood selling and wage labour are viable options for obtaining an in-
come. 
 
Conclusion: 
Based on available data, the following statement can be made: neither the area officially rec-
ognised as agricultural land, nor the area actually under cultivation in the two villages, pro-
duce enough rice to feed the local population under the given conditions of cultivation. There 
is a scarcity of locally produced rice, but this is not tantamount to a scarcity of land. 
In Kodipasa, peasants complain about the scarcity of agricultural land. By this, they mean 
that there is a lack of land of good agricultural quality worth investing labour on. More waste-
land could be cultivated. However, the encroachment of government land registered as culti-
vable waste is linked to high labour costs and low productivity and does not pay in compari-
son to other sources of income. On the other hand, land productivity could be increased. 
Irrigation systems would lower the risk of crop failure and even allow for a second paddy har-
vest. However, raising the land productivity also requires additional labour and capital, which 
few households can afford. 
Thus, under the given conditions of cultivation there is not enough land in Kodipasa. 
In Upper Kansa the reason for the deficiency of locally produced rice is not scarcity of 
land, but high labour input combined with a low and risky return on labour for shifting culti-
vation in comparison with other opportunities for obtaining an income. 
3.2.6 Self-sufficiency measured by seed per consumer 
The quantity of seed sown, per consumer unit, in 1999, is taken here as a more reliable indica-
tor of the degree of self-sufficiency of the villages and households (with regard to the produc-
tion of rice as staple food) than formally owned land. The average quantity of paddy seed per 
consumer used, in 1999, is below the quantity required per consumer to produce enough rice 
to feed one consumer including seed for the next cultivation period. Again, calculations are 
based on the assumption of various rates of daily consumption, together with a harvest rate of 
1:10. This corresponds to the harvest rate of bila cultivation. Under these conditions the quan-
tity of paddy seed required, to feed one consumer, for one year, including the production of 
seeds is as follows: 
 
Table 32: Required paddy seeds per consumer 
Daily consumption 
of rice in kg 
Annual need of 
rice per consumer 
Converted in paddy 
(multiplied by 1.428) 
Plus 10% 
seed 
Paddy seed in kg  
per consumer (10%) 
0.65  237.25 338.79 372.67 37 
0.54 197.1 281.46 309.60 31 
0.45 164.25 234.55 258 26 
 
The diagram on paddy seed per consumer of the various households illustrates the quantity of 
paddy seed per consumer, which was available in 1999, for both villages: 
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Diagram 2: Paddy seeds per consumer 
 
Based on the total available seed, in 1999, the cultivated area in both villages corresponds to 
an area of 127.2326 ha.  
In Kodipasa the average quantity of paddy seed available, per consumer, in 1999, was 
23.8 kg, this results in an average deficit of 18% / 23% or 36% of paddy seed per consumer. 
Only 39 households (33.6%) sowed 26 kg or more paddy seed per consumer unit in their fam-
ily. Using a calculation of 31 kg seed per consumer with a daily consumption of 0.54 kg rice, 
32 households (27.6%) could sow this amount or more per consumer. 
Thus, compared with the data on nominal land per household and consumer, the degree of 
self-sufficiency is higher, if paddy seed is used as a measure. However, many households may 
be self-sufficient with rice, on an average year only and on a minimal level of daily rice con-
sumption, without any surplus for gifts, ceremonies or emergencies. 
In Upper Kansa the average of paddy seed per consumer, in 1999, was 20.5 kg. Niger seed 
per consumer was 2.32 kg. Converted into paddy seed (multiplied by 2.86) this corresponds to 
approximately 6.64 kg. Thus, the average quantity of 27.14 kg paddy seed per consumer is 
higher than in Kodipasa. However, land productivity in Upper Kansa is lower, the risk of crop 
failure is higher and self-sufficiency with rice with this quantity of seed is not attainable even 
in a good year. 
In Upper Kansa, twelve households (60%) sowed 26 kg or more paddy seeds (including 
niger seed converted to paddy seed) per consumer in their family. The remaining eight house-
holds were below this quantity. However, yields from shifting cultivation are lower and losses 
due to animals from the surrounding forest, are higher, so that the same amount of seed yields 
less than on the plain. 
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On the other hand, the availability of land in Upper Kansa is less restricted than in Kodi-
pasa, which partly explains the higher degree of potential self-sufficiency, with regard to a 
minimum rice consumption of 0.45 kg per day. 
To be landless on paper does not mean to be landless in reality: households with no private 
land may cultivate land from other families, by either renting, buying or seizing (mortgaging) 
it. On the other hand, households with land may cultivate only part or none of it.  
Of the sixteen landless households, twelve are Gouda (75%), one is Munda (6.25%) and 
three are Juang households (18.75%); thus the majority of the landless households belong to 
the non-tribals and immigrants. Investigation into the quantity of paddy seed used by the vari-
ous households in 1999 reveals, that all of the twelve landless Gouda families cultivate paddy 
land, albeit of varying size. The landless Munda household also cultivates paddy land, while 
of the three landless Juang families, one cultivates paddy and the other two do not. 
If considering the households which are not cultivating, i.e. households with no seed, in 
1999, in both villages, the situation is as follows: out of 136 households fourteen are not cul-
tivating (10.3%). Twelve of these non-cultivating households are Juang and eleven of these 
twelve Juang households are registered landowners and only one has no land. The other two 
are one Santal and one Munda household. Both are landowners who were not cultivating their 
land. 
This information clearly shows that the data on land ownership does not correlate with data 
on actual cultivation. This is also visible in Diagram 3 on private land and seed per household 
of both villages, where each blue dot indicates a household with its privately owned land, and 
the corresponding red dot below or above in a vertical line indicates the amount of land actu-
ally cultivated by the household, calculated by the amount of paddy seeds used in 1999. 
 
Diagram 3: Private land and seeds per HH 
 
Furthermore, shifting cultivation on non-registered land in Upper Kansa has to be considered, 
i.e. households in Upper Kansa cultivate additional land, which has not been considered as 
private property by the settlement officers. 
Since the settlement of 1982, there is a clear tendency of reduction in landed property. This 
trend is on one hand connected to the heritage system, which requires the equal sharing of 
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landed property among brothers. In the case of the biggest landowner in Kodipasa (see table 
29), this Juang household was still in possession of 5.475 ha in 1999, due to the fact that this 
land had not yet been divided among the four sons. However, two sons have recently married 
and they will, in due course, get their share of this land. On the other hand, there has been no 
major land reclamation since the settlement to compensate for the needs of the growing popu-
lation. Cultivable land in the area is exhausted. 
3.3 Wage labour 
Wage labour is an important source of income for the population under study. It mainly con-
sists of various forms of farm wage labour and off-farm wage labour activities. The availabil-
ity of wage labour in many cases is irregular, insecure and seasonal, not only for work con-
nected to agriculture, but also for off-farm activities. This is also the reason why it is not 
possible to obtain accurate data on the numbers of days spent by each household member an-
nually for wage labour. Villagers do not count the days they earn wage labour. The same 
methodological problem is linked to quantitative data for wood selling.  
However, based on the estimation of the agricultural production of each household and the 
additional income that it needs in order to purchase further supplies of food and cover other 
minimal needs at the market, it is possible to calculate the deficit of each household. Thus, we 
can calculate how much has to be earned by wage labour and/or wood selling. For households 
which follow a strategy of mixed economy, (combining agriculture, wage labour and wood 
selling) we do not know exactly how much of this deficit is covered by wage labour and how 
much by wood selling. This applies to the majority of households. 
However, based on observations in the field and on the analysis of the number of house-
holds and adults involved in wage labour and wood selling, some general estimations about 
the percentage of income earned by wage labour and wood selling are permissible. These es-
timations will be presented after the general description of the situation with regard to wage 
labour and wood selling in chapter 3.5 
3.3.1 Farm wage labour 
Farm wage labour is seasonal and its availability also depends upon the general agricultural 
conditions. In a good year, more farm wage labour is available, but there is also more work to 
be done on own farms and this has to be combined with farm wage labour. Particularly in bad 
years, when the dependence on farm wage labour is high and the demand for wage labour is 
low, there is an excessive supply of daily wage labour in the region and it is not always possi-
ble to get farm work. 
Weeding, transplanting and harvesting are mainly carried out by women. It is mainly the 
men who carry out the ploughing, together with the construction of embankments, although 
they are also used as wage labour for transplanting, weeding or harvesting paddy. Farm wage 
labour is mainly done outside of the two villages, in neighbouring villages on the plain. The 
salary for farm wage labour is higher in other villages than at home. It is paid in cash or kind 
(paddy). Women receive a daily wage of approximately 20-25 Rs. or seven to twelve mano 
paddy, depending upon their work and the conditions in the labour market for farm work (7-8 
mano for weeding, more for harvesting). They prefer to receive their salary in kind: with 
20 Rs. they can buy approximately 2 kg rice at the market: 7 to 12 mano paddy are equivalent 
to 3.5 to 6 kg paddy which will provide 2.45 to 4.2 kg rice (3.3 kg on average). 
The salary for the men involved in harvesting is higher: they earn 25 to 30 Rs per day or up 
to 15 mano paddy. Their work is to bind the paddy into bundles and to carry it. 
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For the same work the local wage in Kodipasa is 7 mano paddy (2.45 kg rice) plus one 
meal for the women. Men get 9-10 mano paddy plus a meal. 
Another form of farm wage labour is the herding of cattle. There are two work systems for 
herders. One system is part of an old pattern of social division of labour to be found in many 
Indian villages. In this system there are special herders who take care of the cattle belonging 
to the villagers. They receive a small daily remuneration and an annual salary in kind (paddy) 
from each household for grazing the cattle. The Gouda men and women were employed in 
this role at the beginning of their migration to the Juang area and several of them are still 
herders for the Juang. The two Gouda households, which graze the cattle of Kodipasa, man-
age to subsist with this salary; they do not buy any additional rice at the market. 
The other system is individual wage labour as a herder for individual households, i.e. to 
take care of the cattle of one specific household, for an annual salary in cash, daily food and a 
place to sleep, if the herder is employed in a place far away from home. Over a period of time, 
several of the Juang have become this type of herder for the Gouda. It is a job for males; 
mainly Juang boys or unmarried young Juang men. There are various arrangements; in one 
case a young Juang gets daily food and 800 Rs. in cash, for herding the cattle of a Gouda fam-
ily over a period of seven months. Another Juang gets daily food plus 1000 Rs. for seven 
months. Another gets daily food and 1200 Rs. for seven months. Another one gets 7 Khandi 
Rice and daily food. Such arrangements partly ease the burden on the Juang households; there 
is one less consumer in the household, but some additional rice and maybe the possibility of 
an income in cash. However, the money earned by the male Juang herder may be spent at his 
will, and may not necessarily contribute to the household’s cash income. 
In one case, a Gouda man takes care of a large herd of cattle, belonging to the richest 
Juang. He receives a daily allowance of three litres of milk, which he can sell for 30 Rs., plus 
an annual allowance of paddy. His household manages to live on this income.  
The following table shows the number of households and individuals in the two villages 
involved in farm wage labour: 
 
Table 33: Farm wage labour in the two villages 
 
Village 
Total number  
of households 
Households involved  
in farm wage labour 
% of adults involved  
in farm wage labour 
Kodipasa 116 88 (75.9%) 41.5% (153 of 369) 
Upper Kansa 20 13 (65.0%) 29.0% (18 of 62) 
Both villages 136 101 (74.3%) 39.7% (171 of 431) 
3.3.2 Off-farm wage labour 
Off-farm wage labour is less available than farm wage labour. It is mostly uncertain, irregular 
and seasonal. Off-farm activities open to the villagers are mainly for unskilled labour (road 
construction, canal construction, pond digging, mining, stone cutting), with wages paid daily, 
weekly or per quantity of delivered work. Daily wages vary between 25 to 30 Rs. for female 
wage labour for canal construction, road construction and mining. For the same work, men 
are paid 30 to 40 Rs. A skilled labourer in house construction earns 60 Rs. per day, but there 
is only one skilled labourer in Kodipasa (a Santal).  
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Table 34: Off-farm wage labour in the 2 villages 
 
Village 
Total number  
of households 
Households involved  
in off-farm wage labour 
% of adults involved  
in off-farm wage labour 
Kodipasa 116 59 (50.9%) 22.0% (81 of 369) 
Upper Kansa 20 9 (45.0%) 14.5% (9 of 62) 
Both villages 136 68 (50.0%) 20.9% (90 of 431) 
 
With stone cutting, which is exclusively male work, 140 to 270 Rs. per week can be earned 
(24 to 45 Rs. daily), although to earn a wage of 45 Rs. involves very hard and lengthy work 
and is exceptional. 
3.4 Forest as a source of income 
The sale of timber to outsiders, in order to obtain cash income, has been common among the 
Juang, since the 1960s, and probably for much longer.  
McDougal mentions the wood trade and observes that “Men occasionally shape rough 
pieces of lumber from tree trunks and sell them at the market” (McDougal 1963:15). How-
ever, he does not mention either the sale of firewood in general, or the involvement of the 
Juang women in the sale of wood. Bose (1967:106) also refers to the Juang selling wooden 
logs of different types at the market and he even indicates that “recently restrictions have been 
imposed for the cutting of timber from the forest”. According to him the Juang women earn 
some income from the sale of mats, which they make from the leaves of the date palm.  
Rout (1969) is more specific about wood selling activities by those Juang villages situated 
nearby Keonjhargarh. He even mentions “Kudiposa”, the village under study here. He does 
not explicitly specify such activities by the Juang men and/or women and comments generally 
on the sale of wood by “the Juang”. Most probably, however, he refers to Juang men when 
generally referring to “the Juang”. 
“The Juang of Juang Pirh of Keonjhar take logs and loads of firewood to sell in the Keonjhar market. The 
Juangs of Barura, Tangarpara, Gonasika, Rodhua, Champei etc., cut timbers of valuable trees and take the 
trouble of carrying them as far as ten to fifteen miles to sell them in Keonjhargarh weekly market. A log 
fetches three to ten rupees depending on its size and quality and the Juang purchase tobacco, cloth and other 
necessaries with this money. The unmarried boys spend the money for purchasing gifts for their bandhu girls. 
The Juang of the nearby villages always bring loads of firewood to Keonjhargarh for sale. They also make 
charcoal by burning logs of wood into embers and sell those. The villagers of Kudiposa, for example, regu-
larly sell fuel and charcoal. A load of firewood fetches twelve annas or a rupee, but a load of charcoal may be 
sold for three to four rupees.  
The Juang women earn a little money by selling mats in the markets. They weave mats of date-palm leaves in 
their leisure hours and sell these in the market. A mat is sold for eight annas or a rupee and the money may 
be spent for buying parched rice, sweet potatoe, cloth or ornaments” (1969:42). 
There is no specific mention of girls and women selling wood and buying rice with the 
money. There are various indications that the selling of forest products such as timber and fu-
elwood has since then gained considerable importance to the local economy of the Juang vil-
lages, at least for those not too far away from the markets. In more remote Juang villages, the 
distance for carrying timber and firewood to the market may be too far to be walked, there 
and back in one day. In some cases, however, road communications make it possible to carry 
wood to the market and return by public transport. The other option, of carrying the load by 
public transport and walking back to the village is avoided, due to the risk of being caught by 
forest guards, at the check gates of the forest department road. 
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One indication of the growing economic significance of wood is the fact that women have 
entered the business of wood selling. Some fifteen to twenty years ago, in Kodipasa and 
Kansa, the women and girls did not sell any firewood, whereas nowadays many of them carry 
two to three head loads of firewood, per week, to the market in Keonjahr or to the nearby vil-
lages. Also, the involvement of the Juang men in the sale of wood has increased. They have 
always carried timber to the town and larger villages on the plain. However, compared with 
the situation, twenty to thirty years ago, they admit that the frequency with which they have 
done this has increased. Also, in recent years, they have sold and continue to sell larger quan-
tities of firewood. To make three weekly trips to other villages on the plain, or to the town it-
self, to sell timber and firewood is something that the elder Juang did not witness in their 
youth. 
According to the price index of 1966 to 1968, one rupee could buy the Juang 0.889 kg rice 
in 1966, 0.826 kg rice in 1967 and 0.811 kg rice in 1968 (ODG 1986:213). Based on the fact 
that a load of firewood would fetch one rupee in the 1960s, this would not have been enough 
for the Juang to buy even 1 kg rice. In 1998/99, they could only purchase 0.1 kg rice per ru-
pee. However the price for a head load of fuelwood was 30 to 40 Rs., according to season and 
size, i.e. 3 to 4 kg rice, could be bought at the market in Keonjhar for this money (the price 
for one kg of rice at this market during the period of this research was around 10 Rs.). Al-
though there are considerable seasonal and annual fluctuations in prices for agricultural crops 
and rice, especially due to fluctuations in supply, the price for firewood and timber has stead-
ily increased during the last few decades and therefore the economic incentive to sell wood 
has strengthened with higher returns to labour.  
Part of the explanation for the growing significance of wood to the local economy of the 
Juang villages, is related to the growing demand for it, from the towns and villages on the 
plain. The village elders remember the time when Keonjhargarh was a relatively small town-
ship, with the Collectorate at its centre. It had fewer inhabitants, few “hotels” and almost no 
shops. In the meantime, the district capital as well as the surrounding villages have grown, 
accompanied by a rising demand for timber and fuelwood, due to dwindling access to local 
forest resources.  
The fact that the hill forests in the Juang area have increased in importance, as providers of 
timber and fuelwood, is also indicated by an increasing number of outsiders entering these 
forests, to collect timber and fuelwood, either for their own use or for sale. According to the 
Juang of Kodipasa and Kansa, approximately twenty years ago, hardly any outsiders came to 
the forests of Kodipasa and Kansa for this purpose. The forest resources were mainly used by 
the Juang and Bhuiya. Nowadays, early in the morning, one may observe columns of men, 
women and children from the villages on the plain, entering the forest They carry small axes 
on their shoulders, and food supplies; as they will spend the entire day in the hills. By late af-
ternoon, they return back home with bundles of wood and small timber. The pressure on for-
est resources, due to the local villagers, as well as outsiders, has therefore increased. Accord-
ing to the elder Juang, the felling of trees for fuelwood production was not carried out in the 
past, as there was sufficient dry wood to be sold. They consider the cutting of trees for fire-
wood to be a result of the growing scarcity of dead wood. 
There is a continuous demand for fuelwood throughout the whole year. The price of fire-
wood, however, fluctuates considerably, according to the season and the market supply. More 
suppliers offer their bundles during the months when there is little or no agricultural activity, 
whereas, during agricultural peak seasons fewer people have time to collect fuelwood for sale 
and the price increases. Part-time wood sellers are, at this time, busy with their own farms or 
work as farm wage labourers. Customers will buy into stock when prices are low, so that even 
with a large supply, a wood seller, in most cases, will sell his bundle. Thus, the price for an 
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average bundle of firewood, carried by a woman on her head, varies between 30 and 40 Ru-
pees. The weight of such a bundle varies somewhat between 22 to 25 kg. Girls may carry 
smaller bundles of approximately 12 kg for which they will receive about 10 Rupees, in 
nearby villages. A man gets between 60 and 90 Rupees for his firewood; two bundles of about 
20 kg each are fixed at both ends of a pole, which he carries on one shoulder (this is locally 
called bahangi; ODG 1986:36).  
To calculate the daily income from the sale of wood, the amount the sellers receive at the 
market has to be divided by two days labour; one day for collecting and preparing, the other 
day for selling. Thus the income from a day’s work for wood selling is between 15 and 20 Rs. 
for women and between 30 and 45 Rs for men. It is theoretically possible for an adult wood-
seller to earn a weekly income of between 90 to 120 Rs. (females) and 180 to 270 Rs. (males), 
according to seasonal price fluctuations. Spending this money on rice allows the purchase of 9 
to 27 kg rice weekly, i.e. enough to feed between one and four adult consumers throughout 
the year. However, the pattern of making three weekly trips to the forest to collect wood, and 
the same number of trips to sell it, is not viable throughout the whole year, due to seasonal 
difficulties (heat or heavy rain) and the hardship of this kind of work. 
Wood-selling activities in Kodipasa and Kansa increase considerably during the first three 
months of the year (January, February, March), when agricultural activities have reduced to a 
minimum or ceased altogether. Harvesting and threshing of paddy has finished and work for 
the next cultivation cycle has not yet started. More people now have sufficient time to collect 
wood, and the weather conditions are suitable enough for working in the forest. Due to its 
abundance, the price of firewood declines at this time of year. The price of timber for con-
struction purposes fluctuates according to the time of year and the relative demand for it. 
Timber yields a good price in these months, as it is an ideal time for construction and repairs. 
During this period in Kodipasa, one gets the impression of living in a village of woodsellers; 
groups of men and women leave their houses in the morning with their axes, and return in the 
afternoon, heavily laden with firewood or timber. The wood that has been carried from the 
forest has to be prepared for sale; the small poles and branches have to be split into well-sized 
logs and properly fixed into bundles for transport and sale. Women carry the bundles as head 
loads, men carry two firewood bundles fixed to a pole carried on one shoulder. Trees cut for 
the purpose of firewood for sale include more than twenty species (see the list of “Reserved 
tree species in the forests of Keonjhar Division” in the appendix), of which some are classi-
fied as reserved species; these are protected by law and their felling is illegal. 
The species cut for timber purposes include Shorea robusta (Sal), Diospyros melanoxylon 
(O = Kendu; J = Teren), Buchanania lanzan (O = Charo, J = Tarap), Schleichera oleosa (O = 
Kusum, J = Bangrur), Madhuca indica (O = Mahul, J = Munnun), Terminalia alata (O = 
Asan, J = Antanak), Albizia lebbeck (O&J = Sirisa), Mitragyna parviflora or Adina Cordifolia 
(Koimo), Jhalai (botanical name not identified by the author), Croton oblingofolius or Croton 
roxburghii (Putuli). Poles to be sold as timber for construction purposes have to be rectangu-
lar in shape and therefore have to be cut accordingly. 
During this period of time, outsiders visit the village to contract the local men for the pro-
duction of timber. While I was in the village in 1999, two men from Keonjhar ordered 40 to 
50 timber poles of approximately three metres in length. The price that they paid to the local 
men was 40 Rs. per pole. This was lower than the price that the timber would have fetched 
outside the village, however, this reflected the fact that the contractors had to take charge of 
the transport and risked being caught by the foresters. Several of the Juang and Munda men 
accepted this offer and the timber was then taken away by lorry. Two days later another con-
tractor ordered 120 poles, paying 37.5 Rs. per pole. A group of five Juang and two Munda 
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men accepted this offer and supplied the timber to a village nearby the Narayanpur Reserved 
Forest. 
The weekly working pattern of the wood trade during the peak season consists of alterna-
tively collecting wood in the forest and preparing it for sale one day, and carrying it to market 
for sale the next. Typically, Monday is a day of rest. Those people who have made money 
from their sales at the Sunday market, may use it to purchase and drink handia or mahul. 
From April onwards, wood selling activities decrease with the start of activities in the 
fields, which increase in the middle of May. In Upper Kansa, the men are busy clearing new 
swidden plots, from the middle of March onwards, and women are busy clearing the second-
year swidden fields. Towards the end of April, the first ploughing of bila fields starts in 
Kodipasa, after the first rainfall. Depending upon the size of the cultivated land, the availabil-
ity of labour and climatic conditions, wood selling is continued by various households and to 
varying degrees, in combination with the necessary agricultural work. In 1999, in Upper 
Kansa for example, the men as well as the women were selling wood until the end of May; as 
the rainfall was little and late, there was a delay in agricultural activities. 
Some households also prepare stocks of fuelwood for sale, before commencing work on 
the farms; this enables them to sell wood without going to the forest. Thus, the women of Up-
per Kansa still sell wood, in nearby villages on the plain, during periods of hard agricultural 
labour; they get up very early in the morning, fix the wood already collected in the dry sea-
son, sell it and return to start work on their fields. 
Weeding is a time consuming job and it therefore reduces the possibility of collecting and 
selling wood considerably. Moreover, July and August is the peak season for rainfall, render-
ing wood collection cumbersome. This is a difficult time for the villagers, as in many house-
holds rice stocks are exhausted, new paddy is not yet harvested and monetary income from 
wood selling is impossible or very difficult. This is a period in which debts are incurred, be 
they in cash or kind. 
The price of fuelwood now increases due to a reduced supply. Customers in the villages on 
the plain, and in the town understand the fluctuations in price and they therefore buy fuel-
wood in advance, if they have the financial means with which to do so. 
From the middle of September onwards, the harvesting of the early varieties of paddy, 
which is grown on badi land, starts. Harvesting of paddy and other crops goes on until the end 
of December. Wood sales, however, start to increase towards the end of the rainy season 
again, in combination with the necessary on-farm activities, be it on the individual’s own 
fields or on other people’s fields working as farm wage-labour. The selling price of fuelwood 
is still good during the months of September through to December, due to the growing de-
mand, in the cold season, and because there are fewer people selling firewood than in the 
months from January onwards. This is a time when more people are to a large degree in-
volved in wood selling activities and when the demand for timber for construction rises. 
Larger supplies of fuelwood from January onwards decrease the price and the cycle starts 
again. 
3.4.1 Wood selling 
The following data illustrates the actual situation regarding the importance of wood selling for 
the whole population and the two villages under study: 
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Table 35: Wood selling in the two villages: 
 
Village 
Total number  
of households 
Households involved  
in wood selling 
% of adults involved  
in wood selling 
Kodipasa 116 88 (75.9%) 46.1% (170 of 369) 
Upper Kansa 20 19 (95.0%) 75.8% (47 of 62) 
Both villages 136 107 (78.7%) 50.3% (217 of 431) 
 
The economic importance of wood selling for the majority of the villagers is obvious from 
this data. More than 78% of all households, and half of the adult population in the two vil-
lages, earn at least part of their income from the sale of wood. 
With a view to the agrarian situation in the area, it is clear that there is a need for other 
sources of income, to compensate for the deficit of rice. For many households in Kodipasa, 
the scarcity of agricultural land is a major reason for selling wood as means of generating ad-
ditional income. Natural population growth, together with immigration in an area, which has 
limited, low quality agricultural land (as demonstrated in chapter 3.2), forces part of the work-
ing population to look for other sources of income. The land available for agricultural pur-
poses can be redistributed among the households by selling, renting or mortgaging, as will be 
shown in chapter 4.4.1, but it does not increase. Substantial changes can only be made either 
by major improvements to the irrigation facilities to intensify land use, or by a high invest-
ment of labour in order to reclaim cultivable wasteland. 
In Upper Kansa, land scarcity does not seem to be a reason for the strong involvement in 
wood selling activities. However, low productivity of land and labour, with high environ-
mental risks in shifting cultivation and a high demand of labour during the peak season, make 
it difficult for households to be self-sufficient by means of paddy. A combination of shifting 
cultivation, wage labour and wood selling is the best strategy for acquiring the necessary in-
come. It is not surprising, that the villagers of Upper Kansa, who live in the forest close to its 
firewood and timber resources, focus on wood selling more than do the villagers of Kodipasa. 
Problems with other sources of income from wage labour and/or off-farm activities have been 
elaborated above. The opportunities for wage labour are few and the forest dwellers dislike 
working for others. They prefer to work independently and the demand for wood, be it fuel or 
timber, is given by villagers in the plain and people in the town who have no or only difficult, 
or no, access to the distant forests. However, several men also explained, that they prefer 
wage labour to wood selling, as selling timber is illegal and involves the risk of being caught 
by the foresters. 
3.4.2 Other forest products 
The forest provides a broad range of resources, other than fuelwood and timber for sale or 
household consumption. It offers materials which can be used for house building, making ag-
ricultural implements, household utensils, furniture, ropes, mats, fences etc. Most villagers 
have domestic animals and the forest is also a source of fodder for cattle and goats, which 
graze in the forest. 
The Juang men enjoy hunting: however, prey is very rare and thus hunting does not really 
contribute to the nutrition of the people.  
The collection of wild edible forest products (roots, tubers, fruits, seeds, mushrooms, 
honey etc.) is done to varying degrees by the villagers: with the exception of the higher rank-
ing Gouda, most households collect some of these products. However, their availability is 
seasonal and therefore the villagers have a limited period in which they can collect and con-
sume them. Their availability is of a greater importance to the poor households, who cultivate 
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little or no paddy. The main strategy of these poor households is to obtain a money income in 
order to buy rice or to work for income paid in paddy. Thus, in poor households edible forest 
products contribute more to their diet than they do in the more affluent households, but little 
to the total consumption of food. 
3.5 Returns to labour of various economic activities 
A comparison between returns to labour of the various economic activities shows returns of 
bila paddy cultivation, under good conditions, to be the highest. The scarcity of land in Kodi-
pasa partially explains why a majority of villagers opt for wage labour and wood selling as 
important source of income. In Upper Kansa returns to labour for shifting cultivation are on 
average less than for both wage labour and wood selling. 
Average returns for wage labour and wood selling are similar, although wage labour is 
marginally higher. 
 
Table 36: Returns to labour of various economic activities per man-day of labour 
 
Type of activity 
Labour productivity per man-day  
of labour in kg rice (average in brackets) 
Cultivation of 1st and 2nd toila land (average) 2.3, 3.1 (2.7) 
Cultivation of 1st and 2nd guda land  
calculated in paddy (average) 
3.6 
Bila cultivation 5.2-7.7 (6.45) 
Badi cultivation 5.3 
Farm-wage labour 2.45-4.2 (3.3) 
Off-farm wage labour 2.5-4 (3.25) 
Wood selling 1.5-4.5 (3) 
 
The average income derived from farm wage labour is marginally higher than that of wood 
selling. However, the availability of farm wage labour is less regular (depending on season 
and demand) than wood selling, although price fluctuations of fuelwood and timber are 
higher. 
Regular off-farm wage labour would, in the long run, probably equal or be greater than the 
income derived from wood selling. However, the scarcity, irregularity and uncertainty of off-
farm wage labour do not make it a viable alternative to wood selling under the given circum-
stances. Usually people are employed under short-term contracts for periods of several days, 
weeks or at best months per year. This may explain the rather low percentage of off-farm 
wage labour, in comparison to wood selling and farm-wage labour.  
The high degree of involvement of most households in the business of selling fuelwood 
and timber can be explained by a variety of reasons. There is a necessity for every household 
to earn some cash. In many cases households suffer from a deficit of paddy from agricultural 
production which has to be balanced by purchasing rice at the market. The scarcity and sea-
sonal variation of the demand of wage labour on one hand, and the fact that wood selling is 
possible for everybody and over large periods of the year on the other hand, are two more fac-
tors which partly explain why households do sell fuelwood and timber. Moreover returns to 
labour from wood selling are not so bad in comparison to other economic options except the 
cultivation of bila land. 
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Based on all available data and on observations in the field, it is possible to roughly estimate 
the percentage of household income derived from wage labour and wood selling in the fol-
lowing way: 
A household’s minimum needs have been calculated taking into account the annual 
amount of rice (0.54 kg) and cash (1250 Rs.) needed per consumer to cover their minimal 
purchases at the market (clothes and other basic goods). The minimal cash requirement for 
basic needs (see also chapter 4.2.) in addition to money needed to compensate for the deficit 
of paddy from their own agricultural production, gives us an indication as to how much in-
come each household has to earn by wood selling and wage labour:  
 
Diagram 4: Number of households and their percentage of income earned by wood selling and/or wage labour 
 
Given the fact that returns to labour for wage labour and wood selling do not differ to a high 
degree, that wage labour is not available throughout the year and that the demand for it is sea-
sonal and irregular, it is estimated in this study that at least 50% of the required cash income 
of households which are involved in wood selling is earned by carrying wood to the market. 
Based on these estimations, more than 350 tons of wood are sold annually by the majority of 
the households of the two villages. On average this corresponds to roughly 38 bundles (25 kg 
in weight) of firewood per day. 
This estimation is supported by quantitative data on the number of households and adults 
involved in wage labour and wood selling (see tables 33, 34 & 35) and by personal observa-
tions in the field. In many cases the cash income derived from wood selling covers more than 
50% of the household’s minimal basic needs, including additional rice purchased at the mar-
ket to compensate for the deficit of paddy production. Moreover the importance of the cash 
income obtained from the sale of wood increases in times of crop failures as well as in situa-
tions where household expenditure rises due to exceptional costs e.g. for the marriage of a 
family member. 
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Timber for sale 
 
 
 
 
 
Tribal man carrying firewood for sale (bahangi) 
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Juang women from Upper Kansa carrying wood to the market 
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Balirai, a young Juang woman of Upper Kansa with firewood (headloading) 
 
 
 
 
Tribal wood sellers nearby Keonjhar market 
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3.6 Summary 
The local economy is characterized by a patchwork of three main sources of income: farming, 
wage labour and wood selling.  
What can be said for all of the peasants in both villages is that the more food has to be pur-
chased at the market, the more income has to be raised by wage labour and/ or wood selling. 
However, the degree of self-sufficiency with locally produced paddy is not necessarily linked 
to the availability of land, as the case of Upper Kansa illustrates. Here, high labour input for 
shifting cultivation and low return to labour, combined with high environmental risk make 
wood selling a rational economic option for the villagers: to buy paddy at the market by sell-
ing wood or doing wage labour is a viable alternative to the production of own paddy. 
However, in Kodipasa, the scarcity of land is a problem, and the area is deficient in food 
production even in good years. The scarcity of good agricultural land for permanent paddy 
cultivation is one of the main reasons why wood selling has become a way of generating in-
come in Kodipasa. Natural population growth, together with immigration into an area with 
limited agricultural land of poor quality, has forced part of the working population to look for 
other sources of income. 
The land available for agriculture can be redistributed among the families and households 
by selling, renting or mortgaging (see chapter 4.4.1) but its acreage does not increase. Sub-
stantial changes could only be made by a higher investment of labour in order to reclaim cul-
tivable wasteland, or by intensifying the use of land, by making major improvements to the 
irrigation facilities. Several factors deter the small peasants from doing so: the reclamation of 
the remaining low quality wasteland requires a high labour input and yields are low during the 
first few years. Poor households, in particular, lack the ability with which to invest labour 
without immediate returns. Moreover, it is uncertain as to whether the peasants will receive 
land titles for encroached government land. To intensify land use by improving irrigation fa-
cilities, also requires a high input of labour. The construction and maintenance of a canal irri-
gation system from the perennial river, which is some distance away, would only be feasible, 
if all or most of the households were to participate in this scheme (better water management 
by a canal system from a perennial river for paddy cultivation is a crucial factor for higher 
and more secure yields). Households, which currently cultivate land belonging to other 
households, as will be shown in chapter 4.4.1, are not interested in investing labour in fields 
which are not their own. 
The fact that there are viable economic alternatives for obtaining an income from wood 
selling and wage labour, also reduces incentives for investing in additional agricultural la-
bour. 
With a view to the agrarian situation in the area, it is clear that there is a need for other 
sources of income, to compensate for the local deficit of rice. Thus, many households sell 
wood because they do not have access to enough land, or because they have access to land 
only with low labour and land productivity. 
However, the quality of, and access to, agricultural land does not alone determine the in-
volvement of the local population in other economic activities. In both villages cash income is 
also required for basic needs other than paddy. This is elaborated in chapter 4.2. Like among 
many smallholders, spreading labour inputs over the year is also an efficient economic strat-
egy followed by the villagers. The scarcity of wage labour, together with a similar return to 
labour for wood selling and wage labour, makes wood selling a viable option for many 
households. Moreover, wood selling in contrast to wage labour, is an option that is available 
throughout most of the year. There is a demand for fuelwood and timber from both the villag-
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ers on the plain and the townfolk, as it is either difficult or impossible for them to obtain fu-
elwood and timber from the distant forests. 
 
  
4 PEASANT STRATEGIES 
After having presented the various economic activities and their conditions together with 
quantitative data for the two villages under study, the next step is to analyse the options and 
strategies of households with regard to their economic activities. 
4.1 Household types and economic performance 
The size of a household, its consumer/producer ratio, composition of male and female mem-
bers and the type of household as the central unit of production and consumption depend upon 
various factors such as the birth and death rate, marriage patterns, age of marriage and timing 
of separation of family members. The household does not control some of these aspects, 
whereas others may result from decisions and behaviour of the various household members. 
The economic performance of a household is interlinked with its availability of labour and 
its access to land, forest and wage labour. Here I will focus on the issues of firstly, the type of 
household that would perform most efficiently under the given conditions of access to land, 
forest and wage labour and secondly, whether the households in the two villages follow the 
strategies necessary to adapt to these conditions. 
If access to land is not limited, larger households could be a viable option for the peasants. 
Land in such a case is not a factor that limits the size of a household, as the cultivated area 
can be adapted according to the size of the household: the larger the household, the larger the 
cultivated area. Furthermore, the pooling of labour in large households with a favourable pro-
ducer-consumer ratio makes sense, if the labour input required for the cultivated area is rather 
high, as is the case with the type of shifting cultivation practiced in Upper Kansa. The tasks of 
preparing, weeding and harvesting of 2nd year swidden fields in particular, all demand a high 
input of labour (see table 9). To have access to a larger pool of family labour is advantageous 
– it is true that there are forms and possibilities of an exchange of labour between households, 
but these are mostly based on balanced reciprocity or external labour has to be paid. Moreo-
ver, during certain periods, access to labour from other (small) households may be difficult, as 
each household is busy working in its own fields. In addition, the loss of family labour due to 
sickness, death or marriage can be better absorbed in a large rather than in a small household. 
However, in order for a large household to become an economically efficient production unit, 
it not only requires access to sufficient land, but also a favourable consumer/producer ratio: 
this is either the case at a later stage in the nuclear family development cycle, or in the case of 
a joint or extended family. In addition to economic motives, another reason to opt for a larger 
household would be for political reasons; in a society where the head of a large household 
gains social status and political influence in the village community. 
Based on these considerations, one could expect large, joint and extended households in 
Upper Kansa to be in the majority. However, this is not the case; the nuclear family is the 
dominant household type in this village as well as in Kodipasa. Under conditions of land 
scarcity, small households may be considered to be well adapted to the economic situation in 
Kodipasa, as many of the households have access to only a small amount of land. Various 
reasons for the dominance of nuclear households in both villages will be discussed, after the 
presentation of the household patterns of the population under study. 
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Table 37: The 20 Juang households in Upper Kansa (by type) 
Household Type Number In % 
Nuclear family 9 45 
Sub-nuclear family with widow 2 10 
Joint family 7 35 
Widow single 1 5 
Others (husband, wife, nephew, niece) 1 5 
Total 20 100 
 
In six of the seven joint families, one of the parents was widowed. In one case, the joint fam-
ily consisted of a widowed mother, her married son and his children, plus the mother’s sister-
in-law. 
 
Table 38: The 66 Juang households in Kodipasa (by household type): 
Household Type Number In % 
Married couple with no children 2 3.0 
Nuclear family 24 36.4 
Sub-nuclear family with widow 10 15.0 
Joint family 23 34.8 
Joint family with widowed son 2 3.0 
Joint family with divorced son 1 1.6 
Extended family 1 1.6 
Widows single 2 3.0 
Others 1 1.6 
Total 66 100 
 
In nine of the cases of joint families both parents were still alive, in fourteen cases the mother 
was a widow. The household under the category of “others” was composed of a husband and 
wife, their married nephew and the children of this nephew. 
The only extended family in 1998/99 consisted of two married brothers; one of which had 
just married. In 2003 they were going to divide their household into two. 
 
Table 39: The 28 Munda households in Kodipasa (by household type): 
Household Type Number In % 
Married couple with no children 1 3.6 
Nuclear family 15 53.5 
Sub-nuclear family with widow 1 3.6 
Sub-nuclear family with widower 1 3.6 
Joint family 7 25.0 
Single (unmarried man) 1 3.6 
Others 2 7.1 
Total 28 100 
 
In four of the seven joint families the mother was a widow, in three cases both parents were 
still alive. 
The category of “others” included two households: one of which consisted of a couple plus 
the unmarried brother of the husband and the other of a widow plus the son of her late co-
wife.  
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Table 40: The 16 Gouda households in Kodipasa (by household type): 
Household Type Number In % 
Nuclear family 11 68.75 
Sub-nuclear family with widow 1 6.25 
Joint family 4 25.00 
Total 16 100 
 
In three of the four joint families the mother was widowed. 
 
Table 41: The 6 Santal households in Kodipasa (by household type): 
Household Type Number In % 
Nuclear family 3 50.0 
Sub-nuclear family with widower 1 16.7 
Joint family 2 33.3 
Total 6 100 
 
Thus, in all of the ethnic groups, the nuclear family was the most common household type 
followed by the joint family. There was only one extended family in 1999. In all the groups 
there is a pattern of sons separating from their family rather soon after marriage and settling 
down in their own household. They are given part of their share of land and become inde-
pendent householders. Parents will eventually live with one of their sons, his wife and their 
offspring. Daughters, despite being valuable labour within the family, are married at an early 
age. This pattern tends to keep the families relatively small. 
In a joint family a favourable consumer/producer ratio within the household can be reached 
if the separation of married brothers from their father’s family takes place at a late stage and 
the unmarried brothers and sisters are already of an age when they can contribute their labour 
towards the family income. However, usually when the second brother marries, or even prior 
to this, the joint family separates. Thus, large joint families are rare and short-lived and most 
joint families consist of a nuclear family with the parents of husband or wife and in many 
cases with only one of them; although joint families, these households are rather small. 
The pattern of early fission of the family among Juang shifting cultivators has already been 
documented by McDougal and is confirmed by this study. McDougal attributes the centrifu-
gal forces behind this separation to the following three structural factors:  
1) Intra-household tension, especially between fathers and sons as well as among brothers, 
and to some degree also between daughters-in-law and mothers-in-law. 
2) The political system of the Juang gives full respect to independent male household heads 
only and thus drives married men towards family autonomy. 
3) A Juang man that is married has access to land for shifting cultivation from the village 
community, which gives him economic independence from his father. 
 
According to McDougal (1963:114) the family developmental cycle among the Juang does 
not usually follow the ideal of a married son remaining in his father’s family for as long as his 
father is alive (a family type which is defined by McDougal as “extended family”, but accord-
ing to my definition as “joint family”): 
“Most males marry when approximately 20 years old, rarely before the age of 18 and occasionally not until 
their late twenties. A man does not deliberatley delay his son’s marriage; on the contrary, he tries to arrange 
the union as soon as feasable, because an early marriage is prestigious. Nevertheless, the payment of 
bridewealth places a heavy economic burden on the family, and poverty or a series of bad harvests may make 
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delay unavoidable. If the ages of two sons are close, the marriage of the younger one may be unduly post-
poned while the family is recovering from the economic strain caused by the payment of the first son’s 
bridewealth, but this should not be overemphasized – the more sons a man has, the more he is able to pro-
duce. (...) A man is usually at least 45 years old by the time his eldest son marries; he has a life expectancy of 
from 60 to 65 years. Therefore, if there is conformance with the ideal, a newly married man faces the pros-
pect of 15 to 20 years as a subordinate member of his father’s family. During this period he is denied full so-
cial status in the community, which is possessed only by heads of independent families; moreover, in a for-
mal sense, he occupies a subservient position in the family.” 
In practice, however, larger family groups break down into their component conjugal units at 
an earlier stage. McDougal (1963:116) attributes this to a “basic divergence of interests” be-
tween father and son: 
“Within the extended family unit [i.e. joint family, N.O.], resources, goods and services are pooled. In theory 
the father has ultimate authority in all family matters – economic, ritual, and political – and the son has no 
independent rights. In practice a man consults his son about decisions and expenditures concerning the fam-
ily unit. Nevertheless a basic divergence of interests develops. The son’s orientation is focused on the even-
tual establishment of independence and the acquisition of full adult status; he becomes resentful in his subor-
dinate role in the family and in the community. On the other hand, the father wishes to retain his son in the 
family, both in order to utilize the son’s economic services and because it is prestigious to be the head of an 
extended family. As the father grows older the son increasingly does more than his share in economic pro-
duction; the returns which he realizes from the production would be greater in his own independent family. 
On the other hand, his father is increasingly dependent on his son. At this point some strain develops in the 
relation between father and son.” 
As the father grows older and the son demands a greater say in the management of family af-
fairs, the father’s ability to exercise authority diminishes. Finally, a son who remains in the 
family, until the death of his father, becomes a de facto household head. If a man is the elder 
of two or more brothers, it is easier for him to separate from his family. His younger brothers 
remain with their father and continue to work with and for him. However, “most married men 
do not establish independence until they have children of their own and until their younger 
brothers have obtained spouses” (McDougal 1993:152). 
Parallel tensions between a daughter-in law and a mother-in-law add to these centrifugal 
forces. A daughter-in-law increasingly resents having to do heavy domestic duties for the 
family of her husband. 
Once a household splits into two, there is “very little if any economic co-operation be-
tween father and son (...). Each family tends to develop its own particular set of co-operative 
economic relations with other families” (McDougal 1963:120). 
Similar tensions exist between married and unmarried brothers33 or elder married brothers 
and younger married brothers and their wives in the case of the death of their father. The 
authority of the eldest brother, who according to the Juang ”is like the father” is put into ques-
tion by his younger brother(s) who try to become independent as soon as possible. Elder 
brothers are expected to support their younger brothers to get married and until such time 
when all of the unmarried brothers have spouses, the elder brothers are expected to remain to-
gether. However, the extended family is a temporary unit, which lasts for some years only. Of 
the thirteen villages studied by McDougal in 1960-62, he found that of the 83 married men, 
which had a married elder brother, only 16.7 per cent of these lived together as an extended 
family. Again, once separated, there is little cooperation between the households of brothers, 
if at all. 
                                                           
33 Among the Juang, men are expected to fully contribute their labour after marriage only. 
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The strategy of the pooling of labour in large households, under a system of shifting culti-
vation, would make sense from an economical point of view; the more people that are avail-
able, the more land can be cultivated and as has been shown, shifting cultivation implies 
many labour intensive activities over considerable periods, especially for the cultivation of 
paddy. If the availability of land is not a limiting factor, households could improve their eco-
nomic situation by following a strategy of having many household members. This brings sev-
eral advantages in comparison with smaller households. Although small households can mo-
bilize additional labour from other households, such cooperation is usually on a reciprocal 
basis; whatever help they get from other households will either have to be paid for or re-
turned. Moreover, the availability of labour from other (small) households during peak labour 
periods is limited, as each household is busy with its own fields. Loss of labour within a 
household, due to sickness, death or marriage can be more easily compensated for in a large 
rather than in a small household. 
Moreover, to be head of an extended family carries prestige and may enhance the political 
influence in the village. Thus also from a political point of view, large households are advan-
tageous, at least for the household head. 
It appears, however, that the social costs among individual family members and especially 
between male members, for organising steady working and cooperating relationships are too 
high to opt for large households. Together with the other two aspects mentioned by McDou-
gal (the incentive for males to marry and therefore to gain independence and increase their 
social status along with the easy access to land for shifting cultivation) this results in condi-
tions, which are sub-optimal from an economic point of view. It also restrains the formation 
of large and enduring households with more political weight in the village community over 
longer periods. To summarise, the young Juang males prefer the social and economic inde-
pendence gained from being the heads of small households, at the expense of prestigious elder 
Juang as heads of larger households that cultivate larger areas. 
The additional options of income generation by means of wood selling and/or wage labour 
enhance centrifugal forces in the household. Given the fact that returns to labour from these 
activities, are reasonable when compared to returns to labour from shifting cultivation, a 
combination of various economic activities makes economic sense. The options of selling 
wood and being employed as wage labour allow for a reduction in the amount of land re-
quired for shifting cultivation. Thus, the argument that having a larger pool of labour for agri-
cultural production is advantageous, no longer holds in the context of a mixed economy. 
 
In the case of the Juang of Kodipasa, the third factor of having easy access to land for cultiva-
tion no longer applies, as they now cultivate permanent paddy fields, having given up shifting 
cultivation twenty to thirty years ago. Limited access to land controlled by fathers could func-
tion as a mechanism for them to keep their sons even after marriage dependent in order to 
control their labour. However, it appears that the fact that land is owned as private property 
does not result in changing Juang family patterns. Early separation still goes on and fathers 
generally cannot or do not keep their married sons as dependents, but instead give them a 
share of the land and let them establish their own households. There are two reasons for this: 
firstly, most of the Juang households in Kodipasa belong to the category of small and mar-
ginal farmers. When a household owns little land, the pooling of agricultural labour does not 
make sense: in this case rather the scarcity of land and not of labour is the economic problem. 
Moreover, as it has already been shown, labour productivity for permanent paddy cultivation 
increases in comparison to shifting cultivation. The second reason for the early fission of the 
family is the opportunity of economic diversification: having the possibility to sell wood 
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and/or carry out wage labour means that newly established households are able to manage 
even if they have little or no land.  
If a married Juang son separates from his father’s household, he will initially only receive 
part of his share of land. The household, which takes care of either the father or mother or 
both, will cultivate a larger share of the father’s land, for as long as the parents live. Ultimate 
land distribution among brothers only takes place after the youngest brother marries and the 
father dies. Thus, the separation of a conjugal sub-unit, from the joint or extended household, 
is in many cases a process, which takes place over several years. It starts with a joint or ex-
tended family pooling their labour resources for cultivation. The yield is shared according to 
the needs of all of the family members. Income derived by the conjugal sub-units from other 
labour such as wood selling and/or wage labour is retained and controlled by those units. The 
responsibility for purchasing items such as oil, salt, soap, cloth and additional rice lies with 
the conjugal units. In the next step land is divided, although the conjugal sub-unit does not yet 
get its full share. However, this now gives the new households full independence. After the 
youngest brother’s marriage and the father’s death, land is finally distributed equally among 
the brothers.  
Thus, in the case where there is a small or marginal land holding and where there is only a 
partial share of a father’s land, a new household will start with only a little land to cultivate. It 
is the scarcity of land and not labour that then limits any cultivation; wage labour and wood 
selling are therefore necessary as additional sources of income. On the other hand, they also 
enable a married son and his wife to separate from their original family. The economic per-
formance of the nuclear family then changes, according to the size of the family, the changing 
consumer/producer ratio and its composition of male and female members.  
The fact that it is possible to generate additional income from wage labour and wood sell-
ing, allowing for the establishment of small independent nuclear households, does not neces-
sarily make these households any more efficient than larger ones. The pooling of labour and 
income does also make sense where there is a scarcity of land and where there are mixed eco-
nomic activities: the pool of available labour can be assigned to various activities (while wage 
labour is seasonal and sometimes scarce, wood selling is an option which is open to every-
body for most of the year). Variation in the consumer/producer ratio, due to unforeseen inci-
dents (births, deaths, or sickness of household members) can be compensated for by other 
household members.  
Small households are vulnerable socio-economic units; if any of the working members of a 
household are sick or die, this immediately affects the economic situation of the household 
and the degree of flexibility with regard to various economic options is lower than in larger 
households. In addition, a small household may lack the opportunity to sell wood during the 
farming period, as all the family labour is involved in farming. Another disadvantage of a 
small household is that if the husband was to die, leaving only small sons, or no sons at all, 
then the task of ploughing cannot be undertaken. Even keeping goats could become a problem 
for a small household, as the grazing of goats interferes with other work.  
Cooperation in a large household requires a high degree of familial cohesion and/or an 
authority that controls the family members and their income and makes them work. The fac-
tors that work against the principal of pooled labour and income in large households are: 
problems of free riding and the lack of incentives for individual household members to con-
tribute their labour to benefit the household as a whole, together with the usual sources of 
conflict that exist in joint and extended families. 
 
Household types and family development cycles among the other groups in Kodipasa show 
similarities in comparison to the Juang.  
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Among the Munda, the nuclear family is also the predominant type, followed by the joint 
family. There were no extended families in 1998/99. Although the ideal is that the family will 
not divide until the youngest son is married, Munda men may separate from their family even 
if they have unmarried brothers. As with the Juang, they will only be given a part of their fi-
nal share of land. The parents will keep the remaining share and distribute part of it among 
the unmarried brothers in order to arrange their marriages. After their marriages, the remain-
ing land will then be shared equally among all the brothers. In the case of joint families, 
pooled labour is used for the purpose of land cultivation. As with the Juang, conjugal sub-
units have independent control over any other income and are responsible for expenditures of 
their individual household. If brothers remain together until the youngest of them marries, any 
land is then shared equally among them, in the presence of several of the villagers.  
Santal households are composed of either nuclear or joint families, where in theory, sepa-
ration of the family unit does not take place until after the marriage of the youngest son; in 
practise this is not always the case. Married sons will be given part of their share of land; their 
unmarried brothers together with the parents will keep a larger share of land until all brothers 
get married. Then all land is equally distributed among all of the brothers. The parents will, 
however, keep some land for themselves, which they will either cultivate for themselves, or if 
they stay with one of their sons, then this land will be added to the son’s share. After their 
death this land will again be distributed among all of their sons. 
Among the Gouda there is the same ideal as among the Juang, Munda and Santal; sons and 
brothers should separate after the marriage of the youngest son and brother, although there are 
not enough cases to check how far the practice follows this ideal. 
 
The fact that in all of the groups the nuclear family type dominates, contradicts the ideal of 
joint and extended families. It seems that tensions among members of joint and extended 
families outweigh the perceived advantages of larger families as units of production and con-
sumption; tensions with regard to everyday affairs of domestic rights and duties, labour con-
tribution for cultivation and/or other economic activities, issues of authority and respect and 
interpersonal relationships. The transaction costs involved in organizing a joint or extended 
family may be too high to keep households composed of more than one conjugal unit together 
over a long period. An early split of joint or extended families also reduces the risk of its 
members to freeride by not contributing their fair share of labour.  
If and for how long a joint or extended family holds good depends, last but not least, upon 
the personalities of its members, the capacity of the household head to control the labour of 
his family, and on their access to land. The following two case studies illustrate the combina-
tion of factors, which result in the good economic performance of two rich households in 
Kodipasa: the richest household among the Juang and one of the most affluent households of 
both of the villages; a Gouda household. 
 
The richest Juang household in Kodipasa: 
The father of the household head was the owner of a lot of bila and toila land in the 1960s 
and 1970s, before land was officially settled in the Juang area. He cultivated this land using 
wage labour from some other Juang households. During the settlement he lost part of this 
land, but due to his office as a sarpanch (political head of several Juang villages) and the fact 
that he maintained good relations with the settlement officer, he still managed to secure more 
than five hectares, which was registered as his private land. As he had only one son, this son 
inherited all of the land. Unlike other Juang who were rich in land, this son did not transfer 
land by sale, lease or mortgage over the following years, when the demand for land increased. 
Like his father, he cultivated his land by means of family and wage labour. To cultivate bila 
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land by using wage labour pays, at least in good years and as long as enough surplus can be 
produced to pay wage labour in addition to feeding the household members. However, the 
larger his family got and the elder his children became, the less wage labour he employed. 
The family structure of this household in 1998 illustrates a point in the familial develop-
ment cycle, at which the advantages of large families become apparent: at this point in time 
this household had seventeen members. It was the only polygamous household in the two vil-
lages. It consisted of a husband, two wives, two married sons and their wives, five daughters 
above the age of fourteen (one handicapped), two small daughters, two small sons and one 
married daughter with her baby. Thus, most of its members were of an age at which they 
could contribute fully or considerably towards the cultivation of the household land. The 
household had sufficient males for ploughing and females for weeding the paddy fields. The 
consumer/producer ratio was 1.27. The family was cultivating 5.26 ha paddy land, i.e. 
0.3758 ha per consumer. Only a little additional wage labour was used. The household had 
produced enough rice in 1998 to feed the whole family, although this was a bad year. Rice 
was distributed throughout the joint family as per the needs of its members. The household 
also had some additional assets: in 1999 it owned ten cows, six bullocks and eight water buf-
faloes – more cattle than anybody else in either of the two villages. The sale of milk from the 
water buffaloes and the sale of cattle in times of need provided the household with cash in-
come. A small shop run by one of the sons was also a source of income.  
The household head had been a sarpanch, like his father, for several years. He was a priest 
and also a respected elder in his village as well as in his family. His sons obeyed him and con-
tributed their labour to the farms, both before and after marriage. 
In 2003 this family still functioned as a joint family, with regard to cultivation, and the two 
married sons had not yet separated from the family household. However, both of them had 
now their own kitchen, i.e. they were responsible for all the household needs (with the excep-
tion of rice) and they disposed of any additional income from their own and their wives’ la-
bour. They still had two unmarried brothers and whether this joint family would divide before 
or after the marriage of the youngest son, who was ten years old in 2003, was not yet clear. 
The land will be divided into equal shares only after the last son’s marriage and the father’s 
death. If any of the married sons separates from the family household, prior to either of these 
events taking place, he will receive only part of his final share of land. Once this Juang family 
divides ultimately, the future of the sons will probably not be as bright as that of their father 
who as the only son of a family rich in land became household head with more than 5 hec-
tares. If this land is one day divided equally among the four sons, each household will have 
only slightly more than one hectare of land after their father’s death. However, this is still 
more land than the majority of Juang households own. 
In 1999 the sale of wood and wage labour played a minimal role in the economy of this 
household. The daughters only rarely sold wood in order to provide themselves with clothes 
and small items, but not in order to buy rice. The sons occasionally worked as off-farm wage 
labourers in order to earn some extra cash for their own and their wives individual needs. 
There are several reasons why wood selling and wage labour play a marginal role for this 
family: working on their own land keeps the family members busy for considerable periods of 
time. Selling wood and doing low-skilled wage labour are not prestigious activities for fami-
lies that consider that they belong to the wealthier households. As their basic needs are al-
ready covered, there is little incentive for them to work for low rates of return. 
However, the significance of wood selling and wage labour probably will increase during 
the process of separation and definitive land distribution among the sons, and with their grow-
ing households. The need to obtain an income in cash in order to provide for the basic needs 
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of the family, requires a minimal amount of wood selling and/or wage labour, if there are no 
other sources of income.  
 
The richest Gouda household: 
Separation of the joint family in the case of the richest Gouda household, which was also one 
of the richest households in the two villages, took place in 2003. This was three years after the 
marriage of the second and youngest son. The elder, married son had remained in his father’s 
house with his wife for more than ten years. In 1999, this household consisted of eight family 
members: father and mother, eldest married son with a wife and two children and finally a son 
and daughter, both of whom were unmarried and of an age that they could fully contribute 
their labour. The consumer/producer ratio was low over a considerable period (in 1999 it was 
6:5, i.e. 1.2). The household cultivated four hectares of paddy land and was more than self-
sufficient with rice as it cultivated 0.6745 ha paddy land per consumer. As with all Gouda 
households, it received additional income from the sale of milk, in this case from three cows. 
The household had four bullocks, which were used for ploughing. Furthermore it cultivated 
vegetables for sale on land that was irrigated by a well. It ran a small shop in the village. In 
1999, the household head bought a paddy-peeling machine, which enabled the family to ac-
quire additional income either in kind or cash.34 It was the pooling of labour and the close co-
operation within the family that allowed them to pursue this mix of economic strategies. The 
lack of labour from within the family to perform all the various activities was compensated 
for by the use of wage labour, mainly for cultivation purposes. It makes sense, financially, to 
use wage labour for paddy cultivation and family labour for other economic activities. 
Neither wood selling nor wage labour were carried out by any of the household members. 
Both activities are not considered appropriate for higher-ranking Gouda families.  
At the point of separation in 2003, the family property was shared among the three conju-
gal units: father and mother, elder son and wife and younger son and wife. Both their private 
and encroached land was divided among the three units. The eldest son got a slightly larger 
share of land than did his brother because “he has cared for a longer time for his parents and 
has given more labour to the farms”, as his father explained. 
Leased land and land of some Juang households which they were holding in pledge was 
cultivated jointly and the harvest was divided among the three parties. Cattle and the vegeta-
ble garden were divided by equal shares among the three units. One of the sons was given the 
small shop, while the other son was given the peeling machine; the monthly income from 
both of these was approximately the same. When the parents are no longer able to manage 
their own household, they will join one of their sons with all their property. After their death, 
this share will be equally divided among both of their sons.  
Thus the separation took place at a point when the two sons could be provided with good 
basic equipment, enabling them to earn an income in cash from the sale of milk and vegeta-
bles, from running the shop and from the use of the peeling machine. By becoming independ-
ent households, no longer having access to the previous large pool of family labour, the use of 
wage labour for the purpose of paddy cultivation and probably for other work as well, will 
continue to be necessary. The efficiency of the three separate households will probably de-
crease in comparison to the efficiency of the joint family. On the other hand, the incentive for 
individual family members to work even harder may increase, as the fruits of their labour 
would only be enjoyed by their small nuclear family. 
                                                           
34 Customers paid with rice or cash for having their paddy peeled. 
128 PEASANT STRATEGIES 
 
In comparison to the richest Gouda household, the richest Juang household cultivated less 
land per consumer in 1999, as the family was much larger: seventeen members as opposed to 
only seven. However, the consumer/producer ratio of the Juang household was only slightly 
higher: 1.27 as opposed to 1.2 in the Gouda household. Conversely, the available land per 
consumer was less: 0.3758 ha in the Juang household compared to 0.6745 ha in the Gouda 
household. There was less of a surplus of paddy in the Juang household than in the Gouda 
family and thus there were less means to pay for wage labour. This meant that most of paddy 
cultivation was done by the household members themselves; this kept them busy for nine 
months of the year. However, because they had an adequate amount of land and family la-
bour, they managed to be self-sufficient with rice. 
The scarcity of labour in the Gouda family had been compensated for by the use of wage 
labour for the purpose of cultivation; allowing them time to invest their own labour in other 
economic activities. Another reason for the use of farm wage labour in this particular family 
was social prestige: keeping women inside the compound and away from the fields, is consid-
ered prestigious among the higher-ranking Gouda. Women in this household worked for the 
production of vegetables just behind the compound, but not on the paddy fields. 
In both households, the household heads had considerable authority over their family and 
managed to keep their married sons as part of their family unit for several years. 
These two cases illustrate successful household strategies with regard to economic effi-
ciency. If larger households manage to keep the family members together over a long period 
of time, when there is a favourable consumer/producer ratio, it is economically advantageous 
in comparison to small families – provided that there is sufficient land to be cultivated. 
Intra-household relations of household members are also of importance. My general 
impression of the Gouda households was that families were characterised by a stronger unity 
in comparison to the Juang and Munda households. The Gouda household heads have more 
authority over their offspring and control, to a large degree, their contribution of labour, be it 
for cultivation, grazing cows or other activities. At least among the higher-ranking Gouda, the 
households strive to improve their economic situation by a mix of strategies and all of the 
members contribute together in these efforts. In the four year period, between my field re-
search in 1998-1999 and 2003, several of the Gouda families had substantially improved their 
economic situation, and all of the others had at least maintained their standard of living.  
The pooling of income is less prominent in Juang households, where individuals dispose of 
their income with more autonomy than the Gouda, although it is expected that they support 
the household.  
Furthermore there are differences with regard to the contribution of labour by the men, 
women, girls and boys. The Juang boys enjoy considerable freedom until they marry, in com-
parison to their sisters. After marriage, men’s labour contribution increases. However, the 
Juang men still enjoy more leisure time than the women. Among the Gouda, boys contribute 
their labour to the household, at an earlier age then Juang boys. After marriage they strive to 
improve their economic situation; more time is spent on economic activities rather than on 
social, ritual and political activities, which are highly appreciated by the Juang men. On the 
other hand, higher-ranking Gouda women are less involved in productive activities than the 
Juang women. The Santal and Munda men contribute more labour to the household than the 
Juang, but the Munda and Santal boys still enjoy more leisure activities than the Gouda boys. 
The Munda and Santal are not biased against women performing wage labour and selling 
wood, as are the higher-ranking Gouda. Nevertheless, the Munda and Santal women are less 
involved in these activities than the Juang women. 
Although intra-household relations are partly related to different norms and values of the 
various ethnic groups, there are examples of strong and weak cooperation among household 
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members in all of the groups and the case of the richest Juang household illustrates strategies 
and behaviours expected mainly from the higher-ranking Gouda. 
4.2 Mixed strategies 
The majority of households obtain their income by a combination of agriculture, wage labour 
and wood selling. This mixed economy results from various factors; the scarcity and low pro-
ductivity of land combined with environmental risks, the opportunity to obtain an income dur-
ing the agricultural slack season and the need for cash. 
The combination of the three main economic activities, reduces the risks linked to agricul-
tural production, smoothes labour input over the year and increases household income. 
 
Table 42: Number of households involved in various economic activities 
Economic activities Agriculture only Wage labour only Wood selling only 
Kodipasa 10 3 0 
Upper Kansa 0 0 0 
Total (% of all households) 10 (7.4%) 3 (2.2%) 0 (0%) 
 
Economic  
activities 
Agriculture and 
wage labour 
Agriculture and 
wood selling 
Wage labour 
and wood selling 
Agriculture, wage la-
bour and wood selling 
 
Other 
Kodipasa 14 10 8 70 1 
Upper Kansa 0 3 1 15 1 
Total (% of all 
households) 
14 (10.3%) 13 (9.6%) 9 (6.6%) 85 (62.5%) 2 (1.5%) 
 
Although it is possible for them to survive without producing their own food, very few 
households (8.8%) eke out their living only by means of wood selling and wage labour or by 
wage labour alone. Living from hand to mouth, without having paddy in reserve, is not con-
sidered a good life. Wage labour in the majority of cases is irregular and unreliable and wood 
selling is hard work and carries the risk of being caught by the foresters. Returns to labour for 
wood selling and wage labour are lower, at least in comparison with the cultivation of paddy 
in permanent fields (bila cultivation) in a good year. 
Thus, almost all households (89.8%) cultivate some land. To harvest paddy, pack it in 
bundles and store it in the house, even in small quantities, gives people a feeling of security. 
However, the scarcity of land for most households, together with the low productivity of 
land and high environmental risks, calls for additional sources of income, be it wage labour 
and/or wood selling in order to buy additional food. Labour and land productivity of shifting 
cultivation are even lower and the environmental risks higher than for permanent paddy culti-
vation. Thus, the combination of shifting cultivation and wood selling and/or wage labour is a 
rational economic strategy even when access to land is not a limiting factor for cultivation as 
it is the case in Upper Kansa.  
Only 7.4% of all households in 1998/99 focused exclusively on agriculture. 
Moreover, wage labour and the sale of wood are the means by which cash income can be 
earned in order to provide the household members with basic needs other than paddy. Even 
households producing enough paddy for their own consumption still require an additional in-
come in cash. Weekly household expenditure is approximately 50 Rs. for the average family 
of two adults and two to three children. Such minimal expenditure includes the purchase of 
vegetables, salt, oil, spices, tobacco, soap and handia. Poor families may spend less than this 
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amount, whereas wealthier households may spend more. The average annual household ex-
penditure is in the region of 2600 Rs. per year.  
Additional cash income is required in order to buy clothes. The annual cost of clothing is 
in the region of 500 Rs. per adult and 250 Rs. per child. The cost of clothing an average fam-
ily, of two adults and three children is in the region of 1750 Rs. per year. 
Thus, approximately 4350 Rs. per year, or 360 Rs. per month, (i.e. the sale of nine or ten 
bundles of wood for 40Rs. per bundle, or nine to ten days wage labour per month) is required 
in order to provide the average household with its minimal basic needs. Not included in this 
budget are exceptional costs for weddings, funerals and medical care. Also not included are 
the additional costs for the extra consumption of alcohol and for the purchase of consumer 
goods above the minimal basic needs. 
Whether wood selling and wage labour are carried out in order to improve the living stan-
dard above the level of minimal basic needs is an interesting question. It is an option to 
households with free capacity to sell wood and/or to do wage labour in addition to that re-
quired for basic needs. Obtaining accurate data for the various households on the numbers of 
days per year, that were spent wood selling and/or being employed as wage labour was im-
possible, as households keep no records of the time spent in these activities, and the work it-
self is irregular. Nevertheless, based on my field experience, free labour capacity is not neces-
sarily used to maximize income and improve the living standard above a moderate level. This 
can be partially explained by the low returns to labour for wood selling and unskilled wage 
labour; too much drudgery for too little money. Instead of improving their material standard 
of living, leisure time is enjoyed, especially by male members of the households. Young and 
unmarried women may do extra work in order to buy some luxury items such as special saris 
and blouses or even small gold jewellery. 
Agriculture does not keep the farmers busy throughout the year. During slack periods in 
the agricultural calendar, there is more time available for other work. To be employed as 
wage labour and/or to sell wood during the agricultural off-season makes sense as a strategy 
for diversifying economic activities throughout the whole year. Most households, which re-
quire additional rice, explicitly follow the strategy of buying rice in the agricultural off-
season, even if they still have some paddy from their last harvest. They know that during 
work on their own fields, they will have little or no time available to go to the forest and/or to 
do wage labour. Thus they try to maintain as much of their paddy stock as possible for as long 
as possible.  
Finally, the mixed economy of most households is emphasized by the fact that at least 
among the tribal population (Juang, Munda and Santal) neither farming, wage labour, nor 
wood selling are strictly gender specific activities. This enables a high degree of flexibility 
between the various economic activities of the household members. 
Based on the analysis of agriculture, wage labour and wood selling so far, this strategy of a 
mixed economy is not surprising. Overall it is an efficient and rational set of behaviours, ex-
hibited by other smallholders under similar conditions (Netting 1993). However, if considered 
under aspects of gender and ethnic membership, the economic performance of individual 
households and of households of the various ethnic groups reveals factors, other than eco-
nomic ones, that influence economic behaviour, as will be shown in the following sub-
chapters. These factors are: the bargaining power of household members, gender ideologies, 
aspects of social status and cultural identity. They broaden or limit the economic options and 
thus are determining factors of economic strategies. Moreover, the economic performance of 
a household is also the result of the behaviour of its individual members. This result is not 
necessarily the outcome of the combined efforts of all of the able household members to op-
timise household income.  
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4.3 Gender aspects 
Gender aspects are interlinked to aspects of tribe, caste and social status. Because the majority 
of the population under study belongs to the tribal groups, the following statements about 
gender aspects mainly refer to the tribal population, with the Juang population being in the 
majority. In Gouda households the situation is quite different, as will be elaborated in chapter 
4.4. 
In many households, women contribute as much or more work than men towards agricul-
tural production. In many households they are also more involved in farm wage labour and 
wood selling and they contribute more to the family income by these activities than the male 
members of the family. However, their economic contributions do contrast with the fact that 
they have less bargaining power than the men. This is partially linked to a dominant gender 
ideology, which demands that women start work at an earlier age than men, and adopt a more 
dutiful approach to work, whereas the men are admitted more free time for social, political 
and ritual activities. It is also linked with the weak ‘fall-back position’35 of women with re-
gard to land in the case of non-shifting cultivators and with their dependence upon men for 
ploughing. The threat of physical violence towards women, which is mostly connected with 
the consumption of alcohol, makes them vulnerable to pressure from the men. Moreover, in-
terventions by non-household members into domestic conflicts are rare and women do not 
necessarily get support from outsiders. Nevertheless, a certain degree of autonomy is linked to 
the many economic activities that the women perform: the mobility of women who are em-
ployed as wage labourers and who sell wood is greater than for women restricted to the do-
mestic domain. Moreover, women that earn a cash income do have some control over it. 
In the next chapter it will become clear that gender relations vary among the various ethnic 
groups and so does the relative contribution of men and women with regard to agriculture, 
wage labour and wood selling. 
4.3.1 Gender and agriculture 
The majority of men and women are involved in agricultural production for their own house-
hold. Men and women perform different tasks in the process of cultivation, but not all of the 
work is gender specific. The percentage of women involved in agricultural production is 
slightly higher than that of men, which can partially be explained by the fact that more men 
than women are employed as off-farm wage labourers. 
 
Table 43: Male and female involvement in agriculture  
  
Total 
adults 
No. of 
adults in 
agricult.  
In % 
of all 
adults 
 
No. of M 
adults 
No. of M 
adults in 
agricult. 
In % 
of M 
adults 
No. of 
F 
adults 
No. of F 
adults in 
agr. 
In % 
of F 
ad. 
% of M of 
all adults 
in agricult.  
% of F of 
all adults 
in agricult.  
Kodipasa 369 327 88.6 173 148 85.5 196 179 91.3 45.3 54.7 
Upper 
Kansa 
62 59 95.2 26 26 100.0 36 33 91.7 44.1 55.9 
Both  
villages 
431 386 89.6 199 174 87.4 232 212 91.4 45.1 54.9 
M: male 
F: female  
                                                           
35 A person’s ‘fall-back position’ as an important factor of his or her bargaining power refers here to the outside 
options he or she has if cooperation within the household would cease (see Agarwal 1998:54). It is a concept 
elaborated by Amartya Sen to analyse conflicts and cooperative arrangements. 
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Based on my general observations in the two villages, women tend to spend more time work-
ing on their farms then men, with the exception of the few households that use farm wage la-
bour in order to raise their social status. That the majority of women contribute more labour 
towards agricultural production than men, results from the fact that women are expected to 
make a greater contribution and start work an earlier age. While in many households daugh-
ters are expected to contribute fully to the family income from about the age of fourteen, sons 
are expected to do so only after marriage. Most boys and men enjoy more leisure time than 
girls and women and if any work can be delegated to the female household members, the 
male members are tempted to do so. In many cases, the men are happy to reduce their own la-
bour efforts at the expense of their wives, daughters, mothers or sisters. To have a large num-
ber of female household members is therefore an advantage. However, a household with little 
or no male labour available for ploughing or clearing the forest is restricted in its agricultural 
activities. Thus, many widows with small sons or no sons at all, do not cultivate their land.  
In households where there is little land to cultivate, there is more scope for delegating the 
agricultural work to the women, than in households where there is more land which demands 
a higher and more coordinated labour input from all the available members. 
Labour intensive tasks of paddy cultivation such as weeding are perceived to be mainly 
women’s work and demand more labour from the women than from the men, while most of 
the other work, with the exception of forest clearing and ploughing – is carried out by both 
men and women. 
The economic performance of a household partially results from the bargaining power of 
the various household members. Good cooperation and coordination among male and female 
members, with regard to agriculture, helps to strengthen the man-made factors of agricultural 
production, whereas conflicts between individual household members have a negative effect 
on agricultural production. Conflicts between men and women can be about the contribution 
of labour, as the following statements from a Juang husband and wife illustrate:  
“My husband is my paid workman. If I do not give him money, he will not plough.” Sita Juang, wife of Gou-
ranga Juang  
“I have to beat my wife, otherwise she will not give me money. But she is living on my land and that’s why I 
have a right to get money from her. If she will not give me money, I will not plough.” Gouranga Juang, hus-
band of Sita Juang (while drunk) 
In the above statement, the husband argued that not only did he own the land that his family 
lived on, but that he had the right to claim any income earned by his wife and daughter, and 
that he could spend that income at his will; mainly on mahul liquor. He also boasted that he 
had sold, mortgaged36 or leased the bulk of his land, and spent the proceeds as he had liked. 
The son of this couple, despite being an able-bodied young man, refused to plough: he ac-
cused his father of having transferred land, drinking too much and failing to make marriage 
arrangements for him. Neither his father nor his mother was able to force him to work. In 
such a case, it may be that not all of the land available is cultivated, or it is not cultivated in 
time. It was Sita Juang (the wife) and her eldest daughter who bore the economic conse-
quences; they combined all the economic activities possible in order to provide enough rice 
for the household. 
Another case, related to a Juang widow, who had two daughters and two sons. The eldest 
son refused to plough the fields belonging to his mother. He preferred to hang around with 
                                                           
36 To mortage land here means to give in pledge land for a credit: the landowner (mortgager) gets back his land 
only after having paid back the credit. The mortgagee, i.e. the person who has given money to the landwowner, 
will cultivate the land of his debtor as long as he does not get back his money. 
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boys of his age and to drink and accused his mother of not looking for a wife for him. Thus 
his mother had to pay male wage labour in order to cultivate paddy with her two daughters, as 
the second son was still too small to plough. All of the work, in this example, was carried out 
by the females of this household, who in addition fed their non-cooperating son and brother 
by combining agriculture, wage labour and wood selling. 
The bargaining power of women in such situations is rather weak. An option, for a woman 
who has an irresponsible husband, would be to refuse to cook for him. However, in a case 
such as this, where a woman protests, the man may react by using physical violence towards 
her, although this mostly happens when the man has been drinking alcohol. To leave her hus-
band temporarily and to visit her relatives in her native village, or even divorce him are the 
most serious consequences a woman may draw from being treated unfairly. However, if she 
leaves forever and returns to her own family, she will bear the main responsibility for her 
children and contribute her labour towards the household in which she lives. Again she will 
depend upon other men to do the ploughing for her. Moreover, she may not receive any land 
for her and her children, except if she were to reside in a village with shifting cultivation. Of 
course, a man left by his wife and daughters who maybe were already working, too will face 
serious difficulties and thus he will try to bring back his wife. 
One consequence for a non-cooperative son could be the delay or refusal of marriage ar-
rangements by his parents. In both of the cases mentioned above this formed part of the con-
flict. To arrange a marriage requires the cooperation of both of the parents of the bridegroom, 
and even if the father is dead the mother will continue to play her role. Moreover, a marriage 
requires the cooperation of all of the family members in order to provide the necessary cash, 
goods and services. The mother, as well as the sisters of a non-cooperative son and brother, 
will be less inclined to assist him to get married. Thus his non-cooperation will cost him per-
sonally. However, his disadvantages do not minimise the economic consequences and costs of 
his non-cooperation which all the other household members have to bear. 
The fact that there are opportunities for obtaining an income, other than by agricultural 
production on their own land, makes the women, as wives, mothers and sisters to bear the 
consequences of husbands, sons and brothers who do not cooperate in agricultural production: 
either they fulfil the demands that the men make for their labour contribution, or they com-
pensate for the agricultural loss by other sources of income. From a male point of view it may 
be profitable to let the women provide the majority of the basic needs of the household by 
means of wage labour and wood selling; although returns to labour may be higher for agricul-
ture than for other activities. Less agricultural activities result in the need to go for more wage 
labour and/or wood selling: as both of these can be done by women, the costs of neglecting 
agriculture can be placed on the shoulders of the female household members. 
Decisions about matters of land are another issue of bargaining power between men and 
women in a household. To transfer land by lease, mortgage or sale has consequences for the 
agricultural production of a household. In some cases both the husband and wife make joint 
decisions about the transfer of land. However, it is possible for a husband to transfer land, 
without consulting his wife, and use the proceeds for his personal needs, in many cases for the 
purchase of alcohol. As men are usually the legitimate landowners, women are in a rather 
weak position to prevent their husbands from transfering land. Again, it is mainly the women 
who bear the consequences of the loss of land, by having to increase their input of labour in 
other activities, be it wage labour and/or wood selling. Widows however, do control the land 
of their late husbands, for as long as their sons remain unmarried. Thus, in the case of the 
non-cooperative son of the widow mentioned above, he would not be able to transfer any land 
of his late father, and nobody in the village would accept land from his family without the 
consent of his mother. 
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These and other cases experienced during field research hint at the possible imbalances of 
economic gender relations within the household, which are usually at the expense of the 
women. But the spectrum of household realities is wide; from households with men and 
women cooperating with regard to all agricultural activities and decision making to house-
holds characterised by conflicts and non-cooperation. Moreover, as a household changes in 
the course of a family’s developmental cycle with regard to the composition, age and status of 
its members, gender related situations also change. 
In cases where there is good cooperation between the men and women, together with the 
willingness of the men to contribute their full labour to the household, this results in a better 
economic performance of the family as a whole. However, in cases where there is non-
cooperation and a low input of labour on the part of the men, the costs are mainly paid by the 
women of the household. 
4.3.2 Gender and wage labour 
Farm wage labour: 
The fact that women are more involved in agriculture than men, is also expressed in their sig-
nificantly higher contribution to farm wage labour: 
 
Table 44: Male and female involvement in farm wage labour in 1998/99 
  
 
Total 
adults 
No. of 
adults 
in farm 
wl  
 
In % 
of all 
adults 
 
No. of 
M 
adults 
No. of 
M ad-
ults in 
farm wl 
 
In % 
of M 
adults 
 
No. of 
F 
adults 
No. of F 
adults 
in farm 
wl 
 
In % 
of F 
adults 
% of M 
farm wl 
of all 
farm wl 
% of F 
farm wl 
of all 
farm wl 
Kodipasa 369 153 41.5 173 51 29.5 196 102 52.0 33.3 66.7 
Upper 
Kansa 
62 18 29.0 26 3 11.5 36 15 41.7 16.7 83.3 
Both  
villages 
431 171 39.7 199 54 27.1 232 117 50.4 31.6 68.4 
M: male  
F: female  
wl: wage labour 
 
As mentioned previously, the burden to provide the household with additional paddy, in many 
cases, is not equally shared among the male and female members of a household. A further 
reason for the uneven contribution of male and female farm wage labour, is the higher de-
mand for female farm wage labour for labour intensive activities such as transplanting and 
weeding. In addition, women are paid less than men, whether it is in cash or kind. 
Farm wage labour is mainly carried out in neighbouring villages. Thus, farm wage labour-
ers leave in the morning and return in the evening. Girls from the age of twelve up to rela-
tively old women can contribute to the income of their families by farm wage labour. Only 
nursing mothers usually do not work as farm wage labourers. 
Men are more involved in long-term agricultural wage labour. They work as herders, either 
in their own village or away from home. In most cases these are young and unmarried men. 
The fact that both the women and men of Upper Kansa are less involved in farm wage la-
bour than the villagers of Kodipasa can be explained by their higher involvement in wood 
selling. Being closer to the fuel wood and timber resources in the forest and more distant from 
the villages on the plain, where there is demand for farm wage labour means that earning an 
income from selling wood is a viable alternative. 
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Off-farm wage labour: 
Considerably more men than women earn some income from working as off-farm wage la-
bourers. This can be partially explained by the higher demand for male workers, together with 
the fact, that work not connected to agriculture outside the village, is considered less appro-
priate for women. Off-farm wage labour sometimes requires the workers to be absent from 
home for several days or weeks. The fact that female household members are required to per-
form domestic work, in addition to their other contributions to the household, together with 
the ideology that women have to be more protected and controlled than men, makes them less 
suitable for off-farm wage labour. It is mainly the unmarried young women that sometimes 
work as wage labourers, if the work can be done near to their village, or if they can join work-
ing groups together with some male relatives or boys from their village.  
An incentive for men to do off-farm wage labour as opposed to farm wage labour is the 
salary that they receive in cash. As it is their decision, to a large degree, what is done with this 
money, a salary in cash gives them more opportunities to follow their own personal interests, 
rather than a salary in kind which usually enters the household. Women too do have control 
over the income earned from wage labour. However, the pressure for them to contribute this 
income to the household is much greater than for men. 
 
Table 45: Male and female involvement in off-farm wage labour in 1998/99 
  
 
Total 
adults 
No. of 
adults in 
off-farm 
wl  
 
In % 
of all 
adults 
 
No. of 
M 
adults 
No. of M 
adults in 
off-farm 
wl 
 
In % 
of M 
adults 
 
No. of 
F 
adults 
No. of F 
adults in 
off-farm 
wl 
 
In % 
of F 
adults 
% of M off-
farm wl of 
all off-farm 
wl 
% of F off-
farm wl of 
all off-farm 
wl 
Kodipasa 369 81 22.0 173 57 32.9 196 24 12.2 70.4 29.6 
Upper 
Kansa 
62 9 14.5 26 9 34.6 36 0 0 100 0 
Both  
villages 
431 90 20.9 199 66 33.2 232 24 10.3 73.3 26.7 
M: male 
F: female 
wl: wage labour 
4.3.3 Gender and wood selling 
A considerable percentage of adult men as well as women from both villages sell wood: 
 
Table 46: Male and female involvement in wood selling in 1998/99 
 Total 
adults 
No. of 
adults 
in ws  
In % 
of all 
adults 
No. of 
M 
adults 
No. of M 
adults in 
ws 
In % 
of M 
adults 
No. of 
F 
adults 
No. of F 
adults in 
ws 
In % 
of F 
adults 
% of M 
ws of all 
ws 
% of F 
ws of 
all ws 
Kodipasa 369 170 46.1 173 75 43.4 196 95 48.5 44.1 55.9 
Upper 
Kansa 
62 47 75.8 26 19 73.1 36 28 77.8 40.4 59.6 
Both  
villages 
431 217 50.4 199 94 47.2 232 123 53.0 43.3 56.7 
M: male 
F: female 
ws: wood selling 
 
But there are some gender specific differences, with regard to the frequency of wood selling 
and the use of its income. As they mainly concern the Juang, the following statements refer to 
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them. A discussion of male and female involvement in wood selling among the other groups 
follows in chapter 4.4.3. 
More Juang women than men carry wood to the market and they do it more frequently. 
This is apparent at times when there are no agricultural activities either for men or for women. 
On several occasions, while climbing up the hill to Upper Kansa, we met a large group of 
women and girls coming down through the forest, with bundles of firewood on their heads, on 
their way to Keonjhar or to nearby villages. They all belonged to Upper Kansa. When we ar-
rived up in their village, their husbands and fathers were sitting in the majang, discussing 
matters of marriage, death ceremonies and pujas. Or they were preparing for a visit to another 
village or were deliberating where they could obtain either a bottle of mahul or handia and 
tried to convince us to support them in their endeavour. While their sisters were carrying 
wood for sale, the boys went to the forest to hunt birds. The men’s activities, at that time were 
definitely of more of a social rather than an economic nature in comparison to the women, 
who provided rice for the daily meal by selling wood. When asked, on that occasion, why 
they did not join the women, selling wood, they laughed and argued, that it was too hot for 
them today for such work or that they were busy with other matters. Obviously they found the 
drudgery linked to wood selling too much – which does not mean that it is less so for the 
women.  
Income derived from wood selling is not necessarily household income, as wood sellers, 
male or female, dispose of the money individually. To a certain extent, the wood sellers can 
spend the income derived from their sales at will, although this is less so in the case of 
women. The pressure for them to provide their family with rice is stronger than for men and 
they take more responsibility in doing so. The women therefore contribute more to the house-
hold income by selling wood more frequently than do the men and by spending the bulk of 
their income for the household. For that reason wood selling is a double-edged affair for 
women: on the one hand it gives them a certain autonomy, as they are able to dispose of the 
money they get from the sale of wood. On the other hand this autonomy is very much re-
stricted, due to the fact that providing food, i.e. rice, is of the utmost priority for most female 
wood sellers. This allows the men to rely on the income provided by the women and gives 
them the opportunity to profit from the responsibility that women take in feeding their family. 
In some cases it weakens their willingness to contribute their share to the household income, 
or even allows them to follow a strategy of reduced agriculture; to sell, rent or mortgage land 
is an option for a landowner, as reduced yields from his fields can be compensated for by in-
creased wood selling activities on the part of the female household members. 
Young and unmarried Juang women are heavily engaged in wood selling. They use part of 
the income derived from wood selling to buy clothes, cosmetics and cheap fineries for them-
selves, or to provide boys from other villages with small gifts (e.g. bidis, towels). The loss of 
their autonomy is felt by the young women that have married into Juang families in villages, 
which are in the interior of the region, where there is no easy access to the market. With the 
loss of income from wood sales they become fully dependent upon their husbands in order to 
be able to purchase goods at the market. They equally lose the opportunity to travel frequently 
with their friends to Keonjhar, to enjoy the market day in the town and to spend some money 
drinking handia on their way back.  
However, the bulk of their income is spent on buying rice; a task which they consider to be 
their responsibility: 
“If we do not contribute to our family, how will this family manage? Boys would not give any money to the 
family, they will drink mahuli.” 
Dheni and Nagami, two Juang sisters. 
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In strong contrast to the unmarried women, young unmarried Juang men are not expected to 
spend part of their income from wood selling on rice. They work for themselves; they spend 
the money on clothes, going to the cinema, drinks or buying small gifts for girls. It is a gen-
eral statement by the Juang villagers, male as well as female, that boys will only take respon-
sibility for the family after they have married. Thus, young unmarried men are much less in-
volved in wood selling. 
Married Juang women with small children do not usually sell wood; they are restricted in 
their movements in the forest and in the carrying wood to the market. They may be involved 
in irregular wood selling in nearby villages. During this period their husbands may resume or 
increase their wood selling activities, especially if there are no other female wood sellers in 
the household. Once the children are older and there are family members to take care of them 
(e.g. elder sisters, mother-in-law), married women are also busy in wood selling. Old women 
reduce or stop wood selling and resume other duties in the household, such as providing fire-
wood for the household, taking care of small children, helping with farm work, preparing 
food or herding goats.  
Married Juang men have the opportunity to adjust their own labour input according to the 
availability of female labour in their family. They decide how much, if any they will contrib-
ute to the household income by means of wood selling, over and above that which is abso-
lutely necessary. As a socially accepted norm, a Juang husband, in the same way as his wife, 
should feel responsible for providing his family with their daily necessities. Many men do in-
deed contribute rice to the household, together with other items, such as salt, oil, spices, vege-
tables, soap etc. which are purchased on the market. Many husbands however, spend consid-
erable sums of money on alcoholic drinks. Although some of the Juang women are used to 
drinking handia and in rare cases even mahul, they drink less frequently and in lower quanti-
ties and spend less of the income obtained from wood selling on alcoholic beverages. The 
consumption of alcohol among the Juang in general has increased considerably. Whereas in 
the past, the consumption of handia and mahul mainly took place during ceremonies and 
events such as marriages, deaths and various agricultural rituals; alcohol is now more readily 
available. 
The general observations made by Elvin Verrier in the 1940s no longer holds true: 
“Liquor is another restorative that helps the people to face the very heavy work that often comes to them. But 
the Juang did not strike me as specially drunken. Like most aboriginals, they like to drink a lot at a celebra-
tion, at a festival, funeral or marriage, but they are not ‘dram-drinkers’ and they do not regularly drink any-
thing but toddy juice” (Verrier 1948:44). 
The changing pattern of alcohol consumption is probably connected to an increase in wood 
selling activities: an increase in cash income and contact to the market has led to the easier 
access to and more frequent consumption of alcohol; not only rice beer (handia), but also ma-
hul. Drunken villagers, more often men than women, are to be met frequently, at any time of 
the day or week. Some Juang men occasionally produce mahul themselves and several Munda 
households produce and sell it regularly. Rice beer is produced and subsequently sold by sev-
eral of the Munda and Santal women. 
It is difficult for women to force reluctant or irresponsible husbands to fulfil their agricul-
tural duties as has been already elaborated. Sometimes, male members of a household try to 
extort cash from the female wood sellers. In one particular case, the head of a household de-
manded money from his wife that she had made from the sale of wood; if she did not give this 
to him, he stated that he would not plough their fields. In another case it was the eldest un-
married son of a widow who continually asked his mother and sisters for cash, threatening 
that he would not plough the family fields.  
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The loss of a female wood seller in many cases puts a serious strain upon the household 
economy. The lack of a considerable contribution of rice to the family has then to be balanced 
by the remaining family members. This probably increases the burden upon the remaining 
female household members; in the case of our neighbours in Kodipasa, the marriage of the 
sister of the household head finally led to his divorce. For a period of time, his wife had tried 
to take over the task of wood selling. His mother, who was approximately 65, supported her 
by taking care of the four children who were too small to work. The household head himself 
did not make any effort to increase the family income, counting instead upon the remaining 
female family members to do this. However, his wife could not manage to combine wood 
selling with caring for her smallest child and she finally left and returned to her native village. 
There were conflicts already in this household, prior to the marriage of the household head’s 
sister. The situation did not escalate however, so long as there was sufficient food, which was 
mainly provided by the sister of the household head. In another case, the marriage of a hard-
working daughter resulted in an increase in responsibilities for her mother, whereas the un-
married younger brother, aged approximately eighteen, did not assist with the sale of wood. 
Shortly after the marriage of his sister, he resumed wage labour for a period of time, but did 
not contribute any money or rice to the household from his income. 
Wood selling is of crucial importance to widows: together with wage labour it allows them 
to eke out their living, even if they are unable to cultivate land.  
4.4 Ethnic groups and economy 
In this section, the economic activities and strategies of the households are analysed by ethnic 
groups. 
 
Table 47: Involvement of the households of the ethnic groups in different economic activities in 1998/99 
 Number of 
households in-
volved in agri-
culture only  
Number of 
households in-
volved in wage 
labour only 
Number of 
households in-
volved in wood 
selling only 
Juang Kodipasa 1 2 0 
Munda 0 1 0 
Santal 0 0 0 
Gouda 9 0 0 
Total Kodipasa 10 3 0 
Juang Upper Kansa 0 0 0 
Both villages 10 (7.4%) 3 (2.2%) 0 (0%) 
 
 Number of 
households in-
volved in agri-
culture and 
wage labour 
Number of 
households in-
volved in agri-
culture and 
wood selling 
Number of 
households in-
volved in wage 
labour and 
wood selling 
Number of 
households in-
volved in agricul-
ture, wage labour 
and wood selling 
 
 
 
 
Other 
Juang Kodipasa 2 10 7 43 1 
Munda 5 0 0 22 0 
Santal 4 0 1 1 0 
Gouda 3 0 0 4 0 
Total Kodipasa 14 10 8 70 1 
Juang Upper Kansa 0 3 1 15 1 
Both villages 14 (10.3%) 13 (9.6%) 9 (6.6%) 85 (62.5%) 2 (1.5%) 
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4.4.1 Agriculture 
The agricultural involvement of the various groups in Kodipasa is indicated by the amount of 
land that they own and cultivate. It has already been shown that the amount of land on paper 
does not necessarily correspond to the actual area that is cultivated. 
Taking into consideration the average area of nominal and cultivated land, belonging to the 
various groups in Kodipasa, in 1998/99 the following picture emerges: 
 
Table 48: Nominal and cultivated land by ethnic groups 
 
 
Group 
Average nominal 
land in ha  
per household 
Average nominal 
land in ha  
per consumer 
Average cultivated 
land in ha  
per household 
Average culti-
vated land in ha 
per consumer 
Gouda 0.1869 0.0358 1.2995 0.2938 
Munda 0.3707 0.1110 0.9449 0.2859 
Santal 0.9892 0.2552 1.4333 0.2821 
Juang Kodipasa 0.9318 0.2545 0.7660 0.1923 
All Kodipasa 0.6966 0.1897 0.9173 0.2335 
 
The average nominal land per household is highest among the Santal and Juang and much 
lower among the Munda and Gouda. The average nominal land per consumer parallels this 
pattern, i.e. it is highest among the Santal and the Juang, followed by the Munda and lastly by 
the Gouda. 
However, the average cultivated land (estimated by the quantity of seed) per household is 
highest among the Santal, followed by the Gouda and Munda. The Juang cultivate the small-
est area per household. The average cultivated land per consumer is highest among the 
Gouda, followed by the Munda and Santal, with the Juang again cultivating a much smaller 
area per consumer than all the other groups.  
The deficit of cultivated land and therefore rice is highest among the Juang. It is consid-
erably lower for the Santal, Munda and Gouda. This indicates that the Juang have a higher 
dependency upon income from wage labour and/or wood selling, due to less agricultural pro-
duction. 
 
Table 49: Rate of nominal land to cultivated land for the ethnic groups in Kodipasa 
Group Average rate of nominal to cultivated land 
Gouda 1:6.9 
Munda 1:2.5 
Santal 1:1.45 
Juang Kodipasa 1:0.82 
All Kodipasa 1:1.32 
 
Obviously the largest difference between nominal and cultivated land is among the Gouda, 
who cultivate almost seven times as much land as they own. The Munda follow with the cul-
tivation of an area more than twice the size of their nominal land. Also, the Santal cultivate 
more land than they own; it is only the Juang who actually cultivate less than what they own. 
How is it possible that farmers cultivate more land than they own and why do the Juang culti-
vate less? It is reasonable to assume that the general area of cultivation has increased within 
the last twenty years, since the land settlement was finalised. Even at that time, some land 
which actually was cultivated under shifting cultivation, had been classified as government 
and not private agricultural land. Since then, other government land has been encroached and 
140 PEASANT STRATEGIES 
 
converted into farmland. Another explanation for the discrepancy between nominal and culti-
vated land, are land transfers. In the following chapter it will be shown that predominantly the 
Juang are leasing, mortgaging and selling land to the other groups, and to a lesser degree, 
among themselves.  
4.4.1.1 Land transfer 
With regard to agricultural land, there are basically four strategies households can pursue: 
households without land can try to obtain it. If they are already in possession of land, they can 
either try to keep it, enlarge it or transfer it.37 Such strategies are linked to other economic op-
tions (wage labour, wood selling, small business) as well as to the needs, possibilities, con-
straints and priorities of a household and its members.  
Here I will focus on the following questions: 
1) What options do the peasants have in order to transfer or obtain land? I will present the 
different types of contractual arrangements for land transactions and analyse their occur-
rence among the various groups. 
2) Why do many Juang households transfer land 38 while households from the other groups 
try to acquire more land? I will discuss land transactions along with the different strategies 
used by the farmers which not only take account of economic considerations, but also as-
pects of social status, caste and gender. 
3) Why are prices with regard to land transfer rather low in the research area, despite the lo-
cal demand for land?  
 
Leasing, mortgaging, selling or buying agricultural land are common practices in the villages. 
Leasing land to somebody means to transfer a piece of land for a period of time and amount 
of money, all of which are specified. In most cases all of the money for the land is paid at the 
outset and not as an annual rent. Mortgaging land means to hand over a specified piece of 
land to somebody in order to get a credit. The debtor gets back his land only after repayment 
of his financial debt. The number of years land is mortgaged thus depends on the ability to 
pay back the credit. Selling is the definitive transfer of land. But officially confirmed pur-
chase and sale transactions of land are rather rare in comparison to more informal sales and 
purchases where there is no official acknowledgement. Due to the legal situation (elaborated 
in 4.4.1.6) the informal sale and purchase of land can result in the transaction being declared 
null and void. 
The following data relates to the census conducted in 1998/99. The questions raised with 
regard to land transfers were the following: Does the household lease land to other house-
holds? Or does the household lease land from other households? Does the household mort-
gage land to others or does it hold land of others in pledge? Has the household ever sold land 
to other households? Or has the household ever bought land from other households? 
                                                           
37 I do not consider in this chapter strategies for improving the quality of land. 
38 The problem of tribal land alienation is prominent in the discourse about tribes in India. Common explanations 
for the loss of tribal land are the poverty of tribal people, dishonesty of moneylenders, merchants and rich peas-
ants, combined with the helplessness of illiterate peasants who are cheated. Tribal people are perceived as pas-
sive and reactive victims rather than as rational actors following strategies under given circumstances. There are 
few studies analysing tribal land issues and aspects of land transfers with a different perspective. However, there 
are good reasons to conceptualise tribal people that cultivate land as being small peasants. F.G. Bailey’s study of 
a non-tribal village in highland Southern Orissa includes a chapter on land coming onto the market (1957:47): 
the behaviour of these non-tribal small peasants does not differ substantially from that of the Juang under study 
here, although specific conditions have to be taken into consideration as will be shown in this chapter. 
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Presented here is a snapshot of the situation in 1998/99 indicating shifting and irregular 
land use by various households. Dependent upon the conditions of the land transfers, house-
holds dispose of and acquire land for varying periods of time.  
 
Table 50: Cases of households leasing land to other households 
Lessors To Juang HH To Munda HH To Gouda HH To Santal HH Total cases* 
Juang HH 8 19 13 2 42 (31 HH) 
Munda HH 0 2 0 0 2 (2 HH) 
Gouda HH 0 0 0 0 0 
Santal HH 0 0 0 0 0 
* Cases refer to land transaction from one to another household. Because the same household may be involved in 
land transactions to several households, the number of households is smaller than the number of cases.  
 
Table 51: Cases of households mortgaging land to other households 
Mortgagors: To Juang HH To Munda HH To Gouda HH To Santal HH Total cases 
Juang HH 4 12 4 3 23 (16 HH) 
Munda HH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gouda HH 0 1 0 0 1 
Santal HH 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 52: Cases of households selling land to other households 
Vendors: To Juang HH To Munda HH To Gouda HH To Santal HH Total cases 
Juang HH 3 16 6 5 30 (20 HH) 
Munda HH 0 0 0 0 0 
Gouda HH 0 0 0 0 0 
Santal HH 0 0 0 0 0 
 
It is obvious that all three methods of temporary or definitive land transfer are mostly from 
Juang households to the other three groups of villagers, while very few, if any transactions 
take place among or between the Munda, Gouda and Santal. The Juang do not obtain land 
from any of the other groups. The transfer of land among the Juang households is less fre-
quent than land transfer to other groups, but it does occur.  
Out of a total of 86 Juang households, only four of them were landless. During the period 
1998/1999, out of a total of 82 Juang households that owned land, at least 48 (59%) of these 
were involved in some kind of land transfer. The leasing of land was the most common type 
(46.3% of all transfers), followed by sale (29.8% of all transfers) and finally mortgage (23.9% 
of all transfers). Seven of the Juang households were involved in more than one type of land 
transfer. 
There was only one landless household among the 28 Munda households. Out of a total of 
27 households with land only two (7%) were transferring land to others. All of the six Santal 
households retained the land that they owned. Twelve out of the sixteen Gouda households 
were landless on paper, which meant that they could not transfer land. Of the four remaining 
Gouda households, one had mortgaged some land to a Munda. 
This data suggests that the Juang are more willing to dispose of their land, whereas the 
other groups generally aim to increase their agricultural production by leasing, holding in 
pledge and buying additional land from the Juang. This may also be interpreted as a greater 
willingness by the Juang population to earn their livelihood by means other than farming, 
whereas the other groups strive to gain additional land for farming, or at least try to keep the 
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little land that they already have. An important economic factor is of course the fact, that the 
Juang, as the original inhabitants of the area, do have land at their disposal, whereas the im-
migrant groups are in a less favourable position. An analysis of the distribution of private land 
(registered in the Revenue Inspector Office) of the various groups is as follows: 
 
Table 53: Distribution of private land of the ethnic groups 
All Juang  70.1385 ha 78.42% 
Munda 10.3790 ha 11.60% 
Gouda 2.9910 ha 3.34% 
Santal 5.9350 ha 6.64% 
Total private land for agriculture 89.4435 ha 100.00% 
 
When considering land ownership among the various Juang clans, it is obvious that the 
households not belonging to the founder clan, barcha bok, have less land than families of the 
founder clan: the average land holding of households belonging to barcha bok is 1.22 ha, 
whereas the average amount of land belonging to families from other clans is only 0.53 ha. 
This however does not mean that there are no poor barcha bok families. 
The fact that the Juang have more land at their disposal than the Gouda or Munda, does not 
yet explain why they transfer it to others. In order to understand local land transfers, one has 
to consider, not only the reasons why the Juang households choose to transfer land, but also 
the motivations and means of those households choosing the strategy of obtaining more land 
for cultivation. A high demand for land results from the growing population of landless 
Gouda families, as well as from some of the Munda households who are striving to improve 
their economic situation by agricultural means. Part of the Santal households also highly 
value agricultural production and try to enlarge their farm land, although they own as much 
land per consumer as the Juang. 
There is a tendency among poor households to transfer land to better-off households, as 
these households are in a position to offer the money required, at short notice, which helps in 
times of emergency. They are also interested in cultivating more land and are capable of pay-
ing additional labour in case the cultivation of additional land requires labour above the 
household’s own capacity. It is mainly some Gouda families, that have the financial means 
with which to buy, lease or hold in pledge land from the Juang, in cases where these require 
larger sums of money in cash or kind (e.g. rice and goats for ceremonies). Several Munda and 
Santal households also try to obtain more land from the Juang. However, the rental, mortgag-
ing and sale of land also takes place among Juang households, although to a lesser extent. 
4.4.1.2 Reasons for transferring land 
Table 54: Reasons for the transference of land by the Juang households 
Reason Cases 
Death 14 
Sickness 12 
Food scarcity 5 
Marriage 5 
Alcohol 6 
Debts / to pay back loan 5 
Material needs 5 
 
The reasons for the land transactions that took place could not be determined in all cases. In 
some cases, interviewees did not know the reasons why either their fathers or late husbands, 
PEASANT STRATEGIES 143 
 
transferred their land; or they did not wish to discuss it. In some cases I only gained informa-
tion from the individuals that were in receipt of the land. However, from the information 
given, it was possible to ascertain that the Juang households lease out, mortgage or sell land 
for the following reasons: 
1) Sickness and death are a serious burden upon the families. They spend money on medical 
care and at the same time they lose valuable family labour. In the case of the death of a 
family member, they have to perform the death ritual (sudho) linked with immediate ex-
penditure in kind, especially rice and meat for the relatives, friends and neighbours. 
Among the Juang households, the costs incurred at the time of death rituals, during the pe-
riod of field research varied between 500 to 3000 Rs. If there is not an ample stock of 
paddy available, then rice has to be purchased, and also possibly a goat. 
2) The most vulnerable groups that may be forced to transfer their land are: widows with 
small children, widows who do not have a son that is old enough to plough the land and 
older widows that live alone. For religious reasons women in India are not allowed to 
touch a plough. From the thirteen non-cultivating households, eight of them were Juang, 
where the household head in each case was a widow. All of these have either, sold, leased 
or mortgaged their land after the death of their husband, be it for performing the death rit-
ual and/or due to a shortage of labour within their household. 
3) Food scarcity due to bad harvest or misfortune in the family such as sickness and death 
may force Juang households to transfer land in order to buy food. 
4) Marriages are a rather expensive affair for a Juang household. They involve large amounts 
of paddy (400 to 500 kg), partially as a gift to the family of the bride, partially to feed the 
guests. Furthermore, up to four goats, rice beer and mahul, money to buy clothes for the 
bride and her kin (dhotis and saris) and other expenditures for preparing food for the 
guests are required. In the case of the marriage, in 2002, of Maheswar Juang (son of a 
widow, with one brother and one sister) to a woman from Rodhuan, the expenditure in-
cluded the following items:  
– 7 pieces of cloth (approx. 650 Rs)  
– 10 bottles of mahul (100 Rs.)  
– 3 goats and 1 cock (approx. 1500 Rs.)  
– 1 pig (500 Rs.)  
– 2 khandi paddy (280 Rs.)  
– 300 kg rice (3000 Rs.)  
– 2 pots of handia (150 Rs.)  
The total cost, in cash and kind, amounted to more than 6000 Rs.  
Although kin and neighbours cooperate and give some support to a marriage, the main 
burden in cash and kind is carried by the family of the bridegroom. Support received by 
close relatives in the form of cash or kind (rice, goats, pigs) is limited and based on rather 
strict and balanced reciprocity. The bridegroom’s paternal and maternal uncles and aunts, 
together with his own married brothers and sisters, are expected to contribute towards the 
cost of the marriage. However, their contributions may be very small, and more of a sym-
bolic nature rather than of substantial material value. Thus, in the above case, the main 
contribution was 3 khandi rice (value of approx. 520 Rs.), which was given by the mater-
nal uncle of the bridegroom. This contribution would have to be repaid, in the event of a 
marriage in his maternal uncle’s family. 
5) In at least six cases, land has been mortgaged, leased out or sold by male members, in or-
der for them to buy alcohol. There were probably other instances of this happening, al-
though the families concerned did not explicitly mention them. Excessive consumption of 
alcohol is a problem, mostly concerning the Juang, and to a lesser extent the Munda, al-
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though not the Gouda. The higher-ranking Gouda do not drink alcohol at all, whereas the 
Gouda herders do it in a more controlled way. 
6) Two final reasons why the Juang families may transfer land to others are the necessity to 
either repay debts or to satisfy material needs (e.g. new roof, plough, bullock, bicycle).  
These are all reasons why Juang households lease, mortgage or sell their land. However, most 
of these circumstances, do to some extent also apply to households of the Munda, Gouda and 
Santal. They all are faced with sickness, death, marriage, crop failure and any number of other 
risks and insecurities. They all have material needs and are all in need of cash at some time or 
other. The costs incurred for a marriage for example are the same or even higher among these 
groups. Thus in the case of Munda household 95, the total cost of the marriage of a son would 
be in the region of 8000 Rs.: 
– 200 kg rice for the feast (2000 Rs.) 
– 120 kg rice for handia (1200 Rs.) 
– 2 bullocks for 800-900 Rs. each (1600-1800 Rs.) as bride-price 
– 2000 Rs. for clothes 
– 1 goat, 1 cock, 15 pai paddy for the bride’s family (1000 Rs.) 
In the case of the richest Gouda household, the cost of a son’s marriage would be in the re-
gion of 10,000 to 20,000 Rs. In the case of a daughter this could be as high as 30,000 Rs. Of 
course such expenditures do to some extent correlate with the general economic situation of a 
household and a family. 
 
The hypothesis that the Juang are more vulnerable to crisis than other groups in the research 
area, and are therefore under greater pressure to transfer their land, cannot be confirmed. 
These situations are typical for all small peasant households. The reasons mentioned above 
cannot sufficiently explain why the Juang are ready to transfer land in such situations, while 
households of other groups do this very rarely. But they evoke other questions: what strate-
gies and options do other households have for coping with these situations and are these op-
tions also available to the Juang? Why do other households not transfer land to the same ex-
tent as the Juang families? And why do non-Juang households with little or no land opt for 
trying to acquire some or more land, thereby giving the Juang the option, of transferring their 
land? 
One possible hypothesis could be that social networks linked with support in cash or kind 
from outside the household which is facing economic pressure or an emergency, would re-
lieve the pressure leading otherwise to the household in question having to forfeit its land. 
Thus, households with more adequate social networks and a higher degree of solidarity, in-
cluding economic support from outside the household, would be less vulnerable to the tempo-
rary or permanent loss of their land. Maybe such networks and forms of solidarity are weaker 
among the Juang than among the other groups? 
Most households do have some kinship relations with other households in the village, and 
this applies to all of the ethnic groups. However, there are no substantial indications that kin-
ship rights and duties, or forms of solidarity, in cases of emergency, vary in any significant 
way, for any of the ethnic groups. On the contrary, in all of the ethnic groups, households as 
the main economic units are very much self-reliant and they depend to a large degree on their 
own family members, resources and capabilities. Little or no support is received, even from 
close kin, in the case of an emergency. If a household receives support at all, even from close 
kin, this is strictly based on reciprocity or on payment; e.g. labour for labour or labour for 
cash. However, the Gouda appear to have an advantage over the Juang and the Munda with 
regard to credit: they may get financial or material support from relatives, although they have 
to pay this back with interest. There appears to be sufficient trust among the Gouda relatives 
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that credits will be repaid. This does not appear to be the case for the other groups. Individu-
als say that it is difficult to obtain credit, as the creditors are unsure that the loans will be re-
paid even among relatives. The possibility of obtaining credit without land being offered as a 
security, helps to stabilise the economic situation of a household in cases of emergency, or 
enables a household to invest and improve its general situation Financially, they will be able 
to pay for land and the necessary labour with which to cultivate it. 
In all of the ethnic groups, free support from kin is not expected. It is considered the norm 
for a family to be responsible for its own household and to cope with any difficult situations 
that may arise within it. When asking people, whose families were facing serious problems, 
whether they received any support from their kin, they often reacted with a counter-question: 
“Why should I get help? They have their own families, they have to take care of themselves.” 
Thus, any problem is immediately reflected in the household situation and requires reac-
tions based on the resources and capacities of its family members. One might interpret this 
lack of support to be caused by the lack of means – poor people do not have the means with 
which to support other poor people. However, also among the wealthier households there is 
little cooperation and support on such occasions. 
Given the fact that in all of the groups, households basically have to face their economic 
problems and constraints themselves, their strategies result from their economic options and 
preferences, which differ among the various ethnic groups, as will be demonstrated in the fol-
lowing sections. Selling wood and/or being employed as wage labour are the two main op-
tions in the research area, apart from agriculture. They are theoretically open to all groups. 
However, social and cultural barriers and preferences result in different patterns of strategies 
among the households of the various groups.  
To cultivate land and sell milk are considered to be appropriate ways of earning an income 
by the higher-ranking Gouda. They try to increase their farm land and have the financial 
means to do so. They do not consider wood selling an appropriate activity for their caste, even 
under serious economic circumstances. When asked, why they do not sell wood, they state 
that they have no knowledge of this kind of work, and do not wish to acquire it, as this would 
mean that they would have to work alongside the Juang in the forest and they do not wish to 
mix with the Juang. The idea that their women could sell wood is almost unthinkable. In these 
households, the men provide the fuel wood for household use, which they collect from time to 
time in large quantities. In all other groups, it is predominantly the women that perform this 
task. Off-farm wage labour is performed reluctantly, only if absolutely necessary, and only by 
the men. In 2003, several of the Gouda informed me about a serious drought, which had oc-
curred about twelve years previously. Even at the time of the drought the Gouda did not sell 
wood and the women were not employed as wage labourers. Only men worked in road con-
struction or were digging ponds as wage labourers. Wage labour for girls and women, even 
farm-wage labour, is considered degrading. The exception to this is farm-wage labour for 
other Gouda, preferably for kin. High social status among these Gouda is also linked to the 
fact that they can employ wage labour for farm work, thereby allowing the women of the 
household to stay at home. Thus, it is a combination of caste, social status and ideals about 
appropriate economic activities for Gouda women and men, which results in them striving to 
keep or increase the amount of land that they have available for cultivation. Out of a total of 
sixteen Gouda households, twelve are landless on paper, but all of them cultivate land in 
Kodipasa. 
The majority of the Gouda families (the men only) sell milk outside the village, on a regu-
lar daily basis and from this they manage to earn a regular income. Combined with the in-
come they earn, from their agricultural activities, this makes them less vulnerable to unfore-
seen events. It allows them to save some cash for emergencies and for costly events such as 
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marriages or the acquisition of additional land to cultivate. However, selling milk requires the 
purchase of a specific breed of Jersey cow. They produce more milk than the local breeds, but 
also require different treatment. Jersey cows are expensive. Prices vary between 6000 Rs to 
12.000 Rs. and their acquisition requires investment and/or long term saving capacities: Thus 
in the case of household 63, one son had worked for two years in a hotel in Keonjhar. His sal-
ary was 800 Rs. per month and he contributed all of this money to his family. With this 
money, plus a loan from some relatives they bought three Jersey cows for totally 25,000 Rs. 
They are able to sell about 10 litres of milk per day, yielding a profit of 55 Rs. per day 
(100 Rs. minus approximately 45 Rs. for extra fodder). They cultivate some encroached land, 
as well as land from the Juang. The daughters sometimes work as farm-wage labourers, but 
only for their relatives. Most of the Gouda families use wage labour, indicating a scarcity of 
family labour in the context of their diversified economic activities. The input of labour re-
quired to keep milk cows and sell milk products diminishes the amount of male labour avail-
able for cultivation. 
Some of the Gouda households earn additional income from small-scale business activi-
ties. One such family runs the paddy mill in the village of Kodipasa. From this mill, they earn 
an income in kind of between 30 to 40 kg rice per month. Another Gouda family runs a small 
shop in the village; its monthly profit is between 400 to 500 Rs., equivalent to 15 Rs. per day. 
Both these families combine their business activities with milk selling and farming. Thus they 
have a regular income in cash as well as in kind. 
The lower-ranking Gouda herders do not keep cows in order to sell milk, but they earn a 
sufficient income in paddy, by grazing the cows of the villagers. Nevertheless, they are en-
gaged in cultivating land, which is partly encroached government land, partly land leased and 
mortgaged from the Juang, to improve their economic situation and to make use of free fam-
ily labour. In contrast to the status-conscious families, who strive for high-ranking caste 
membership, Gouda wood sellers are from these lower-ranking families and they have, to a 
certain extent, assimilated with the Juang. They are socially closer to them, they drink alcohol 
with them and they herd cattle for them. Some men from this group also work as wage la-
bourers in order to get cash. There is less restriction for women to be employed as wage la-
bour and some of them even sell wood to obtain a cash income. There is social mobility 
among the Gouda; men who have previously worked as cattle herders for the Juang, have 
ceased to do so and now earn their livelihood from farming, as cattle owners and also as 
small-scale business men. 
To earn an income from being milkmen, like the Gouda, is not an option for the Juang. 
This would mean purchasing rather expensive Jersey cows39. The fact that the Juang do not 
become milkmen like the Gouda is also linked to the caste system. The Juang are considered 
unclean by the Gouda and it may well be that clients of the Gouda milkmen, in other villages 
and in the town, would not buy milk and milk products from the Juang or any other tribal 
people. There are no milkmen among the Munda or Santal. 
There are no social barriers that prevent the Juang from being involved in small scale busi-
ness activities. However, running a business requires an initial capital investment acquired ei-
ther from savings or from surplus production. The long-term planning and strategies required 
to run a business however, are not a dominant feature or a favoured option for the Juang; al-
though the wealthiest of the Juang households runs a tiny shop in the village. 
However, the Juang do have the option of transferring land to other households and they 
are able to compensate for their loss of land by wood selling and wage labour. Selling wood is 
                                                           
39 The Juang do not consume milk and they do not milk their cows which anyhow do not give much milk. 
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a viable economic option for the Juang, who are more inclined to do this work than the 
Gouda, Munda and Santal. The Juang men have in fact sold wood for a long time. Over the 
past twenty to thirty years the Juang women have also been involved in wood selling and to-
day they do more of this than the men. It is interesting to note that female involvement in the 
business of wood selling has increased with the development of some kind of land market. On 
average, there is more labour involved in wood selling than in paddy cultivation on permanent 
fields, as has already been shown (in chapter 3.5). It appears that it is to a large extent, the 
Juang women that compensate for the loss of land by increasing their input of labour, not only 
for wood selling, but also additional farm-wage labour as will be shown below. There are no 
gender specific restrictions over Juang women selling wood and being wage labourers as 
there are among the higher- ranking Gouda. Given such restrictions, the Juang men would 
possibly be more reticent to forfeit their land and instead adopt other options and strategies. 
A further explanation as to why the Juang are prepared to transfer their land, may be that 
the rather loose kinship ties among the Juang do not impede land alienation; there is no pro-
nounced concept that ancestral land must be kept within a kinship group (lineage, clan) and 
there are no social and cultural barriers for checking land transfers to any other household, be 
it related or not to the owner of the land. This is not tantamount to claiming that the Juang do 
not identify themselves with their Juang homeland, village territory and landscape. An exam-
ple of this is that Juang rituals are important for the well being of all of the villagers, not just 
the Juang. Any such rituals have to be performed by the Juang priests. For an outsider to ob-
tain land in Kodipasa, they have to become a member of the village community. Juang broth-
ers, however, will not interfere in each other’s land matters, once the land has been divided 
between them. 
The link between land ownership and socio-political status in the Juang community is also 
not very strong; married men have access to the main political institution of the majang 
(men’s meeting house), even if they have no land. Being rich in land may result in being con-
sidered important in village affairs (as is the case with the richest Juang), however, there is 
other criteria linked to social status and prestige. 
The Munda favour agriculture and like the Gouda they strive to keep their land or to in-
crease it by obtaining more from the Juang, if they can afford it. Keeping cows, for the pur-
pose of selling milk, like the Gouda, is not an option for them. However, some of the Munda 
households produce and sell alcohol (handia as well as mahul); mainly to the Juang and other 
Munda. This gives them some cash income. 
With the Munda, there are no restrictions over the selling wood linked to social status or 
gender, as with the higher- ranking Gouda. But the Munda in Kodipasa do not have the same 
long-established tradition of selling wood like the Juang. They prefer wage labour. They sell 
wood only if there is a shortage of land, or any other opportunities for earning an income. 
Selling wood, moreover, is done more by men than women among the Munda and wage la-
bour is more gender-balanced than among the Juang.  
The Santal are first of all farmers. However, they do not object to combining agriculture 
with wage labour and small business and they do not restrict the wage labour of their women 
on the grounds of social status like the Gouda. Santal men rarely sell wood and consider it the 
last possible option for obtaining an income. The women do not sell wood at all, but they do 
produce handia for sale. 
Thus the combination of the following factors results in land transfers from the Juang to 
the other groups: the preference for agricultural production of the immigrant population, the 
fact, that the Juang do have more land to give away and the possibility for Juang men to shift 
the costs for neglecting their own agricultural production to the Juang women. The various 
types of land transfers are analysed further in the following sections. 
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4.4.1.3 Leasing  
Leasing land to somebody means to offer that person a specific piece of land for a specified 
period of time for a specified amount of money. In most cases the total amount of money 
changes hands at the start of the lease period and is not paid as an annual rent.  
On one hand, to lease out land to somebody is more advantageous for the owner of the 
land than to mortgage or sell land, as both the term of lease and the rent are fixed in advance, 
no money has to be returned and at the end of the lease period the landowner regains the land. 
Any agricultural risks during the period of lease are taken by the tenant.  
On the other hand, the cost of leasing land from a landowner is surprisingly low, taking 
into account both the scarcity of land in the study area and the value of the paddy cultivated 
and harvested by the tenant / leaseholder. Juang households predominantly lease out their land 
in times of urgent financial needs. There are few rich households that have a surplus of ready 
cash available and the Juang do not have much bargaining power in times of need. An exam-
ple of this is given by Sanatan Munda, who tries to increase his land by acquiring land 
through leasing, mortgage and through buying land from others. He explained that if one of 
the Juang, who was in need of cash, was to approach him and offer him land for lease at a 
particular price, and over a specific period of time, he would state that he did not have the 
money to do this over the time period suggested. He would then propose to rent the land but 
only if the leasing cost and the period of the lease were to be reduced. If they cannot find any-
one else to rent their land, under their original terms, Santal would get it at the reduced rate 
and would then negotiate a longer period of lease, as the landowner would be desperate for 
the money. To get some idea of the low cost of land lease in the study area, we can consider 
some cases where there is available information on the amount of seed used on a rented field 
(converted in size in ha), the number of years it has been leased and the money value involved 
(calculated in Rs. per ha per year): 
 
Table 55: Prices for leasing land in 1998/99 
 
HH number 
 
Total price in Rs. 
 
Years 
Price per year  
in Rs. 
 
Size in ha 
Annual rent per ha  
in Rs. 
9 600 6 100 0.2 500 
10 1000 8 125 0.2 625 
11 500 5 100 0.25 400 
13 300 Rs. + 1 goat 10 50-60 0.22 230-270 
 
16 
500 
1000 
650 
4 
10 
6 
125 
100 
108 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
625 
500 
1080 
17 500 5 100 0.2 500 
18 
900 
440 
4 
4 
225 
110 
0.25 
0.25 
900 
440 
39 320 4 80 0.3 267 
42 1000 5 200 0.2 1000 
46 600 6 100 0.6 167 
52 800 10 80 0.3 267 
68  200 2 100 0.11 909 
121 900 5 180 0.4 450 
129 1000 10 100 0.3 333 
 
Prices vary according to the size, quality and position of the plots as well as the bargaining 
power of the individuals involved in the transaction. Thus, household number 18 once leased 
out two plots (0.25 ha) for a total of 900 Rs. for a period of 4 years to another household. 
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Several years later, after the lease period of these two paddy fields had finished, the house-
hold needed to lease out that land again, as they required cash urgently, due to sickness in the 
family. On this occasion, as before, the lease period was four years, but now they only re-
ceived 440 Rs. in rent. 
In comparison to the average income generated from cultivation, the rental cost of land is 
very low. The highest annual rent of 1080 Rs. per ha corresponds to 108 kg rice bought in the 
market in 1999. Assuming a low yield of 490 kg rice per ha, corresponding to 4900 Rs., an-
nual rent is 22%, assuming a better yield of 560 kg rice, annual rent is 19% and assuming a 
good yield of 595 kg rice, annual rent is 18%. If bila land is cultivated with HYV and fertil-
izer, yields may be up to 1050 kg per ha and the annual rent would be only 10%. 
HH 9: This Juang household head leased out one plot of bila land to a Munda, for a total of 
600 Rs. for 6 years. The yield from 1 khandi paddy seed to cultivate this plot of approx. 
0.2 ha, is between 8 to 10 khandi paddy in a good year, i.e. 160 to 200 kg paddy or 112 to 
140 kg cleaned rice, the value of which is between 1120 to 1400 Rs. per year. The annual rent 
(100R.s) is equal to approximately 7% to 9% of the yield. Of course, the cost of labour in-
volved in farming a piece of bila land of approximately 0.2 ha in size has to be deducted. La-
bour input is approximately 27 man-days, with an output of approximately 4 to 5 kg per day. 
To purchase the same amount of rice from the sale of wood, would require at best 37 man-
days of labour (assuming a good daily wage of 30 Rs.), or at worst 56 man-days of labour (as-
suming a lower wage of 20 Rs. per day). 
HH 10: This Juang household head leased out a plot of land to another Juang for a total of 
1000 Rs. for 8 years. The yield from 1 khandi seed to to cultivate this plot of approx. 0.2 ha, 
in a good year is between 8 to 10 khandi paddy, i.e. 160 to 200 kg paddy, 112 to 140 kg 
cleaned rice, the value of which is between 1120 to 1400 Rs. per year. The annual rent 
(125 Rs.), is equal to approximately 9% to 11% of the yield. Labour input is approximately 27 
man-days, with an output of approximately 4 to 5 kg per day. To purchase the same amount 
of rice from the sale of wood, would require at best 37 man-days of labour (assuming a good 
daily wage of 30 Rs.), or at worst 56 man-days of labour (assuming a lower wage of 20 Rs. 
per day). 
HH 16: This Juang household head leased out a plot of land to a Gouda for a total of 
500 Rs. for 4 years. The yield from 1 khandi seed to cultivate this plot of approx. 0.2 ha, in a 
good year is between 8 to 10 khandi paddy, i.e. 160 to 200 kg paddy, 112 to 140 kg rice, the 
value of which is 1120 to 1400 Rs. per year. The annual rental (125 Rs.), is equal to approxi-
mately 9% to 11% of the yield. Labour input is approximately 27 man-days of labour, with an 
output of approximately 4 to 5 kg per day. To purchase the same amount of rice from the sale 
of wood would require at best 37 man-days of labour (assuming a good daily wage of 30 Rs.), 
or at worst 56 man-days of labour (assuming a lower wage of 20 Rs. per day). 
HH 39: This Juang household head rented a plot of bila land (0.3ha) to a Munda, for a total 
of 320 Rs. for 4 years. The yield from 1.5 khandi (30kg) seed to cultivate this plot is ap-
proximately between 240 to 300 kg paddy or 168 to 210 kg rice per year the value of which is 
between 1680 to 2100 Rs. Annual rent is 80 Rs., i.e. 5% to 4% of the yield. Labour input for 
paddy cultivation is approx. 40.5 man-days. To purchase the same amount of rice from the 
sale of wood would require 56 to 84 man-days of labour with an income of between 20 to 
30 Rs. per day. 
HH 52: In 1993, Munda HH 95 rented land from Juang HH 52 for a period of 10 years for 
a total of 800 Rs. The yield in a good year from 1.5 khandi (30 kg) seed to cultivate this plot 
is between 240 to 300 kg paddy, i.e. 168 to 210 kg rice, the value of which is between 1680 to 
2100 Rs. The annual rent for this plot is 80 Rs., i.e. 4% to 5% of the yield. Labour input is ap-
proximately 40.5 man-days. In order to buy the same amount of rice from the sale of wood 
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would require between 56 to 84 man-days of labour. After the harvest in 2003, the leasing pe-
riod would be over and the Munda intended to buy this plot for 2500 Rs. At the time of the 
study, the family of HH 52 was composed of a widow with two sons and two daughters. At 
the time of the death of her husband, all of her children were still too small to help her culti-
vate her land. 
4.4.1.4 Mortgaging 
Mortgaging land to somebody means to give a specified piece of land to a creditor as pledge 
for a specified amount of money or material goods. Usually the period of time the creditor 
may cultivate this land is unspecified. He is obliged to give back the land only after the land-
owner has repaid his debts. In many cases land is mortgaged for several years; sometimes for 
a period of ten years or more. 
In many cases significantly larger sums of money are involved in mortgaging as opposed 
to leasing land. The villagers mention debts of between 1200 and 8000 Rs. Considering the 
precarious financial situation of many Juang households and the fact that they live from hand 
to mouth, it is difficult for them to scrape together such amounts, in order repay the debt. In 
several cases sons, whose fathers had mortgaged their land would like to pay off their debt 
and reclaim their land, but they face problems in repaying such a large amount of money. I 
know of only one case, where the son of a deceased Juang planned to work as a waged la-
bourer for at least one year, in order to earn the money to repay the debts and to reclaim the 
land mortaged to a Santal family. The Juang family had mortgaged approximately 0.4 ha bila 
land for 8000 Rs. They had been in need of 3000 Rs. for the death ceremony of the deceased 
household head and of another 5000 Rs. in order to purchase two bullocks. 
Creditors prefer to hold land in pledge than to lease land from somebody. To hold land in 
pledge is no loss; the mortgagee (creditor) will get back his money and in most cases make a 
profit after having cultivated the land for several years. Most informants compared the prac-
tice of mortgaging land with a monetary credit which has to be paid back with interest: the 
right to cultivate the land and the gain from it is seen as the interest for the money credit, but 
also as a security. The longer the money is not paid back, the higher the “interest” gained by 
the creditor. To lend somebody a considerable sum to get a paddy field as pledge may thus be 
an advantageous strategy for the creditor. In some cases the mortgagor (debtor) asks for an-
other credit after some years from the same creditor. Because of the landowner’s incapability 
to repay his debts, he may get it; the higher the credit, the better the chance for the creditor to 
be able to cultivate the land for many more years  
Household 13: The household head (a Juang) mortgaged one plot of bila land (0.2 ha) 3 
years ago for 1200 Rs. to a Munda. The field can be sown with 20 kg (1 khandi) paddy seeds 
and in a good years yields approx. 10 to 12 khandi paddy, i.e. 200 to 240 kg paddy, i.e. 140 to 
168 kg cleaned rice, in money value 1400 to 1600 Rs. per year. 
Household 121: The household head (a Juang) has mortgaged a small piece of land for 
250 Rs. to a Gouda. The field yields 5 to 6 khandi paddy in a good year, i.e. 100 to 120 kg 
paddy, 70 to 84 kg rice, in money value 700 to 840 Rs. per year. 
Household 15: The household head (a Juang) mortgaged land (0.25 ha) 3 years ago for 
3000 Rs. to a Munda. The seeds are 1.5 khandi paddy, yield in a good year approx. 15 khandi, 
i.e. 300 kg paddy, i.e. 210 kg cleaned rice with a value of 2100 Rs. per year. 
Household 16: The household has mortgaged 0.5 ha land (50 kg seeds) for 1500 Rs. for 
more than 4 years to a Gouda. 
Not included in these calculations however is the considerable risk of bad harvests due to 
unfavourable climatic conditions. Thus the above numbers are rough estimations and to get a 
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detailed picture of gains and losses due to leasing and mortagaging detailed case studies over 
longer periods would be necessary. 
Strikingly, land is sometimes mortgaged for many years even when relatively small debts 
are involved, sums which could be procured with reasonable effort by the landowner, e.g. by 
wood selling. It seems that at least part of the Juang are not particularly interested in getting 
their land back and they leave it to others to cultivate for a small sum. Household No. 7 e.g. 
has mortgaged a piece of land for the sum of 500 Rs. since more than 4 years. Household No. 
21 has mortgaged a plot for 200 Rs. for more than 4 years. Household No. 129 has mortgaged 
a plot for 100 Rs. for more than 2 years. If land has been mortgaged in order to use the credit 
for alcohol, there is a low probability that the land owner will try to repay his debts. He will 
rather spend his money on drinking. In other cases the land may be of lower quality and it is 
of low value to the owner. A further reason may be that a household does not have enough la-
bour to work due to sickness or death in the family and the land would not be cultivated by 
them anyway. 
4.4.1.5 Selling 
If at all possible, the Juang will not sell their land, preferring instead to lease it out to some-
one, or to mortgage it. They wish to retain their land so that they can pass it on to the future 
generation. Young men need land in order to marry and start their own family and household 
(whereas young women will move to their husband’s village). Land ownership is also appre-
ciated among the immigrants who have settled in the Juang area due to the scarcity of land in 
the area that they originate from. To buy land is seen as the best option for households who 
try to cultivate more land. Ownership gives the landowner increased security and also means 
that he is far more able to predict and plan farming and other economic activities. However, 
due to the official legal requirements for the transfer of land by tribals, the informal purchase 
of Juang land carries a degree of risk (see 4.4.1.6). For a household to cultivate leased and 
pledged land from various other farmers – under various conditions, for various periods – in-
volves risks and insecurities. To cultivate the land of others also restrains a household from 
investing in improving soil conditions and making provisions for better irrigation. 
Larger amounts of money are involved in the purchase of land as opposed to the rental of 
it. Compared to the sums involved in the mortage of land however, the sums paid for buying 
land are comparable. This leads us to question of why farmers should sell their land instead of 
mortgaging it when they are in immediate need of money. My presumption is that the owners 
sell their land due to limited bargaining power; when they have little alternative of transfer-
ring it for better conditions in an emergency situation. Other farmers are interested in buying 
land in order to avoid risks and to gain security. To cultivate land mortgaged from somebody 
is less advantageous than to cultivate one’s own land. 
 
Table 56: Cost of purchasing land (examples of 5 households buying land) 
HH number (buyers) Cost in Rs. per plot Size of plot in ha Cost per ha in Rs 
30 1300 0.3 4300 
 
48 
3500 
800 
800 
1.0 
0.15 
0.1 
3500 
5300 
8000 
52 2500 0.3 8300 
 
93 
 
2000 
2000 
1700 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
10000 
10000 
17000 
95 3000 0.2 15000 
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This means that the context of negotiation is important: the short and long term considerations 
of both parties, together with any possible alternatives to farming, such as wage labour and / 
or wood selling have to be taken into account during any negotiations. 
Surprisingly some cultivable paddy fields in Kodipasa lie fallow despite the scarcity of 
land in the village. Two reasons have generally been given by the villagers for this: some 
people, who for various reasons do not cultivate land themselves, refuse to rent or mortgage it 
to other households, as they are afraid of losing their land. They want to keep their land for 
the future, for their children for example. Another reason for uncultivated paddy land is the 
fact, that land, which has not been cultivated for several years, requires an additional initial 
input of labour for the first few years. During this initial period, there will not be a good yield, 
as the soil has to soften. For a tenant it is only worthwhile renting such land if it can be culti-
vated over a long period. 
Considering these various contractual arrangements of land transaction in the area under 
study, it may be said that there is a certain kind of a local land market. It operates in the con-
text of the local scarcity of land, the limited purchasing power of poor households, and the 
limited bargaining power of households which are in immediate need of cash. This results in 
very low prices for land transfers of the various types.40 
Under conditions of land scarcity the very low prices for which land is given away, are 
surprising. Many households would like to own more land, but poor households in particular 
lack the ready cash with which to pay for land from other households. There is therefore a 
limited demand for land. In times of need poor households have less bargaining power than 
the wealthier households, who have the means for obtaining additional low-cost land. 
However, there are additional factors which may explain why the Juang transfer their land; 
one is the fact that they are more willing to sell wood than other groups. This is also linked to 
a gender division of labour, which allows the men to shift the burden of any additional labour 
that may be required to compensate loss of land, to the Juang women. Another factor is the 
rather loose kinship ties among the Juang, with regard to land. The fact that land is not an in-
dispensable source of social status and prestige among the Juang further reduces their incen-
tive to keep it. 
4.4.1.6 Alienation of tribal land 
Efforts to protect the Juang and Bhuiya from land alienation were made just before the merger 
of the princely state with the State of Orissa. In 1947 the then ruler Balababhadra Narayan 
Bhanja issued an act called the “Bhuyan and Juangapirh Immigration Act, 1947”, declaring 
that:  
“Immigration of or attempt to immigrate into Bhuyan and Juangapirhs by any people other than a Bhuyan or 
Juanga shall henceforth be unlawful. (...) Immigration shall not be lawful except with the permission of the 
Ruler.” 
If the immigration is “in the interests of the Bhuyan and Juang community with regard to im-
provement of agriculture, medical aid, cottage industry, social development and benevolent 
act for the uplift of the Bhuyans and Juang or such other matter which will raise the standard 
of living of the Bhuyans and Juangs” (ibid.), the ruler may allow immigration of outsiders to 
                                                           
40 Sarap (1998) contributes an interesting analysis of the “operation of land market in backward agriculture” on 
the basis of the study of a village in Sambalpur, Orissa. Although the land market in this village has some simi-
larities to the situation described here for Kodipasa, it also differs in various aspects due to local conditions, 
which are different from the situation in Kodipasa. 
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the area. Non-Bhuiya or Non-Juang people that have resided in the Bhuyan and Juang Pirhs, 
for at least seven years prior to the implementation of the Act, were exempt. 
This Act is no longer in force. Access to land in tribal areas for non-tribals is now regu-
lated by the “Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable Property Regulation” of 1956 
and by the Orissa Land Reform Act of 1960. 
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force any transfer of immovable prop-
erty situated within a Scheduled Area by a member of a Scheduled Tribe shall be absolutely null and void 
and of no force or effect whatsoever unless made in favour of another member of a Scheduled Tribe or with 
the previous consent in writing of the competent authority.” (Orissa Scheduled Areas Transfer of Immovable 
Property Regulation 1956, pg. D-2) 
“Transfer of immovable property” includes mortgage, lease, sale, gift, exchange or any other 
dealings with such property. 
Therefore, to buy, mortgage or lease land from a tribal by a non-tribal is considered illegal 
under these laws and regulations if such transactions are not officially sanctioned. All infor-
mal land transactions are null and void and may be invalidated in favour of the tribal land-
owners, if there is any conflict and official proceeding: 
“(...) Where a person is found to be in unauthorised occupation of any immovable property of a member of a 
the Scheduled Tribes by way of trespass or otherwise the competent Authority may, either on application by 
the owner or any person interested therein, or on his own motion, and after giving the parties concerned an 
opportunity of being heard, order ejectment of the person so found to be in unauthorised occupation and shall 
cause restauration of possession of such property to the said member of the Scheduled Tribes or to his heirs” 
(ibid. D-6). 
The ‘competent authority’ refers to the Collector and includes any other officer or officers ap-
pointed by the State Government to perform all or any of the function of the Collector under 
the regulations of this Act. 
To legally obtain land, non-tribals (as well as tribals) may encroach wasteland and try to 
get it legalized officially. However, the total amount of encroached land that the State is pre-
pared to legalise is restricted to one “standard acre” (see chapter 3.2.3). In Kodipasa it is 
mainly the Munda, Santal and Gouda that have encroached cultivable wasteland. 
In the villages under study, most of the land transactions that take place are informal, unof-
ficial and illegal in the strict sense of the term. Agreements are either made orally or some-
times in writing between the parties involved. As long as there is no new land settlement, 
such informal dealings have no legal consequences. However, among several of the Gouda 
families, the various types of land transfers from the Juang to the Gouda as non-tribals are 
known to be sensitive issues and there is some fear that the illegal cultivation of tribal land 
may be stopped by the government. 
The fact that the informal purchase of land by the Gouda, from the Juang, is illegal and 
risky may be a further reason for low land prices. 
 
4.4.2 Wage labour 
4.4.2.1 Farm wage labour 
Farm wage labour carried out by the adults from the various social groups of the population 
under study is as follows: 
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Table 57: Involvement of ethnic groups in farm wage labour 
 
Ethnic 
group 
 
% of all adults 
per group 
% of male adult 
population  
per group 
% of female 
adult population 
per group 
% male farm wl 
of all farm wl 
per group 
% female farm wl 
of all farm wl  
per group 
All Juang 
35.3% 
(96 of 272) 
16.1% 
(20 of 124) 
51.4% 
(76 of 148) 
20.8% 
(20 of 96) 
79.2% 
(76 of 96) 
Munda 
66.3% 
(57 of 86) 
66.7% 
(26 of 39) 
66.0% 
(31 of 47) 
45.6% 
(26 of 57) 
54.4% 
(31 of 57) 
Santal 
22.7% 
(5 of 22) 
18.2%  
(2 of 11) 
27.3% 
(3 of 11) 
40.0% 
(2 of 5) 
60.0% 
(3 of 5) 
Gouda 
25.5% 
(13 of 51) 
24.0% 
(6 of 25) 
26.9% 
(7 of 26) 
46.2% 
(6 of 13) 
53.8% 
(7 of 13) 
 
In all of the four groups, a greater number of women than men are involved in farm wage la-
bour. However, the largest difference between the number of men and women involved in 
farm wage labour is to be found among the Juang, where almost 80% of all farm wage labour 
is done by women. Gender balance is higher among the other groups. However, there are also 
other differences between the various groups: The Munda are more involved in farm wage la-
bour than any other group, with both the men and women involved to a considerable extent. 
The Juang are not as involved in wage labour as the Munda, but are more so than the Gouda 
and Santal. The Gouda male and female farm wage labourers are mainly employed as cattle 
herders for the villagers. 
Considering the fact, that farm wage labour is available for all of the four groups with the 
same problem of seasonal and irregular availability, the differences between the various 
groups including gender specific differences, have to be explained by the preferences of the 
various groups resulting in diverse economic strategies. 
It is common for both the men and women of all of the four groups to carry out farming ac-
tivities for their own households. To be employed as farm wage labourers on other people’s 
farms, is connected with a lower social status, for the higher-ranking and status conscious 
Gouda families. Gouda women that belong to the wealthier families in particular, are primar-
ily considered to be workers within their own families and households. These Gouda house-
holds try to avoid farm wage labour and also grazing cattle for others. Instead they try to in-
crease their land and, wherever possible use wage labour to cultivate it. 
The Munda combine wood selling and farm wage labour in a more gender-balanced way 
than the Juang. Their strong involvement in farm wage labour, in comparison to the Juang, is 
partly due to the greater number of males that participate in farm wage labour, as opposed to 
wood selling, which is not a traditional activity for them. Being migrants from areas with no 
tradition of wood selling, they are less ready to sell wood, although for poor households it is 
seen as an indispensable source of income. The Munda women are much less involved in 
wood selling than the Juang women. 
The Juang are employed less as farm wage labourers than the Munda, mainly due to the 
fact that only a small percentage of Juang males perform this role. They perceive farm wage 
labour as women’s work and as such, less appropriate for themselves. Another factor for the 
lower involvement in farm-wage labour of the Juang, in comparison to the Munda, is that 
wood selling is common among both the Juang men and women and a viable alternative to 
farm wage labour. 
Due to the small number of households belonging to the Santal, it is difficult to draw any 
valuable conclusions about their involvement in farm wage labour, although it can be said that 
they do relatively little. 
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4.4.2.2 Off-farm wage labour 
The involvement of both the Gouda and Juang in off-farm wage labour is considerably less 
than that of the Munda and Santal. Again, statements about the Santal are not very significant 
due to the small number of households. 
 
Table 58: Involvement of ethnic groups in off-farm wage labour 
 
Ethnic 
group 
 
% of all adults 
per group 
% of male adult 
population  
per group 
% of female 
adult population 
per group 
% Male off-farm 
wl of all off-farm 
wl per group 
% Female off-farm 
wl of all off-farm 
wl per group 
All Juang 
14.7% 
(40 of 272) 
29.0% 
(36 of 124) 
2.7% 
(4 of 148) 
90.0% 
(36 of 40) 
10.0% 
(4 of 40) 
Munda 
44.2% 
(38 of 86) 
61.5% 
(24 of 39) 
29.8% 
(14 of 47) 
63.2% 
(24 of 38) 
36.8% 
(14 of 38) 
Santal 
36.4% 
(8 of 22) 
45.5% 
(5 of 11) 
27.3% 
(3 of 11) 
62.5% 
(5 of 8) 
37.5% 
(3 of 8) 
Gouda 
7.8% 
(4 of 51) 
4.0% 
(1 of 25) 
11.5% 
(3 of 26) 
25.0% 
(1 of 4) 
75.0% 
(3 of 4) 
 
The Gouda’s involvement in off-farm wage labour is very low in comparison to the other 
groups. Low-skill off-farm wage labour is considered debasing by the higher-ranking Gouda. 
But some few members of the lower- ranking Maghada Goud work as off-farm wage labour-
ers. The high percentage of female Gouda off-farm wage labourers in comparison to the 
males, is due to the very small number of Gouda involved in off-farm wage labourers (only 
four). One of the three women works as a cook for a health-worker in the village, the other 
two are employed at a local pyrophylite mine. 
The Juang generally do not like wage labour. They prefer independent activities, such as 
wood selling, where they can make their own decisions, as they are not accustomed to work-
ing under the supervision of a contractor or employer. Most of those that work as off-farm 
wage-labourers are employed as stonecutters, where the salary is paid per quantity of work 
and not by the amount of time worked. This work is done locally, in Kodipasa, and as such, 
they can make a decision, on a daily basis, as to whether to do the work or not; even, on occa-
sions, deciding at the last minute. Equipped with the necessary tools, Juang men may pass 
through the village and when asked, where they are off too, they will reply, that they are go-
ing to cut stones today. Some time later one may see them sitting in a circle of friends and 
neighbours, enjoying handia. Of course, some of the Juang men enjoy this kind of autonomy 
at the expense of their women, whose only “autonomy” is to decide whether to sell wood or 
do farm wage-labour in order to feed their children and husband. 
Off-farm wage labour is also an option that is available to young, unmarried Juang men 
that wish to earn an income in cash for themselves. As with any other income that they may 
earn, it is up to them to contribute income from off-farm wage labour to the household. 
Juang women are hardly involved in off-farm wage labour at all. This is probably due to 
their large involvement in farming and wood selling. However, young and unmarried Juang 
women, accompanied by male relatives, may travel far from home, if employed as off-farm 
wage labourers by contractors. It is an opportunity for them to visit new and different places 
and meet new people, although there are many stories of bad experiences such as uncontrolled 
exploitation of the workers by the contractors under such circumstances. The decision to opt 
for this type of off-farm wage labour is not necessarily made by all the members of a house-
hold: the lack of parental authority can result in sons and daughters leaving their village, even 
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when their labour is needed for agricultural production. How much, if any, of their income, 
that they will contribute to their family, depends upon the intra-household relations. 
The Munda have the highest proportion of off-farm wage labourers, in comparison to the 
other groups; with a rather high female contribution. This may be explained by the lesser in-
volvement of the Munda in wood selling activities, combined with the fact that they will read-
ily allow their womenfolk to be employed as wage labourers. Off-farm wage labour is an op-
tion, that is both socially and economically acceptable to the Munda women. At the same 
time, Munda men seem to be more prepared to be off-farm wage labourers than their Juang 
counterparts. This results in a more balanced contribution to the household income on the part 
of the men, than among the Juang. 
4.4.3 Wood selling 
If the sale of fuel wood and timber are both considered viable options for income generation, 
when compared to other sources of income, this then raises the question as to why local peo-
ple choose different economic strategies to earn their livelihood in such a difficult environ-
ment. Economic factors such as the availability of land, farm wage labour, off-farm wage la-
bour and small-scale business, determine the degree to which the various groups are involved 
in wood selling activities. However, I suggest that in addition culture, caste and gender issues 
are three important and interlinked factors that help to explain the economic behaviour of the 
various groups, as has already been shown in previous sections. 
The following data illustrates the situation in 1998/99, regarding the importance of wood 
selling, for the various ethnic groups and for men and women: 
 
Table 59: Involvement of ethnic groups in wood selling 
  
Total 
HH 
 
WS 
HH 
 
 
In % 
 
Total 
adults 
 
Adults 
in WS  
In % 
of all 
adults 
 
M 
adults 
M 
adults 
in WS 
In % 
of M 
adults 
 
F 
adults 
F 
adults 
in WS 
In % 
of F 
adults 
F adults 
in % of 
all ws 
M adults 
in % of 
all ws 
All Juang 86 79 91.9 272 163 59.9 124 64 51.6 148 99 66.9 60.7 39.3 
Munda 28 22 78.6 86 46 53.5 39 24 61.5 47 22 46.8 47.8 52.2 
Gouda 16 4 25 51 6 11.8 25 4 16.0 26 2 7.7 33.3 66.7 
Santal 6 2 33.3 22 2 9.1 11 2 18.2 11 0 0 0 100 
Juang 
Kodipasa 
66 60 90.9 210 116 55.2 98 45 45.9 112 71 63.4 61.2 38.8 
Juang  
Upper 
Kansa 
20 19 95.0 62 47 75.8 26 19 73.1 36 28 77.8 59.6 40.4 
WS: wood selling 
M: male 
F: female 
 
There are clear differences between the various ethnic groups. The Juang are the main group 
selling wood, with regard to the population as a whole, as well as with regard to the percent-
age of wood sellers within their own group. Out of all of the wood selling households in the 
two villages, 74% are Juang households. Almost 92% of all Juang households are involved in 
wood selling and almost 60% of all adult Juangs sell wood. Amongst the Juang, there are a 
higher proportion of wood sellers in Upper Kansa, then in Kodipasa. 
With regard to gender, Juang women are heavily involved in wood related activities; two 
thirds of all Juang women collect wood from the forest to sell. This percentage is higher than 
among the Juang men; slightly more than 50% of the men sell wood. Moreover, it has been 
observed that most of the Juang women do collect and sell wood more often and on a more 
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regular basis than the Juang men. In Upper Kansa, more Juang men do sell wood in compari-
son to the Juang men in Kodipasa. 
The Munda are also heavily involved in wood selling, although not to the same extent as 
the Juang. There are less Munda women involved in wood selling in comparison to the Juang 
women and also in comparison to the Munda men. Those Munda men and women who sell 
wood, do it on a less regular basis than the Juang. The Munda cultivate more land per con-
sumer than the Juang and are more involved in wage labour. 
Wood selling is of marginal importance to the Gouda. The percentage of female and male 
wood sellers is very low, when compared to the other groups. Only 25% of all Gouda house-
holds (11.76% of the adult Gouda population) sell wood and it is the Gouda herders that do 
this. More men (16%) than women (7.7%) do sell wood. 
Data for the Santal are from a very small number of households and thus are probably not 
very significant. The two male wood sellers recorded, sell wood very rarely. The Santal prefer 
agriculture and off-farm wage labour to wood selling. 
4.5 Summary 
There are several interlinked factors resulting in the different economic significance of agri-
culture, wage labour and wood selling for the households of the two villages, for individual 
households and for households of the various ethnic groups. 
Access to land for agricultural production differs between the two villages, the individual 
households and the households of any particular group. In Upper Kansa access to land for the 
purpose of shifting cultivation is not the limiting factor for agricultural production. It would 
be possible for villagers to cultivate more land. But the low land and labour productivity in 
shifting cultivation, combined with the risk of crop failure, due to environmental factors, 
makes wood selling a viable option when combined with agricultural production. In Kodipasa 
access to land of good quality is restricted and the distribution between individual households, 
as well as between the various groups, is unequal. Most households cannot produce sufficient 
paddy for their own needs due to the shortage of land and therefore have to earn an income 
either as wage labourers or wood sellers in order to be able to buy the additional paddy that 
they need. 
In both villages the opportunity to sell wood helps to spread the input of labour over the 
year and enables the villagers to earn an income in cash. Access to the resources of the forest 
is given to all of the households in both villages; theoretically anyone can go to the forest and 
cut timber for sale. Moreover, there is a regular demand for timber and fuel wood in neigh-
bouring villages and in the nearby town. 
Wage labour is also open to everybody. However, the demand for wage labour is seasonal 
and irregular and therefore the availability of wage labour is restricted in comparison to wood 
selling. 
Apart from key economic factors such as access to land, forest resources and wage labour, 
intra-household relations mainly dependent upon household size, age and gender, are of cru-
cial importance to understand peasant strategies at a household level. They include aspects of 
the sexual division of labour linked with gender ideologies, ideas about who has to contribute 
what and how much at which age to the household income, the bargaining power between 
men and women, young and old. These are all important factors in determining the economic 
strategies and behaviour of households and individuals under given conditions of access to 
land, wage labour and wood selling. It has been shown that the economic performance of 
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these peasant households is not always optimal from a purely economic point of view, as it is 
the result of the interests, preferences and strategies of individual household members. 
Social status and identity (caste and tribe) and interrelated gender ideologies are three im-
portant and interlinked factors, which help to explain the differences in economic behaviour 
and strategies (also with regard to critical events) of the households of the various ethnic 
groups. Thus, decision-making is not made on a purely economic basis.41 
Although most households do earn some income from the sale of wood, there are several 
reasons why the Juang are more involved in this activity than the other groups. They not only 
form the majority of the local population, but also give less preference to agriculture, in com-
parison to the other groups. In Kodipasa in particular, they even transfer land to the other 
groups. Thus, households belonging to the other groups are able to increase their agricultural 
production with land that they have been able to acquire from the Juang, while these compen-
sate for their loss of land by selling wood, which has a lower return to labour. The resulting 
costs are mainly shifted to the Juang women who are heavily involved in commercial wood 
selling.  
Thus, under local conditions of agriculture and wage labour, wood selling is of paramount 
importance to the local economy, although the significance of wood selling varies between 
the individual households and between the different ethnic groups. It makes strong economic 
sense to fell trees and sell the timber or fuel wood at the market, as has been shown in chap-
ters 3 and 4. However, the consequences of this kind of forest resource use are not only of an 
ecological nature (in the form of forest degradation). In the long run, the uncontrolled felling 
of trees for timber and fuel wood endangers the amount of forest resources available to be 
sold in the market, or to be used for the individual needs of the villagers. To a certain extent 
this has already happened in Kodipasa, and the scarcity of resources in the village forest has 
resulted in local initiatives to control access to and use of these resources. 
In the following chapter the institutional frameworks of forest use, in the research area, are 
outlined in order to gain an understanding of the local use of the forest. These institutional 
frameworks have to be analysed using an historical perspective. Thus, chapter 5 relates to the 
official forest policies as well as local forest politics. It links to the above economic analysis, 
when analysing costs and benefits of managing the forest as common property, as opposed to 
common pool resources with open access. 
 
                                                           
41 See Kurien 1994: His article shows how caste identity affects the patterns of consumption, investment and ex-
change within three caste communities in Kerala. To analyse in Kodipasa not only patterns of economic activi-
ties in the sphere of production, but also in the sphere of consumption, investment and exchange would also re-
veal differences among the various ethnic groups. 
See also the case study of Jackson and Chattopadhyay (2000): they illustrate how ideologies of gender and eth-
nicity and the practices of three social groups are related to the use and perception of natural resources in a 
Jharkhand village. 
  
5 FOREST POLICIES AND VILLAGE FOREST POLITICS 
The following short history of forest policies in India since the 19th century makes it clear that 
from the very beginning of British colonial forest policy, ideas about the management of In-
dian forest resources and about the role of local people were neither homogeneous nor free of 
contradictions.  
But also practices of post-colonial Indian forest policy were neither uniform nor consistent 
across India. The reconstruction of localised forest policy in Keonjhar in chapter 5.1-5.3, not 
only indicates the increasing state control over forest resources, but also the limits of the For-
est Department to implement rules and regulations in tribal areas. 
The analysis of local village forest politics in Kodipasa in chapter 5.4 addresses the issue 
of forest management based on local initiatives to protect village forest resources without the 
intervention of the Forest Department. I have deliberately selected villages that are not in-
volved in any official programmes of co-management between the villages and the Forest 
Department. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, I was interested in evaluating the endoge-
nous potential of a tribal village community in tackling the problem of forest degradation. 
This gave me the opportunity to verify some of the heterogeneous, contradictory and very 
general assumptions made about tribal use and management of forest resources. Secondly, the 
majority of tribal villages located in or nearby forests are not involved in so-called Joint For-
est Management (JFM) Projects.  
The consolidation of British colonial forest policy was initiated by the establishment of the 
Imperial Forest Department in 1864, which drew up and passed forest legislation and based 
the use of forest management systems upon contemporary scientific principles of modern for-
estry. However, the process of drafting forest legislation for British India was characterized 
by a vehement controversy within the colonial bureaucracy about the role that the communi-
ties and the state should play in the management of forest resources. The discussion revolved 
around the legal aspects of forest ownership and the capacity or incapacity of rural communi-
ties to use forests in a way that did not contradict with the superior interests of the colonial 
state. Gadgil and Guha (1996:124ff) distinguish three distinct positions crystallizing between 
the passing of the hurriedly drafted Indian Forest Act of 1865 and its more elaborate follower, 
the Indian Forest Act of 1878: 
1) The ‘annexationist’ position advocated by among others, the well-known senior civil ser-
vant B.H. Baden-Powell, pleaded for total control by the state over all forest areas. 
2) The ‘pragmatic’ position, favoured by among others, the first inspector-general of forests, 
Dietrich Brandis, argued in favour of state management of ecologically sensitive and stra-
tegically valuable forests, whereas the other areas should remain under communal systems 
of management. 
3) The ‘populist’ position represented most clearly by the Madras government, completely 
rejected state intervention and proposed the exercising of the sovereign rights of tribal and 
peasant communities over forest resources. 
Underlying these three schools of thought were different perceptions of the historical, politi-
cal, social and ecological features of traditional forest resource use: 
 
The annexationist position: 
Underlying the annexationist position were, on the one hand assumptions of a customary open 
access of rural communities to forest resources and on the other, historical interpretations of 
oriental governments as general owners of all unoccupied land, together with wasteland. The 
exponents of this position argued that any customary use of and access to forest hitherto en-
joyed by rural communities was exercised only at the discretion of the respective rulers. Once 
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the historical right of the oriental state to dispose of or retain for public use the waste and for-
est area was proven or accepted, the next step was to legitimise the transfer of this right to the 
colonial state. The annexationist position was further backed by early advocates of conser-
vancy with their negative judgement of indigenous systems of resource management and 
early suggestions of governmental responsibility for halting environmental degradation. Envi-
ronmental problems and issues of conservation had already been discussed during the 19th 
century. Regarding the functional role of forests within a broader ecological system, the con-
sequences of deforestation were assumed to be negative, resulting in changing water levels in 
large rivers, siltation, decreased local water supply, erosion and avalanches. The indigenous 
people were perceived as being inherently hostile towards the natural environment and its 
preservation. They were thought to be ignorant of the ecological functions of the forest and of 
conservation strategies; carelessly using natural resources. They were therefore held responsi-
ble for environmental degradation. Although the reasons for advocates of conservancy de-
manding state control over forest resources were not necessarily identical to those of com-
mercially oriented forest officials, both “parties” agreed on the policy of excluding local 
communities from using forest resources without major state control.  
 
The populist position: 
Diametrically opposed to such a position, was the total denial of the legitimacy of any state 
intervention in the forest held by the “populist” advocates, mainly represented by the Madras 
government. “All instances of the use of the forest by the people should be taken as presump-
tive evidence of property therein” (in Gadgil & Guha 1996:126). According to this view, a 
claim of the state over forests was virtually non-existent:  
“... all of them [forests: N.O.] without exception are subject to tribal or communal rights which have existed 
from time immemorial and which are as difficult to define as they are necessary to the rural population....Nor 
can it be said that these rights are susceptible to compensation, for in innumerable cases, the right to fuel, 
manure and pasturage, will be as much a necessity of life to unborn generations as it is to the present.....[In 
Madras; N.O.] the forests are, and always have been, common property, no restriction except that of 
taxes....was ever imposed on the people till the Forest Department was created, and such taxes no more indi-
cate that the forests belong to the state than the collection of assessment shows that the private holdings in 
Malabar, Canara and the Ryotwri districts belong to it” (in Gadgil 1996:127). 
The pragmatic position: 
Brandis’s position was a compromising one; between the ‘annexationist’ and the ‘populist’ 
position. According to him, in certain cases the state had indisputable, superior rights over 
forest resources. But there was no categorical and absolute right for the state to annex the tra-
ditionally grown forest rights of the people. Against the position of Baden-Powell, he took the 
view that the customary law of rural communities in India, which had evolved over a period 
of time, gave them the ‘right’, although not formally documented, to use forest resources. For 
that reason, he asked for a settlement of rights to be implemented in a “just and equitable 
manner” (in Gadgil and Guha 1996:129), as far as possible taking into account the customary 
rights of rural people. Accordingly, he advocated a restricted takeover of forests by the state, 
in order to avoid conflicting claims on the part of the state and the rural people, by proposing 
to “demarcate as state forests as large and compact areas of valuable forests as can be ob-
tained free of forest rights of persons” (ibid. 131). The residual forest areas, smaller in size, 
but more conveniently located for the supply of forest resources, should be left under the con-
trol of village communities. Based on the European model, he suggested the creation of three 
large classes of forest property: state forests, forests of villages and other communities, and 
private forests (ibid. 131). 
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Brandis’s advocacy for the right of village communities to control their forests was based 
on his belief in their ability to manage their own affairs. He referred to well-managed com-
munal forests in European countries that were recognized by law and it seemed to him “par-
ticularly desirable to strengthen the old village organization by consolidating and ameliorating 
the grazing grounds, forests and waste land of the village community” (in Gadgil and Guha 
1996:133).  
Brandis’s efforts to defend the traditional rights of the people to forest resources, against 
the extensive grip of the state failed. The first Indian Forest Act of 1878 predominantly re-
flected the position represented by the annexationists. It provided for three classes of forest: 
“Reserved forests”, “Protected Forests” and “Village Forests”. 
The demarcation of “Reserved Forests”, which consisted of compact and valuable areas, 
was aimed at the creation of forests for sustained exploitation by the state: in reserved forests 
a definite settlement of rights was aimed to secure total state control. The settlement meant 
either the extinction of private rights, the transfer of them, or in exceptional cases allowed 
their limited exercise (Gadgil and Guha 1996:134). These rights concerned shifting cultiva-
tion, grazing and pasture, grass cutting, lopping boughs and gathering leaves, wood rights, 
rights to dead and decayed leaves for litter and manure, rights to other forest produce, hunting 
and fishing etc. 
“Protected Forests” were also controlled by the state, although in a less strict manner. In 
this category, rights were not definitely settled, but recorded. However, detailed provisions 
“for the reservation of particular tree species as and when they became commercially valu-
able, and for closing the forest, whenever required to grazing and fuelwood collection”, se-
cured the possibility of excluding local users from the forest (Gadgil and Guha 1996:134). 
The “village forest” as a third class of forests, were small forest areas in which local com-
munities retained their customary rights, as long as these did not contradict the laws and regu-
lations laid down by the Forest Department. 
Based on the legal structure of the Indian Forest Act of 1878, which aimed to maintain 
strict state control over forest utilization, the “scientific” management of forests enabled the 
working of compact blocks of forest for commercial timber production. Timber for the pro-
duction of sleepers was required for the expansion of the Indian railway. Later, the two world 
wars enhanced the demand for Indian forest products. Commercial timber extraction by the 
colonial state reflected the cardinal principle of British imperial policy – a self-supporting co-
lonial administrative machine; the Indian colonial Forest Department had to generate suffi-
cient revenue in order to contribute its part in fulfilling this policy. A clear indication of the 
primary role assigned to forestry may be seen by the fact, that in most provinces the Forest 
Service was placed administratively under the Revenue Department (Sivaramakrishnan 
1995:10). Economic needs and fiscal considerations may hence be seen as the driving factors 
behind the consolidation of colonial forest policy and for the growing commercial value of 
Indian forest resources.  
In many respects the forest policy of independent India is linked with the colonial past. 
The Forest Policy Resolution of 1952 judged the fundamental concepts underlying the colo-
nial forest policy as being sound. It just needed to be reoriented; i.e. the commercial orienta-
tion persisted, although no longer in the context of imperial interest but in the context of na-
tional interest of the independent state (Pathak 1994:21). As Gadgil and Guha (1996:181ff.) 
point out, the evolution of forest policy since 1947 has to be set in the context of the general 
development track which India took after independence. Ghandi’s scenario for the reconstruc-
tion of both the Indian economy and society, after the colonial experience, gave primacy to 
the rural population. He envisioned a revival of the village communities of the pre-colonial 
and pre-industrial phase and aimed at the integration of craft production in rural population. 
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His model was opposed to a project of modernization with industrialization, not only advo-
cated by the first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, but also by many representatives of pow-
erful interest groups - capitalist merchants and industrialists, technical and administrative bu-
reaucracy and rich farmers.  
Gadgil and Guha (1996:186ff) define four stages in the industrial orientation of Indian for-
estry:  
1) 1947-1960: the exploitation of forest resources was still based upon traditional “sustained 
yield” selection methods of indigenous commercial species, but they were being intensi-
fied. However, due to a variety of reasons (inadequate database, failure to take account of 
rural demands, excessive grazing and fire, and the violation of standing prescriptions) the 
selection system did not supply the expected yields and a new strategy of intensive for-
estry was called for. 
2) 1960-85: the emphasis was on the production of economically attractive resources by 
means of plantations of quick-growing, high-yielding and predominantly exotic tree spe-
cies, which would replace the existing slow growing varieties. ‘Production forestry’ im-
plied the clearfell logging of existing forest stands and their replacement with plantations. 
Two distinct kinds of monoculture were aimed for: firstly, to raise eucalyptus and tropical 
pine plantations for industrial raw materials and secondly, to grow species such as teak 
and rosewood to be converted into high-quality furniture; in this way generating valuable 
foreign exchange. Such trends were encouraged by foreign aid agencies. The USAID, for 
example, believed, that “it would be highly advantageous for the Indian economy to re-
place a significant percentage of the mixed tropical hardwood species with man-made for-
ests of desirable species such as eucalyptus, tropical pine and teak” (in Gadgil & Guha 
1996:188). 
A concomitant of the concept of production forestry was the concept of “social forestry” 
which was both backed and influenced by the National Commission of Agriculture 
(NCA). The NCA had been created in 1970, by the Indian Government in order to exam-
ine all aspects of agriculture including forestry (Pathak 1994:124; Fernandes 1988:26). 
Whereas production forestry focused on the production of raw materials for industrial 
needs, social forestry focused on meeting the non-industrial needs of the people by the 
production of firewood and timber. However, the performance of diverse social forestry 
projects in different states, often supported by international donor agencies, brought to 
light several constraints and problems. 
3) The third stage in the industrial orientation of forest policy was the implementation of 
“farm forestry”, which overlapped with the second stage. Mainly due to ecological rea-
sons, production forestry for industrial needs had failed to realize projected yields. From 
1975 onwards, millions of farmers had started to plant tree crops on their individual hold-
ings, in order to sell them on maturity to rayon and paper manufacturers.  
4) The fourth stage (since 1985) implied the intensive lobbying of the paper and rayon indus-
tries, for the allotment of government land as captive plantations along with a massive 
import of wood and paper pulp.  
 
However, to interpret post-colonial forestry and forest policy as more or less directly and ex-
clusively guided by purely economic reasons would be to ignore other factors, which played a 
significant part. From the 1970s onwards, the growing international and national discourse on 
environment began to interfere increasingly with Indian forest policy. This is not to say that 
the issue of the environmental role of forests was hitherto absent – it has already been men-
tioned, that environmental arguments were used to legitimise the take-over of forests by the 
colonial state in the 19th century, and environmental aspects are to be found in diverse policy 
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documents on the forestry of independent India. “However, environmental considerations 
were subordinated to the dominant ideology of unlimited growth and industrialisation. Envi-
ronmental considerations became important only after the rise of environmentalism in the 
West and the globalisation of the issue of environment” (Pathak 1994:31). 
In the late 1960s, environmental considerations in the developed countries shifted from 
concerns over pollution in their own countries, to natural resource degradation in the develop-
ing countries. This globalisation of the environmental discourse found its expression in the 
United Nations Conference on Human Environment, Stockholm in 1972. Despite conflicts be-
tween the North and South, as developing countries felt that they were being hampered by the 
West in their efforts to achieve economic growth, the Stockholm Conference “implanted the 
roots of environmental thought in the official discourse in India” (Pathak 1994:33). An insti-
tutional beginning in the field of environment was made with the creation of the National 
Committee on Environmental Planning and Coordination (NCEP), which was entrusted with 
the responsibility of identifying environmental problems, reviewing policies and carrying out 
research. The formation of nine sanctuaries in nine Indian states under the title of “Project Ti-
ger”, started in 1973 with a grant from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). This marked the start of environmental action 
(Pathak 1994:34). The Wildlife Act was drafted to accord complete protection to wildlife 
from the local population.  
In 1980, a separate Department of Environment was created by the Central Government 
under the Ministry of Science and Technology. This Department was a central agency for en-
vironmental protection, eco-development work and the environmental appraisal of develop-
ment projects. Policy formulation on forests, land use, oceans and the air was one of its func-
tions (Pathak 1994:50). In 1985, the Department of Forests, hitherto under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, was merged with the Department of Environment to form a separate Ministry of 
Environments and Forests (Pathak 1994:56). This institutional and administrative reorganisa-
tion, on the one hand reflected the growing importance of environmental issues on the na-
tional political landscape. On the other hand, the merger of these two departments (Forest and 
Environment) resulted from their conflicting and controversial viewpoints, with regard to the 
forests prior to their union. The Forest Department was more inclined to commercially ori-
ented production forestry, whereas the Department of Environment promoted protection for-
estry. However, the strategy of the central Government to move the Forest Department out of 
the Ministry of Agriculture, in order to give environmental considerations more weight, did 
not solve the problem of internal struggle, which now continued under the common organisa-
tional umbrella of the Ministry of Environments and Forests (Pathak 1994:56). 
Environmental considerations of the newly created Department of Environment are well 
reflected in the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85); the Plan expressed the concern that there had 
been a rapid depletion of forests, and clearly formulated the objective of forest conservation. 
States were accused of destroying forests to extract revenue and Forest Departments were 
blamed for reducing the genetic base of natural forests by their conversion, without consider-
ing the disastrous repercussions on the environment and economy of the country. Along with 
the conservation of forests, complete protection of representative samples of land, water, flora 
and fauna, through the creation of sanctuaries and biosphere reserves, were strongly recom-
mended. Furthermore, it was emphasised that the remaining forests should not be logged at 
all, even if this meant that pulp had to be imported. (Pathak 1994:53) The concept of social 
forestry was supported for environmental reasons: it was conceived that this method would 
potentially reduce the pressure on natural forests, and differed from the recommendations of 
the Forest Department, namely to reduce pressure on forest for production forestry. 
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The Forest Department, for its part, took over the environmental discourse to secure and 
extend control over forest resources, without clearly shifting its commercial and revenue-
oriented position to more protective and conservative practices of forestry activities. This 
strategy is visible in an attempt by the forestry establishment to expand its control over forest 
resources in the draft Forest Bill of 1981, prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture: this policy 
document retained the commercial orientation and the territorial monopoly of Forest Depart-
ments over forests by simultaneously accusing forest dwellers of environmental degradation: 
“Ecological considerations were ambiguously placed in conjunction with deriving benefits from forests, leav-
ing wide gaps for the Forest Departments to continue traditional forestry practices and even the conversion of 
natural forests. The policy blamed the local people for bringing about the depletion of forests and, thus, made 
out a case for larger powers for the Forest Department over the forest dwellers” (Pathak 1994:54). 
The Draft Bill of 1981 was rejected under considerable pressure from social activists, envi-
ronmentalists, legal and other professionals. This rejection may be considered the beginning 
of the strengthening of an approach, which attested local people a different role in their rela-
tionships with the forest. In 1980 the Ministry of Home Affairs constituted the “Committee on 
Forests and Tribals in India” to suggest a re-orientation of forest policy, in order to serve the 
tribal economy. The report, delivered by this committee in 1982, accused the Forest Depart-
ments of treating the forests as a source of revenue, and of destroying the tribal means of sub-
sistence by the destruction of natural forests. The Forest Departments were blamed for alien-
ating the tribals from the forests. “The Committee recommended harmonising the national, 
regional and local interests in forests and recognising the symbiosis of the local people with 
forests in forestry works” (Pathak 1994:55). 
Poffenberger and Singh (1996:62) state that since 1988, there had been indications of a 
shift towards a more active involvement of local communities. The Indian National Forest 
Policy of 1988 and the Joint Forest Management (JFM) Resolutions made on 1st June 1990, 
combined with some sixteen state-level resolutions and government orders, began reshaping 
the environmental policy, acknowledging the need to give more rights and authority to com-
munity groups.  
The Joint Forest Management Resolution of 1990, referred to the National Forest Policy of 
1988 and resumed the idea of the participation of forest communities in forest protection and 
management: 
“The National Forest Policy, 1988, envisages people´s involvement in the development and protection of for-
ests. The requirements of fuelwood, fodder and small timber such as house-building material, of the tribals 
and other villagers living in and near the forests, are to be treated as first charge on forest produce. The Pol-
icy document envisages it as one of the essentials of forest management that the forest communities should 
be motivated to identify themselves with the development and protection of forests from which they derive 
benefits.” (Government of India 1990; no.6-21/89-F.P.)  
This somewhat more “people-oriented approach” is still characterised by a paternalistic atti-
tude towards “forest communities”, who are to “be motivated to identify themselves with the 
development and protection of forests”. Moreover people’s participation is envisaged first and 
foremost for the regeneration of already degraded forests. 
However, the issuing of the Joint Forest Management Resolution has gained considerable 
importance in several states of India; Orissa being one of them. Thus it may be said that to-
wards the end of the 20th century, Indian forest policy partly includes elements of the “prag-
matic” position, although these have been criticised by the followers of a more “populist” ap-
proach for not giving enough autonomy and control over forest resources to local people.  
It was not only global “environmentalism” which influenced recent debates about the for-
ests and peoples of India, but also the international discourse about ‘indigenous people’ and 
their role with regard to natural resource management. In this context the role of the adivasi 
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(tribal peoples of India) as primary custodians of nature, whose participation was required in 
order to conserve the rapidly degrading forest resources of India, was emphasised by advo-
cates of a people-oriented forest policy. 
A closer look at the forest situation in Orissa and Keonjhar, on one hand sheds light on the 
localised version of the Indian colonial and post-colonial forest policy. On the other hand, this 
forest policy has evolved in the context of a high percentage of tribal population. 
5.1 Colonial forest policy in Orissa and Keonjhar 
The history of forest policies in Orissa and in Keonjhar shows many traits identified as gen-
eral developments of forest control and management in India, which were initiated by the 
British and carried forward by the independent State. However, what might be called the 
“grand story” of this aspect of environmental history of India, in reality took place in the form 
of many local histories in different places under different local circumstances. Even within 
smaller regions of India, such as Orissa, the process of increased state control over forest re-
sources did not take place simultaneously or in a uniform manner throughout the region. This 
was partly to do with the complexity of the political situation of Orissa. At the beginning of 
British colonial rule in Orissa in 1803, the area known today as Orissa consisted of two politi-
cal settings, which were linked to specific historical and environmental conditions: the Garjat 
and the Mughal bandi areas. 
The Garjat area in those days consisted of 24 tributary chieftains or tributary mahals, also 
referred to by the British as Tributary, Feudatory or Princely States. These were semi-
independent territories that were ruled by rajas, who made payments either in cash or kind to 
the Maratha rulers. Sometimes the rajas were reluctant to make these payments, or on occa-
sions, did not make any at all. These little kingdoms were situated in northern, western and 
central Orissa, characterized topographically by hilly and mountainous areas and plateaus in-
terrupted by river valleys. With the exception of the river valleys, they were thickly forested 
and thinly populated, difficult to access and thus difficult to control, be that by the Maratha 
rulers, the Mughal Empire or any other empires in the past. 
Any centralised state that claimed power over Orissa in the past had direct control only 
over the coastal plains formed by the deltas of the rivers, which ran from the mountainous re-
gion in the west (Mahapatra 1997:899). This was the Mughal bandi area, the plain and open 
part of Orissa, with fertile areas and a higher population density. In the second half of the 18th 
century, it was under the direct control of the Maratha government. Prior to this, it was con-
trolled by the Nawabs of Bengal, and from the end of the 16th century to the beginning of the 
18th century it was at first controlled by the Moghul Empire of Akbar and later Aurangzeb. 
The British had to deal with these two patterns of political rule in Orissa. Their policy resulted 
in various degrees of integration, subordination and control of the various areas within the 
framework of British colonial rule. Some areas came under direct control of the British. Some 
of the rajas of the princely states had signed treaties acknowledging British suzerainty while 
maintaining a large degree of autonomy over the internal administration of their states. Keon-
jhar was one of these tributary states. It had signed a treaty with the British in 1804. 
This political diversity of the various areas of Orissa under British rule is also reflected in the 
legal situation with regard to forests. On the eve of independence and before the merger of 
several princely states into present-day Orissa, there were three categories of forests in Orissa 
(Fernandes 1988:29ff): 
1) The government-owned forests under the management of the Forest and Revenue De-
partments of the erstwhile provinces of Bihar and Orissa at the time of independence. In 
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these forests the ownership was established by two legislative measures: either by the 
Madras Forest Act of 1927 (in Ganjam and Koraput districts and in the Balliguda and G. 
Udayagiri talukas of Phulbani district) or by the Indian Forest Act of 1927, which applied 
to the remaining districts. 
2) The forests of the princely states of the Eastern States Agency, which merged with Orissa 
in January 1948. Keonjhar was one of the premier states of the Eastern States Agency, i.e. 
its forests belonged to this category (N.O.) 
3) The zamindari forests, that were either under the control of the princely states or the State 
Government.  
 
In the princely states, each state had its own rules and regulations regarding the forests. It was 
only several years after independence and after the merger of the Princely States with the in-
dependent State of Orissa, that all rules and regulations for forests in the State of Orissa were 
incorporated as part of the Indian Forest Act of 1927, in a process of standardization of a na-
tional forest policy, which took place in 1954, when an amendment to the Indian Forest Act 
of 1927 was passed. The Orissa Forest Act of 1972 further enhanced this process. 
However, even during the colonial period, the British had tried to push ahead their ideas 
and policies with regard to the management of forest resources, and to convince the rulers of 
the princely states to adopt them. The following short historical review, on forest management 
in Orissa, illustrates the British efforts to not only bring forests under the control and man-
agement of institutions of the Colonial Government, but also to persuade the princely states to 
strengthen their control over their forests: 
 “The actual management of forests in Orissa started in 1883-84, when the Orissa Forest Division came into 
being for the first time. Initially the division had only 267 sq. miles to its credit, but gradually demarcations 
for settlement and reservation were taken up. Orissa was separated from Bengal and a new State of Bihar and 
Orissa came into being in 1912, during which two more forest divisions had started functioning at Puri and 
Sambalpur [two districts of Orissa: N.O.]. During 1936, the state of Orissa became independent [i.e. it was 
separated from Bihar: N.O.]. By this time, a total of four forest divisions existed in the State - Angul, Puri, 
Sambalpur (East) and Sambalpur (West).  
The same year the Forest Department was formed and brought under the administrative powers of the ‘Con-
servator of Forests’ at Angul. After the merger of the Ganjam district with Orissa, Ganjam Forest Division, 
which was initially attached to the Madras Province got transferred to Orissa.  
However, the forests of the Garjat States [i.e. princely states: N.O.] were under the administration of the Ra-
jas. Some of the big states like Mayurbhanji and Bolangir-Patna, had fullfledged Forest Departments func-
tioning on terms similar to those in the provinces of British India. The Garjats were under a political agent 
with headquarters at Sambalpur. The Conservator of Forest, posted at Sambalpur, acted as adviser to these 
states in matters of forestry; a post held by Dr.F. Mooney for long. Orissa had already 9 forest divisions ex-
isting in 1947 under a conservator of forest at Angul” (CPSW 1994:41). 
In the Settlement Report, 1892-1900, of Keonjhar State (Government of Orissa 1964:62f.) a 
very short summary of the situation of the forest in the then Princely State of Keonjhar is 
given, together with strong recommendations to strengthen central control over forest re-
sources and to introduce forest conservancy rules. The report does not necessarily document 
the condition of the forests in Keonjhar, but it undoubtedly reflects the spirit of the age of 
British Forest Policy in India as discussed in previous chapters: 
“Up till 1892, little or no attention had been paid to prevent the primeval forests in Upper and on the borders 
of Lower Keonjhar from being denuded of its valuable shade. The subjects on the State mercilessly felled or 
destroyed whole forests of magnificent trees for Toila cultivation [shifting cultivation: N.O.], or for obtaining 
lac, and the income derived from these sources would be considered as an advantageous gain to the State. In 
that year the Government, on the report of the Conservator of Forests regarding the forests of the Tributary 
Mahals, Orissa, thus wrote to the Superintendent:   
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The Lieutenant-Governor considers the conservation of these forests to be a matter of the greatest impor-
tance, and I am to request that influence may, as far as possible, be brought to bear on the Chiefs by asking 
them, in their own interests, to place the forests in their States or portions of them, under the management of 
the Forest Department, and that in any case the Chiefs may be induced to obtain from that Department the 
Services of trained Foresters with a view to carry out the forest conservancy rules. The Chiefs should at the 
same time be asked to strictly prohibit the felling of immature Sal trees having a girth (at 4 feet from the 
ground) of less than six feet as suggested by the Conservator.  
The Maharaja [Dhanurjay Bhanja: N.O.], on receipt of the Government orders, became sensible to the advan-
tages of having the forest rules enforced in the State, and has since then opened a small department for regu-
lating export and realising fees. The income from forest and forest produce has greatly increased since then, 
and is fast developing, though the conservancy rules have not been strictly followed in all parts of the State. 
The prohibitory orders for felling valuable timber could not be extended to the hills inhabited by the Bhuyans 
and Juangs, who, as noted before, live chiefly on toila cultivation, and in the jungly portions of Upper Keon-
jhar proper scrutiny for want of regular supervising establishment is not being kept.  
The whole establishment that is being entertained for the Forest Department at present consists of one head 
Muharrir [clerk], two Muharrirs and 12 peons for Lower Keonjhar and the dandpats [an administrative divi-
sion in ancient Orissa consisting of a group of villages, or its head: ODG 1986: 454] of Rebna and Hunda in 
Upper Keonjhar and one Muharrir and three peons for the Nayagarh Subdivision of Upper Keonjhar. It is 
high time now that the settlement operations have been wound up to consider the question of entertaining a 
regular forest staff under a trained and decently salaried Forester from Government employ. The State is a 
comparatively big sized one, and to supervise the working of the conservancy rules in the extensive forest ar-
eas of the State, an establishment like the one at present entertained will never do. The Maharaja has prom-
ised to consider the question in his next year’s budget, and he should be induced by all means to have a regu-
lar Forest Department opened if the umbrageous tracts of valuable timber in Upper Keonjhar is not to be 
deforested any more by reckless felling of green trees. Toila cultivations in the hills cannot, of course, be ab-
solutely stopped, but accessible areas in them containing promising growths might well be reserved as State 
Forests, and the rest made over to the hillmen for their toila.” 
The perception of people as ‘merciless’ destroyers of forests and valuable timber - with a spe-
cial mention of tribal people and their practice of shifting cultivation - together with consid-
erations of revenue generation from forest resources as well as aspects of conservancy are the 
key elements of this report. However, the document also indicates the difficulties of imple-
menting conservancy rules, of supervising large forest areas and of trying to put a stop to 
shifting cultivation. It specifically mentions the Bhuiya and Juang area, where the new forest 
policy could not be implemented. 
The policy of “reserved trees” was already at work at the beginning of the 20th century. In-
cluded in this Settlement Report is a table of twelve timber-yielding tree species, which at that 
time were already prohibited from being felled without a licence. Yet again, it is also specifi-
cally mentioned, that this rule was not in force in the Bhuiya and Juang hill tracts. The sub-
jects of the State were also prohibited from cutting down any fruit bearing trees such as 
mango, jackfruit (Artocarpus integrifolia), beheda (Terminalia belerica), harida (Terminalia 
chebula), etc. However, there is no information on how far this policy was implemented. In 
addition, there is a table, which estimates the income that would be obtained by the State from 
forest and forest produce for the year 1900-1901. The estimated income from the forests of 
Upper Keonjhar (including the Bhuiya and Juang hill tracts) in contrast to that from the for-
ests of Lower Keonjhar gives no mention of any income from forest cesses. The Settlement 
Report clearly states that the people living in the tracts of Upper Keonjhar did not pay any 
taxes for firewood or for using timber for their houses and ploughs, “as the condition of the 
people is not such as to warrant the levy of extra fees over their land jama [annual rent or 
revenue]” (ibid.:83). The people of Lower Keonjhar on the other hand paid “a house-tax for 
using bamboo and other minor wood for their dwelling houses, for the construction of 
ploughs and for using firewood and charcoal” (ibid.: 83). 
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During 1906, the first trained ranger was appointed and an attempt was made to strengthen 
the organisation of the Forest Department. When in 1907 the State of Keonjhar came under 
the direct management of the British Government, due to several years of political unrest, the 
reservation of forest blocks was initiated. The selection and demarcation of reserved forest 
blocks was advanced by the appointment of the first Agency Forest Officer, A. N. Grieve, in 
1911 and had virtually been completed by 1924. The selection and actual demarcation of the 
protected forests were initiated at the close of the settlement in 1915 and completed not long 
afterwards. However, it was not until 1930 that reserved and protected forest blocks began to 
be managed according to systematic working plans. The first of these was designed by a Dr. 
Mooney, the then Forest Adviser (Working Plan 1984-85:97f). In the past, between 1910 and 
1930, the Bengal Timber Trading Company had a lease that permitted them to fell as many 
trees as they wished, during the period of their contract. The exploitable girth of the timber 
was fixed at approximately 1.5 metres. The lease had been given for revenue purposes. The 
production of sleepers by the Bengal Timber Trading Company, from the unrestricted felling 
of trees in some forest areas of Keonjhar, for extensive periods, reduced these in many cases 
to a pole crop (ODG 1986:21 / Working Plan 1984-85:97). 
Under the British forest advisers, the forests of Keonjhar were divided into three main 
categories, which defined the rights and concessions of the people (Appendix I in ODG 
1986:36). These referred to the use of forest products such as timber, firewood, bamboo and 
“Minor Forest Produce” such as fibre, honey, wax, leaves and grass, edible fruits, roots and 
flowers, as well as to grazing rights. It clearly stated under which circumstances these prod-
ucts may be collected for personal use or for sale and in the latter case the rates were fixed. 
The document indicates that certain categories of people got preferential treatment, in so far 
as the restrictions were less rigid for them. These categories included the “aboriginal tribes, 
landless or poorer classes”. 
1) In “A” class reserved forests reservation was considered absolute. However, some rights 
were conceded for “aboriginal tribes” and other categories of local users: “aboriginal 
tribes, landless, or poorer classes” were allowed to remove for the purpose of sale natu-
rally fallen firewood” (Appendix I in ODG 1986). For an annual payment, they were al-
lowed to collect minor forest produce such as fibres, leaves and grasses, honey and wax 
from “A class reserved forests” in restricted quantities, e.g. one head load of firewood per 
day. Edible fruits, roots, flowers and leaves were free for “aboriginal tribes”. Timber was 
free to cesspayers (local taxation), but it could only be obtained with prior permission 
from the Forest Department. There was to be no free grazing in reserved forests. No spe-
cial mention is made regarding shifting cultivation, however, it is clear that it was not 
permitted. 
2) In “B” class reserved forests, the rights of the local users were less restricted, the forest 
was meant for the Nistar (usufruct) of the villagers. “B class reserved forests” were also 
known as “demarcated protected forests”. The collection of firewood and minor forest 
produce was free for cess paying villagers that were “situated within a convenient radius 
of B class Reserved Forest”. Timber for agricultural implements was also free. There was 
no free grazing allowed in such forests, however, the rates for grazing were less than in 
“A” class reserved forests. There were no special rights for tribal people mentioned for the 
use of this type of forest. 
3) In addition to “B” class reserved forests, there were village forests, also called Khesra for-
ests, which were neither surveyed nor demarcated but were managed by the Forest De-
partment. They were also known as undemarcated protected forest. Unreserved and re-
served species in such forests were free, if used for agricultural implements. “All Pans [a 
scheduled caste: N.O.] and members of the indigenous tribes and all persons of poorer 
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classes and landless labourers are allowed unreserved trees for their personal use as well 
as for sale and reserved trees for personal use”. Firewood was free; as was the collection 
of bamboo, minor forest produce and grazing. No special mention is made about the prac-
tice of shifting cultivation: it is neither explicitly allowed nor forbidden. 
 
The same rights and concessions are still in force today, except that the schedule of rates was 
revised and slightly increased by the Forest Department in 1977 (ODG 1986:22). The list of 
species declared as “reserved species” steadily increased over the years and by 1959 it already 
contained 27 species (Working Plan Keonjhar 39-40). 
A report on “Working Plan for the Reserved Forests of Kendujhar State” prepared in 1929, 
shows the following numbers for forest areas coming under the category of reserved and pro-
tected forests (ODG 1986:27f):  
 
Area of State:  8018.64 km2 
Reserved Forest: 1570.84 km2 
Protected Forest: 388.50 km2 
 
Unfortunately the areas of “A class” and “B class” reserved forests are not indicated. How-
ever, the total classified forest area amounts to 1959.34 sq. km. These figures show that in the 
period of approximately 30 years, from 1892, large forest areas in Keonjhar Princely State be-
came classified as reserved forest and to a lesser extent protected forest, although the actual 
management of such forests, using systematic working plans had not, at that time been im-
plemented.  
However, in the Bhuiya and Juang pirhs, which cover a total area of 1258.74 km2, no for-
ests had been declared reserved or protected forest at that time (ODG 1986:27).  
According to a revised working plan in 1945-46, the total classified forest area of Keonjhar 
district, immediately prior to the merger with Orissa State was roughly the same as in 1929, 
with 1997 km2. In this plan, some Khesra forest was mentioned (ODG 1986:28): 
 
Reserved forest:  1523 km2 
Demarcated protected forest: 264 km2 
Keshra:   210 km2 
5.2 The forest situation in Keonjhar after independence 
In the postcolonial period in Orissa, as well as in Keonjhar district, the policy of state control 
of the forest, which had been moulded by the British colonial past in India, was consolidated. 
After the merger of the ex-princely state of Keonjhar into the state of Orissa, the Indian Forest 
Act of 1927 was extended to include Kendujhar district, in the Administration of Orissa 
State’s Order of 1948. The Orissa Amendment Act 11 of 1954 further amended the India For-
est Act of 1927, by the addition of section 20A to this Act. This stipulated that any forest land 
or wasteland in the merged territories, which had been recognised by the previous ruler as re-
served forest, in pursuance of any law, custom, rule, order, working plan or register, etc., im-
mediately before the merger was deemed to be reserved forest for the purposes of the Indian 
Forest Act (ODG 1986:29). 
All other than reserved forests were classified as protected forest according to the Indian 
Forest Act of 1927. This Indian Forest Act of 1927 remained in force until it was replaced by 
the Orissa Forest Act of 1972, which contained provisions similar to those of the Indian For-
est Act of 1927, regarding forest reservation, protection, contracts and control etc.: 
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“Forest recognised in the merged territories, as Kheshra forests, village forests or protected forests or forests 
other than reserved forests by whathever name designated or locally known, shall be deemed to be protected 
forests within the meaning of this Act and provisions of subsections 2 and 3 shall mutatis mutandis apply” 
(The Orissa Forest Act 1972, Ss. 81). 
Thus, under the Indian Forest Act of 1927 and Orissa Forest Act 1972, there were no legal 
distinctions made between “A” Class or “B” Class reserve forests, or between “Demarcated 
Protected Forests” (DPF) and “Undemarcated Protected Forest” (UDPF). A forest was either 
a reserved or a protected forest under this law (ODG 1986:29). Nevertheless, the categories of 
“demarcated protected forest” and “undemarcated protected forest” are still in operation, in 
Keonjhar district today. In the Orissa Forest Department Code 1979, protected forests are 
subdivided into “Demarcated Protected Forests” and “Undemarcated Protected Forests”: 
“The protected forests are classified into Demarcated Protected Forests and Undemarcated Protected Forests. 
The Demarcated Protected Forests are those which have been declared to be closed under Section 34 (c) of 
the Orissa Forest Act” (Das & Routray 1996:89). 
Section 34 (c) of the Orissa Forest Act 1972 states: 
“The State Government may, by notification declare that any portion of such forest [demarcated protected 
forest; N.O.] as may be specified in the notification shall be closed to grazing and removal of any forest pro-
duce for such term as the State Government think fit for the plantation and natural growth of the forest” (Das 
& Routray 1996:287). 
Section 36 of the same Act specifies the following matters, for which the State Government 
may make rules and regulations in protected forests: 
a) the cutting, sawing, conversion and removal of trees and timber and the collection, manufacture and re-
moval of forest produce from protected forests;  
b) the granting of licenses to the inhabitants of towns and villages in the vicinity of protected forests to take 
trees, timber or other forest produce for their own use, and the production and return of such licenses by such 
persons;  
c) the granting of licences to persons for felling or removing trees or timber or other forest produce from 
such forest for the purposes of trade, and the production and return of such licences by such persons;  
d) the payments, if to be made by the persons mentioned in clauses b) and c) for permission to cut such trees, 
or to collect and remove such timber or other forest produce;  
e) the other payments, if any, to be made by them in respect of such trees, timber and other forest produce, 
and the places where such payment shall be made;  
f) the examination of forest produce passing out of such forests;  
g) the alienation, clearing and breaking up of land for cultivation or other purposes in such forests; 
h) the protection from fire of timber lying in such forests and of trees reserved under Section 34  
i) the cutting of grass and pasturing of cattle in such forests;  
j) hunting, shooting, poisoning water, setting traps or snares and collection of wild life in such forests; 
k) the protection and management of any portion of a forest notified under Section 34; and  
l) the exercise of rights referred to in Section 33 
Penalties imposed for the contravention of Section 34 or of rules under Section 36 of the 
Orissa forest Act 1972 concern the following acts (Das 1996:288f): 
Any person who:  
a) fells, girdles, lops, taps or burns any tree reserved under Section 34, or strips off the bark or leaves from, 
or otherwise damages any such tree;  
b) contrary to any prohibition under Section 34, quarries any stone, or burns any lime or charcoal, or collects, 
subjects to any manufacturing process, or removes any forest produce;  
c) contrary to any prohibition under Section 34 breaks up or clears for cultivation or any other purpose any 
land in any protected forests or cultivates or attempts to cultivate any such land in any manner;  
d) sets fire to such forest or kindles a fire without taking all reasonable precautions to prevent it spreading to 
any tree reserved under Section 34, whether standing, fallen or felled, or to any portion of such forest notified 
under the said sanction;  
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e) fells any tree or drags any timber so as to damage any tree reserved as aforesaid;  
f) permits cattle to damage any such tree; or  
g) infringes any rule made under section 36  
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year and with a fine which may 
extend to two thousend rupees and shall also be liable to pay such compensation not being less than the value 
of the damage caused to the forest as the convicting Court may direct to be paid. 
Undemarcated protected forests include “all other protected forests and all unreserved lands”. 
The growth of undemarcated protected forests is under the management of the Forest De-
partment, while the land itself is managed by the Revenue Department (Das & Routray 
1996:89). 
The Forest Department may classify any type of forest as reserved or protected. The situa-
tion of the forest area of Keonjhar district in 1993 was as follows: 
 
Table 60: Forest in Keonjhar district 
Geographical area 8303.0 km2 100% 
Total Forest Area 2494.35 km2 30.04% 
Per Capita land area (in ha.) 0.621  
Per Capita Forest Area (in ha.) 0.187  
Density of Population per km2 161  
Total Forest Area 2494.35 km2 100% 
Reserved Forest 1833.02 km2 73.49% 
Demarcated Protected Forest 648.41 km2 26.00% 
Undemarcated Protected Forest 12.68 km2 0.50% 
Unclassified Forest 0.24 km2 0.01% 
(Data from the Government of Orissa: Orissa Forests 1993. Statistical Branch, Office of the Principal Chief 
Conservator of Forests, Bhubaneswar.) 
 
In the 1990s, most of the forest in Keonjhar District was classified as reserved, while the re-
mainder belonged to the category of demarcated protected forest. Undemarcated protected 
forest was almost non-existent. 
These official categories or legal classifications, however, give no insight into the natural 
qualities of the classified forest areas: whether a forest is open or closed, the crown density, 
age or species of the trees etc. However, a statement made in the ODG in the 1980s, was still 
valid for the situation in the 1990s: 
“The present forest area as reported in 1984 thus works out to 30 per cent of the total geographical area of the 
district. (...) The area of the reserved forest comes to 22.20 per cent of the geographical area of the district 
against the State [Orissa, N.O.] average of 16.05 per cent. It may further be stated that much of what is stated 
as reserved or protected forest does not contain forest growth worth the name due to large scale encroach-
ments and pilferage of timber by contractors and local people.  
Local enquiry reveals that tribal migrants from Singhbhum and Mayurbhanj districts have cleared about 
3,237 hectares of reserved forests in Atai, Rebana, Kalapat, Padapur reserved forest. Extensive encroach-
ments have also been done by local Adivasis in Boula and other reserved forests. Both migrants and local 
people have also been made extensive encroachments in Telkoi and Bhuyanpirh ranges. [areas of Juang and 
Bhuiya tribes, N.O.] Besides, extensive forest area in Telkoi, Harichandanpur and Banspal Blocks are af-
fected by shifting cultivation by Bhuyans and Juangs. According to the opinion of the local forest officials, 
though legal forest has somewhat increased, its density and yield has considerably decreased over the years” 
(1986:29). 
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5.3 Forest policy in the Juang and Bhuiya area 
What is the situation in Upper Keonjhar, which is inhabited mainly by the Juang and Bhuiya? 
It may be said that stronger restrictions over forest use in the tribal areas of the Juang and 
Bhuiya were implemented at a later stage than in other areas of the district. Before the imple-
mentation of the Orissa Amendment Act 11 of 1954, forests in these areas were considered 
Keshra forests, i.e. forests with fewer restrictions for the local people than ‘A’ or ‘B’ class re-
served forests. With the implementation of this Act, the Keshra forests of the Juang and 
Bhuiya were classified as protected forests and were covered by the rules and regulations for 
such forest areas. However, until the end of the 1970s, the forests in the hills inhabited by the 
Juang and Bhuiya had not, by and large been surveyed and the area did not include any re-
served forest, to the disapproval and regret of the Forest Administration: 
“The vast unsurveyed forest area of Bhuyanpira and Juangpira which extends up to Telkoi Tahsil on the west 
of Kendujhargar needs a special mention though the area does not include any reserved forest. This beautiful 
patch of forest has been continuously subjected to shifting cultivation and the aboriginal tribes of the area 
ruthlessly cut down the trees in the steep hill slopes for podu (Jhooming) cultivation every year. In this proc-
ess most of the valuable species like Sal, Asan, Bija, Sisoo and Gambhar have been taken out of the forests” 
(Mahapatra 1984/85:45). 
However, since 1978 the Forest Department has increasingly gained control over the forest of 
the Juang and Bhuiya. In the meantime, several forest areas have become Proposed Reserved 
Forests and Demarcated Protected Forests. In 1986, the B.J.P. range (Bhuiya-Juang-Pirh 
range) was created as a separate range, which encompasses the forests of Kodipasa and 
Kansa. Previously, the forests of the B.J.P. range were part of the Suakati section. Unfortu-
nately there is no data available on the total size of the B.J.P. range and its actual forest cover. 
According to the B.J.P. range officer, most of the forest areas within this range are highly de-
graded. This is one of the reasons, why the Forest Department does not commercially exploit 
forests of the B.J.P. range. According to the officers of the range, it would take rather a long 
time to gain any commercial benefit from the forest. As it consists mainly of pole crops, tim-
ber production would not be profitable for the Forest Department. Moreover, there has been a 
general shift in the state’s forest policy, away from the commercial aspects of forest manage-
ment, towards conservation and protection of forest areas. Thus, according to statements 
made by the forest officers, the only duty of the Forest Department is “to protect the forest” in 
the Bhuiya-Juang Pirh (personal communication 1999). 
In 1998, the B.J.P. range included 37 blocks, which were in the process of obtaining the 
status of reserved forest. Since, 1978, 21 blocks, covering a total area of 87.9 km2 have been 
classed as proposed reserved forest (B-class), under Section 4 of the Notification Orissa For-
est Act, 1972, i.e. they were in the process of being legally classified as reserved forest. Sec-
tion 4 of the Notification Orissa Forest Act, 1972 states: 
“Whenever it is proposed to constitute any land a reserved forest, the State Government shall issue a notifica-
tion in the official Gazette: 
a) declaring that it is proposed to constitute such land a reserved forest 
b) specifying as nearly as possible, the situation and limits of such lands; and 
c) appointing an officer (herein called “The Forest Settlement Officer”) to inquire into and determine the 
existence, nature and extent of any rights or privileges alleged to exist in favour of any person in or over 
any land comprised within such limits, or in or over any forest produce, and to deal with the same as 
provided in this chapter” (Das & Routray 1996:272). 
Finally, such forest will be declared as reserved forest under Section 21, Orissa Forest Act. 
Since the mid 1980s, 16 blocks (142.5783 km2) are in the process of being classified under 
Section 4, Orissa Forest Act, 1972, for classification at a later date as reserved forest. Cur-
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rently they are classified as demarcated protected forest. Thus, a total of 230 km2 forest in the 
tribal area of the Juang and Bhuiya are currently in the process of becoming reserved forest, 
which will result in a stricter control by Forest Department over the use of forest resources by 
the local communities.  
The remaining forest is also classified as demarcated protected forest, but has not yet been 
registered under Section 4. The forest area in Kodipasa and Kansa comes under this category. 
In order to determine the total area of forest in the B.J.P. range, the settlement records of the 
230 villages would have to be evaluated. These records include quantitative data on the areas 
classified as forest, which either come under the direct control of the Forest Department, or 
the Revenue Department. Even if this information were to be obtained, no clear statement 
could be made about the quality of the various forests. Areas registered as forest, during the 
1970s land settlement of the Bhuiya-Juang Pirh, may no longer fulfil the criterias to be de-
fined as forest. Thus, extensive ground surveys would be necessary in order to qualify the 
quantity and quality of forest areas in the B.J.P. range. However, according to the range offi-
cer of the B.J.P. Range, most of these forests are strongly degraded. 
According to local foresters, there are two major problems for the forest resources in their 
range: shifting cultivation and tree felling, either for timber or firewood for commercial pur-
poses. However, they seem to be unable to agree upon the seriousness of these two problems. 
Some of the foresters hold the belief that shifting cultivation is the main cause of the degrada-
tion of the forest in their range, while others perceive that the felling of trees for fuel wood 
and timber is the major concern. Others assume that it is large-scale timber smuggling that is 
the main cause. According to them, this is carried out mainly by outsiders and causes serious 
damage to the forest, whereas the wood and timber selling activities of the Juang and other 
poor people, are regarded to be less harmful. The Forest Department has not carried out any 
serious quantitative and qualitative evaluation in order to compare the detrimental effects of 
the various activities upon the forest. 
5.3.1 Policies against shifting cultivation 
The attitude of both higher and lower ranking forest officials versus tribals that practice shift-
ing cultivation and are dependent upon the sale of timber and firewood, is a mixture of repro-
bation, comprehension and limited tolerance, of laissez-faire and selective sanctions. In cases 
where the tribals contravene the forest laws and regulations, they are at the mercy of the For-
est Department. 
Shifting cultivation is not tolerated in reserved or demarcated protected forest that comes 
under Section 4 Notification Orissa Forest Act, 1972. If the forest dwellers encroach on such 
forest, the foresters may file cases against them. If any forest is going to be classified as re-
served forest, it is up to the settlement officer, from the Forest Department to suggest that for-
est under shifting cultivation in such areas shall be excluded from the reserved forest and left 
for the villagers to cultivate. The claim of the state to control shifting cultivation is clearly ex-
pressed in the Orissa Forest Act, 1972, Chapter II, Section 10: 
“(1) Claims relating to the practice of shifting cultivation in any land notified under Sec. 4 shall not be admit-
ted but if the Forest Settlement Officer considers that some portion of the land under settlement needs to be 
excluded to provide sufficient land for cultivation, he may, after considering the objections of the Forest Of-
ficer, if any, representing the Forest Department (...) or the Divisional Forest Officer, make a report to the 
State Government containing his recommendations for alteration of the limits of the land.  
(2) The State Government may, after considering the recommendations so made, sanction the alteration pro-
posed by the Forest settlement Officer either in whole or with such modifications as they deem fit and there-
upon the Forest Settlement officer shall pass an order altering the limits of the land as sanctioned by the State 
Government.  
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(3) The practice of shifting cultivation shall, in all cases, be deemed a privilege, subject to control, restriction 
and abolition by the State Government” (Das & Routray 1996:275). 
The fact that land used for shifting cultivation in the Bhuiya-Juang Pirh has not been settled in 
categories of agricultural land with land titles, indicates the claim of the State to control the 
practice of shifting cultivation. As explained in chapter 3.2.3, land under shifting cultivation 
was recorded as village forest (grama jungle) and grazing area under Rakhit Khata and/or as 
jungle of Abad Jagya Anabadi (cultivable waste) or Abad Ajagya Anabadi (non-cultivable 
waste land) in Kodipasa and Kansa. All such land is by law government land (in contrast to 
private land); the soil of such government owned land is under the control of the Revenue 
Department, but any forest vegetation on such land comes under the control of the Forest De-
partment. Thus, any intervention by the Revenue or Forest Department, over the way in which 
the villagers use such land is considered legal. Shifting cultivation is tolerated or restricted at 
the good will of these departments and according to their policies and strategies. However, it 
is well known that the livelihood of the tribal forest dwellers is in many cases still mainly 
based on shifting cultivation. Thus, in the majority of forests belonging to the B.J.P. range, 
which are not in the process of being reserved, shifting cultivation is tolerated within certain 
limits. As long as villagers practice shifting cultivation nearby their settlements and only cul-
tivate within a limited area, by rotation of various forest patches, the foresters do tolerate 
podu cultivation. However, if they use new forest areas for this purpose, even if these are not 
demarcated for reservation, this may cause problems for the villagers. Of course, to control 
and restrict the expansion of an area that is already being used for shifting cultivation is diffi-
cult in practice. However, if a tribal village were to move into a hitherto uncultivated forest 
area, the Forest Department would not tolerate this. 
Thus, in the research area, the general forest policy with regard to shifting cultivation may 
be described as a policy of containment. However, there are efforts to actively reduce or stop 
the practice of shifting cultivation, where it is a long established practice. Such efforts are 
based on long established general views about shifting cultivation in the context of Indian 
forest policies, which have consistently occurred in various forest policy documents, as in the 
following: 
“Shifting cultivation is affecting the environment and productivity of land adversely. Alternative avenues of 
income, suitably harmonised with the right land use practices, should be devised to discourage shifting culti-
vation. Efforts should be made to contain such cultivation within the area already affected, by propagating 
improved agricultural practices. Area already damaged by such cultivation should be rehabilitated through 
social forestry and energy plantations”(Resolution National Forest Policy 1988, Section 4.7; Shifting Cultiva-
tion). 
Efforts to discourage shifting cultivation by the Forest Department are linked with more gen-
eral projects and programmes to develop tribal people. Tribal forest dwellers and shifting cul-
tivators such as the Juang and Bhuiya are perceived in terms of poverty, tradition, primitive-
ness, backwardness and desire for freedom in the forest; all resulting in the unproductive and 
destructive practice of shifting cultivation. This widespread image of tribal forest dwellers 
finds its expression in statements such as these: 
“The biotic factors especially human interference, direct or indirect, have considerably modified the pristine 
vegetation [of Keonjhar District; N.O.] and are solely responsible for the present degraded condition of the 
forests. The Bhuiyans and the Juangs are a people of very primitive instincts. Their chief instinct is hunting 
and a craving for unfettered freedom. They consider themselves to be the lords of the soil and live in a simple 
arcadian fashion. Shifting cultivation is an immemorial and traditional custom with these aboriginal tribes 
which had been followed by them uninterruptedly. The areas of of shifting cultivation may rightly be termed 
as ‘Jhumer’s paradise’. The jhuming [shifting cultivation; N.O.] represents truly the aboriginal method of 
shifting cultivation followed by the Bhuiyans and the Juangs” (ODG 1986:20). 
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“(...) the economic condition of most of the people belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled 
Tribes is very poor. They are mostly Juang and Bhuiyans. (...) The Juangs and the Bhuiyans are tradition-
bound, shy and secretive in nature. They practice extensively a primitive system of cultivation known as 
shifting cultivation which is most unproductive and leaves behind a mark of destitution. The method involves 
cutting and burning of trees and bushes in the hill slopes to prepare patches of land for cultivation. Rasi [ni-
ger; N.O.] or til along with some pulses are cultivated in these plots in the first year. In the second year the 
same plots are used for the cultivation of paddy. Mandia and Gangoi are cultivated along with paddy in the 
borders of the field. In the third or fourth year the land is abandoned and another piece of land is selected for 
similar cultivation” (ODG 1986:223). 
“Agriculture is the main occupation of the Adivasis of the district, but due to extreme poverty they often take 
to podu cultivation which is extremely harmful. To stop this harmful practice the Adivasis are now given 
various agricultural aids and loans. Some minor irrigation projects and digging of tanks and wells have now 
been undertaken in the tribal areas. Government also makes grants for land improvement (...). Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes people have been provided with bullocks, seeds, agricultural implements 
and irrigation facilities like wells and tanks” (ODG 1986:392). 
Development programmes have to be looked at, in the context of such general judgements of 
the situation of the tribal people in Orissa and Keonjhar. In 1974, the Government of India, in 
association with the Government of Orissa, initiated a project called “Tribal Development 
Agency” (TDA) to tackle the vast problems of “poverty and sufferings” of these tribal people 
with a view “to bring about significant changes in their economic condition” (ODG 
1986:224).42 This Agency was inaugurated by Indira Gandhi43 and aimed at economic devel-
opment programmes such as: 
1) “proper utilisation of land and water, development of agriculture and horticulture, settlement of landless 
families with lands, prevention of shifting cultivation and introduction of afforestation measures to con-
trol soil erosion; 
2) introduction of subsidiary occupations like rearing of goats and sheep, pigs poultry, dairy development, 
beekeeping, sericulture, etc. 
3) strengthening of co-operative and marketing infrastructure supplemented by a network of link roads; and 
4) undertaking debt relief measures specially to free the tribal people from their existing burden of debts 
and to safeguard against alienation of tribal lands and their restoration to the original owners” (ODG 
1986:224). 
The project implemented in Keonjhar District included several schemes: 
1) Agriculture, which included the supplying of bullocks, implements, oil seed develop-
ments and input assistance 
2) Horticulture (backyard plantation, mango in situ plantation and guava orchard) 
3) Reclamation of wastelands and land development 
4) Irrigation including lift irrigation, MIPs (minor irrigation projects) and dug wells 
5) Animal husbandry 
6) Afforestation 
7) Communication 
8) Co-operation 
9) Rural industries including sericulture 
10) Training and publicity 
11) Administration (ODG 1986:225). 
 
                                                           
421979 The Tribal Development Agency was converted into another agency called the Integrated Tribal Devel-
opment Agency (ITDA) for constant follow-up action. 
43 A fact still remembered by the villagers who benefited in some ways from the Development Programme; e.g. 
they consider that they received land from Indira Gandhi, who represented the Indian government at that time. 
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If the financial outlay necessary for these schemes is to be taken as an indicator of their im-
portance, agricultural inputs and irrigation, together with reclamation of wasteland and land 
development were given high priorities within the programme. The TDA in Keonjhar covered 
three Community Development Blocks, of which Banspal Block was one. Both Kodipasa and 
Kansa were targeted for inclusion in some of the schemes of this development programme, as 
already mentioned in chapter 3.2.3. In Kodipasa, wasteland was reclaimed for landless fami-
lies and agricultural implements were distributed to them. Both the foresters and staff of the 
TDA told the villagers of Kodipasa “to stop shifting cultivation”, “to keep the forest”, “to pro-
tect the forest”, “to stop toila chasa because it is destroying the forest” and that “rain will stop 
if you continue with toila chasa”. The Juang perceived that the government had made a deal 
with them, in that they had received both bila land and agricultural implements from the gov-
ernment, but that they in turn had to stop toila cultivation. Their version of events is that the 
Forest Department together with the government, seized their village forest; “closing” it to 
stop the Juang to continue with shifting cultivation. 
“Prevention of shifting cultivation” was also aimed at the villagers of Upper Kansa, which 
resulted in their resettlement in Kodipasa, where they were given bila land and agricultural 
implements. The Forest Department backed the resettlement project as “prevention of shifting 
cultivation” was part of it. Before being relocated to the foot of the hill range, the villagers of 
Upper Kansa had intended to move to a more distant forest area. The Forest Department how-
ever restricted them from doing this and instructed them to apply for bila land in Kodipasa, 
nearby their old village. The idea was to stop toila cultivation in Upper Kansa, by relocating 
the village to the plain where the Juang could make their living by means of permanent bila 
cultivation. However, according to the Juang from Upper Kansa, it was not possible to subsist 
from the new bila land in Kodipasa, and subsequently they tried to combine toila with perma-
nent rice cultivation (bila) at the new area in Kodipasa. They were soon stopped by the Forest 
Department, which argued that the purpose of the resettlement project was to stop toila culti-
vation in both villages. However, the fact that half of the resettled Juang families returned to 
Upper Kansa after several years and resumed shifting cultivation up in the hills and forest also 
indicates that the Forest Department, as well as TDA, had been unable to fully implement 
their policy of putting a stop to shifting cultivation. 
Thus, the transition from shifting cultivation to permanent paddy fields in Kodipasa, was 
supported by the policy of the Forest Department, which tried to stop or reduce toila cultiva-
tion in that area, by the process of land settlement as well as by general development strate-
gies in the 1970s. It would be too simplistic however to conclude that this local process was 
determined by forest and development policies alone. In chapter 3 it has been shown that 
there are also economic incentives for intensifying land use, where possible. 
The transition from shifting to permanent paddy cultivation was a lengthy process, marked 
by the gradual decline of shifting cultivation, as may be deduced from conversations with 
several villagers. There was no specific point in the past where shifting cultivation had been 
given up collectively, based either on a decision taken at village level or purely on interven-
tion from the Forest Department and other government agencies. 
Village elders remember the time, when Kodipasa consisted mainly of Juang households, 
with a few Gouda families herding the cattle of the Juang. They recall forest areas, which 
have subsequently been converted to permanent agricultural land and settlement area. The 
landscape increasingly altered, as more and more land was taken under permanent cultivation. 
Forest patches slowly disappeared from the plain, leaving behind only some of the larger 
trees. This process had started without intervention from the State. It continued and was ac-
centuated by the immigration of new settlers, with the land settlement and distribution in the 
1970s.  
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Hence, several factors other than growing pressure from the Forest Department and the 
Governmental Development Agency have contributed to the total cessation of shifting culti-
vation in Kodipasa. There was also growing pressure from those villagers, who had already 
stopped toila cultivation and were interested in using nearby village forest for purposes other 
than agriculture. Thus opposition to the attempts by the Juang (that had resettled from Upper 
Kansa to Kodipasa) to clear nearby forest for toila cultivation, also came from the villagers of 
Kodipasa. These villagers feared that they would lose their remaining few local forests, which 
so far had been pushed back to the slopes of the hills behind their village. More recently, 
when some poor Juang families from Kodipasa attempted to resume toila cultivation, they 
were asked to stop, not only by the Forest Department but also by other villagers as well. The 
growing pressure that was being put on the land by the decreasing fallow periods and yields 
from guda land were incentives for poor households to resume their traditional practice of 
shifting cultivation. A further argument that was put forward by several of the Juang for re-
suming toila cultivation was their wish “to taste Ruma, Birhi, Kangu, Chotua, Harada again”; 
all local varieties grown on swidden plots. 
Another factor for giving up shifting cultivation was the declining yield from swidden 
plots in the remaining forest. With an expanding population and an increase in the number of 
permanent rice fields, the forest area previously used for toila cultivation had decreased, re-
sulting in shorter fallow periods. Furthermore, it proved difficult for single households to 
practice shifting cultivation individually, as they lacked the necessary labour and cooperation 
from the other households for the clearing of forest and bushy vegetation, once the majority 
of the families had stopped toila cultivation. The village community no longer supported the 
practice of shifting cultivation and there was no longer the formal annual distribution of forest 
patches to households, which had previously received ritual blessings from the village priests. 
When asked for the reasons for having given up shifting cultivation, the Juang mainly 
mention the protection of the forest by the Forest Department, restrictions imposed by the 
government and the concern of the majority of villagers to conserve the remaining forest. 
While giving up shifting cultivation completely was the result of a combination of various 
endogenous economic and exogenous political factors, the initiative to actively protect the 
remaining forest of Kodipasa was mainly a local initiative as will be shown later. 
5.3.2  “Tolerated Theft” 
According to the B.J.P. range officer, the damage that shifting cultivation causes to the forest 
is less than that caused by the felling of trees for timber and firewood, because shifting culti-
vation is done in restricted areas, whereas timber and firewood are collected everywhere. An 
increasing amount of timber and firewood is obtained from reserved or demarcated protected 
forest areas, as all other types of forest are already heavily degraded. As long as the demand 
for timber and firewood exists, it is difficult to control illegal felling and the incentives are 
great enough to risk confrontation with the law. The demand for these forest products will 
continue and even increase, as long as substitutes are not widely available and/or more expen-
sive than traditional products.  
Every day wood sellers from various villages and forest areas arrive in the district capital 
of Keonjhar. Not all of them reach the centre of the town, as some of them have already sold 
their wood on route. Several of them have regular customers and they deliver the wood to 
their homes while the remainder sell their loads in the streets nearby the market place. The 
Forest Department, which is located next to the market, could easily confiscate all the wood 
which is not collected according to the rules and regulations: it is mainly freshly cut wood and 
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not “naturally fallen firewood”. It would be much easier for the forest officers to do this, than 
to detect illegal felling of trees in remote, large forest areas which are difficult for them to 
survey.  
However, it is well known that the selling of firewood is an essential source of income for 
the tribals and other poor people who are mainly from Scheduled Castes. It is also a recog-
nised fact that the majority of households in the villages and towns depend upon firewood as 
a source of fuel and that if a household has sufficient income available, that this firewood will 
be purchased from wood sellers. Even the forest officers buy their fuel from the wood sellers, 
who, were the law to be strictly enforced, would not be able to sell the quantities of wood that 
they do. There is a high demand for whatever the Juang, Munda and other wood sellers carry 
from the forests.  
There are official firewood depots belonging to the Forest Department in Keonjhar town 
where legally produced firewood can be purchased. It is even cheaper than the wood sold by 
the tribal and low caste people. However, the wood from these depots has not been cut into 
smaller pieces, it is not carried to one’s home and its quality is said to be less than that of the 
wood from the illegal sellers. Furthermore, the supply is irregular and it can happen that there 
is no fuel wood available in the depots. 
The restrictions with regard to timber seem to be implemented more seriously by the staff 
of the Forest Department. Almost all of the men that were selling timber in the two villages 
complained about difficulties with the foresters. Tales of timber being confiscated by the for-
esters while it was being transported for sale to other villages or the towns were common. Fil-
ing cases against small-scale illegal timber traders seems to be rare. However, confiscation it-
self is a kind of fine, as it means not only the loss of a day’s work but also the income from 
the sale of that timber. It is suspected that the foresters sell the confiscated timber themselves 
and keep the money. Confiscated timber should be taken to the wood depots and sold by the 
Forest Department. 
The tribal men have not always been faced with such difficulties, when trying to sell tim-
ber. Up until 1984, the Juang and Bhuiya were allowed to sell any timber to a special Bhuiya-
Juang Sale Depot, which had been operating in Keonjhar town even before independence. 
There were no restrictions over either the species of tree, or the amount of timber cut by the 
Juang and Bhuiya. Timber was then sold from the depot to the customers, who had to pay 
royalty. The depot was under the control of the Forest Department. In 1984, the depot was 
closed and the sale of timber was declared illegal. According to a forest officer (Mr. Mahapa-
tra) this decision was based on the principles laid down in the Orissa Forest Conservation Act 
and Wildlife Act. The Juang in the two villages still remember the depot, as they had sold 
some of their timber there, although they were unaware of the reason why it had closed. Some 
other timber was sold directly to customers or to contractors. Today all timber is either sold 
directly to the customers or to contractors. The difficulty that the men face in trying to sell 
wood, due to the illegal trade, is reflected in the statements of some of the villagers, who state 
that they would prefer to earn a regular income from wage labour if there were more and bet-
ter opportunities to do so. 
5.4 Village Forest Politics  
“Corporate organization is found only in villages where commons situations have become commons dilem-
mas” (Wade 1988b:184).  
In literature and debates about Indian people and their use of and rights over forests, there is 
often an open or hidden assumption of a history which runs as follows: once upon a time for-
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ests as common pool resources44 were sustainably managed as common property. They 
stopped being so with the growing intrusion and grip of the state, which transformed forests 
de facto into open access resources, or deprived local people of their forest resources com-
pletely. Local existing attempts to protect forests are seen by scientists and social and envi-
ronmental activists as a “relic from the past” and hopes to revive them are associated with 
projects to protect forests, by means other than exclusive control of forest resources by the 
state. There are three assumptions behind this version of the relationship between local com-
munities and forest resources: 
1) Common pool resources of forests were managed as common property with rules and regu-
lations. 
2) They were managed in a sustainable way: i.e. rules and regulations to control access to and 
use of forest areas and their resources were designed for the purpose of sustainable man-
agement and conservation. 
3) Common property regimes collapsed due to state intervention.  
 
Such a story may be true in many cases and has been documented for several of them. How-
ever, there are indications of other histories regarding the relationship between the forest, the 
people and the state. As long as there is no scarcity of natural resources, rules and regulations 
about the use of such resources are unnecessary. Restricted access, for outsiders, to the local 
resources of a local community, may be the consequence of a territorially designed space and 
not because there is a scarcity of natural resources. Finally, there may be other reasons for the 
collapse of common property regimes than intervention by the state. 
If, to what extent, and how, the Juang communities of Keonjhar managed their forest areas 
under common property regimes in the past is a question that remains unanswered so far. In 
existing literature there is little data about the management of the forest by the Juang, with the 
exception of forest areas used for shifting cultivation. Access to, and use of such areas was in-
stitutionally organized and regulated.  
Information from the villages under study here, however, indicates at least in the recent 
past, a rather loose handling or control of those forest areas which were not used as swiddens: 
if outsiders wanted to use village territory for shifting cultivation, they required permission 
from the villagers. Although the Juang considered forest areas in their village territories as 
common property of their village, for many forest areas an open access situation seems to 
have been prevalent. Outsiders, not belonging to the village communities, were not prevented 
from collecting forest resources and / or grazing cattle and goats in the forest within the terri-
tory of a village. There are no indications that there was any restriction upon the quantity or 
quality (species) of firewood and timber that was collected, or that there existed any ban on 
the felling of trees (with the exception of certain fruit bearing varieties), or that outsiders were 
restricted from taking any forest produce (except for game). However, it must be assumed that 
the number of forest users was smaller in the past and put less pressure on forest resources. 
The Juang in the two villages under study state that in the last twenty to thirty years, not 
only has there has been a growing number of outsiders using their forest areas, but their own 
demand, especially for fuel wood and timber for commercial purpose has increased. As the 
villagers of Kodipasa realised that their forest resources were both deteriorating and diminish-
                                                           
44 Ostrom and others define common pool resources as characterized by difficulty of exclusion and the genera-
tion of finite quantities of resource units or subtractabilty, i.e. “one person’s use subtracts from the quantity of 
resources available to others” (Ostrom 1999:1) These characteristics are phsyical qualities of resource systems 
and do not yet define whether common pool resources are managed as common property resources, under condi-
tions of open access or any other institutional setting. 
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ing, they started to close their forest to outsiders and created rules and regulations for com-
munity members. I suggest that it is only recently that the forest has in fact become a common 
pool resource under a common property regime, and that in fact open access without deleteri-
ous consequences was common in the past. Thus this common property regime is not a relic 
from the past, but a recent development, brought about by the increasing pressure on and 
scarcity of forest resources, based upon recent experience and knowledge that has been 
gained. 45 
The attempt to solve a “common problem” however is partly based on experience gained 
from other problems, on existing patterns and forms of social organization and institutions of 
the village community. How far these traditional social and institutional resources may be 
helpful in solving new problems, in a changing context will be examined in the following sec-
tions. But firstly, the various attempts of the villagers of Kodipasa to take action for active 
village forest protection will be described.  
5.4.1 Village Forest Protection in Kodipasa 
Before the beginning of the 1990s, the village forest of Kodipasa was de facto in a state of 
open access. Its resources came under growing pressure, as neighbouring villages on the plain 
had started to protect their own small forest areas, i.e. outsiders were denied access to them. 
These outsiders were then forced to go to the more remote forests, i.e. the forest of Kodipasa 
and forest areas behind it. The villagers of Kodipasa themselves, although no longer practis-
ing shifting cultivation, continued to fell trees in their village forest for timber and fuel wood, 
both for their own use and for sale outside the village. 
The villagers of Kodipasa now realized that the resources of their village forest were 
dwindling. The main problem for them was that they were losing a valuable nearby source of 
timber and fuel wood for their own use. It was not only the quantity but also the quality of 
forest that had changed. High-quality timber for construction purposes, for example was diffi-
cult to obtain from the forest, as the trees were too young and of insufficient quality for con-
struction. This was the main incentive for them to actively protect the village forest. A more 
active forest protection scheme aimed at the exclusion of outsiders and the establishment of 
rules and regulations for the villagers themselves were necessary. The initiative for imposing 
restrictions on the access to and use of the village forest, was taken by household heads from 
the wealthier families. Among them were the then sarpanch (a Juang) and two relatively  
 
                                                           
45 An attempt to protect the village forest, or at least part of it, is taking place in other villages as well. In Kund-
hei, a large mixed village of Juang, Munda, Santal and Gouda, the Juang have started, in recent years to protect 
part of the village forest, mainly consisting of Sal trees for their own use, while still practising a reduced form of 
shifting cultivation with shorter fallow periods of four to five years in the area next to the protected forest. The 
protected forest lies close to the hamlet of the original Juang settlement and is closed for any use by the villagers. 
In previous times it was used for shifting cultivation. Now the forest patch is protected, for the purpose of timber 
and firewood for the personal use of the Juang and not for any commercial purpose. The Juang can obtain timber 
from this forest only after getting permission from the village assembly in the majang, but they have to pay for 
it. In order to get straight trees, branches are lopped off and used as firewood. Other firewood has to be collected 
in the non-protected forest.  
Other hamlets in Kundhei do not protect any forest, but they respect the protection of the forest patch by the 
Juang. The initiative to protect the forest by the Juang was taken without any intervention from the forest de-
partment after realising the problem of timber scarcity for the villagers. However, some time after my visit to 
this village, I met the Sarpanch of Kodipasa Gram Panchayat, a Juang from Kundhei. When asked whether the 
village forest was still protected, he admitted problems of supervision and sanctions and his comment to the 
main problem was “We are all thieves!”, accompanied by a sympathetic smile for human nature. 
The neighbouring village of Kodipasa (Jamudiha) also tries to protect its forest. 
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Part of the protected village forest in Kodipasa 
 
prosperous Gouda household heads. They wanted to protect the village forest, in order to se-
cure the availability of timber and firewood for household use for the immediate future and 
were concerned that they had to travel to more and more distant places, in order to cover their 
personal needs. None of these households were dependent upon selling timber or fuel wood. 
The decision to keep the forest for the purpose of timber and firewood for local use only and 
to close it to outsiders was taken in a meeting of all of the villagers from all hamlets and all 
groups. They all agreed to protect the forest in the meeting, or at least there appears to have 
been no open opposition. The villagers were all aware of the degrading village forest and that 
they needed timber and firewood for their own use. However, the opportunity costs for pro-
tecting the village forest were higher for the poorer households (they had to travel longer dis-
tances to collect firewood and timber for sale) and the benefits less costly for households that 
needed the forest purely for timber and fuel wood for their own use. 
The following rules and regulations were made: 
1) No outsiders were allowed to enter the village forest for whatever purpose (grazing, cutting 
timber, collecting firewood). 
2) Villagers were allowed to collect dry firewood only. The felling of trees for the purpose of 
timber and/or firewood for sale was prohibited. Larger quantities of timber for personal use 
had to be approved by the villagers in a meeting. Smaller quantities (one or two trees) were 
free for the villagers. The felling of Sal trees for any purpose was not allowed. Timber for 
personal use had to be produced from other species of tree. 
3) Sanctions involved the payment of fines and in serious cases the confiscation of the axe. If 
an individual were to fell trees against such rules, he would be fined 50-100 Rs. according 
to the size of the tree that he had felled. The money would be used for ceremonial purposes 
of the village. 
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There was a village forest protection committee formed that consisted of four to five Gouda 
men, seven to eight Juang men, two to three Santal men and two to three Munda men who 
were responsible for checking and implementing these rules and regulations. 
The control of the village forest was initially based upon a rotation system: a special stick 
(badi) was circulated among the households and each household was responsible for control-
ling the village forest on the day that the stick came into their possession. At that point, one of 
the household members was sent to control the forest. However, after a period of two years, 
this system was abolished. There were various reasons why this system did not work, as will 
be elaborated below. 
At the outset of this method of protecting the forest, all of the hamlets of Kodipasa, includ-
ing Lower Kansa, had one common village forest. After some time the two hamlets of Masani 
Sahi (Munda) and Lower Kansa (Juang) received their own portion of this forest which they 
shared with a hamlet from a neighbouring village, that had applied for participation in the vil-
lage forest protection activities in Kodipasa: it had become apparent that the whole village 
forest area was too large to be watched and protected effectively and thus the people of Ma-
sani Sahi and Lower Kansa, together with the villagers from a hamlet called Sirispal, started 
to protect this separate forest patch. This inclusion of outsiders from the neighbouring village 
was resented by some of the villagers of Kodipasa, because of the way in which it had hap-
pened: people from the neighbouring village had approached the Sarpanch of Kodipasa vil-
lage, to ask permission to participate in the village forest protection scheme. Several villagers 
maintain that the Sarpanch received bribes, in the form of cash for integrating these neigh-
bours into the scheme. They were annoyed that this decision about the village forest had been 
taken without a village meeting. However, they felt too weak to initiate a dispute with the 
Sarpanch. The integration of a nearby village hamlet, which had a long-standing tradition of 
using the nearby forest resources of Kodipasa, shows that in the past, village forest resources 
had not been perceived as village common property, in the strictest sense. 
Villagers from other hamlets (Kodipasa Sahi, Sologhoro Sahi) were not allowed to fell 
trees, in the forest protected by the people of Lower Kansa, Masani Sahi and Sirispal and vice 
versa. But they were allowed to collect dry firewood. 
Control of the forest that was protected by the people of Sologhoro Sahi (Munda and San-
tal) and Kodipasa Sahi (Juang and Gouda), was then delegated to a group of four villagers: 
two Munda and two Juang were responsible for patrolling the village forest and ensuring that 
the villagers kept to the rules and regulations. For carrying out these tasks, each village forest 
guard was supposed to receive 25 mano of rice (approximately 16 kg rice) and 25 Rs. per 
month, plus an additional 5 khandi of paddy (100 kg paddy) annually. 
This system was also abandoned one year later, due to non-fulfilment of duties by both the 
guards and the villagers. The guards were accused of not patrolling the forest properly, as 
they started their patrol in the morning, returned at noon and in the afternoon the forest was 
left open and unchecked. The original agreement had been to check the village forest between 
the hours of 9 a.m and 4 p.m. There were also rumours that the guards had helped themselves 
to wood from the village forest. The forest guards accused the villagers of not compensating 
them for the work that they had done; several households did not give the agreed amount of 
paddy to the guards. During this time, it was not only outsiders that took timber and fuel 
wood from Kodipasa forest; but also the villagers themselves. 
This attempt to guard the village forest by using a small number of villagers, who were 
paid in kind for their services, parallels the local cattle herding system used in Kodipasa: spe-
cialised Gouda cattle herders take care of the cattle for a remuneration in kind and cash. This 
is a well functioning economic institution of the village. However, a similar system for the 
protection of the village forest did not work. The reasons for this could be that the benefits of 
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such a scheme for each household are not immediate and reliable. By comparison, the cattle 
of a household are grazed daily and brought back in the evening, whereas a forest protected 
on a daily basis, hardly yields anything for the household. Moreover, it is difficult to monitor 
whether the forest guardians are doing their job well, while the condition of the cattle brought 
back in the evening may be checked. Thus, the benefit, even on a daily basis, of organised 
cattle grazing is obvious to every household i.e. their cattle are looked after. If a farmer does 
not pay the cattle herder his daily allowance of a handful of rice per cattle, then the herder 
could exclude that particular farmer’s cattle from the herd. This has immediate consequences 
for that household, as they now have to organise the herding of their cattle themselves. There-
fore, the costs and benefits are apparent, as are the consequences of non-cooperation. If, how-
ever, a household does not pay for the village forest guardians, for whatever reasons, it does 
not suffer any consequences in the short term. On the contrary, as long as other households 
are prepared to make up their contribution, every household profits from an amelioration of 
forest resources. Theoretically, members of a non-paying household could be excluded from 
regularly using the village forest, but in reality, this would be difficult. The collection of fire-
wood, for example, is a traditional right of all villagers and it would be unthinkable to deny 
them this. 
A further problem was that the village forest protection committee had also not operated 
properly. At the outset, if anyone was caught cutting firewood or timber in the forest and con-
travened the rules, a meeting was called, the matter was discussed and the culprit warned 
against doing this again. Everyone obeyed these rules for a while. However, after a period of 
time, no more meetings were called and people started to break the rules without fear of retri-
bution. In addition, there were occasions where one villager would openly accuse another of 
violating the forest rules and regulations and this would result in conflict between the two par-
ties involved, rather than it being resolved at a village level by the village forest protection 
committee. 
Another weak point was the vague formulation of rules and regulations. When discussing 
these with two villagers who had been guards at that time, they could not agree on the rules, 
as they had not been fixed in any written document at the time and were therefore open to in-
terpretation. According to one of these guards, the village forest was fully closed to every-
body, i.e. even the collection of dry firewood was not allowed. Timber for own use should 
have been collected outside the protected village forest. He explained, that the imposing of 
such a rule made it easier to control and monitor the forest, than if the regulations allowed for 
the collection of dry wood or the felling of certain trees for construction purpose. His com-
panion however stated that the villagers were allowed to collect dry fuel wood, although out-
siders were not. 
After the failure of appointing special forest guards, the “stick rotation system” was re-
introduced by the villagers. Two men from neighbouring households were to patrol the forest 
from 9 a.m till 4 p.m. In the evening they were to give the stick to one of the next two house-
holds responsible for patrolling. Thus the stick would rotate among the households, with each 
household taking their turn every three weeks. 
During my stay, this system again did not work as it should have. The stick had stopped 
being circulated in June 1998, when agricultural activities increased. By November it had still 
not started being passed from house to house, “due to work”, as some villagers explained. I 
was told that the same had happened the previous year. According to several of the villagers, 
the pressure on forest resources of timber and fuel wood decreases during periods when there 
is increased agricultural activity and increases during periods when there is little or no work 
to be done on the farms. The breakdown of the stick system, during periods of agricultural ac-
tivity is generally considered to be insignificant, as fewer people have the time to go to the 
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forest to fell trees, or to sell fuel wood or timber at the market. However, given the fact that 
some households in the village itself primarily depend upon the sale of timber and fuel wood 
for income and that agricultural activities are of little or no importance to them, then this may 
be a false conclusion. There is a lesser supply of timber and fuel wood during times of inten-
sive agricultural activities and this obviously results in an increase in the price of this wood, 
making wood selling a financially viable means of obtaining an income at times of intensive 
agricultural activities. And not only the villagers are tempted to infringe on the rules made by 
themselves, but outsiders equally realise gaps in the control system and start to enter the pro-
tected forest again. 
In a village meeting, held in December 1998, the problem of the protection of the village 
forest was again discussed. Of the men that were seated around the central fireplace in the 
majang, the majority of them were elderly, middle-aged or young married men. The meeting 
in the majang, a traditional Juang institution, was not restricted to Juang men, as Gouda men 
also participated and Munda and Santal men could have taken part but did not. Not present at 
the meeting were the Munda and Santal men from Sologhoro Sahi, nor was every household 
from Kodipasa Sahi represented. Those who were interested attended the meeting, but it was 
by no means mandatory for people to attend.  
Several Juang women had positioned themselves within earshot outside the majang, so that 
they could listen to the men, who were having a lively but orderly discussion. Relatively few 
men were talking; the majority were just listening. First of all, the current situation was de-
scribed. Over the last few weeks, an increasing number of trees had been felled in the forest 
area. Despite the fact that the villagers had previously stated that they would protect and pa-
trol the forest, to prevent this happening, several of the villagers, as well as outsiders had been 
helping themselves without permission. Two consequences of this state of affairs were men-
tioned. Those villagers that had restricted themselves from felling trees in the village forest 
felt disadvantaged; protecting the forest was perceived as a loss for them. One of these villag-
ers jokingly proposed that in order to compensate for their loss, those people that had obeyed 
the rules should now be allowed to fell the same quantity of trees as the others. This would 
mean that the village forest would at least be destroyed in an egalitarian way. The same Juang 
man suggested that the village forest should be divided among the households. As in previous 
times with toila chasa (shifting cultivation) each family should get a part of forest and would 
then be responsible for protecting it. However, it was obvious that such a system would not be 
practicable. The cost of protecting a forest patch for each family would be too high.  
Another consequence was the disappearing village forest and it was stated that nobody 
would gain any benefit from such a loss in the near future. 
It was then decided that the village forest had to be protected again. A proposal by one of 
the Juang, to give the village forest to the foresters for protection, was rejected with the argu-
ment, that the rangers were not able to control the whole forest area and that the villagers 
should do it themselves. A Gouda man suggested re-introducing the system of employing two 
forest guardians, to be paid annually. Each household would pay 16 mano paddy (8 kg) per 
year, plus a daily handful of rice, in the same way that the herders were remunerated. A young 
Juang man replied that the people in Kodipasa did not have enough to eat, and therefore how 
could they afford to pay two guardians? Keeping the rotation system with the stick would be 
less costly for everybody. 
A proposal made by another Juang to establish a committee with a president and a secre-
tary to receive complaints from villagers and to control the patrolling system was not dis-
cussed further, although he had addressed a sensitive issue with it. The problem that could 
arise, with villagers using a system of rotation, is one of mutual protection. It would be a case 
of each turning a blind eye in favour of the other. There were even rumours, that the patrollers 
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themselves were guilty of felling trees, while “watching the forest”. Villagers that broke the 
rules themselves would not be in a position to take action against other villagers. Having 
some kind of independent committee would allow the villagers to address complaints to this 
committee about villagers and patrollers alike. 
Another proposal, made by the same Juang man, was to have a meeting, every Monday 
morning, to discuss issues of the village forest. This proposal was noted, but no clear decision 
was taken with regard to it. It turned out later that no regular meetings were held. It was fi-
nally decided to resume the stick rotation system, in order to protect the village forest. Thus, a 
decision was taken with consequences for people who were not at the meeting. There were no 
discussions about actions to be taken against those who did not act accordingly. 
The women had left the meeting before it came to an end. They considered the problem of 
forest protection to be something to be handled by the male villagers, as they were not part of 
the patrols. 
However, the stick rotation system proved to be a partial failure again and there were sev-
eral reasons for this. The stick did not move properly from household to household. Those re-
sponsible for patrolling the village forest did not always do their job. Instead of watching the 
forest they were busy with agricultural activities, were trying to earn some money from sell-
ing timber or firewood or were just enjoying a day of drinking handia or mahul with other vil-
lagers. There was no system for controlling whether the stick was moving properly and 
whether those who received it were doing their duty. This is well documented by observing 
what happened to the stick over the period of the following months. In the village meeting, 
held in December 1998, it was decided to resume the stick rotation system. It was decided 
that during the first month, the village forest should be controlled daily, by a group of four 
men from neighbouring households; two watching the lower portion of it, two the upper. Af-
ter this initial period, the number should be reduced to two men. It was assumed that outsiders 
would realize within the first month, that the village forest was seriously protected again and 
the villagers would equally be reminded of the rules and regulations. There were to be two 
sticks. One was to start at the upper end of the village, where mainly Gouda resided, and at 
the same time another stick should start its rotation in the lower side of the village, inhabited 
by the Juang. However, with the exception of one Gouda man, the other three men that were 
supposed to patrol the next day, were not in the meeting. The Gouda man also announced, 
that he would not go to the village forest with his neighbour due to some conflict between the 
two households. It was left up to this man to solve the problem, i.e. to find somebody else to 
patrol the forest with him. 
During the weeks that followed this meeting we tried to observe what was going on with 
the system of patrolling the village forest. It appeared to work for some time. In January, sev-
eral villagers from Naranpur had been seen in the village forest. They had been informed, that 
the forest was protected and watched as a village forest. The patrol then sent them away to the 
other side of the hill. Once outsiders realized that they were felling trees in a forest protected 
by the villagers, they accepted the claim of the local people. However, the protection has to be 
visible and control is necessary, in order to prevent outsiders from taking the opportunity of 
getting forest resources from the nearest forest possible. 
Three weeks after the meeting there was another meeting in the majang and among other 
issues that were debated, there was a short discussion about the village forest. It turned out 
that the stick had stopped rotating a few days previously, as one of the Juang men, who was 
drunk, had burnt it. A new stick had to be prepared and put into rotation. During the meeting 
it was decided who was going to be the next villager to patrol the forest. The Juang responsi-
ble refused to patrol with his neighbour, because this one would always start his “tour” in So-
loghoro Sahi by drinking handia and would be drunk by the time that they were due to patrol 
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the forest. This problem was solved by the decision that another neighbour should accompany 
him.  
Some days later the stick came to the household of our host. The eldest son was due to go 
to the forest on this particular day. His neighbour, who should have accompanied him, how-
ever, was visiting a sister in a neighbouring village. Thus, our host’s son went alone. In the 
evening there was a short discussion about the rotating system in front of our house. A Juang 
man complained that some of those villagers that were to receive the stick would not patrol 
the forest, but would instead drink handia or mahul or spend their day involved in other ac-
tivities. Furthermore, he suggested that punishment should be more serious; anybody violat-
ing the rules and being caught in the village forest should lose his axe immediately. 
The stick continued to move; albeit with interruptions due to misunderstandings as to 
whose turn it was, till the middle of May. At this point, this system stopped for a long period. 
The stick remained in a Juang household and nobody really bothered to keep it going. The vil-
lagers were busy with farm work or with wood selling or with both.  
The stick rotation system parallels the cattle herding system of Upper Kansa, where cattle 
are herded in a system of rotation. The difference between the two is that with the cattle graz-
ing rotation system, the herders, if it is their turn to take care of the village cattle, are at the 
same time looking after their own. They are therefore performing a role that would have been 
necessary anyway. By comparison, looking after the forest for one day is a day “lost” in the 
sense that nothing else can be done on that day and it is additional work, without an immedi-
ate return. This makes it a job that is not worth doing well, if at all. 
A further weakness of the village forest protection system is that sanctions are not imple-
mented. Throughout February the stick was still moving. However, one morning at the begin-
ning of March, we met a young Gouda man, who was using some bullocks to pull some fresh 
poles that he had obtained from the village forest. He explained that these poles were to be 
used for firewood for his household. On the afternoon of the same day, we met Juang women 
from Lower Kansa who were collecting firewood; partly dry, partly cut. They explained that 
some of it would be sold, while the remainder was for their own use. A little later on, we met 
another group of Juang women from Kodipasa, who were felling trees in the village forest. It 
had now become obvious to us, that people from various groups were blatantly breaking the 
rules. The stick was still rotating, but had lost its meaning. The system of patrolling had be-
come ineffective. The more frequently the rules were broken without being sanctioned, the 
less villagers felt bound to honour them, with the result that the protection system failed. 
There was not one incidence of anybody that had broken the rules being penalised. How-
ever, various groups accused each other of violating the rules. Several Juang households were 
accused by the Gouda of cutting firewood and timber for sale from the inner area of the vil-
lage forest, while the Juang accused the Gouda of felling too many Sal trees for construction 
purposes. The poorer Juang households whose income was derived solely from the sale of 
fuel wood and timber, accused other Juang (who cultivated rice), of felling trees in order to 
construct frames for the paddy straw. The poorer Juang demanded to get the same amount of 
timber from the village forest for sale. Juang women that collected dry firewood from the for-
est for household use, accused the Gouda men of taking large amounts of fuel wood from the 
forest; sometimes felling trees for this purpose and transporting them by bullock cart to their 
homes. 
The Munda equally accused the Juang of breaking the rules. They perceived the Juang as 
being “bazaar people”, largely dependent upon the sale of wood. According to them, the 
Juang even cut valuable timber that was supposed to be used for construction purposes, for 
firewood. Thus, they held them mainly responsible for the degraded village forest. They ac-
cused the Juang (although not openly), of generally failing to protect the village forest, due to 
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their high dependence upon the sale of wood, which they considered to be a consequence of 
their negligence of farm work. Some of the Munda and Santal people from Sologhoro Sahi 
discussed among themselves the possibilities of having their own village forest patch. The 
people of Sologhoro Sahi had lost interest in protecting a village forest that was harvested by 
others; mainly identified as the Juang. When asked why they were not addressing the problem 
of forest protection directly to the Juang, they referred to them as the original inhabitants of 
this area, thereby granting them a status of the traditional owners of the land. They accepted 
them as being the original dwellers and “landlords” (one of the Munda even used the meta-
phor of “raja” (the king) to describe the Juang) of the area and they refrained from openly 
criticising them. 
Laziness is perceived by some of the villagers as being the main reason for the destruction 
of the village forest: “The axe is destroying the forest and lazy people are destroying the vil-
lage”, was the comment made by one of the Juang, while walking through what remained of 
the village forest. A Gouda man made the following remark: “We are tired to talk about the 
forest, it’s no use. The Juang sell wood, when there is no work on the farm and the Juang sell 
wood when there is work on the farm – they sell wood the whole year.” 
However, poverty is also perceived to be a reason for breaking the rules of village forest 
protection. Thus, a wealthy Gouda man explained not only the hardship encountered by the 
poorer Juang householders, but also the difficulty in punishing people that are short of food, 
on a daily basis. “How is it possible to fine widows, landless families and elderly villagers, 
for obtaining their means of livelihood from the nearby forest?” he asked. There was defini-
tively some understanding and sympathy for those villagers whose income from wood selling 
was essential.  
5.5 The political system and institutions of the Juang 
“Prior experience with other forms of local organization greatly enhances the repertoire of rules and strate-
gies known by local participants as potentially useful to achieve various forms of regulation. Further, appro-
priators are more likely to agree upon rules whose operation they understand from prior experience, than 
upon rules that are introduced by external actors and are new to their experience” (Ostrom 1999:7).  
In the discussion about the management of common property resources (CPR), on the one 
hand a reason for the breakdown of once well functioning CPR systems is seen in institutional 
and organizational changes, due to changes in other socio-economic, political and/or ideo-
logical domains. On the other hand, hopes and attempts to promote self-organization on a lo-
cal level, with regard to natural resource management, try to link new institutional arrange-
ments to established institutions or to revitalise degraded local institutions. These issues raise 
several questions: to what extent do traditional institutions exist that are still working? Is it 
possible to carry out successful forest protection with them? How have traditional institutions 
changed? Are there any new institutions, do they work and are they appropriate for successful 
forest protection? 
The study of the general political system and institutions of the Juang helps to explore the 
viability of traditional Juang community institutions for the management of forest as common 
property. To regulate and control access to and use of natural resources is a matter of politics 
and the management of protected village forest as common property is embedded in a local 
political system. Questions of social and political leadership, political participation, mecha-
nisms of conflict resolution, establishment of rules and sanctions in the case of non-
accomplishment, the relevant socio-political units and arenas within and beyond Juang vil-
lages – all these are issues also to be dealt with in the context of an analysis of common prop-
erty regimes. Thus in this chapter, I will give an outline of the traditional political system of 
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the Juang, mainly based upon the ethnographic research carried out by McDougal in the early 
1960s.46 With regards to terminology I will use the term “traditional”, not with a view based 
on any fixed point of reference in the past, but as a term of reference to a political and social 
system that was still in existence when McDougal carried out his research, although it was 
probably then already in the process of changing. The political system of the Juang was em-
bedded in and influenced by the larger political system of the pre-colonial and pre-
independent Hindu kingdom of Keonhar. After independence, it was subsumed under the po-
litical structure of the state of Orissa. Viewed from a historical perspective, there are continui-
ties and discontinuities to be discerned: there is a growing integration of the Juang into local 
and national politics beyond the village level, probably a loss of local autonomy on village 
level, an increasing articulation of local political bodies and institutions within supra-local 
structures especially in the area of development and local government. On a symbolic level 
there is less attachment to the anonymous and abstract concept of the State, which is no 
longer embodied in the person of a Hindu raja. 
The contemporary situation of the various traditional political institutions, as well as new 
forms of political manifestations experienced during my field research, will be presented fol-
lowing the analysis of the traditional system. With the help of some of my experiences and 
my own data, both old and new lines of conflict will be illustrated and discussed, in the con-
text of the attempt to solve the problem of protecting forest as common property. Issues not 
mentioned by McDougal and others will add to the picture of the contemporary political 
situation of the Juang in a changed context and environment. 
Before staying for several months in two Juang villages, I had read McDougal’s ethno-
graphic account of the social and political system of the Juang and I was trying to verify, what 
remained 50 years later, what had changed and what had not been mentioned by him. Some 
observations about the social and political village life were familiar, in the sense that I was 
able to recognize what McDougal had described. Others were unfamiliar and unexpected. Dif-
ferences to McDougal’s account were more prominent in Kodipasa than in Upper Kansa. Old 
political institutions seemed here to be in the process of losing importance paralleled by shifts 
in traditional structures of local leadership and power relations. 
5.5.1 Juang village politics: the majang and its political actors 
In the pre-independent political system of the Juang, the village was the most important po-
litical unit within the wider unit of the loosely organised tribe. Referring to the traditional 
context of the Juang society, McDougal characterizes the Juang village as follows: 
“The village is the largest corporate group in Juang society. It is the only land-owning unit, controlling ac-
cess to all resources. It is a unit of economic production, distribution and consumption, and economically 
self-sufficient in relation to other Juang communities. It is a ritual congregation and the largest Juang ritual 
unit. In relation both to the external administration and to other Juang villages, it is politically autonomous” 
(McDougal 1963:62). 
                                                           
46 Although his approach is that of a structural-functionalist with the concomitant weakness of describing a 
smoothly functioning social and political system with some lack of historical depth and analysis of conflicts not 
to be solved by social mechanisms of the system itself, his monography on the Juang of Keonjahr is still today 
the most elucidating and encompassing portrayal of Juang society. His findings have only partially been supple-
mented by other ethnographic research and literature, while the majority of other authors have either reproduced 
in the same or sligthly different way what is to be found in his monography. However, some studies focused on 
aspects neglected by McDougal, these being ecological and economic aspects of shifting cultivation (Bose 1967) 
and ethno-botanical research by Patnaik et al. 
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Within the village community it is the complex institution of the majang, which regulates vil-
lage affairs. It is not only the organizational structure with regard to all communal affairs, the 
men’s house is also a prominent building within the village. It is the central meeting place, 
where important rituals and social activities take place. 
5.5.1.1 Family heads and ritual elders 
Political authority and responsibility in the village are vested in the village council of family 
heads, i.e. the married men as heads of independent households. McDougal classified these 
men broadly, in various categories according to their status, age, influence and office held. 
The first distinction he makes is between “secular family heads” and “ritual elders”, the for-
mer having no formal ritual posts. 
The secular family heads are subdivided into the two groups of “young married men” and 
“elders”; the age of about 40 years being a rough dividing line. Elders tend “to monopolize 
political activities, exercising the greatest amount of influence in the community” (1962:193). 
Elders also tend to monopolize liquor provided from village funds and distributed in formal 
situations in the majang. They restrain from participation in village dances, whereas young 
married men may still join the groups of mainly unmarried boys and young men during visits 
by girls and women from other villages. However, in everyday interpersonal relations, young 
men do not show any prominent signs of deference towards elder men and elder men have no 
formal authority to enforce their will upon younger men. Within the group of elder family 
heads, there are several informal leaders whose leadership is based on their personal abilities: 
“A leader is a man who exercises influence over his fellows; his opinions are heard and respected, and they 
influence the actions of others. He is a man of forceful personality, who possesses initiative, experience, 
sound judgement, and a gift of oratory. He is often relatively wealthy, but there are men of modest means 
who are important leaders, and rich men whose opinion count for little in the community. Leaders are recog-
nized by members of their own and other communities as ‘important men’ (mukhia lukoki). At the village 
level, this acknowledgement of their political position is not formalized - there are no special titles or sym-
bols of status” (McDougal 1963:370). 
The category of ritual elders relates to the older men of the village that hold named ritual 
posts. Among these, the two offices of bwita and ordhano are the most prominent ones; they 
perform all the central rituals within the community. There is a division of ritual labour be-
tween them: the bwita is the keeper of a basket with ritual offerings, the ordhano is the keeper 
of a sacred axe (pathakhanda) with which sacrifices are killed. Other names used instead of 
bwita are nagam or dehuri: according to N. Patnaik their use varies according to region: “The 
sacerdotal head of the village called Nagam in Keonjhar and Buita or Dehuri in Dhenkanal 
usually officiates in all communal rituals of the village” (1989a:54). 
Patnaik’s description of the ordhano differs from that of McDougal. Patnaik uses the term 
pradhan for this office holder and according to him the pradhan is the formal and secular 
headman of the village: 
“His office was created by the feudatory rulers of Keonjhar and Dhenkanal. Some of the important activities 
in which he takes leadership are the distribution of land for axe cultivation among villagers and adjudication 
of intra and inter village disputes. Formerly he used to collect revenue from the villagers and send it to the 
Sardar for payment to the State treasury. He used to make arrangements by way of providing accomodation 
and provisions for the officers while on tour in his area. (...) The Pradhan used to receive some remuneration 
from the feudatory rulers for his work in connection with collection of revenue and contributions for func-
tions to be observed at the state headquarters. As village headman he also enjoys some privileges” (Patnaik 
1986:60). 
He emphasizes the “vital role” that the pradhan plays in the village: 
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“All significant matters are brought to his notice and his opinion and participation is desired in all important 
matters. He is the formal spokesman of the village. Any individual can file his complaints before him against 
any other individual in the village and the villagers are expected to obey his commands. Whenever necessary 
the Pradhan can call the village council meetings. He may significantly influence the opinion of the council 
by his statement although the final decision is taken by the council and not by the headman” (ibid.). 
This prominent role ascribed to the office of the pradhan (respectively ordhano) does not ap-
pear in McDougal’s analysis of the political system of the Juang. However, it appears that by 
looking for village representatives, the former state authorities created a kind of formal head-
manship which was then transmitted by the Juang to one of their traditional ritual elders; the 
ordhano. But within the village community he was still dependent upon the willingness of 
other villagers to ascribe him authority and influence. The analysis of the political structure 
among the Juang by McDougal, convincingly denies any fixed position of headmanship or in-
fluential power to command. The term pradhan is an Oriya term meaning ‘foremost’ or 
‘head’; however, there is no such clearly defined leadership position among the Juang. In the 
observations of Elwin Verrier it is indicated that the pradhan “sometimes combines in his 
person the function also of Dhuri or Bhuitar” (1948:36), i.e. the function of pradhan could 
also be fulfilled by the bwita.  
Regarding the authority of the two offices of nagam and pradhan, Rout says: 
“The ritual head (Nagam) of the village has important roles to play in the village rituals but he has little voice 
in the village council. The secular officer (Padhan) is responsible for certain external affairs of the village, 
and has a definite role to play in the village rituals. But he does not necessarily exercise supreme power in 
the internal affairs of the village. (...) it is evident that the offices of the leaders confer responsibility, but no 
real authority” (1969:86). 
Other elders may assist during rituals, but their activities are not definitely prescribed and 
they lack any symbols of office (McDougal 1962:194). According to McDougal, the names of 
these posts may vary from village to village, but titles that are widely used are nayko, odhi-
kari (according to Bose 1967:146 the odhikari is the assistant of buita during religious func-
tions) and dangua. The dangua: 
“… acts as an assistant of Nagam. He collects the offerings from the villagers. He also announces the deci-
sion of the village leaders in respect of ritualistic performances to all the villagers in front of the dormitory 
house. (...) He acts as a messenger to the Nagam and the Pradhan. He takes the news around the village, 
summons the village people for any occasion or informs them of any important decision of the village coun-
cil” (N. Patnaik 1986:61). 
The religious offices of bwita and ordhano are always kept by male members of the local de-
scent group and ideally this office should be given to its most senior male member. However, 
it is possible that the post of a deceased bwita can be designated to the current bwita’s wife, 
for a period of two to three years, until a successor is found. In such a case the woman is con-
sidered a ritual elder “subject to all contingent rights and obligations” (McDougal 1962:199). 
Probably due to the need for performing sacrificial killings with the sacred axe, the post of 
ordhano is always occupied by a male. In the event of his death his duties may be performed 
by the bwita himself, thus he would be assuming both offices at once.  
The ritual power of elders does not necessarily give them authority over secular village af-
fairs which are rather the domain of the secular family heads, over the age of 40. These heads 
tend to have a dwindling influence towards old age; old men somehow draw back from very 
active debating, they would rather observe what is going on and remain in the background, 
making comments rather than trying to be influential. 
 “It is recognized that as men grow old they diminish in physical and mental vigor, necessary qualities for 
leadership, with the result that they tend to exert less influence in the political sphere” (McDougal 1962:208). 
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My observations, to a large extent, mirror those made almost 40 years previously, by McDou-
gal with regard to the description of the various categories of men in these two villages, their 
roles, functions and behaviour. In both villages there is a majang, the men’s house which was 
described and analysed in detail by McDougal as the one prominent feature of the social and 
political life of the Juang. In both villages, men meet there to discuss everyday village affairs 
as well as exceptional events. Juang men invested with political and/or ritual offices are all 
married and they are all independent household heads. They all belong to the founder clan of 
the villages. Both unmarried and young married men adopt a passive role, in comparison to 
elder independent family heads, although they may participate in any public discussion. Their 
verbal reservation in public discussion however does not necessarily coincide with consent to 
the dominant discourse. The fact that there are few extended families among the Juang of the 
two villages, may be interpreted as the result of the fact that both married men and independ-
ent family heads strive for autonomy and higher social status. Older men tend to remain in the 
background, as silent listeners. Women do not participate in majang meetings, although they 
may follow discussions from outside. 
In Upper Kansa, the two religious offices of the bwita and ordhano were occupied by one 
elderly Juang male. He was assisted by his younger brother, who was perceived to be his po-
tential successor. The situation of the religious leaders in Kodipasa was somewhat excep-
tional, in so far as the prominent figure with regards to ritual affairs was an elderly Juang 
woman. She had been invested with the office of the bwita after the death of her husband; the 
previous priest of the village. He had been a member of the village founder clan (barcha bok), 
from which religious leaders are recruited. Without her, most religious rituals and ceremonies 
were not practicable. She was highly appreciated as a priest, while in everyday life she took 
on the role of an old widow, who was supported by her family and had no specific authority. 
It appears that this particular woman did not actively seek to become the bwita; in fact she 
was pressured into taking this role by the villagers, after the death of her husband. A bwita 
transmits messages and offerings to the spiritual and divine world and as such is the link be-
tween the needs and demands of both men and gods. A bwita carries the burden of being 
made partly responsible for successful agriculture and the general well-being of the villagers. 
The year before my stay in the village had been a bad year, with little rain and crop failure 
and there seemed to be hidden reproaches toward the bwita, which were rejected by her dur-
ing the preparation for an annual agricultural ritual. 
The female bwita of Kodipasa had two male assistants; one being the ordhano (also called 
podhano47) in the village, the other who was locally called the odhikar. Both were over 50 
years old and belonged to the founder clan of the village. The ordhano previously held the of-
fice of a nayko (assistant). For many years he was also a panchayat ward member – thus, for 
several years he had held a political office created by the State. Economically the ordhano of 
Kodipasa belonged to the lower strata of the village community as the majority of the Juang. 
This was in contrast to the odhikari, who was the richest Juang in the village. His eco-
nomic success however was not connected to his office as a priestly assistant; there are few 
opportunities for transforming “ritual capital” into economic assets. However, it is likely that 
his economic status had helped him to secure this office. His wealth was at least mentioned as 
having been one of the reasons for electing him as a priest. Other reasons for his election were 
his experience and knowledge of village affairs and his connections to the world outside of 
the village, due to his political past, when he was sarpanch for several years. He assisted the 
                                                           
47 Acording to Bose (1967:146) Pudhan = village leader 
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bwita in the rituals and was declared successor to the bwita. His father had also been a bwita 
(dehuri).  
During everyday life, the social status of these village priests is not markedly different 
from that of other Juang men. The same holds true for the female bwita (and for the wives of 
the male priests.) The fact that Juang men with priestly offices are not sacrosanct persons in 
everyday life, will be demonstrated in the light of a conflict analysed below. 
There are also new political offices to be found in Kodipasa. In this village there are 
Panchayat ward members and a Sarpanch ex officio. This previous Sarpanch is an interesting 
political figure. He is actually the odhikari described above, assisting the female bwita and he 
is her future successor. He is the richest Juang man in the village, with regard to land and cat-
tle. As the son of a Sarpanch and after having been a Sarpanch himself for several years, he 
has the experience and know-how to deal with external authorities and he remains the infor-
mal contact person for outsiders; a role not claimed by any other villager. He is respected and 
distrusted at the same time by the other Juang, who are not only unable to ignore his wealth 
and power, but are also unable to sanction efficiently his misconduct towards the villagers as 
will be shown in chapter 5.5.2. 
Two of the Juang men from Kodipasa are ward members of the grama panchayat, elected 
by the villagers. They both belong to barcha bok. Both are literate, which is a prerequisite for 
eligibility to this office. Thus, old and new offices in Kodipasa are held by married Juang men 
belonging to the founder clan.  
With regard to the majang there are some obvious differences between the two villages. 
The majang in Kodipasa is no longer the daily meeting place of the male villagers. A lot of 
the time it is empty, with no fire burning in it. It is mainly used for rituals and ceremonies and 
for announced meetings. The majang has retained its ritual significance, but its social and po-
litical meaning has been reduced. It is no longer the prominent centre of village life, as many 
Juang houses, as well as houses and hamlets of other villagers, are situated some distance 
from the majang. It has also partially lost its function as a dormitory for young and unmarried 
men. This may be partly due to a housing scheme that was implemented by an external devel-
opment agency, in order to provide additional houses for the Juang population. However, the 
loss of this function can not only be explained by the greater availability of houses: traditional 
Juang houses can be constructed of local materials relatively easily and therefore it would be 
too simplistic to explain the reason for spatial segregation of unmarried boys and men in the 
majang as being down to the the scarcity of living space in traditional Juang houses. I thus in-
terpret the demise of the majang as a sleeping place as being related to the phenomenon of a 
broader social change within the Juang village community; a change towards even more 
fragmentation and increasing centrifugal forces than those that already exist in the traditional 
setting. 
Entering the village of Upper Kansa one easily gets the impression of being in one of the 
villages described by McDougal, some 40 years ago. Here, the majang is still the central place 
for the male villagers that meet there everyday. It stands in the centre of the small houses 
clustered around it and its fire is always burning. 
5.5.1.2 The subordinates: women and young men 
There are two other categories of people within the village community that form part of the 
political structure and are in a comparatively subordinate position. These are women and un-
married girls and unmarried boys and married young men that do not have the status of inde-
pendent household head. 
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Raia, Kusiana, Bajana and Nidi (from left to right): Juang family heads in Upper Kansa 
 
The majang is clearly a male dominated place and institutional structure, although the exclu-
sion of women and girls is not absolute; under certain circumstances and in a clearly regulated 
manner, women and girls are admitted access to the majang. (I myself as a foreign woman 
was never denied access to the men’s house and in fact the majang was the normal place to be 
welcomed when visiting Juang villages). Young unmarried girls have the duty of keeping the 
majang clean and before any ritual event they apply fresh cow dung to the floor and the walls 
of the men’s house, if necessary mixed with mud to repair any damage to the walls. For 
communal feasts they prepare cups and platters made from Sal leaves. 
Although women do not participate in the meetings held by the men, it is quite easy for 
them to know what is going on in the majang. There is no strict secrecy surrounding these 
meetings and as the majang house has an open structure, everything is visible and discussions 
going on may be followed from outside. 
Among the women, the wives of the bwita and ordhano do have some special status and 
some ritual functions. The widow of the bwita may even become a bwita herself, and as such 
she has considerable ritualistic power and can enjoy free access to the men’s house. The 
wives of both the bwita and ordhano also play a ritual role during religious ceremonies; the 
wives of the elders that are to perform the rituals lead the way from their homes to the ma-
jang. They bless the route by sprinkling turmeric water, from the doorsteps of their homes to 
the central pillar of the majang (McDougal 1962:202). 
The majang is not only the men’s house; it is also the dormitory for boys from about the 
age of ten upwards and for unmarried young men. They gather together there in the evening 
and sleep near the big fireplace in the centre of the main hall. However, the boys eat in their 
family homes and are subject to the formal authority of the family head (McDougal 
1962:185f). Traditionally, these boys have clearly defined duties connected with the majang, 
as well as with certain rituals. They are obliged to provide the large logs for the fire in the ma-
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jang; this fire is to be kept alight at all times. They sweep the majang and they may be asked 
to collect thatching grass and to periodically fix the roof. They assist during rituals, they fetch 
water and firewood for the preparation of food during communal feasts. They play the changu 
(drums); they sing and dance during various social and ritual occasions. It is their prerogative 
to eat, together with the ritual elders, the head of a sacrificed animal (fowl or goat), from 
which secular family heads are excluded. Thus, boys and unmarried young men may always 
be present in the majang, although their role during debates and discussions is a passive one; 
they listen and observe but do not interfere. 
McDougal describes the position of young married men that are not independent family 
heads as somewhat ambiguous: 
“They lack the rights and obligations of either unmarried boys or family heads, while possessing no special 
prerogatives or responsibilites of their own. For the performance of certain tasks – e.g., chopping wood, 
fetching water, butchering animals, and cooking for communal feasts or for visitors – they are aligned with 
the unmarried boys, as well as some of the younger family heads. They often work together with the boys, 
assisting them in the construction of drums and in preparing the larger varieties of straw rope bundles. They 
frequently take part in the dances of the unmarried boys and girls” (McDougal 1962:192). 
These men live either under the authority of their father or their elder brother as family head. 
According to McDougal, the fact that these men are denied the full social status of an inde-
pendent family head is an important factor for them in becoming independent socio-economic 
household heads. This results in a low percentage of joint or extended households. 
Although restricted with regard to active participation in village politics, which is domi-
nated by married family heads, there is some scope for both women and young men to pursue 
their interests. One strategy is for them to ignore decisions that have been made by the village 
council, if they do not find them convincing The fact that women, as well as young men, do 
break the rules that have been made by the village council, regarding protection of the village 
forest, indicates that such resolutions are not automatically obeyed. 
The public role of women and unmarried girls in both villages is characterised by discre-
tion, with regard to the majang as a male meeting place and forum. Among themselves, 
whether they are with their family, other household members or their neighbours, they have 
their own means, places and times to communicate and to discuss personal and village affairs. 
The Juang women spend considerable time either in a group with other Juang women of a 
similar age, or of varying ages. They talk together while working in the fields and when, in 
groups, they collect firewood from the forest and carry it to the town. Young unmarried girls 
visit other Juang villages to dance there and they welcome boys from other Juang villages, 
who come to dance and sing with them. 
The Juang women are neither invisible in village life nor tacit observers of the Juang men. 
They make comments about the men and their behaviour. However, the women acknowledge 
the public role of men and accept decisions that concern the usual village affairs. However, 
during my stay there were two events that highlighted the fact that although the majang is 
perceived as a male dominated institution, the women also have a degree of informal influ-
ence within the community. These two illustrative cases raise doubts about the effectiveness 
and strength of the majang as a political institution and authority with binding force when in-
terfering with the interests of women. 
Before leaving the field I wanted to give a gift to the two village communities and I pro-
posed to buy them a big pot, to be used in village rituals, when large quantities of food needed 
to be prepared. I also suggested, that such a pot could be kept in the majang and borrowed by 
any family in the village, who had to cook food for guests on occasions of marriages or death. 
The Juang men agreed. However, the women of Kodipasa instructed me not to give the pot to 
the men to be kept in the majang. They argued that it would be stolen from there; some irre-
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sponsible men could sell it and use the money to buy mahul. It would also be difficult to get 
the pot for ‘private’ purposes (e.g. marriage, death). It was obvious that they distrusted their 
men in this matter. They instead suggested that the pot should be kept in the house of a re-
spected Juang woman, whose husband was mentally sick and did not drink alcohol. The sons 
of this family were still young and therefore did not drink either. It would probably have been 
difficult for the women to remove the pot from the majang; had I given it to the men. They 
managed to keep the pot out of purely male control and to solve the problem in a way which 
gave them more free play for their own interests. Due to mental ill health, the husband of the 
household where the pot was to be stored, was not in a dominant position; neither were his 
sons, due to their young age. It would be far easier for any of the women to deal with this fe-
male custodian of the pot, than with any of the men in the majang.48 
The fact that the women are capable of refusing to accept decisions taken by the men was 
illustrated by the following incident that took place during our field research. When we 
wanted to measure swidden plots in Upper Kansa, we asked the permission of the men in the 
majang and they agreed. However, when we took steps to measure the first field, the women 
working there refused and the men conceded. It was not possible for us to find out the reason 
why the women refused us permission. 49 However, this example showed us that it was not 
possible to by-pass the women. We had addressed the men in the majang, assuming that they, 
as family and household heads, could either give or refuse their consent. It is quite likely, that 
had we asked the women first, they would have directed us to discuss the matter with the 
men. 
Even if women are to a considerable extent excluded from the meeting place of the majang 
and young males are partially excluded from discussions, debates and decision making that 
takes place among male family heads and elders, they have several options available to them, 
for either cooperating with the men or by-passing and obstructing their decisions. The fact 
that they are excluded from village politics, in a direct way, is not tantamount to saying that 
they are subordinated to male decisions. Policy decisions and rules relating to the local village 
forest are followed; as long as they fit the current circumstances that the women are experi-
encing. They are by-passed if necessary; particularly if individual women perceive that they 
are being cheated by others who are not following the rules and regulations that apply to the 
forest. 
                                                           
48 The gift of the pot evoked other facets of village life. My gift had no common and shared value for the various 
groups in the village: it was estimated by the Juang and considered as useful. However, the Gouda immediately 
declared the gift as useless for them: because the Juang would cook pork meat in this pot, it would therefore be-
come impure and it would be impossible for the Gouda to use it for any private or ceremonial purposes. A 
woman from a richer Santal household explained that my gift was useless for her, as she already had large pots 
in her own household. In addition, several of the Munda suspected that the Juang would withold the pot from the 
Munda people and would not allow them to use it for their own private purposes. This episode highlighted the 
various centrifugal forces that were present in this village community, by factors of gender, economic and social 
status as well as cultural (religious) identity. It also illustrates my own naivety (in thinking that I could give a gift 
to everybody) hinted at my unconsciously cherished idea of a harmonious village community, at least partly re-
futed by reality). 
49 Bose (1967:6) mentions the following perception of the Juang which might indicate a reason for resistance to 
the measurement of swiddens: “The Juangs of Keonjhar believe that if a person, specially one belonging to the 
Government, measures a plot for mapping, then a clear ownership of the plot will be feasable. In fact, in areas of 
shifting cultivation, land is not owned permanently by any individual, but is treated as communal property. 
When a plot of land is, however, alloted to him for a season, he enjoys the full fruits of his labour.” 
Hunt (2000:263) also mentions “vigorous local resistance to standard measuring techniques” in agricultural stud-
ies, e.g. among the Iban. 
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The issue with the pot in Upper Kansa was somewhat different: I did not want to carry the 
pot myself to the village, as it was too heavy. I therefore asked the men of Upper Kansa to 
send two Juang men to carry the pot. They agreed, but had difficulty convincing two men to 
do it. The elderly men tried to persuade two of the young unmarried boys to get the pot, but 
they refused, claiming that they did not have the time to do this. It was only when I threatened 
to give this pot to the villagers of Kodipasa as well that two men were prepared to carry the 
pot to their village, albeit after suggesting that I give them not only the pot but some addi-
tional money for mahul as remuneration for carrying my gift. This incident illustrates the lack 
of authority of elderly men over the younger men. 
During my stay, I frequently heard complaints about the laxity of the male youth, with re-
gard to their duties in and for the majang. These complaints mainly came from the ritual eld-
ers during the performance of rituals. However, it is difficult to interpret such statements as a 
clear indication of not only the demise of rituals within the Juang culture, but also the in-
volvement of boys and young men connected to them. McDougal repeatedly mentions not 
only the difficulty of individuals in Juang society exerting their authority but also the lack of 
authority that the elderly men have over younger men and even boys. But there were obvious 
signs of the majang being given less importance. The missing or broken changus (drums) in 
the majang of Kodipasa, were symbolic of the fact that the majang was losing its significance 
as a central place of cultural, ritual and social Juang life. 
5.5.1.3 The role of non-Juang villagers 
The majang is partially open to other male villagers that do not belong to the Juang. The type 
and degree of participation depends on various factors. Certain ritual village affairs are left to 
the Juang, with the view that they are the original inhabitants of the place and as such are the 
specialists, not only in dealing with local gods and spirits, but also in performing sacrifices for 
the general well-being of the village; for the people and animals as well as the crops. This 
principle does not interfere with the separate religious places and rituals of the Santal, Munda 
and Gouda. The Santal and Munda have their own sacred forests where they perform their 
rituals. The Gouda do not have any prominent sacred space in the village; they perform their 
pujas in their homes. However, they do contribute milk and ghee to certain rituals performed 
by the Juang priests and are in this way involved in the Juang religious ceremonies. 
During our stay in the village, there was one exceptional ritual performed by the Juang 
priest, where male villagers from all groups participated. A goat was sacrificed, in order to 
drive away roaming elephants that had menaced the village for some time. After the sacrifice, 
there was a meal of rice and goat meat. The ritual united all of the male villagers together as 
everybody was suffering, from elephants entering the village. However, it was clear that this 
ritual had to be performed by the Juang priests. Juang priests are recognized by the non-
Juang, but no special preferences are given to them in every-day village life; neither by the 
Juang nor the non-Juang. 
Meetings in the majang to discuss village affairs are open to all male villagers. They may 
attend or not, they can join in discussions and give their opinions and suggestions in the same 
way as the Juang men. In the same way as the Juang men, both elderly and married men may 
be more involved in discussions and are more influential in the decision-making process. 
However, there are no formal leaders among the Santal, Munda and Gouda. Possibly, due to 
their longer involvement in Juang village life, over a period of three to four generations, sev-
eral of the more elderly and prosperous Gouda men seem to be well established in village 
meetings. The Santal and Munda are less present in the majang; they are somehow more reti-
cent to participate actively in the institution of the majang. However, they know what is going 
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on in the village and they join meetings in the majang, if they think that something of concern 
to them is going to be discussed there. 
Thus, while the majang is predominantly a Juang institution and on certain occasions, ex-
clusively their domain, it functions as a forum for village politics that is open to all male 
villagers, regardless of whether they are Juang or not. From that point of view, apart from the 
problem that women are excluded from the majang, it may be considered a valuable institu-
tion for dealing with problems that relate to the whole village; as is the case with the forest.  
5.5.2 Village affairs and conflict resolution 
The village affairs regulated by the meetings of family heads in the traditional context, as de-
scribed by McDougal, are mainly rituals and social events. Regular annual ritual events that 
have to be planned and organized, are mostly connected to the agricultural cycle. As the ritual 
calendar does not follow any specific date, the day of the performance of a specific ritual has 
to be decided in advance. This is done by the family heads who discuss the various conditions 
for the performance of the ritual. It may be necessary to coordinate the ritual with other 
events. It is possible that there is a death either in the village itself, or in a relative’s village, 
which makes it necessary for the agricultural ritual to be postponed. This can also occur if a 
matrimonial event has to take precedence. When the ritual eventually takes place, the neces-
sary items and sacrifices have to be obtained and instructions have to be given to the boys and 
girls that are to assist. There is a great deal of routine in the performance of these annual ritu-
als and the villagers know the various steps and stages of such an event. There is a clear divi-
sion of labour between the bwita, ordhano and other ritual elders and the duties of unmarried 
girls and boys are equally clear. There may be irregular ritual events which are not a fixed 
part of the annual ritual calendar, but which are performed according to the demands of spe-
cific circumstances; for example an unusual destruction of crops by animals, the sickness of 
cattle, a drought. 
Another domain of village affairs are social events such as deaths or marriages within the 
village, which do not just involve the members of the individual households and families con-
cerned, but also require cooperation from the rest of the villagers. Marriages and deaths of 
people from other villages also require adequate behaviour from the villagers. Thus, village 
affairs not only concern intra-village affairs, but also affairs related to other villages. 
The village council also has judicial functions. It is responsible for ensuring that the rules 
and norms are adhered to and for dealing with incorrect behaviour and conflicts. Homicide, 
adultery, theft, witchcraft and flagrant disrespect for the recognized authorities and symbols 
of the community, are considered crimes to be dealt with by the village council. Quarrels be-
tween members of the village which involve assault and the uttering of curses, require public 
reconciliation. In cases where members of other communities are involved in crimes and con-
flicts, this becomes a matter either between the two villages or all the villages of the pirh. 
Cases of incestuous relationships cannot be settled within the village, they have to be dealt 
with at the pirh level (McDougal 1962:377). Sanctions may be subdivided into legal sanctions 
that have been formalised and are implemented by the village council, and more informal and 
diffuse sanctions that are mainly implemented by the village community as a whole. Without 
going into detail, the rough structure of sanctioning and conflict resolution includes the fol-
lowing elements (McDougal 1962:377ff): 
1) A formal accusation must be made before formal judicial action is taken. There must be a 
high degree of certainty that the accused is guilty. The accused may volunteer to take an 
oath of innocence. False accusations may result in supernatural sanctions for the plaintiff 
and thus an accusation is not carelessly made. 
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2) The accused is considered ritually impure and risks permanent ostracization by the villag-
ers unless he confesses his guilt and pays compensation. Ostracization refers to the ameni-
ties of organised social life, i.e. the person may be excluded from grazing stock with the 
communal herd, from taking water from the water supplies of the village and from partici-
pating in any village affairs.  
3) If the accused not only admits his guilt and is willing to pay the required compensation, but 
also shows his willingness to respect the norms and rules of the community, the social or-
der is reaffirmed. He is reinstated into the community by means of a ritual that involves the 
drinking of liquor.  
4) If he denies any guilt he may be forced to take an oath to swear his innocence; by this oath 
he renders himself to death by supernatural powers if he does not tell the truth, i.e. he has 
to fear being killed by a tiger if he commits perjury. He is considered innocent if he takes 
an oath. If threatened with taking an oath he admits his guilt, he is reinstated after due 
warning and payment of compensation. 
5) If he refuses to take the oath and still denies his culpability, he has to undergo an ordeal 
until he confesses. The ordeal consists of physically painful treatment and exposure to pub-
lic ridicule. After such an enforced confession he has to pay compensation. 
 
According to McDougal the amount of compensation is not scaled according to different of-
fences; compensation must be given to the judicial body in form of a goat, rice and money for 
liquor to provide a feast consumed by the village council. 
Whereas the village council sanctions individual behaviour in a formal way, there are dif-
fuse social sanctions by villagers towards members who are charged with inappropriate be-
haviour. These sanctions include ridicule, malicious gossiping, rumours and diffuse accusa-
tions of witchcraft. Latent conflicts between individual members of the community are thus 
handled in a rather indirect and hidden way. Opponents try to influence the opinion of their 
social environment about the bad behaviour of their adversaries to get support by spreading 
rumours and maybe even diffuse accusations of witchcraft. However, there seem to be 
counter-mechanisms to reduce the danger of escalating individual conflicts into conflicts af-
fecting the community as a whole: Juang society may be characterised as a rather individual-
istic society. Households in the traditional context, are small and in many respects rather 
autonomous units. Clans and larger lineage groups are of no central importance and next to 
the household comes the village community as a whole, as the most important reference 
group. People are not really interested in interfering in matters that do not affect them di-
rectly. Latent conflicts seem to be diffused and thus alleviated. McDougal mentions several 
ways in which this is done. Serious accusations of witchcraft are very rare and there is rarely a 
consensus about who is practicing witchcraft in the community. Personal misfortunes and ca-
lamities may be explained or interpreted as having been caused by sorcery, however in most 
cases it is ascribed to some supernatural malevolent spirits. If the traditional diviner finds out 
that sorcery is the cause of some misfortune, he “does not communicate the name of the sor-
cerer, but attempts to exorcise the spirits which the latter has sent to attack his victim with 
magical techniques and contingent offerings, or performs counter-magic to neutralize that 
employed by the sorcerer, as the case may be” (McDougal 1962:397). Malicious gossips may 
be taken note of, i.e. people listen to gossip, but they do not feel urged to take action and it 
may be forgotten after a short time. McDougal even mentions a dispute among the Juang, 
which finally resulted in the punishment of an outsider (a non-Juang visitor), who had nothing 
to do with the conflict but was selected to be the scapegoat in order to restore harmony among 
the villagers. He was driven out of the village and the conflict thus settled (McDougal 
1962:401). 
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Such hidden conflicts may vanish in the course of time, or they may escalate into open 
conflicts mainly during group drinking. Open aggression mainly erupts in situations where the 
consumption of alcohol prepares the ground for uncontrolled behaviour and it is the most di-
rect form of opposing somebody in the community. In such a situation, physical violence may 
occur; in extreme cases leading to homicide. In situations of imminent or actual physical vio-
lence, other villagers try to intervene and to separate the adversaries who may later be sanc-
tioned by the village council, for their violence towards each other. According to McDougal 
(1962:399) situations of group drinking that result in displays of open aggression are a peri-
odic outlet for accumulated aggression: 
“On these occasions (group drinking) the great majority of middle-aged and old men become intoxicated, and 
when in this state they invariably begin to quarrel, often about something quite trivial, but as the altercation 
continues, other incidents are introduced. Repressed feelings of oppression are suddenly released. These may 
be specific or general, and they may be directed at the object of aggression or displaced on a convenient sub-
stitute, in either case often an individual who has not fulfilled his social obligations or met social expecta-
tions. Grievances within the community are brought to the surface and aired. ” 
During our field research the handling of ritual affairs, connected mainly to the annual cere-
monial calendar, was still a prominent domain of village elders and family heads as described 
by McDougal. In Upper Kansa, necessary rituals connected with shifting cultivation were still 
performed, while these rituals had been abandoned in Kodipasa. Other rituals were performed 
in both villages. However, rituals were somewhat more public in Upper Kansa than in Kodi-
pasa, in the sense that the small population of Upper Kansa was more in touch with what was 
happening in and around the majang, whereas in Kodipasa rituals were mainly the affair of 
the village priests and other villagers did not pay much attention to them and their religious 
performances – a fact that the priests sometimes complained of. 
The same may be said of other ceremonial occasions, such as burials and marriages in 
Kodiopasa. Such events are mainly affairs of the families and kin of those concerned. Neigh-
bours are involved to a lesser extent. However, decisions concerning the performance of the 
death rituals are taken in the majang, as it has to be fitted in with the general ritual calendar 
and one death ritual has to be performed by the village priests and a close family member of 
the deceased, in the front of the majang. This puja takes place rather unnoticed by many of 
the others villagers. In Upper Kansa due to its small size, close kinship relations and neigh-
bourhood, all villagers are involved in such events, although to varying degrees. 
Most conflicts between individuals were not handled on a village level. No serious crimes, 
such as homicide, theft or accusations of witchcraft (which according to McDougal were dealt 
with on a village level) happened during my stay in the villages. But there were visible and 
audible conflicts between husbands and wives, mothers and sons, neighbours and villagers. 
These were conflicts over money, behaviour, food and reputations. There were verbal attacks, 
accusations, insults and threats and men were sometimes physically violent towards women. 
Alcohol was part of quarrels. However, in many cases there was no meeting of the family 
heads to discuss these conflicts. They were left for the individuals concerned to resolve; al-
though comments were made by outsiders. Even close kin did not necessarily interfere in a 
conflict between husband and wife, or mother and son. In one case, a man filed a case with 
the police, against his brother, who had slaughtered a goat, during a quarrel with their mother. 
The conflict was not handled at the majang, but was taken to the district police; although it 
was unclear as to whether the police were going to take this matter seriously. Thus, formal 
conflict resolution mechanisms and proceedings are not a prominent characteristic of Juang 
village life. 
McDougal does not explicitly mention the control of natural resources as being a village 
affair, dealt with jointly by family heads; except in the case of the distribution of swiddens. 
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There is no indication for a traditionally institutionalised forest resource management; except 
for shifting cultivation. But in Kodipasa and in some other Juang villages, forest resources 
and their protection have in the meantime become a village affair, discussed during meetings 
in the majang. Decisions have been taken, rules have been designed, sanctions have been de-
cided and control systems have been outlined. I have shown that forest protection partly fails, 
due to the difficulties of implementing rules and regulations, of sanctioning wrongdoers and 
resolving conflicts effectively. However, the male villagers of Kodipasa have decided to use 
the majang as a forum for discussing the forest problems and looking for solutions. Without 
any external support or advise they have started to tackle the problem – which shows that 
there is not only an awareness among the villagers of the problem of the degrading forest but 
also a willingness to solve it. 
But what has been described in a general pattern of conflict resolution mechanisms by 
McDougal can be discerned with the issue of forest protection as well: the conflict between 
the various villagers, about village forest resources does not manifest itself openly. It is di-
luted, there are rumours and mostly hidden or general accusations: the men blame the women 
and vice versa, the rich blame the poor, the Juang blame the Gouda and the Gouda blame the 
Juang etc. On one hand conflicts over the forest are turned into private conflicts between indi-
viduals and withdrawn from the public domain. On the other hand, it may be that a conflict 
between individuals, which is not necessarily connected to the forest, may have negative con-
sequences for the protection system. So far, no villagers have been called to account for of-
fences against the rules and regulations. One reason for this could be that the cost for publicly 
resolving such a conflict is deemed to be rather high. In addition, an offence against the forest 
rules is not perceived to be that serious. 
It appears that the traditional political system, with regard to village affairs, is strong as 
long as there is broad consensus and voluntary fulfilment of duties and rules. However, the 
lack of a strong institutional body, with the authority and power to enforce rules, allows con-
siderable free reign for individuals to by-pass rules, without fear of serious reactions and con-
sequences. Gossip and rumours, as well as mutual accusations, are an indication that there are 
problems, but they do not go any way to solving them and they do not always fulfil the func-
tion of being “informal sanctions” as sketched by McDougal. One reason for the inefficiency 
of various forms of informal “sanctions” may be the fact that contemporary Juang society is 
composed of rather autonomous small social and economic units, mainly struggling for them-
selves, with few general forms of mutual help and cooperation.50 Thus non-cooperation, with 
regard to village forest protection, is difficult to sanction by non-cooperation in other do-
mains. 
The analysis of a conflict, that took place when we were in the village, shows some of 
these elements of sanctioning, but also illustrates the risks of a rather ineffective problem 
solving mechanism. At the same time, this conflict demonstrates the limited authority of the 
ritual leaders in the Juang community. 
The richest Juang in the village of Kodipasa, the Sarpanch ex officio, who was at the same 
time the assistant of the bwita, had taken a loan with interest from the village community. The 
money was provided from a fund that the villagers had raised to pay for a village festival. Not 
all of the money had been spent and the remainder had been given to the richest Juang house-
hold, whose head had applied for the credit and who was supposed to be able to repay the 
                                                           
50 I gained an impression, during my entire stay among the Juang, that their society was a rather ‘individualistic’ 
one, composed of small and independent families and households, characterized by a large degree of social 
autonomy and only loosely tied to other families and households. However, these households and families were 
not all equal; neither with regard to their economical assets nor their political power. 
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loan with interest. However, one year later, when the festival had to be planned and financed 
again, the money (5000 Rs. including interest) had not yet been paid back. In a meeting in the 
majang, the debtor was publicly reproached by one of the Gouda. The accused reacted an-
grily, stating that he would pay back the loan, but that he would decide when he would do 
this, and that the villagers could not force him to do so. Various households then refused to 
contribute to the collection for the next festival, so long as the money from the previous year 
was still due, although they were eager to perform their annual festival. A small letter was 
handed over to the debtor, with a demand for payment. This he ignored. There was gossiping 
about his behaviour, which was deemed unfair, but there was no open opposition or conflict.  
The conflict between this man and the villagers manifested itself in a different context. On 
the occasion of a public ritual, where he as odhikari acted as the assistant of the bwita, he 
scolded several of the Juang men, for arriving late at the ritual place. He reproached them for 
not taking the ritual seriously enough, which was to be performed to protect the village from 
roaming elephant herds. They felt offended and reacted by publicly reproaching him for em-
bezzling the money that the villagers had previously contributed towards the performance of 
the pus puni ritual. He denied these accusations and instead asked that the villagers contribute 
some money again so that the necessary ingredients for cooking the meat for the sacrifice, 
which would be distributed among the men, could be bought. His demand was refused and af-
ter a loud altercation between him and several of the Juang men, he finally left, telling the 
men to perform the ritual without him. In his absence he was publicly ridiculed by a middle-
aged Juang man who took the bottle of mahul (liquor) provided for the ritual and drank it in 
one go. He then refilled the bottle with water from the nearby rivulet, closed it again with 
some leaves and put it back with the other items that had been prepared for the ritual. At the 
same time he claimed to be able to inflict heavy stomachache upon the odhikari that would 
ultimately end in his death. Nobody opposed his behaviour and they were all amused to imag-
ine the priest returning to perform the ritual and to drink water instead of mahul. By interfer-
ing with the priest’s ritual drink and consuming it in such a profane manner, this Juang man 
demonstrated the limited authority of the village priest, who is dealt with in a rather pragmatic 
way and who cannot claim immunity. 
After some time there were half-hearted attempts by several of the men to bring the odhi-
kari back. As he refused to return, it was decided to perform the ritual without him, as he was 
only an assistant to the bwita. However, the female bwita had also left with the odhikari, as he 
had advised her to do so. As the ritual could not be performed without her, serious attempts 
were made to bring her back and finally she came and the ritual took place. In the meantime, 
the bottle filled with water had been refilled with mahul, by the same man that had emptied it, 
so that the ritual could be performed properly. 
However, the main conflict between the odhikari and the villagers had not been resolved 
and despite the villagers displaying their disapproval of him, he did not pay back the loan. 
The villagers knew that they had no effective means to force him to do so. He was rich and 
independent enough to afford a bad reputation and he just sat out the problem. There was no 
higher instance to be called to solve the problem. The villagers finally performed the annual 
festival much later than usual and with less money, due to the fact that some households re-
fused to pay their contribution. This incident added to the already damaged reputation of this 
man, but he did not care. It is not easy to ostracise a rich villager: to refuse cooperation with 
somebody who does not need it, is not an efficient sanction. And not every villager cares 
about having the reputation of being a good man. 
Interestingly, this conflict was handled in a very individualistic way by the villagers – the 
recently married son of the debtor was not involved in the conflict that the villagers had with 
his father. There were no indications of identifying the whole family with the family head.  
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5.5.3 Decision making 
On a daily basis, men meet more or less regularly in the majang; mainly in the morning and in 
the late afternoon or evening. However, such meetings are informal and according to the 
mood of the men; each man is free to sit and chat or alternatively to engage in his own daily 
affairs. These daily meetings keep the villagers informed about what is going on, both in and 
outside the village and they are the foundation for later decision-making if necessary. Thus, 
before a decision is made, the matter is discussed and views are exchanged for several days. 
Provided that consensus has been achieved during previous meetings, the decision may then 
finally be made quickly, without further discussion. If an immediate, or very important deci-
sion, which requires more deliberation is necessary, one or more additional sessions may be 
held and importance is given to the presence of all the family heads. But as writes McDougal 
(1962:374): 
“The informal and casual character of the proceedings cannot be over-emphasized. There is no discussion 
leader, no person who determines who is to speak first and who next. As soon as one man has finished, any 
other may speak. Leaders and men who make constructive comments are allowed to speak withouth hin-
drance, but other persons are frequently interrupted, especially if they have acquired a reputation for in-
dulging in irrelevant discourse. The more heated the discussion becomes, the less order or decorum exists, 
and the greater the number of interruptions. It may degenerate to a point where several persons are shouting 
simultaneously, each in an attempt to make himself heard. ”  
However, there is a tendency for leaders to dominate the discussion and to influence final de-
cisions: 
“The leaders do most of the talking, and make the first speeches, offering concrete suggestions and outlining 
particular courses of action. The various facets of the issue are usually elucidated and alternative solutions 
formulated by the leaders before others express their opinions. The later speeches are usually repetitions or 
elaborations of what the leaders have already said. In effect, what occurs in most cases is that the leaders 
reach an agreement among themselves which is then ratified by the majority” (1962:373). 
The discussion continues, as long as the leaders do not reach an agreement. The solution may 
be an alternative that emerges during discussion or a compromise. However, the decision 
must be a majority one: 
“...there must be agreement by the majority before it can be implemented. Once a resolution regarding collec-
tive action or community policy has been passed, all the family heads must abide by it, and are subject to the 
coercive sanctions exercised by the council” (ibid.). 
The decision making process may also result in a deadlock. The matter may then be dropped, 
without any action taken, or it may be discussed again in subsequent meetings. Temporary 
factionalism and in rare instances, a split in the community, may result if no agreement on a 
crucial matter can be reached (McDougal 1962:374). Such complex matters may be about 
whether, when and where to shift the village site. However, most village affairs that have to 
be addressed are of a routine, recurring and regular nature and as such, are decided without 
major or unsolvable conflicts. 
What McDougal describes, is still valid, to a considerable extent, forty years later. Routine 
village affairs are mostly connected to rituals or ceremonies and are handled in an informal 
manner. They are discussed not only in the majang and during formal meetings, but also by 
families, among neighbours, on the street and while working. In this way topics that are to be 
dealt with in the more formal meetings in the majang are prepared, opinions are made and de-
cisions suggested. After public discussion decisions in the majang may be made or may not. 
However, what McDougal documents as binding resolutions to be followed by the family 
heads, raises some doubts as to the effectiveness of the political institution of the majang, es-
pecially when dealing with village affairs that are out of the ordinary. Decisions may be 
FOREST POLICIES AND VILLAGE FOREST POLITICS 203 
 
taken, rules and regulations elaborated, even sanctions may be designed. However, the ques-
tions arise as to just how binding these decisions are and who is going to implement the sanc-
tions? It may well be that the male villagers find solutions and agreements and that they are in 
unison as to how to tackle a specific problem, but not everybody will carry these resolutions 
through, although they will not openly oppose them. The men that remain silent during the 
meetings as well as those men and women that are absent from them may try to avoid the de-
cisions that have been taken by the village council. Considering the weak authority of fathers 
over their sons, elder brothers over their younger brothers and the elderly over the young in 
general, the implementation of decisions and rules made in the majang is not self-evident. 
Neither is it self-evident that the women follow what has been decided by their men at the 
meetings. The problem not tackled by McDougal is the gap between what people say they 
will do and what they actually do; between the local model of politics and the practice of local 
politics. Villagers are able to explain how things should be done and they explain them as if 
they are done in this way. They explain for example, that a man who beats his wife will be 
called to the majang, where a meeting will be held and he will have to pay a fine. While being 
in the field, I observed that there were several conflicts between husbands and wives, mothers 
and sons, sons-in-law and mothers-in-law, but none of them were discussed in the majang. 
When analysing local village forest politics these issues come up quite clearly. The villag-
ers explained to me the rules and sanctions with regard to their village forest, which had been 
decided in the majang. However, when asked who and how many people have been punished 
for breaking these rules, it turned out that so far nobody had. 
The weakness of the forest protection system established by the villagers is partly due to 
the inefficiency of implementation, control and the sanctioning of rules and regulations that 
are decided at village meetings, as documented above. All of the villagers are aware of the 
problem of forest degradation and everybody agrees that measures need to be taken to protect 
the village forest. However, as has been said before, the forest protection system was initiated 
and promoted by several household heads whose opportunity costs for village forest protec-
tion are less than for the majority of the other households. Sanctions “exercised by the coun-
cil” do not take place and the committee of villagers that was established at the beginning of 
the forest protection system does not function.  
The fact that the village forest protection system does not work could be explained by rea-
sons other than political ones: villagers do not perceive that the problem of forest degradation 
is serious enough to pay the costs that are necessary for its protection. However, this is in con-
trast to their continued efforts, over the past few years, to protect their forest by different 
means and monitoring systems. They do not give up; forest degradation is a common issue in 
the village and the problem emerges again and again.  
The fact that those who break the rules are not punished, may be partially explained by a 
type of moral economy that exists within the village: several of the households are so depend-
ent upon wood selling as a means of income, that they would go hungry if they did not sell 
wood. However, if this were to be the main reason, villagers would make every effort to adapt 
the rules and the sanctions to the economic heterogeneity of the households. At the very least, 
there would be discussions to decide who would be punished and who would not. However, 
this does not happen. 
Thus I consider the main problem to be linked to two characteristics of local Juang politics: 
on one hand, the weak structures of authority and power of the majang and the various types 
of leaders in the village community and on the other, the policy of hidden conflicts. Decisions 
taken in the majang lack a strong binding force and only in combination with the willingness 
of individuals to obey such decisions are they followed. The fact that breaking the rules that 
relate to the village forest is not considered a serious offence of course contributes to the 
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loose handling of these rules. Other infringements that are taken more seriously, for example, 
are incestuous relationships: when such a case happened in Kodipasa, the villagers reacted 
immediately to restore the moral order. Routine decision making with regard to ritual affairs 
also does not pose problems, these are unquestioned necessities for keeping and maintaining 
the general well-being of the village and its inhabitants.  
The strategy of diluting conflicts rather than settling them is disadvantageous in the long 
run, particularly with the type of problems that are linked to the management of forest re-
sources. As long as personal conflicts between two individuals are kept at a low level, be-
cause the community either does not interfere at all or only does so in a rather indirect way, 
this strategy may reduce the danger of affecting the whole community. But if problems that 
concern the whole community are diluted in a similar way, they nevertheless do not stop af-
fecting the whole community.  
5.5.4 The Juang and the state  
The Juang were loosely integrated in the pre-independence political structure of the Hindu ra-
jas governing the kingdom of Keonjhar. It seems that they enjoyed considerable economic, 
political and cultural autonomy within their territory of hills and forests, an area that had been 
hardly opened up. On certain ritual occasions they made their reference to the raja, whom 
they acknowledged to be their king. Their status of subjects was reiterated in a rather sym-
bolic way. They paid tax and performed some services for the king and his officials. Occa-
sionally they had to reaffirm their recognition of the raja as the supreme ruler of the state and 
to maintain loyalty towards him. However, in their everyday life they managed their affairs 
independently and mainly at an individual village level. There were few administrative links 
to the state government; both the sardar and podhano fulfilled intermediary functions be-
tween the village communities and state officials. 
A document of agreement, which dates from the beginning of the 20th century, between the 
podhano of a Juang village from Jharkhand Juang Pirh and the Raja Sri King Gopinath Nara-
yan Bhanja Deo of Keonjhar together with the then British Superintendent J.H. Price (1919-
1928) indicates the type of relationship that existed between the Juang and the state. Parts of 
the kabuliyat (written agreement) are quoted below51: 
“We, Sri Paia Podhan, village Samagirhi, Jharkhand Juang Pirh, District Kendujhar, promise and write that 
we will follow this agreement:  
1. I, the Podhan from village Samagirhi, agree to collect 13 pahiri and 10 khandi mung, which per Cuttack 
measurement is equal to 15 seer and 17.5 mano of cupper cup as well as birhi, in Cuttack measurement 30 
seers and 15 copper pahire. This tax has been fixed and this tax I will collect and deposit in the king´s treas-
ury in the month of magho at once.   
2. Every year I will deposit one goat of one year and one goat of six month in the king’s government. 
3. We will deposit the following items at the following time at the following place: 120 brooms at the palace 
at the beginning of the year.  
4. If I will not deposit the above mentioned tax, the goats and the other things in scheduled time and place or 
only part of it, the price of paddy, mung, birhi will be fixed at the time of harvest and the price of the one 
year old goat will be 2 Rs. and the price of a six month old goat will be 1 Rp. and this amount will be col-
lected by auctioning my property.  
5. From this village I will collect from each household (...) pouti of any crops. From these crops 1 pouti will 
be deposited at Nizigarh Sri Baladevo Jiu´s storehouse and the remaining part I will keep for my expendi-
tures.  
                                                           
51 This document is with the Collectorate Keonjhar District. It is written in Oriya and was translated by my re-
search assistant. 
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6. I, with all the adult male members of my village, will do the following work without wage (beti):   
 
a) beti for the king:  
1) Every year in the month of phaguna we will be present with material for the construction of 3 roofs and 
one boundary roof.  
2) We will supply kuli to carry food for the king, the king’s family members, his managers, assistant manag-
ers, assistant officers and king´s lawyers or other state´s laywers any time they will come to or leave from 
Juangpirh. We will supply fuel wood, straw and leaves free of charge.  
3) Whenever the king or the above mentioned persons go out of this district, we will supply one kuli to carry 
their luggage. This kuli will only get food.  
 
b) beti for Nizigarh Sri Baladevo Jiu:  
1) We all the Juang, nayak, podhan with all people will supply 2 ropes for the chariot52.  
2) During the time of construction of the chariot, the Juang will provide one hut for the people constructing 
the chariots and one house for the blacksmith. The Juang will supply small ropes to pull up the wooden poles 
for the construction of the chariot. For this reason we will get food. 
 
c) all other types of beti:  
1) We will carry thatching grass, mai (?), small sticks and other material for the construction of the roof of 
one storehouse.  
2) If any officer of the British Government will visit Juang Pirh we will be responsible to provide kuli. We 
will supply foodstuff which is available in our village. The kuli we will provide will get food and the food-
stuff which we will supply will be given at the current rate. We will supply firewood, straw and leaves free of 
charge to the above mentioned officers. According to necessity we will provide a hut for them.  
3) We will not supply anything to outsiders at a higher than the local price. The crops we will harvest we 
may sell at our will. Every year, we, all the nayaks and podhanos of the whole Jharkhand Pirh will deposit 
the amount of 7 Rs. total plus the amount of 9 pouti mung per area giving 1 Rs. (...) in the storehouse of Ma-
haprabu (Beladevo Jeu).   
4) Every year in the month of Jaitra we, the nayaks with the podhanos of Juang Pirh will be present at the 
king´s palace in front of the king, the queen and the British saheb. We will give some gifts to the king´s man-
ager, the denan and we will get our salary.  
5) If there is any uprising or revolt against the king, we will not join. If we will see any sign of such an action 
we will inform the king´s government.  
6) We will obey any order of the king.  
7) Without the permission of the king we will not keep any person with gun, bombs and pistol. If we will 
keep such weapons we will inform the king´s government. We will be punished if we make some fault. 
8) If we want to settle outside the Juang Pirh, but within this district we have to take permission from the 
king´s government. Without permission from him we are not allowed to live in other areas.  
9) The deposits fixed in this kabulyat will be valid for 7 years (...)  
10) Whatever offense happens in our villages we will report to the police station or to the kacheri. If some 
mischievious person or some warranted person comes to our village we will not give him any shelter. As 
soon as possible we will inform at kacheri or police station. If any time some culprit comes to our village we 
will help to catch him. Any type of unusual death we will report to the police station. 
11) We will not go beyond this agreement. If we go beyond we will be dismissed from our office of podhano 
or sardar. We will accept any type of punishment. The power of any dismissed podhano will go back to the 
king who has full power to install another one.  
12) We will be bound to obey any forest rules and regulations in our Pirh.  
13) Without permission of the State we will not allow other community persons to live in our village.” 
Village taxes, free labour and services (beti) for the king, the state and his officers, many in 
connection with religious ceremonies (beti for god Nizigarh Sri Baladevo Jiu), recognition of 
the state’s superiority and confirmation of loyalty towards the state as well as recognition of 
territorial restrictions are the current aspects of this agreement. The emphasis on loyalty de-
                                                           
52 This refers to the great religious Rath Jatra festival, where the three deities Jagannath, Subhadra and Baladev 
are placed in a wooden chariot pulled by hundreds of devotees. 
206 FOREST POLICIES AND VILLAGE FOREST POLITICS 
 
manded from the Juang towards the king and state has to be seen against the background of 
two tribal uprisings in Keonjhar in the 19th century, illustrating the potential political power 
the tribal population could have under certain circumstances.  
5.5.4.1 Colonial era 
To analyse the relationship between tribal subjects and the colonial state, during the 150 years 
of British colonial politics in Keonjhar District, would go beyond the scope of this study. 
However, the description of a tribal uprising in the 19th century sheds some light on the politi-
cal dynamics between the various players in this princely state under British rule. The Juang 
participated in this uprising, but they were less prominent players than the Bhuiya. 
 
The Uprising of 1867-68 
The first tribal uprising under the leadership of Bhuiya sardars took place in 1867-68 and was 
caused by a disputed succession to the throne in the state of Keonjhar. Raja Gadadhar Bhanja, 
the native ruler of Keonjhar from 1839-1861 died in 1861 without a male heir. After his 
death, there were two rival claimants for the gadi (royal throne). The first was Dhanurjay, an 
illegitimate son by a concubine of the late Gadadhar Banja and the second was a grandson of 
the Raja of Mayurbanjh, who claimed that his grandson Brindaban had been adopted by 
Gadadhar Banja. The claim of Dhanurjay to the thrown was strongly opposed by the widow 
of the late Gadadhar Banja, Rani Pattamahadevi, who had no children. She supported the suc-
cession of Brindaban and among her followers, were not only her relatives, but also a large 
part of the tribal communities, including the Bhuiya and the Juang. The conflict over the suc-
cession of the appropriate Raja was further complicated by the fact, that the British authorities 
also had a say in matters of installation of successors in the tributary mahals of Orissa. They 
decided in favour of Dhanurjay and tried to persuade Rani Pattamahadevi to accept him as the 
legitimate successor. However, when in 1867, preparations were made to install Dhanurjay 
with all the necessary ceremonies, she carried out secret communications with the hill tribes, 
mainly the Bhuiya and the Juang. She threatened to leave the palace and Keonjhar in case of 
the arrival and installation of the young Raja Dhanurjay. The British authorities “expected 
that the Bhuyas and the Juangs would raise a disturbance if the Rani quitted the family house” 
(Cobden-Ramsay 1982:217). In comparison to the Juang, the Bhuiya’s role was crucial, inso-
far as they were more numerous and as “they claimed a right to install each Keonjhar Raja 
separately after their own fashion” (ibid.). Their refusal to accept the new Raja was a serious 
threat to the peace and order within the state and the British authorities tried to calm down the 
situation: 
“The Superintendent, therefore, directed his Assistant to proceed to Keonjhar and deliver a letter to the Rani, 
and also to explain to the hill chiefs that the Raja was desirous that the Rani should reside in the family 
house, but that, if she was determined to leave, she would be properly escorted wherever she pleased to go. 
On arriving at Keonjhar, the Assistant found that the agents of the Rani were fomenting dissaffection” (Cob-
den-Ramsay 1982:218). 
Constant rumours of opposition and of “large gatherings of hill-men in the neighbouring jun-
gles” continued and it was said that deputations passed between them and the Rani (Cobden-
Ramsay 1982:218). In December 1867, Superintendent Ravenshaw himself had a meeting 
with a joint party made up of the Bhuiya and the Juang. The Juang “promised to accept Dha-
nurjay; but the general result of the meeting was that no definite answer could be given, until 
both tribes had held a conference together.” (ibid.) Despite the opposition of the Rani, Super-
intendent Ravenshaw formally installed Dhanurjay “amidst the abuse of the Rani and her 
women. The ceremony was attended by many of the Juangs, but not by the Bhuiyas, and was 
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quite distinct from that of recognition by the hill tribes” (Cobden-Ramsay 1982:219). Follow-
ing the installation Ravenshaw toured the hills to try to convince the people to recognise Dha-
nurjay: 
“After a short while, he found that there was a manifest change in public opinion. (...) An important section 
of the community, known as the Saonts, also declared for Dhanurjay; the Juangs followed, and ultimately the 
bulk of the Keonjhar tribes gave in their adhesion. The Bhuyas, however, held out stoutly, being strongly un-
der the influence of Ratna Naik, who was said to have been bound by an oath not to desert the cause of the 
Rani. This opposition was of some importance, in consequence of the prescriptive right claimed by the 
Bhuyas, of confirming the installation of a new Raja by certain peculiar ceremonies. It was, however, ex-
pected that if the Rani could be quietly removed from Keonjhar to Puri, the Bhuyas would accept Dhanurjay” 
(ibid.). 
However, the Bhuiya did not give up their resistance and they armed themselves with bows, 
arrows and axes when the Rani finally left the palace and Keonjhar. The British then tried to 
solve the problem using force and they caught several hundreds of them, brought them to the 
Rani and asked her to give up her opposition, otherwise they threatened that other Bhuiya 
would also be captured and would have to bear the consequences for their actions. Under such 
conditions the Rani accepted to release the Bhuiya from their oath and finally agreed to con-
sent to the succession of Dhanurjay: 
“On the 13th February 1868 she was present at the installation of Raja Dhanurjay by the Bhuyas, and on the 
next day she conferred on the Raja a shiropa, or token of her acknowledgement of his succession. On the 
17th February 1868, the final ceremony of ‘first-offering’, in token of submission, was performed by the 
Bhuyas and Juangs. The Raja was seated on a low gadi of cushions in the outer courtyard, and received the 
people, who flocked in with music playing and garlands round their necks. Each Bhuya headman in succes-
sion kissed the foot of the Raja, and then pressed it to his forehead and ears. Offerings of pumpkins, plan-
tains, and grain were then presented, and salutations were exchanged. The Juangs followed the Bhuyas, and 
separately made offerings and address to the Raja. Each headman was then presented with a tusser silk turban 
and a suit of clothes; goats and fowls were provided, and the people celebrated the occasion with a general 
feast” (Cobden-Ramsay 1982:220). 
However, appearances were deceptive. Under the leadership of Ratna Naik, an influential 
leader of the Bhuiya, they broke into open insurrection towards the end of April: 
“(...) on 21 April 1868 Ratna Naik declared open revolt against the authority of the Raja. He organised an as-
sembly of the bhuyans, kols and juangs. In the assembly it was decided that they would not recognise Dha-
nurjay Bhanja as their Raja and would not obey his orders. Rather, they would revolt till they suceeded in in-
stalling Brundaban Bhanja in the gadi of Keonjhar. Any person of the Raja Dhanurjay Bhanja sent for a 
negotiation with the rebels, was either arrested or detained” (Mishra 1983:141). 
They plundered the bazaar at Keonjhar and abducted the Diwan (Revenue Minister) of the 
Raja, together with a hundred of his partisans. They disarmed the constables, dismounted the 
Raja’s guns and besieged the palace. They were joined by “all the wild clans (...) in the insur-
rection” (Cobden-Ramsay 1982:221) and the whole country was thrown into chaos. The in-
surgents gradually increased their numbers, until there were 20,000 (Mishra 1983:141) and 
they were joined by dissatisfied raiyats. After a period of more than three months, the tribal 
uprising was finally suppressed by British troops, together with military forces from neigh-
bouring states. Once the military presence of the British and the local authorities was too 
strong to defy openly, the tribal insurgents hid in the inaccessible jungles. Joint expeditions, 
comprising of a total of 2,200 sepoys and 13 officers participated in the persecution of the re-
bels (Mishra 1983:145). Their strategy was to capture the tribal ringleaders; most of whom 
were Bhuiya and some Juang. The persecution of the rebellious tribals in the forests also led 
to the burning of tribal villages. After the military suppression of the uprising, 183 prisoners 
were sent for trial. Seven ringleaders were sentenced to death, 27 were banished for life and 
the others were imprisoned for various periods (Mishra 1984:145). 
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Mishra mentions political, economic and administrative causes leading to the tribal rebel-
lion in Keonjhar in 1867-68. The immediate political reason was the installation, with British 
support, of a new Raja, against the will of the tribal population, mainly the Bhuiya. It appears 
that for a period of time, the widow of the late Raja successfully managed to gather tribal 
leaders for her cause. However, the exact reasons why they opposed Dhanurjay Bhanja are 
not clear and it would be too simple to assume that the opposing tribal population had purely 
been manipulated by the Rani for her personal political purpose. The fact that the conflict es-
calated after the Rani had finally given her consent to the installation of the new Raja, at least 
indicates that there were other motives involved than purely obedience towards the widow of 
the late Raja. It is possible that the tribal leaders perceived the intervention by the British 
authorities to settle the conflict about the successor to the throne as a sign that they were in 
danger of losing their influence and political autonomy. 
Economic and administrative reasons seem to have played a major role in causing the 
Bhuiya led uprising. According to Mishra (1983:139ff) since the middle of the 17th century, 
the Hindu Rajas of Keonjhar had made increasing demands for revenue and services from 
their subjects, including the the tribal population. Bethi, the system of free labour for the king 
and his officers was increased. Under the reign of Raja Laxmi Narayan Bhanja, the construc-
tion of a large Hindu temple (Balabhadraji) was initiated and free labour services were de-
manded from the subjects. In the second half of the 18th century, the struggle by Raja Balab-
hadra Bhanja (1762-97) to resist the invasion by the Marathas called for the strengthening of 
military forces: one of the strategies employed was to convert part of the Bhuiya pirhs into 
paikali tenures (land alienated for the paiks, the local militia holding the lands of the military 
chiefs or rajas by tenure of military service), as the Raja was in need of soldiers. The result of 
this was that these pirhs were then excessively taxed. This provoked resistance from the 
Bhuiya (Mishra 1983:140ff). At the beginning of the 19th century, Raja Janardan Bhanja made 
the first settlement of the estate (1803) details of which are not, however, available (ODG 
1986:249). Various taxes (plough tax, house tax) and bethi and maguns (subscriptions or 
cesses levied by the zamindar for special purposes) systems were retained. While such taxes 
were nothing new in the state, the settlement appears to have been an effort on the part of the 
Raja, to increase his control over his officers. Prior to the settlement the situation is described 
as follows: 
“In the former days there was no land settlement in the region forming the present district of Kendujhar. The 
revenue system was simply that of making certain demands upon the village headmen who were left to dis-
tribute the burden of the demand upon the cultivators in their villages in any manner they considered suitable. 
Probably each village was called upon to pay as much as it would bear and agreed to pay. But in those days 
cultivators were fewer than land available for cultivation. There was the possibility of cultivators oppressed 
by too heavy a demand throwing up their cultivation and shifting to other areas. Hence, this must be having a 
salutary check upon the capacity of the early rulers in fixing up any unreasonable demands” (ODG 
1986:249). 
During the 19th century, there were various complaints made by the Bhuiya, about the impos-
ing of illegal cesses by higher and lower revenue officers of the State, as well as the enforce-
ment of free labour for various work. The fact that during the uprising of 1867-68, the dewan, 
the revenue minister of the new Raja, was abducted and later killed while another hundred 
“oppressive officials of the Raja were carried off to the hills by the insurgents” (Mishra 
1983:141) suggests that administrative arbitrariness was probably a major cause of the unrest 
among the Bhuiya and other tribal communities. Shortly after the installation of the new Raja, 
Dewan Nanda Dhal “started oppressing the Bhuyan Sardars who had supported the cause of 
Brundaban. The Bhuyans suspected that the Dewan was organising a rule of tyranny at the 
connivance of the British officers” (ODG 1986:50). The increasing feeling of domination by 
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the king’s officers and the British authorities was in marked contrast to the perception of the 
Bhuiya as being the original inhabitants of the area. According to this perception they had 
themselves called the first king into their territory; a perception which was expressed in a 
symbolic way at the occasion of the instatement of a new king to the throne; he was to be car-
ried on the back of a Bhuiya as part of the ceremonies (Cobden-Ramsay 1982:214). 
There was a second tribal uprising in the princely state of Keonjhar between 1891 and 
1893. The Juang were again involved, but the tribal leaders belonged to the Bhuiyan commu-
nity. Political unrest of the tribal population was triggered by their dissatisfaction of the poli-
tico-administrative behaviour of the Raja and his officials who inter alia had required exces-
sive free services for the construction of a canal (Mishra 1983:150). After the beginning of 
the insurgence in 1891, the then Raja, Dhanurjay Narayan Bhanja, called for British support 
against his tribal subjects. In 1893 he fled to Cuttack. The British authorities took over the 
management of the state and the tribal uprising was finally ended with the help of troops un-
der British authority. The Raja returned to his palace in 1894. However, a high-ranking Brit-
ish officer was appointed to supervise the administration of Keonjhar for several years (ibid. 
162) and efforts were undertaken to tackle the causes of tribal unrest in this princely state. 
Both incidences illustrate the delicate political relationship between the state and its tribal 
subjects that was further complicated by the intervention of the British. The British authorities 
played an ambivalent role in supporting the Raja, as well as trying to address the causes of 
conflicts. 
5.5.4.2 After independence 
The history of the relationship between the State and the Juang before independence shows 
that there were elements of tribal autonomy, interdependence and state control in shifting po-
litical pre-colonial and colonial contexts. With regard to the period after independence, the 
degree of integration of the Juang into modern state structures has increased and there has 
been a certain loss in their autonomy, with regard to the control of natural resources such as 
land and forest in Juang area. In the context of the official tribal policy, the Juang together 
with other tribal communities are perceived as people who deserve special treatment for their 
development and ‘upliftment’. They come under the official category of a ‘scheduled tribe’ 
(ST), a concept linked to special policies designed to develop so-called ‘backward people’. 
The attitude of the state, together with its various institutions and officers, towards the Juang 
is oscillating between welfare and negligence and there are considerable variations between 
policies on paper and performance in reality. The Juang themselves partially adopt the attitude 
ascribed to them, as recipients of development aid and special treatment and in certain situa-
tions they refer to themselves as adivasi to claim support from the state. 
Generally, it can be stated that the control of the State over Juang resources has considera-
bly increased since independence and this has decreased the autonomy of the Juang over their 
area. With regard to forest policy, it has been shown how external control by the Forest De-
partment over the forests in Juang area has increased, since independence. This has certainly 
resulted in a loss of their previously higher degree of local autonomy, with regard to forest re-
sources. Although the tribals still have the right to sell fuel wood and timber, restrictions in 
reserved forests, together with stricter rules and regulations in protected forests, have limited 
the rights of the Juang to their forest resources. Most of the fuel wood and timber that they 
sell nowadays has been collected illegally; either by felling trees for fuel wood production, or 
the felling of protected species of tree (classified as ‘reserved’ trees) for timber . The once le-
gal method of selling timber to the Juang-Bhuiya depot is no longer possible. Although sanc-
tions are not strictly implemented by the Forest Department, the relationship between the 
Juang and the foresters is potentially conflicting. 
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State law also interfered with and changed the traditional land management system and 
land tenure, as has been analysed in chapter 3. The control by the Forest Department and the 
Revenue Department over natural resources in the Juang area has, in this way, considerably 
increased since independence, particularly during the settlement that took place during the 
1970s. The introduction of the Panchayat system and the administrative organisation of the 
Block Development, are modern ways of introducing new or replacing former methods of lo-
cal organization. They were primarily designed to develop people by using a top-down ap-
proach, rather than aiming to strengthen their local autonomy and active participation. Orga-
nization above village level was not a prominent feature of Juang society and culture in the 
past. However, strong local organization above village level would be necessary, in order to 
obtain or increase bargaining power vis-à-vis the state, its institutions and officers, who have 
become more present in the Juang area since independence.  
5.5.5 Inter-village affairs: Pirhs and Gram Panchayat 
Above the level of individual villages in the traditional context, Juang villages were organized 
as political units, which had their roots partly in the administrative structure of the pre-
independent Keonjhar state. However, according to McDougal they were “based on a tradi-
tional Juang grouping of neighbouring villages” (McDougal 1962:59). Before independence, 
western Keonjhar was divided into administrative units called pirhs; each pirh contained sev-
eral villages and was represented by a sardar, an official post created by the State. He was 
supposed to act as an intermediary between the group of villages in his pirh and the State. He 
was elected by the constituent villages and in Juang territory it was always a Juang that occu-
pied this post. However, within the traditional political structure of the Juang “the post of 
sardar conferred responsibility, but virtually no authority (...) The sardar had no direct sanc-
tions at his disposal and exercised no power by virtue of his formal role. He was the represen-
tative of his group, not an administrator” (McDougal 1962:61). His main duties were to col-
lect annual taxes and deliver them to the tahsildar; the State’s collection agent. On certain 
occasions, representatives from all of the Juang villages paid homage to the king in his palace 
at Keonjhar. The king or his officials would then exchange greetings and gifts with the vari-
ous sardars as representatives of the village groups. In cases where the king or any important 
officials visited the Juang hills, it was the responsibility of the sardar to make the necessary 
arrangements for such visits; although these were rare (McDougal 1962:61). 
The pirh as an indigenous political institution of neighbouring Juang villages that regulated 
inter-village affairs, operated in a manner similar to the village council, although meetings 
were less frequent and only according to needs. The pirh council was restricted to dealing 
with political affairs; there were no articulated economic or ritual ties binding the individual 
villages of a pirh. The pirh council was mainly assembled to settle matters of incest and adul-
tery, as well as deal with conflicts involving members of different communities, which could 
not be resolved by the two villages. Very broadly expressed: 
“A pirh council may be convened to take action in any case which is considered a threat to the solidarity of 
the territorial unit, or disruptive to the equilibrium of the system of relationships among its component vil-
lages. If a certain village is considered responsible, the others may impose sanctions to insure that social or-
der is restored; a pirh council may be called on the initiative of the leaders of any village which considers it-
self affected” (McDougal 1962:390). 
Once a pirh council was convoked, any family head from any village belonging to the pirh 
could decide to join the meeting and to discuss the case. There were no officially or formally 
appointed delegates. The procedure described by McDougal resembles that of the village 
council: 
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“When all the delegates have arrived, the proceedings are informally opened. Just as informal leaders are 
recognized among the family heads of different villages, the more influental of these are acknowledged as 
leaders at the pirh level, and are styled as podhanki. They play the major part in conducting the case” 
(McDougal 1962:388). 
For settling a case, the pirh council had to be compensated for by providing a feast at the ma-
jang for the delegates in the evening. Compensation had to be paid by those persons including 
their villages who had caused the dispute. The offenders could be fined in cash and kind 
(stock, rice and money), according to their means.  
McDougal mentions the following cases, which provoked the convocation of a pirh coun-
cil: 
1) Incestuous relations  
2) Adultery between members of two different villages 
3) Conflicts between members of two villages (physical violence, curse, witchcraft) 
4) Conflicts between groups of villagers, e.g. during marriage ceremonies which may have 
led to fights 
 
McDougal does not mention any territorial conflicts, or the regulation of conflicts over natu-
ral resources as a matter for pirh councils. “Disputes over land, especially those concerning 
the traditional boundaries between two villages,” are mentioned by Nayak et al. (1993:45) as 
affairs to be regulated by the pirh council. According to them, “land disagreements within an 
individual village, as concerning re-allocation of land for shifting cultivation or other work” 
are considered cases for the pirh council, something not mentioned by any other author. N. 
Patnaik also mentions disputes over village boundaries as matters for the pirh council 
(1989a:62). However, according to Rout “Disputes concerning land are difficult to be decided 
in the village level, and very often such cases are brought to the Court of Law for judgement” 
(1969:86). 
Contemporary Juang villages are (as all villages) officially organized into so-called Gram 
Panchayat units, which are composed of several villages. Kodipasa Gram Panchayat com-
prises ten villages with a total population of 3,329, according to the 1991 census. These ten 
villages are mainly inhabited by the Juang, but include a considerable number of other tribals 
and non-tribals. 
A Gram Panchayat is considered to be “the primary unit in the democratic decentralisa-
tion” by the government. This administrative system was established in Orissa (as in other 
parts of India) one year after Independence, with the introduction of the Orissa Grama 
Panchayat Act in 1948. The aim was to “establish and develop local self-Government in the 
village communities and to make better provision for their administration” (ODG 1986:334). 
In 1954-55, the Grama Panchayat administration was extended all over the district of Keon-
jhar and covered all of the villages. Later these institutions were governed by the Orissa 
Grama Panchayat Act of 1964. Each Gram Panchayat is divided into a number of wards. A 
panchayat ward member, who is elected on the basis of adult franchise by his constituents, 
represents each ward. The head of the Gram Panchayat is the Sarpanch, who is elected by the 
voters of the Gram Panchayat. The functions of the Gram Panchayat are described as fol-
lows, in the Orissa District Gazetteer (1986:334): 
“The Grama Panchayats continue to function as the main agency for the implementation of all development 
works and for mobilising manpower in rural areas. Development activities of different Departments of the 
Government which are co-ordinated at the Block level also continue to be executed through the agency of the 
Panchayats.  
The functions of the Grama Panchayat include looking to village sanitation, aiding schools, supplying of 
drinking water, maintenance of roads and wells, ferry ghats, cattle pounds, providing street lights and imple-
menting different agricultural schemes.” 
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Between six and ten Gram Panchayat units together constitute a Panchayat Samiti, the next 
administrative level of local self-government and administration. A Panchayat Samiti covers 
the same area as the so-called Block; an administrative unit created by the Community Devel-
opment Department for the purpose of development. The planning, execution and supervision 
of all the development programmes in the Block area are carried out by the respective 
Panchayat Samitis. 
Although designed as institutions of local self-government, in reality this political body has 
rather limited potential for local self-government. The Panchayat system is mainly used to 
implement projects and programmes through a top-down approach; programmes and projects 
that are decided by various government departments. Local self-government of the villages of 
a Gram Panchayat is in many cases further restricted by the scarcity of financial means.53  
The Gram Panchayat as an organizational structure beyond village level could be used to 
frame a local forest policy; to coordinate the rules and regulations between neighbouring vil-
lages that are using the same forest areas for their needs, but also with regards to outsiders. 
However, such cooperation between villages would require the strengthening of panchayat 
units, together with the backing of forest protection efforts at Block level and the coordination 
of a local forest policy, with the Forest Department. 
5.6 Collective action for the management of village forest 
So far, I have described how the villagers of Kodipasa, by means of collective action, have 
tried to get the problem of degrading village forest under control and the difficulties that they 
have faced in trying to successfully manage it as a common property resource. The analysis of 
the political system and institutions of the Juang in general and in the two villages in particu-
lar, indicates the chances and risks involved in the local institutional setting to solve the prob-
lems of managing the village forest as common property. 
Based on census data, together with my own observations and discussions with villagers, I 
will in the following section firstly, crosscheck how far the project of village forest protection 
in Kodipasa fulfils the design principles of Becker and Ostrom (Becker and Ostrom 1995; Os-
trom 1997 and 1999) for a successful common property regime. Secondly, I will consider the 
variables that Becker and Ostrom (1995) suggest are conducive to the selection of norms, 
rules and property rights that reduce externalities of collective action for the management of 
common pool resources as common property. 
5.6.1 Ostrom’s design principles 
By design principle Ostrom means an “essential element or condition that helps to account for 
the success of (...) institutions in sustaining the common pool resource and gaining the com-
pliance of generation after generation of appropriators to the rules in use” (1997:90). “These 
principles work to enhance the shared understanding of participants of the structure of the re-
source and its appropriators and of the benefits and costs involved in following a set of 
agreed-upon rules” (1999:9). She discriminates between “robust”, “fragile” and “failed” self-
governed common pool resource institutions. Robust, long-term institutions are characterized 
                                                           
53 Thus the annual income of Kodipasa Gram Panchayat from 1996-1999, for example was as follows: 1996-
1997:16,243 Rs. (100 Rs. = 2.7 CHF) / 1997-1998: 11,749 Rs. / 1998-1999: 23,052 Rs. 
Expenditure of Gram Panchayat units are higher than their income, because through development projects by 
the State they get additional support – however, being the recipients of support and development, participation 
and local self-government are restricted. 
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by most of the design principles listed below. Fragile institutions are characterized by only 
some of these design principles while failed institutions are characterized by only a few (Os-
trom 1999:9). Ostrom takes into account conditions that refer to attributes of the resource, but 
also conditions that refer to attributes of the appropriators. 
 
1. Clearly defined boundaries: 
“The boundaries of the resource system (e.g. groundwater basin or forest) and the individuals or households 
with rights to harvest resource products are clearly defined” (Becker & Ostrom 1995:119). 
The boundaries of the village forest in Kodipasa are clearly defined and not disputed. It is 
equally clear that all of the households in the village are recognized as belonging to the local 
user group. Outsiders from other villages are excluded. The fact that the Forest Department is 
not formally involved in the village forest protection activities, is a factor of uncertainty: any 
change in the official forest policy and the implementation of its rules might be of concern for 
the protected village forest. However, to date, the Forest Department plays neither a positive 
nor a negative role in the management of the village forest. 
 
2. Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs: 
“Rules specifying the amount of resource products that a user is allocated are related to local conditions and 
to rules requiring labour, materials, and/or money inputs” (Becker & Ostrom 1995:119). 
The allocation of “benefits” is not clear; rules regarding the quantity of timber for construc-
tion for own needs are vague and there is considerable individual free-play. Households with 
little or no need for timber for their own use would like to harvest the same amount of timber 
as other households, in order to have the same benefit from the village forest. This is clearly 
voiced, for example by the poorer Juang who accuse the wealthier Gouda households of using 
too much timber from the village forest for house construction, or by the non-cultivating 
households that feel that they are disadvantaged by the cultivators that use timber for agricul-
tural purposes (to construct ploughs, stables, and storage). Rules that state that products from 
the protected village forest should only be for household use and should not be sold, are diffi-
cult to monitor and not necessarily equitable, as the needs of the households vary. A possible 
way to solve this problem would be to periodically allocate a restricted quantity of timber to 
each household54 It would then be up to the individual household to decide whether to use this 
timber for their own needs, whether to sell it, or to use it for any other purpose. So long as 
each household were to spend the same amount of time patrolling the village forest, they 
would all get the same amount of resources out of it. 
Allocation of fuel wood per household, has so far not been an issue in discussions about 
the management of the village forest: the only rules with regard to fuel wood are that no trees 
                                                           
54 Ostrom refers to a study by Netting of the Swiss village of Törbel, where the distribution of timber from the 
village forest combines aspects of fairness, monitoring and low transaction costs: “(...) residents of Törbel (...) 
who own communal land spend time governing themselves. Many of the rules they use, however, keep their 
monitoring and other transaction costs relatively low and reduce the potential for conflicts. The procedures used 
in regard to cutting timber – a valuable resource unit that can be obtained from communal forests – illustrates 
this quite well. The first step is that the village forester marks the trees ready to be harvested. The second step is 
that the households eligible to receive timber form work teams and equally divide the work of cutting the trees, 
hauling the logs, and piling the logs into approximately equal stacks. A lottery is then used to assign particular 
stacks to the eligible households. No harvesting of trees is authorized at any other time of the year. This proce-
dures nicely combines a careful assessment of the condition of the forest with methods for allocating work and 
the resulting products that are easy to monitor and are considered fair by all participants” (Ostrom 1997:65). See 
also Netting (1995:175-177). 
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should be felled for fuel wood and that only dead wood should be collected. The fact that the 
village forest is used for the collection of firewood increases the problem of monitoring; who-
ever enters the village forest may break this rule. The cost for the households initially is in the 
time spent patrolling the village forest. However, the weakness of the monitoring system re-
sults in an unequal balance of costs and benefits; those who do not patrol at all, or do not do 
so properly, are not sanctioned, but they save time, which they can spend for other activities 
and for their own personal use. 
Moreover, opportunity costs are not evenly distributed: there is little doubt that restricted 
and regulated use of the village forest affects all households, but in different ways. This is 
connected to the varying degree of dependence that each household has on wood selling, as 
demonstrated in previous chapters. Even if the benefits from the village forest were to be dis-
tributed in an egalitarian way among all of the households, the costs of protecting the forest 
are higher for the poorer households: their labour input for patrolling the village forest is the 
same as that of the wealthier households, but they bear the additional cost of looking for tim-
ber and fuel wood in more distant areas. If local conditions were to be taken into considera-
tion, this could mean that the rules could be designed, in such a way that more benefits could 
be assigned to the poorer households; however, it is unlikely that the wealthier householders 
would agree to protect the village forest partly for their poorer neighbours in the village.  
 
3. Collective-choice arrangements: 
“Most individuals affected by harvesting and protection rules are included in the group who can modify these 
rules” (Becker & Ostrom 1995:119). 
Several aspects point to some weaknesses with regard to that condition. To date, decisions in 
Kodipasa have been taken during meetings in the majang; a political institution rooted in 
Juang society and culture.  
a) As women are excluded from the majang, and harvesting and protection rules to date, have 
been mainly decided at such male meetings, the local collective-choice arrangements are 
vulnerable to forms of “passive resistance” by women, who are a very important user 
group of the forest, as collectors of fuel wood for their own needs and as wood sellers. It is 
probably the poorest women that bear the highest opportunity costs for village forest pro-
tection.  
However, some Juang women were passive participants at the periphery of the meetings 
that I observed and they were therefore informed as to what went on. The majang is not a 
secretive place and what is discussed there, is easily understood by the women who are as-
sembled within earshot of the meetings. When discussing matters of the village forest with 
them, they were as knowledgeable as the men. Moreover the women share a gendered po-
litical ideology that village affairs are to be decided by men.55  
Women are, to varying degrees, affected by village forest protection. They are not directly 
involved in patrolling the forest; although male members of their households are. As pro-
viders of fuel wood for household use, most tribal women are interested in having a forest 
nearby that provides sufficient fuel wood for their needs. This issue is not of direct concern 
to the Gouda women, as it is the male members of their households that collect the fuel 
wood from the forest.   
                                                           
55 According to Agarwal (1997:26) in tribal or hill communities “social constructions of acceptable female be-
haviour, notions about male and female spaces, and assumptions about men’s and women’s capabilities and ap-
propriate roles in society” constrain women’s participation in emergent community institutions for forest man-
agement even without formal exclusion.  
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Tribal women that are either widows or members of poor households are highly dependent 
upon selling firewood for their income and the protection of the village forest forces them 
to go further afield to get the necessary resources.  
Many women are caught in the dilemma of having a conflict of interests when it comes to 
forest resources: on one hand there is the vital need to keep the village forest for the future, 
as to have a forest nearby from which to collect firewood for household purposes reduces 
their work. On the other hand, the possibility of getting some cash by selling firewood 
from the village forest, is an incentive that is not easy to resist. Thus, the women will, un-
der certain circumstances break the rules, which they, like the men, welcome in theory. 
Several of the villagers informed us, that the first people to have started breaking the rules, 
in the protected village forest were: old women, widows and other poor women. Whether 
this was true could not be determined. However, it was obvious that the women, once the 
control system failed, participated in getting forest resources “freely” and they understood 
only too well, that what was not taken by them, would be taken by somebody else, sooner 
or later. 
b) The institution of the majang is based on the informal leadership of men, especially mar-
ried household heads and elder men: individuals that remain silent or do not give their con-
sent to resolutions, do not necessarily put them into practice. Thus, both boys and unmar-
ried men that are called to patrol the village forest do not necessarily have an interest in 
village forest protection, or do not perceive that there is any benefit to them for investing 
their time in this way. Unless linked with concrete sanctions, such resolutions are not nec-
essarily binding. 
c) Although non-Juang men are not excluded from meetings in the majang, they are rather 
reticent to participate in this traditional Juang institution. A weak degree of integration of 
non-Juang immigrants into the traditional political institution of the majang lowers the ef-
fectiveness of decisions taken there. However, the example of Gouda men shows that it is 
possible for non-Juang men to become part of the local political institution of the majang. 
 
4. Monitoring:  
“Monitors, who actively audit physical conditions and user behaviour, are at least partially accountable to the 
users and/or are the users themselves” (Becker & Ostrom 1995:119). 
The monitoring system in Kodipasa is obviously weak. The fact that monitors are users them-
selves, in this case is not always advantageous, but also part of the problem: while patrolling 
the forest the monitors may break the rules by helping themselves to the resources or if they 
meet somebody who is breaking the rules, they may take no action, as they know that they 
have done the same, which makes them much more lenient. Moreover, the accountability of 
rotating monitors to users who themselves are monitors from time to time is difficult to put 
into practice. The fact that villagers should control each other, both as users and monitors im-
plies potential conflict, which increases the social costs of village forest protection. 
There is another problem that arises from “monitoring the monitors” with regard to the 
stick rotation system: who checks if somebody really goes to patrol when it is his turn? At 
what time do the monitors go and when do they come back? What happens if the stick is no 
longer rotating? Although the stick rotation system does not function properly, at least spo-
radic discussions in the majang make it work occasionally and to a certain extent reduce the 
degree of unregulated use of the village forest. Outsiders are at least kept out of the village 
forest and villagers that cut timber and firewood there, may be observed by the patrol and re-
minded that the village forest is protected.  
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5. Graduated sanctions: 
“Users who violate rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context 
of the offense) from other users, from officials accountable to these users, or from both” (Becker & Ostrom 
1995:119). 
Sanctions are not implemented, neither for violation of the rules governing the use of the vil-
lage forest nor concerning the monitoring system. One reason why this is the case is that a 
type of moral economy exists within the village. It is well known that some households de-
pend very much on the sale of timber and firewood and if they were denied the opportunity to 
sell them, they would suffer from hunger. However, there are no efforts made to adapt rules 
and sanctions to the economic heterogeneity of the households. Another reason why sanctions 
are not implemented is also linked to the fact, that breaking rules with regard to forest use is 
not, as yet, considered to be a serious offence. 
 
6. Conflict resolution mechanism: 
“Users and their officials have rapid access to low-cost, local arenas to resolve conflict among users or be-
tween users and officials (Becker & Ostrom 1995:119). 
The once established forest protection committee did not function and thus, there are no ap-
pointed officials responsible for dealing with forest conflicts within the village. The local 
arena of conflict resolution is the majang. 
There are conflicts due to the village forest and its resources in the form of mutual accusa-
tions and suspicions, verbal aggression and non-cooperation. However, these conflicts are 
kept at a low level and are dealt with in a rather informal way. There are no serious efforts 
made at a village level to settle them, or remove the causes of these conflicts. It appears that 
the cost of handling such matters locally are too high for the villagers. As shown in chapter 
5.5.2 this pattern of conflict management strongly resembles traditional patterns of conflicts 
among the Juang. 
Other villagers such as the Munda, Gouda and Santal respect the Juang as being the origi-
nal inhabitants of the area and thus refrain from picking a quarrel with them over forest re-
sources. 
Although local institutions of conflict resolution with regard to village forest protection 
fail, villagers are not willing to involve outsiders, such as the Forest Department in local con-
trol of conflicts. There is no trust in officials from the Forest Department; moreover they also 
consider the cutting of timber and firewood in other forest areas to be illegal. 
 
7. Minimal recognition of right to organize: 
“The rights of users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities, 
and users have long-term tenure rights to the resource” (Becker & Ostrom 1995:119). 
So far, the institution of the majang has not been jeopardized by the State and the government 
has not interfered with locally designed institutions over matters relating to the management 
of the village forest. But the long-term rights with regard to the village forest are not clear. 
There is currently no formal cooperation between the foresters and the villagers and therefore 
the villagers have no secure long-term tenure rights to village forest. Classified on the one 
hand as village forest, it belongs to the village. However, the land belongs to the Revenue 
Department, the forest vegetation to the Forest Department and what will finally happen to 
the protected village forest will depend upon the official forest policy, its laws and regulations 
and their implementation. 
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8. Nested enterprises: 
“Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are orga-
nized in multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Becker & Ostrom 1995:119). 
This is not the case, although the village forest of Kodipasa is de jure under the joint control 
of the Forest and Revenue Departments.  
The lack of integration of surrounding forest areas and interior villages in sustainable for-
est management relativise local forest protection activities. Costs for village forest protection 
are externalised and pressure on forest resources in interior areas whose protection is linked to 
higher costs increase. 
Analysing the situation in Kodipasa using these design principles, points more to “fragile” 
rather than successful and sustainable institutions of forest management. The repeated break-
down of the new village forest protection system is caused by a combination of economic and 
political reasons. That, at least some of the villagers, are reluctant to pay the costs involved in 
monitoring, either by paying others who patrol the forest in kind, or by spending their time 
carrying out the monitoring themselves, may to some extent be explained by economical fac-
tors; villagers have to ‘pay’ for the forest resources, which in the past they got for free: now 
they have to spend their time making rules and regulations, monitoring the forest and resolv-
ing conflicts. Moreover, there are no immediate benefits to protecting the village forest. While 
such short-term calculations are part of the problem, it would be too hasty to assume that vil-
lagers are not capable of making decisions that are based on long-term considerations. To as-
sume that local forest protection does not work because the villagers do not perceive it as a 
serious enough problem that requires solving is also not convincing, as the villagers have tried 
for years to address this issue.  
I rather assume that non-cooperation in paying the costs for forest protection results from 
the political weakness of the system: the weakest points in the villager’s efforts are related to 
collective choice arrangements, monitoring, sanctions and conflict resolution mechanisms. In 
chapter 5.5 it has been shown that these difficulties are linked to the general political system 
of the Juang, which also provides the framework for organizing the management of the vil-
lage forest.  
Using the above design principles as the basis for their arguments, Becker and Ostrom pos-
tulate a set of preconditions for the making and implementation of successful and sustainable 
common property resource management systems. They refer to the selection of norms, rules 
and property rights.  
5.6.2 Selection of norms, rules and property rights 
According to Becker and Ostrom (1995:123-124), the success of a collective management of 
common pool resources systems is favoured by the selection of norms, rules and property 
rights that reduce externalities. In this section, variables conducive to the selection of favour-
able institutions are evaluated with regard to the situation in Kodipasa.  
 
1. Information: 
“Accurate information about the condition of the resource and expected flow of benefits and costs are avail-
able at low cost” (Becker and Ostrom 1995:123-124). 
This variable is closely linked to design principle 2, which refers to costs and benefits. Villag-
ers are aware of the general value of the forest as a provider of various non-timber forest 
products, fuel wood and timber. They also know that the degrading village forest is linked to 
the need to increase labour by means of having to travel further afield in order to get fuel 
wood and timber. This information is available to everybody at low cost. However, there is no 
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detailed assessment of the ecological condition of the village forest and its productivity, 
which is of course linked to aspects of costs and benefits. Villagers do not have accurate in-
formation that informs them of the sustainable harvest rate that would allow the village forest 
to regenerate. Thus, the current allocation of timber (harvest rate) for the users is not neces-
sarily attuned to the conditions that would be necessary for sustainable management of the 
forest. It is possible that even the felling of trees other than Sal to get timber for household 
needs, is no longer sustainable under current conditions. But the villagers do not consider im-
posing a total ban on tree felling in the village forest until it has started to recover.56  
Once fully recovered, sustainable timber and fuel wood harvest rates would have to be 
fixed. It is possible that the village forest is too small to fulfil the basic subsistence needs of 
the villagers. However, it may also be possible that, once fully recovered, the forest would 
yield additional timber and fuel wood for sale. But the villagers do not know if and when this 
will be the case and how much they would benefit individually per household once the forest 
had recovered. 
While villagers are well aware of the general material benefits that are to be obtained from 
the forest, with regard to timber and fuel wood, other aspects relating to the forest such as wa-
ter balance, soil erosion and the local climate are rarely mentioned and such environmental 
“benefits” are not of high priority in the local cost benefit analysis.  
 
2. Homogeneity: 
“Participants are relatively homogeneous in regard to asset structure, information, and preferences” (Becker 
and Ostrom1995:123-124). 
Due to the vagueness of the term “relatively” this variable is difficult to check: with regards to 
the asset structure, I have shown that there is a considerable variation between the individual 
households and groups, with respect to access to land and the dependency on wood selling 
and other sources of income. However, despite these differences, most households belong to 
the group of marginal and small farmers and thus may be considered rather homogeneous. 
Concerning information with regard to the actual state of the forest resources, there are no dif-
ferences among the households. Preferences with regard to forest resources vary according to 
the economic situation of a household as well as to ethnic groups as analysed in chapter 4. 
However, the importance of having firewood and timber for their own use is shared by all vil-
lagers, thus the future provision of these forest resources is the smallest common denomina-
tor. One of the problems is the higher opportunity costs for the poorer households in compari-
son to the more affluent ones. 
Thus, all villagers share common interests – this helps to make efforts to protect the village 
forest. But at the same time differences among the villagers renders forest protection diffi-
cult.57 
 
                                                           
56 Moreover, if nobody were to be allowed to fell any trees in the village forest during a restricted period, super-
vision and control of the forest would be easier. 
57 The same as the factor of group size, the factors of homogeneity or heterogeneity respectively are also con-
tested: “Many scholars conclude that only very small groups can organize themeselves effectively, because they 
presume that size is related to the homogeneity of a group and that homogeneity is needed to initiate and sustain 
self-governance” (Ostrom 1999:12). However, heterogeneity of user groups does not always impede successful 
management of common property resources: “Neither size nor heterogeneity are variables with a uniform effect 
on the likelihood of organizing and sustaining self-governing enterprises. (...) Instead of focusing on size or the 
various kinds of heterogeneity by themselves, it is important to ask how these variables affect other variables as 
they impact on the benefit-cost calculus of those involved in negotiating and sustaining agreements” (ibid.). 
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3. Common understanding: 
“Participants share a common understanding about the potential benefits and risks associated with the con-
tinuance of the status quo as contrasted with changes in norms and rules that they could feasibly adopt” 
(Becker and Ostrom 1995:123-124). 
All villagers have a common understanding of the risks involved if the use of the village for-
est was to continue in an uncontrolled manner: nearby forest products would cease to be 
available and an increase in labour would be necessary for obtaining them from more distant 
areas. This latter problem is a recurrent issue in discussions about the forest with the villagers. 
Everyone, irrespective of their gender, ethnic identity and economic situation is interested in 
having forest resources nearby. The group of households who were responsible for initiating 
the village forest protection scheme were not dependent upon the commercial use of forest re-
sources, but were mainly interested in having a nearby source of fuel wood and timber for 
their own use. However, for the remaining households new norms and rules that restrict ac-
cess to the village forest for commercial purposes are linked with a comparatively larger loss 
of income. 
 
4. Social capital: 
“Participants share generalized norms of reciprocity and trust that can be used as initial social capital” 
(Becker and Ostrom 1995:123-124). 
This condition is only partially fulfilled in the case of the village under study. This is partly to 
do with the heterogeneity of the various groups in the village, which is characterised by im-
migration and ethnic heterogeneity.  
But social capital is also rather limited within the socio-economic and political structure of 
Juang society in general. Community based activities among the Juang focus more on politi-
cal and ritual than on economic activities; with the exception of shifting cultivation and cattle 
grazing. The main socio-economic unit is the household. Forest resources have so far been 
used mainly at an individual household level. To use them in a commonly regulated way is a 
rather new concept for the Juang. 
 
5. Group size: 
“The group using the resource is relatively small and stable” (Becker and Ostrom 1995:123-124). 
Again, the term “relatively” makes it difficult to check this variable. Considering the size of 
the village forest, the village community is not too large; the village forest is nearby, it can be 
surveyed without too much effort and there are enough households to share the work con-
nected with forest protection.58  
Apart from a few new settlers and the natural growth in the local population, the village 
population as a user group is rather stable. 
However, there are two reasons why it may be de doubtful that small groups are beneficial 
for reducing externalities59. Social proximity by links of kinship and close neighbourhood on 
                                                           
58 Each household has to provide about 8 man days of work a year for patrolling, if the village forest is to be pa-
trolled every day. 
59 The interrelation of group size and solving problems of collective action is unclear for other reasons as well. 
According to Ostrom “(...) one of the problems with a focus on size of group as a key determining factor is that 
many other variables change as group size increases. (...) Since there are tradeoffs among various impacts of size 
on other variables, a better working hypothesis is that group size has a curvilinear relationship to performance” 
(1999:11). 
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the one hand may be an incentive for avoiding conflicts over the village forest, i.e. one would 
avoid accusing the other of breaking rules and regulations. This happens for example with the 
monitors patrolling the forest. On the other hand, any conflict due to the village forest may 
easily be linked to conflicts which have nothing to do with the forest. Or, any other conflict 
may be linked to the forest issue – as in the case of disputing neighbours who are not willing 
to patrol the village forest together. Social control in a face-to-face community does not nec-
essarily reduce transaction costs and local conflict arenas may not be the best place to deal 
with villagers breaking the rules with regard to village forest. Thus support and enforcement 
of locally designed operational rules by external authorities may be an important point. 
 
6. Discount rate: 
“Participants do not discount the future at a high rate” (Becker and Ostrom 1995:123-124). 
When looking at the future of village forest resources, there is a contradictory perceptional at-
titude among the villagers. They are all aware that they and their families will suffer without 
the village forest, or any other forest and their efforts to protect the village forest are an indi-
cator of that fear. Conversely, it is difficult for the villagers to imagine that the forest would 
ever disappear, although they already realise that they have to spend an increasing amount of 
time searching for what they require; especially timber and fuel wood. 
The discount rate with regard to forest resources varies, depending upon the economic op-
portunities and alternatives within the households. Thus, it is important to consider the dis-
count rate of the future, not only with regard to the forest, but to other economic activities as 
well. For the very poor people with little or no land, that live from hand to mouth, there is lit-
tle choice of a high or low discounting rate of their future; they just try to survive by selling 
timber and wood. The wealthier households can afford to discount the future, with regard to 
the forest, at a lower rate, as they can manage with other sources of income. In addition, some 
of the Juang discount the future in agriculture at a high rate, as they shift to more intensive 
commercial forest use. 
 
7. Autonomy: 
“Participants have the autonomy to make many of their own operational rules, which if made legitimately, 
will be supported and potentially enforced by external authorities” (Becker and Ostrom 1995:123-124). 
With regard to village forest protection, the villagers have so far created their own operational 
rules without checking with or seeking the legitimacy of the state or the Forest Department. 
Support and enforcement of their own operational rules by external authorities therefore does 
not take place. 
The villagers’ efforts to protect the village forest are partly congruent with the policy of 
Joint Forest Management. However, in order to become a legally accepted Joint Forest Man-
agement project, the villagers would have to change part of their operational rules and coop-
erate with the Forest Department. 
 
8. Collective-choice rules: 
“Participants use collective-choice rules that fall between the extremes of unanimity or control by a few (or 
even bare majority), and thus they avoid high transaction or high deprivation costs” (Becker and Ostrom 
1995:123-124). 
The analysis of the traditional Juang system of the majang in chapter 5.5.2 hints at the prob-
lems of collective choice rules of this traditional political institution. The fact that this local 
institution exists does not automatically mean that it may solve new problems, such as the one 
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of degrading forests. Furthermore, the fact that new groups have migrated into the Juang area 
implies possible problems with the integration of these new groups into this traditional politi-
cal institution and the need to create new forms of collective choice. 
The lack of integration of women into the majang, as a political village institution, ex-
cludes women as an important forest user group from decision-making about the rules of vil-
lage forest use and protection. 
 
9. Low-cost monitoring and sanctioning: 
“Participants can develop relatively accurate and low-cost monitoring and sanctioning arrangements” 
(Becker and Ostrom 1995:123-124). 
Problems with monitoring and sanctioning, in the context of village forest protection, have al-
ready been illustrated in chapter 5.4.1. Although arrangements are made, they are not imple-
mented in an effective way.  
5.6.3 No village forest protection in Upper Kansa 
Wood collectors from Kodipasa, but also from other nearby, or even more distant villages, are 
obtaining wood for their household use, or for sale in the forest behind the protected village 
forest in Kodipasa. Both men and women can be observed, early in the morning, arriving 
from the plain, carrying food and axes, to spend their day in the forest. In the afternoon they 
return to their villages, carrying head loads of fuel wood or timber. They arrive from the 
neighbouring villages of Sirispal and Tulasichaura, as well as from more distant villages such 
as Narayanpur, Ranki, Mandua, Saras, Kashipur, Badabil and Kandaraposi (all within a radius 
of 6 to 12 km distance). Some of these villages and hamlets are close to Keonjhar Town. 
Some of the wood collectors originate from areas where there are no forests at all, or just 
small patches of open forest. Others, such as the villagers from Narayanpur live at the edge of 
a larger forest. However, Narayanpur Forest is classified as a reserved forest and is therefore 
under stricter control by the Forest Department than most other forests in the Juang area that 
are classified as protected forests. 
The villagers that come from outside the area climb the hill of the protected village forest 
of Kodipasa and cut timber and firewood in the various forest areas that lie behind it, in the 
same locations as the villagers from Kodipasa, Upper Kansa and other Juang villages. The 
fact that a large number of outsiders from the plain come to collect wood in this Juang area is 
a recent development. The Juang of Upper Kansa remember a time, when outsiders were 
rarely seen in their area and they realise, as do the villagers of Kodipasa, that their forest is 
coming under increasing pressure. However, there are several reasons why they do not feel 
that they are able to actively protect their forest area. Firstly, the area is too large to be 
watched. Secondly, the Juang of Kansa feel that they are powerless to stop the increasing 
number of outsiders coming into their area. Some of these villagers, from the plain arrive in 
groups, with bullocks and yokes, to carry large amounts of timber (one pair of bullocks can 
carry 12-15 timber poles).  
On the other hand, there is still an attitude towards forest resources as common pool re-
sources, accessible and open to everybody, linked to a rather vague concept of fixed and 
strongly marked territoriality. In the same way as the Juang of one village do not hesitate to 
collect forest products, or graze their cattle in other areas outside of their village, they do not 
feel that they are the exclusive proprietors of the forest in their own village area. Their per-
ception is closer to the idea that forest resources belong to nobody or to everybody. They do 
not accept the claim by the Forest Department to be the only proprietor of their forest area, 
nor do they claim that they themselves are the exclusive owners and users of these resources. 
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Another way in which the two villages differ in their attitude towards village forest re-
sources, is probably related to the size of the forest area that has been affected. The villagers 
of Upper Kansa do not perceive that the forest area is noticeably dwindling at the same rate, 
as do the people from the village at the foot of the hills who live on the margins of the village 
forest.  
Similar attitudes can be found in other Juang villages in somewhat more remote areas than 
Kodipasa; thus the Juang of Roduan do not feel it necessary to restrict outsiders from collect-
ing timber and firewood, or grazing their goats and cattle, in their territory. They perceive the 
forest resources to be abundant. The only restriction that they do impose is that any outsider 
that wishes to start cultivating in their area must first seek their permission before doing so. A 
Juang man from Gonasika, made an interesting remark, when he stated that in his village, the 
Juang do not feel harassed by outsiders, but by the foresters. 
5.6.4 Village forest protection – other’s forest destruction? 
It is perceived to be becoming increasingly difficult to find an adequate supply of satisfactory 
trees for timber and firewood in the immediate neighbourhood of Kodipasa and Upper Kansa. 
Further distances have to be travelled to get timber and firewood for sale. If one were to con-
sider the areas where the villagers of Kodipasa and Upper Kansa cut trees for timber and fuel 
wood, it transpires that they cover a rather wide area, including the forests that surround other 
original Juang settlements. Forests around Kansa, Radhuan, Kundhei, Bhagamunda, Tangar-
pada, Gonasika, Barurha, Duarsani, ToRanipani, Jantari, Bali, Kapotadiha and Pandadara are 
all mentioned when people are asked where they go to collect timber. They travel distances of 
up to fifteen kms or more, mainly in a westerly and south-westerly direction. This route takes 
them into interior forest areas, which according to the maps of 1978/79 were described as: 
“dense mixed jungle”, “dense mixed jungle mainly sal” or “fairly dense mixed jungle mainly 
sal” with some areas at the fringe of the forest hills characterised as “open mixed jungle”. 
However, according to statements made by the forest rangers the forests in this area in the 
meantime have degraded considerably and there is hardly any dense forest to be found in the 
whole of Bhuiya-Juang Pirh. 
In all of these forests, people from the Juang villages in the hills, on the fringe of the hilly 
forest areas and to a lesser extent even from the plain, cut wood for their own use and for sale. 
The combination of farming and wood selling is found in many villages of the research area, 
although the distance from the villages to the main market of Keonjhargarh is an important 
factor that determines the extent to which wood is sold. In interior Juang villages that are a 
large distance from Keonjhargarh or other market centres, less wood is carried to the market. 
The Juang of Panasanasa,for example, are more dependent upon shifting cultivation and their 
toila fields are larger than those in Upper Kansa. In contrast to the Juang women of Kodipasa 
and Kansa, women from Juang villages that are a greater distance from Keonjhar market, are 
less involved, if at all, in wood selling activities and it is mainly the men that sell timber. 
The protection of village forest, as in Kodipasa is linked with the externalisation of costs in 
the form of increasing pressure on forest areas lying beyond the protected village forest. Not 
only the villagers from Kodipasa, but also outsiders that are excluded from the protected vil-
lage forest, shift to the more remote forest areas. As long as there are no substantial economic 
alternatives to selling fuel wood and timber, for providing a rather secure income, wood sell-
ers will increase their labour input by spending more time in other forest areas and walking 
longer distances to find adequate forest resources. To focus on the protected village forest 
only, evades the larger ecological context, of which a protected village forest is part. 
This is a highly problematic issue with regard to many of the variables that Ostrom and 
Becker consider to be important for sustainable resource management. If costs for the protec-
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tion of specified natural resources are externalised this may have consequences for resources 
not being under a common property regime and for users not being included in the protectors 
group. Sustainable use of a defined protected area may therefore be gained at a cost to other 
areas and to other users. 
To handle the environmental problem of forest degradation beyond an individual village 
community would be challenging in many ways. It is obvious that any kind of regional forest 
protection could only be undertaken in the form of nested enterprises and their institutional 
frameworks would have to go beyond the village community. 
All village communities in the forest area that are visited by outsiders, who come to collect 
fuel wood and timber, would have to be involved. The coordination of rules and regulations 
between villages and an inter-local monitoring system, as well as inter-local conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms would be required. Adequate information about the condition of the various 
forest areas and resources and about the “carrying capacity” of the forest areas would have to 
be delivered in detail, as a prerequisite to deciding about the definition of users and bounda-
ries, the number of users and the rates of harvest, and expected costs and benefits for a net-
work of forest protection groups. 
Whether traditional institutions that link the Juang villages, or more modern institutions 
such as the panchayat system or the block development organization, could play a part in 
such an approach would have to be considered.  
Without any serious coordination between the Forest Department and the village commu-
nities, in the form of formal and legal agreements between them, clearly defined roles and 
functions, their rights and duties, such a regional approach is unlikely to be successful. Some 
few Joint Forest Management (JFM) projects, as well as local forest protection activities on 
the part of single villages, will not solve the problems of forest degradation, but mainly shift 
them to neighbouring areas, except where they are designed in such a way, that no costs are 
externalised. 
In fact, Becker and Ostrom’s design principle number 8 incorporates all the elements of 
principles 1 to 7, but in an even more complex way. This also applies to the variables that are 
conducive to the selection of norms, rules and property rights that reduce externalities: 
1) Accurate information about the condition of the resource and expected flow of benefits and 
costs will be more difficult to get and not be available at low cost for large forest areas. 
2) Participants (villagers / Forest Department) will be more heterogeneous in regard to asset 
structure, information and preferences. 
3) There will be less common understanding about the potential benefits and risks of forest 
protection.  
4) There will be less social capital between various participants. 
5) Group size will increase. 
6) The future will be discounted at various rates by the participants. 
7) Designing and elaborating models of increased autonomy for participants will be a lengthy 
process. 
8) Collective-choice rules for users of several villages will have to be established. 
9) Costs for monitoring and sanctioning will increase. 
 
 
 

  
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Based on my field research and the data presented here, my conclusions focus on the eco-
nomic and political issues of the management of natural resources with special regard to land 
and forest in the research area. 
By and large, peasants in the two villages follow strategies of minimizing labour input and 
maximizing output under given environmental and technical conditions. Returns to labour of 
various economic activities are taken into consideration for economic decision making. How-
ever, peasant strategies also aim at minimizing the risks, by combining various economic ac-
tivities and by spreading labour over the year. 
In order to understand the economic meaning of forest resources for the two villages, one 
has to consider the local economy as composed of various land use systems; agricultural land 
and forest being the most prominent resources used by the villagers. Wage labour is the third 
means by which the villagers can earn an income. The study has clearly shown that forest re-
sources are of vital importance for both villages under study. Villagers are not solely depend-
ent upon them for their own use, but also as a means of earning cash. Fuel wood and timber 
are cash crops for the majority of the villagers; not just the Juang. The sale of timber and fuel 
wood to a large extent compensates for the lack of locally produced paddy – most villagers 
sell wood in order to buy food. 
Factors that limit the local production of paddy in Kodipasa are the low productivity of 
land using current cultivation techniques, combined with the shortage of good quality agricul-
tural land for the majority of households and the village as a whole. If peasants complain 
about scarcity of agricultural land, this means that there is a lack of land of good agricultural 
quality sufficiently worthy of investing in.  
Substantial changes could only be made using high labour investments in order to reclaim 
cultivable wasteland, or intensifying land use by major improvements to the existing irriga-
tion facilities. Several factors deter the small peasants from making these changes: the recla-
mation of the remaining low quality wasteland requires a high input of labour and yields are 
low during the first few years. Poor households in particular, lack the capacity of investing la-
bour without immediate returns. Moreover, it is not a foregone conclusion that the peasants 
will be given land titles for government land that they have encroached.  
Higher productivity of land for paddy cultivation would reduce the dependency of the ma-
jority of households on felling trees for timber and fuel wood, in order to earn the necessary 
income with which to buy food. To raise land productivity and to reduce risks linked to rain-
fed cultivation is possible by improving irrigation facilities. However, this requires labour and 
capital. The construction and maintenance of a canal irrigation system from the perennial 
river, which is some distance away, would only make sense if all or at least the majority of 
households participated in this scheme (better water management by a canal system from a 
perennial river for paddy cultivation is a crucial factor for higher and more secure yields). 
Households that cultivate land that is not their own, as shown in chapter 4.4.1 are not inter-
ested in investing labour in fields that do not belong to them. 
Access to land, either under private property regime, or regulated by informal land transac-
tions, together with the quality of land are crucial variables for the degree of involvement of 
various households of Kodipasa in agriculture and thus also in commercial wood selling. The 
shortage of locally produced paddy is not equally distributed among the households and thus 
the degree of dependence on other sources of income also varies among households. How-
ever, even if land were distributed equally among all households, this would not stop com-
mercial wood selling, but only redistribute the dependence on wood selling or other sources 
of income among households, to compensate for the general deficit of locally produced 
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paddy. Thus, the landless Gouda households rely for their agricultural production upon being 
able to purchase or rent land from the Juang who make their land available to the Gouda, as 
they choose to increase their income by selling wood rather than cultivating the land.  
However, it is not only access to land and land productivity that determine the degree of 
dependence on wood selling and/or other sources of income: labour productivity is also taken 
into consideration in the context of economic decision making. In Upper Kansa land scarcity 
is not a problem: under a regime of common property, each household has access to land ac-
cording to its needs. Contrary to Boserup’s (1998) theory of higher returns to labour for shift-
ing cultivation in comparison to wet rice cultivation; in Upper Kansa returns to labour are 
lower than in Kodipasa. The shifting cultivators of Upper Kansa combine agricultural produc-
tion with wood selling and wage labour; as returns on labour for selling wood and wage la-
bour can equal those of shifting cultivation. They reduce labour input for the cultivation of 
swiddens and increase the amount of labour used for wood selling. Although, on average, re-
turns to labour for shifting cultivation are no lower than for wood selling and wage labour, the 
risks are higher: in a bad year shifting cultivators lose income from their labour input in swid-
dens and have to compensate for this loss mainly by wood selling. Thus, their strategy is to 
minimise their risk by limiting the area that they use for shifting cultivation and selling wood 
in order to cover part of their needs. Thus, they do not fully exhaust available land and labour 
for shifting cultivation. 
There is limited potential for agricultural intensification in areas of shifting cultivation. 
Thus, to force a reduction in wood selling activities in Upper Kansa, by an increased en-
forcement of forest laws, would probably result in an increase in toila land. A reduction in the 
pressure on forest resources by way of imposing a restriction on the felling of trees for the 
purpose of selling timber and fuel wood, would therefore only shift the pressure on forest re-
sources to areas used for shifting cultivation. 
Moreover mixed economic strategies bolster risks linked to uncertainties in the context of 
rain- fed cultivation or cultivation based on low-sale irrigation facilities and allow the spread 
of labour input throughout the year in both villages. The fact that wood selling is a rather con-
sistent source of income throughout the year makes it a reliable supplement to agricultural 
production. The lack of wage labour, be it farm or off-farm, together with similar returns on 
labour for wage labour and wood selling, are further reasons for opting for wood selling as a 
viable economic opportunity. If there were a greater and more frequent demand for wage la-
bour which had a better return to labour than wood selling, this would probably reduce the in-
centive to sell wood. 
Finally, villagers not only need cash to buy additional rice, but also to cover other needs: 
the sale of fuel wood and timber provides the cash with which to buy goods on the market for 
their household and individual needs. 
However, the economic strategies of individual households are not influenced by economic 
considerations and circumstances alone. Intra-household relations to a certain extent also de-
termine the economic performance of a household and the level of its involvement in various 
economic activities. Intra-household relations are dependent upon the bargaining power and 
fallback positions of individual members, their gender, age and marital status. These in turn 
are partially related again to aspects of social status, caste and interlinked gender ideologies. 
There is a broad variety of household realities in the two villages with regard to intra-
household relations. Neither the idea of a household as a cooperative unit based on the altru-
ism of individual household members pooling labour and income for the common well-being 
of everybody, nor the idea of a household as a unity held together by an authoritarian and 
powerful family head, fully cover household realities in the two villages. The idea of a house-
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hold as composed of individual members with their own preferences, interests and strategies 
reflects the reality of many households more adequately. 
The degree of cooperation and conflict among household members, the degree of power 
and authority a household head has, the bargaining power of men and women and older and 
younger members vary between households and also depend upon the stage that the house-
hold developmental cycle is in. 
The interaction of these various factors may result in a sub optimal economic performance 
of a household. Thus, from an economic standpoint, nuclear families are not necessarily best 
adapted to the economic requirements necessary for the type of shifting cultivation practised 
in Upper Kansa. Low land and labour productivity and extended labour peaks can be man-
aged better by larger households: these may cultivate larger areas and handle labour peaks 
with more ease than smaller households, provided that the household head has enough author-
ity to control the household members and has their full cooperation. In addition larger house-
holds are less vulnerable when it comes to the loss of household members due to sickness, 
death or marriage. 
Large households are also at an advantage in a system of permanent paddy cultivation if 
they have access to sufficient land. And even if the amount of land a household has access to 
is restricted and the family is highly dependent upon other sources of income, a large house-
hold could still be at an advantage because it has a higher degree of flexibility over the in-
vestment of labour in various activities. But there are centrifugal forces within the households 
resulting in early household fission: lack of trust between family members, problems of free-
riding and lack of social status of dependent household members may all be sufficient incen-
tives for them to separate and to work harder for an independent household of their own. 
The nuclear family is the most common type of household found in both villages and 
among all ethnic groups. Although data from this study does not indicate that household size 
is generally well adapted to economic requirements, there are cases, which suggest quite the 
opposite: if a household manages to adapt to economic requirements, its economic perform-
ance is better. The delay of household fission may be a result of either cooperative behaviour 
of individual household members or of the authoritarian power a household head may have or 
a combination of both. 
Despite the broad range of household types, it may be said that the families and households 
of the Juang, in comparison to the Gouda are characterised by a higher degree of individual-
ism and by the fathers as family heads having a lower degree of authority; thus centrifugal 
forces tend to be stronger among the Juang, than among the Gouda. The fact that wood selling 
and wage labour are not considered by the Juang to be beneath their social status probably en-
hances tendencies of early household fission. 
Other examples of sub optimal economic household performance are linked to poorer 
households having to transfer their land: loss of land for paddy cultivation due to renting, 
mortgaging or selling it to other households usually has to be compensated for by an increase 
in labour for wood selling and/or wage labour. In some cases it is not only a loss for the 
household as a whole, but the burden has to be unevenly carried by various household mem-
bers: in the case of the Juang, the women are more involved in wood selling and wage labour 
than the men. 
Analysis of data about the economic behaviour of the households of the various ethnic 
groups allows the conclusion that aspects of status, caste and gender linked to ethnic identity 
interfere with economic strategies and decision-making. Thus, cultural and social values and 
preferences determine to a certain degree involvement in commercial wood selling. These 
values in the case of the Gouda restrict the activity of wood selling, contrary to the Juang, 
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who find it acceptable to do this kind of activity and even shift a large part of this responsibil-
ity to the woman.  
The analysis of the economic meaning of forest resources for the peasants provides the ba-
sis for an examination of different aspects of contemporary management of forest resources in 
the two villages, within the historical context of official forest policies and traditional local 
management systems. 
Contrary to widespread assumptions about the management of natural resources as com-
mon property in tribal communities, the type of forest management required for protecting 
forest resources as common property, is not part of the traditional resource management sys-
tems of the Juang. To handle the problem of degrading forest areas is a new challenge for the 
villagers. Villagers in Kodipasa initiated village forest protection when they started to realise 
that they were in danger of losing the material benefits of forest products for their own use. 
Romantic and optimistic ideas that tribal forest dwellers protect forests for cultural or social 
reasons, due to their unique relationship with nature and in particular the forests, neglect the 
fact that it is the material value of forest resources that determines their use to a great extent 
and that many contemporary forest dwellers are partially integrated into a cash and market 
economy.  
Thus in Kodipasa the increasing pressure on forest resources has on the one hand initiated 
efforts to manage forest resources as common property and on the other hand the fact that 
many villagers sell timber and fuel wood is part of the problem of successfully protecting the 
village forest. 
For economic and political reasons, village forest protection in Kodipasa is a partial fail-
ure, as its evaluation according to Ostrom and Becker’s design principles and preconditions 
for collective action indicates. Socio-economic heterogeneity between households as well as 
between the various ethnic groups complicates collective action for the protection of the vil-
lage forest due to differing opportunity costs. However, the fact that every household across 
all the ethnic groups is dependent upon forest resources to a certain extent, could nevertheless 
provide the economic basis for collective action: thus socio-economic heterogeneity in this 
case is not considered to be the main factor for the weak performance of the village forest 
protection initiatives. Problems of collective choice arrangements, monitoring, sanctions and 
mechanisms of conflict resolution are more serious issues than aspects of socio-economic 
heterogeneity. 
Established institutions are at the heart of all efforts to solve the problem of degrading vil-
lage forest. However, the traditional political institutions of the Juang largely preclude the 
participation of women and young men and limit the participation of non-Juang immigrants. 
They are also weak with regard to mechanisms of conflict resolution and sanctioning.  
An important finding of this case study is that neither small sized user groups nor close so-
cial proximity between the villagers, by links of kinship and neighbourhood, are necessarily 
advantageous when it comes to handling problems of collective action for the management 
and protection of the village forest, especially with regard to sanctioning and conflict resolu-
tion. Firstly, social proximity may prevent or limit the punishment of an individual who 
breaks the rules, particularly if the rules that are broken are not highly valued by the society 
(in contrast to rules of endogamy and exogamy e.g.). Secondly, social proximity may raise the 
cost of conflicts within the community, especially if there is no legitimate leader with the 
authority to implement sanctions, as in the case of the villages under study. The strategy of 
diluting conflicts (in order to prevent them affecting larger parts of the community) instead of 
solving them, is not effective, when it comes to dealing with problems that relate to village 
forest protection, as has been shown. 
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The idea that existing local institutions can easily provide solutions to new problems that 
arise, is too optimistic in the case of Kodipasa. These institutions nevertheless, are starting 
points for the villagers, for dealing with the new problem of degrading village forest and offer 
them the potential to contribute towards its solution. Support from outsiders, not belonging to 
the village community, could enhance the chances for the successful organisation of village 
forest protection. Although monitoring, enforcement and sanctioning by individuals, other 
than members of the user groups, would be more costly, it might be more effective to delegate 
these activities, or at least part of them to outsiders. The recognition and backing of locally 
designed rules and regulations by external authorities could also strengthen local efforts. 
However, cooperation with the Forest Department as a potential partner for efforts of village 
forest protection is difficult as the Department formally controls all of the forests in the area, 
including the one where the villagers illegally cut timber and fuel wood for sale. 
So far, new institutions such as the Gram Panchayat do not play a role in the local man-
agement of natural resources although institutions that interlink and organise village commu-
nities would be necessary for the sustainable management of forest resources in larger areas. 
Limited village forest protection, as in Kodipasa does not solve the problem of forest deg-
radation, but partially shifts the pressure to other forest areas, which have open access, even if 
legally they are under the control of the Forest Department. Part of the costs that are linked to 
village forest protection in Kodipasa are externalised. This is a result of the exclusion of out-
siders from the protected village forest by sending them to the interior areas. Moreover, the 
needs of the Kodipasa villagers that can no longer be satisfied by the protected village forest, 
are met in interior forest areas. Ideally the protected village forest should yield enough to 
meet all or most of the villagers’ needs in order to reduce their dependency from obtaining re-
sources from the interior areas. This would require the adaptation of the size of the village 
forest to the villagers’ needs based on reliable data on yield rates of various forest products in 
the village forest. 
In order to control forest degradation in larger forest areas, a regional approach would be 
necessary that would require cooperation, not only between villages, but also between the vil-
lages and the Forest Department. Forest management, in the form of nested enterprises, as 
suggested by Becker and Ostrom (1995) however would be a rather ambitious project, given 
the fact that there is no history of either inter-village cooperation with regard to forest re-
sources or cooperation between the villagers and the Forest Department. 
Contrary also to widespread assumptions that with the start of British colonialism, inter-
ventions by an almighty state and the Forest Department have destroyed common property in-
stitutions in tribal communities, the forest area of the Juang and Bhuiya enjoyed, for a consid-
erable period, a special status as a tribal area. It is only since the 1970s that the Forest 
Department has increased its control over these areas. Paradoxically, this increase coincides 
with the implementation of an official forest policy in India and Orissa that promotes the par-
ticipation of local communities: Joint Forest Management promotes cooperation between vil-
lage communities and the Forest Department with the purpose of achieving sustainable forest 
management. But so far, no JFM project has been undertaken in the tribal area of the Juang 
and Bhuiya. 
The role of the Forest Department and its attitude towards the forest dwellers is ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, it bans the felling of trees for the purpose of producing fuel wood for 
sale; on the other hand it tolerates the sale of such wood in the centre of the district’s capital. 
It is stricter in sanctioning villagers who sell wood as timber. 
The Forest Department also encourages villagers to stop shifting cultivation and to protect 
“their” forest. Conversely, it is the Forest Department that legally controls all forests, even 
those that are within village territories. In the case of Kodipasa, there is no coordination be-
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tween the efforts of the villagers to protect their village forest and the Forest Department. Due 
to the conflicting relationship between the foresters and the villagers, the villagers do not ac-
tively seek support from the foresters when it comes to matters relating to the protected vil-
lage forest. Cooperating with the Forest Department with regard to the village forest while 
disregarding forest law elsewhere would be contradictory. Successful cooperation between 
foresters and villagers could only take place if there was an equitable agreement made about 
the use of both protected village forest and forest areas not protected by the villagers.  
Given the prominent economic significance of forest resources as cash crops in both vil-
lages, basically there are two strategies for handling the problem of forest degradation caused 
by wood selling. Firstly, a strategy to protect forest resources by restricting the felling of trees 
for wood selling would have to compensate for the economic loss of the villagers, i.e. provide 
them with the means to get an adequate alternative income. This would suggest raising the 
productivity of the land for paddy cultivation e.g. by improving irrigation facilities or provid-
ing them with regular, guaranteed wage labour or other income generating possibilities.60 
The other strategy would be to accept that many villagers in and around the forest are con-
siderably dependent upon the cash income that they get from selling fuel wood and timber, 
besides being dependent on various other forest products for their own use. As long as the lo-
cal demand for fuel wood and timber from people not living in or nearby forests (due to the 
lack of alternatives) is high, such a strategy would also be feasible. Until the start of the 
1980s, the Juang-Bhuiyan depot at Keonjhar was a place where the Juang and Bhuiya could 
legally sell timber and fuel wood. This points to a crucial issue, which has not been given 
adequate attention in recent forest policies: the commercial significance of forest resources as 
a means for the forest dwellers to eke out their living. In many cases it may be naive to as-
sume that forest dwellers are satisfied with using the forest in a traditional and non-
commercial manner.  
A forest policy acknowledging the needs of forest dwellers to sell forest resources to en-
sure their livelihood, could give them the status of legal providers of fuel wood and timber. 
This could be an incentive for the forest dwellers to manage forest resources in a regulated 
and controlled way. Sustainable forest management would then require the development of 
management systems which yield timber and fuel wood for sale in specified areas and which 
are based on serious environmental evaluation. To encompass the cash needs of the villagers 
in efforts of Joint Forest Management would of course require larger forest areas under the 
control of villagers than they would need purely for their own subsistence needs.  
                                                           
60 Ideas such as the one of planting several mango trees, in order that the villagers could sell mangos instead of 
fuel wood and timber are shortsighted, as they do not seriously consider the needs of the local villagers that re-
quire regular cash throughout the year in order to buy rice. It is of little benefit to the villagers to be able to sell 
mangos for a few weeks a year. 
  
APPENDIX 
1)   Glossary / Abbreviations 
Badi: permanent cultivation of various crops on land behind the house, by use of the plough 
and dung, with crop rotation und mixed cropping 
Bila: paddy cultivation on permanently cultivated land 
Bok: Juang term for patrilineal clan  
Bualok: 2nd year swidden plots: (bua = paddy, lok = place) 
Bwita: Juang village priest  
Gonat: Juang term for a small hand hoe (in Orya: goronda) 
Gram Panchayat: village council of several villages 
Guda: a type of semi-permanent cultivation, with fallow periods of between two and five 
years 
Handia: rice beer 
HYV: High Yielding Varieties  
I.T.D.A: Integrated Tribal Development Agency  
Khandi: local unit of measurement, 1 khandi = 20 pai = 40 mano 
Mahul: alcohol produced from the flowers of the tree Madhuca indica 
Majang: the men’s house in a Juang village  
Mano: local vessel of specific size 
Mana: a local measurement of land. Two mana are approximately equivalent to one acre. 
Nala: 3rd year swidden plots (nala = old in Juang terminology) 
Ordhano: assistant of the village priest bwita 
Pai: local vessel of specific size approx. double size of mano 
Pradhan: headman of a village 
Pus puni: a ritual which takes place during the month of January, and which initiates the an-
nual subsistence cycle 
Rani: a princess or queen, the wife of a Raja 
Ryot / raiyat: 1) a cultivator, 2) an occupancy tenant 
Sahi: village hamlet 
Sardar: headman of a village 
Sarpanch: political head of a Gram Panchayat 
Surilok: 1st year swidden plot: the Juang name these plots with reference to the cultivation of 
sulur (= Phaseolus mungo; O = biri; black gram, pulse variety) 
Tahsil: an administrative unit for revenue administration 
Toila (podu, jhum): shifting cultivation 
USAID: United States Agency for Development Aid 
Zamindar: 1) an official in precolonial India assigned to collect the land taxes of his district, 
2) a landholder in British colonial India responsible for collecting and paying to 
the government the taxes on the land under his jurisdiction 
2)   Measures, weights and rules of conversion 
Local Measurement of crops, converted into metric weight 
Pouti, khandi, pai and mano are local measurements of various grains and crops. Pai and 
mano refer to two vessels, each of a specific size. Khandi and pouti are measures referring to 
a certain number of pai: 
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2 mano = 1 pai 
20 pai = 1 khandi 
10 khandi = 1 pouti 
1 khandi = 20 pai = 40 mano 
1 pouti = 10 khandi 
 
The weights of these measures vary according to the weight of various grains and crops. Most 
important in the context of this study are the weights of paddy, rice and niger. 
According to Bose (1967:146) mano as a measurement of crops is equal to one pound. 
This is valid for paddy and niger only, not for rice. 
 
Paddy: 
1 mano paddy = 0.5 kg paddy = 0.35 kg rice 
1 pai paddy = 1 kg paddy = 0.7 kg rice 
1 khandi paddy ? 20 kg paddy ? 14 kg rice 
 
Rice: 
1 mano rice = 0.65 kg rice = 0.93 kg paddy 
1 pai rice = 1.3 kg rice = 1.86 kg paddy 
1 khandi rice ? 26 kg rice = 37.13 kg paddy 
 
Niger: 
1 mano niger = 0.5 kg niger 
1 pai niger = 1 kg niger  
The local exchange rate of niger – rice in 1998 was 1:2. This means, 1 kg niger could be ex-
changed for 2 kg rice. 
 
Conversion paddy – rice: 
According to own measurement in the village the weight of 1 kg paddy made into cleaned rice 
is as follows: 
1kg paddy = 0.7 kg rice, thus 1 kg rice = 1.428 kg paddy 
The conversion rate of rice to paddy is therefore 1.428. 
According to the District Statistical Handbook, 1 kg paddy is 0.66 kg rice, the conversion 
rate of rice to paddy is 1,5.  
 
Square measures 
According to the ODG (1986: 270) 2 manas correspond to nearly 1 acre of land. 
In this study calculation was done with the following measures: 
– 1 mana land = 0.5 acre = 2023.5m2 = 0.20235 ha 
– 2 mana land = 1 acre = 0.4047 ha 
– 1 hectare = 2.4711 acres ? 5 mana 
 
According to the ODG (1986:250) the original mana in Upper Keonjhar covered an area usu-
ally sown with 25 kg paddy for wet cultivation, i.e. bila land. 
Farmers of Kodipasa give the following information regarding the quantity of seeds per 
quantity of land for paddy cultivation: with 1 khandi paddy (20 kg paddy seeds) one mana 
land can be sown, either for bila or for guda cultivation. Thus to cultivate 1 hectare, 100 kg 
paddy seeds are required.  
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For this study, the calculation of cultivated area (in hectare) in 1999 is based on the quan-
tity of paddy seeds used by the households: 
The quantity of paddy seeds in kg divided by 20 kg paddy seeds required per mana gives 
the number of mana. The number of mana then divided by 2 results in the quantity of acres (2 
mana = 1 acre). This area multiplied by 0.4047 ha indicates the area in hectare. 
3)   Seeds required per consumer under various conditions of daily rice consumption 
The last column of the following table indicates the required seeds per consumer under condi-
tion of a harvest rate of 1:10 and under various conditions of daily rice consumption: 
 
Daily rice  
consumption 
Annual need of rice 
per consumer 
Converted in paddy 
(multiplied by 1.428) 
 
Plus 10% seeds 
 
Required seeds (10%) 
0.65 kg 237.3 kg 338.8 kg 372.7 37 kg 
0.54 kg 197.1 kg 281.5 kg 309.6 31 kg 
0.50 kg 182.5 kg 260.6 kg 286.7 29 kg 
4)   Area required per consumer under various conditions of rice consumption  
and rice yields per ha 
237.25 kg rice has to be produced to feed one consumer for one year, if an optimal daily con-
sumption of 650 grams rice is assumed. With a harvest rate of 1:10, additional 10% are neces-
sary for seeds: i.e. 260.975 kg rice per consumer is required. If assumed a lower yield of 
595 kg rice per hectare as per the official data for Kodipasa G.P., the necessary area incl. seed 
production will be 0.4386 ha per consumer unit. 
Calculation: 365 x daily consumption plus 10% seeds for the next cultivation cycle gives 
the required quantity of rice per consumer to be produced annually. 
Required area in ha per consumer under various conditions of yield and consumption is the 
following: 
 
Rice per consumer in kg 
Yield in kg rice 
per ha 
Required ha  
per consumer 
0.65 595 0.4386 
0.65 700 0.3728 
0.54 595 0.3644 
0.54 700 0.3097 
0.45 595 0.3037 
0.45 700 0.2581 
 
Conversion of niger seeds into paddy seeds under various conditions  
of niger and paddy harvest rates 
1 kg niger seeds corresponds to 4.24 kg paddy seeds: 
If a niger harvest rate of 1:15 is assumed, 1 kg niger seeds yields 15 kg niger, which corre-
sponds to 30 kg rice or 42.44 kg paddy. To cultivate 42.44 kg paddy with a paddy harvest rate 
of 1:10, 4.24 kg paddy seeds are required. 
 
1 kg niger seeds corresponds to 2.86 kg paddy seeds: 
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If a niger harvest rate of 1:10 is assumed, 1 kg niger seeds yields 10 kg niger, which corre-
sponds to 20 kg rice or 28.56 kg paddy. To cultivate 28.56 kg paddy with a paddy harvest rate 
of 1:10, 2.86 kg paddy seeds are required. 
 
1 kg niger seeds corresponds to 5.712 kg paddy seeds: 
If a niger harvest rate of 1:10 is assumed, 1 kg niger seeds yield 10 kg niger, which corre-
spond to 20 kg rice or 28.56 kg paddy. To cultivate 28.56 kg paddy with a paddy harvest rate 
of 1:5, 5.712 kg paddy are required. 
5)   Harvest rates for paddy cultivation on various types of land 
Harvest rate of bila cultivation for local rice in Kodipasa: 
1: 9; 1:10 in a good year  
1:8 in a medium year 
Less in a bad year 
 
Harvest rate of bila cultivation for HYV with fertilizer: 
1:12 in a good year 
1:15 in a very good year on good land 
According to McDougal (1963:49) the harvest rate for irrigated bila cultivation is 1:13. 
 
Harvest rate of guda cultivation for local rice in Kodipasa: 
1: 9; 1.8 in a very good year 
1:7 in a good year 
1:6; 1:5 in a medium year 
Less in a bad year 
 
Harvest rate of shifting cultivation: 
McDougal (1963:49): 
Harvest rate for “kimbiyang rice” (long term rice variety): 1:7 
Harvest rate for “fast growing rice” (short term rice variety): 1:5.5 
 
Rice yields 1996-1999 (qtl./hectare) in Keonjhar District and Banspal Block: 
 1996-1997 1997-1998 1998-1999 
Keonjhar District       
Autumn 5.16 10.96 4.33 
Winter 8.62 16.28 9.57 
Irrigated summer 18.63 20.96 n.a. 
    
Banspal Block    
Autumn 6.51 10.65 5.56 
Winter 11.03 13.86 6.59 
Irrigated summer 8.82 11.19 n.a. 
(Statistical data from the Deputy Director of Agriculture, Keonjhar) 
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Average rice yield (qtl./hectare) in Banspal Block 1997-1998 (in a “good year”,   
“normal year”): 
Autumn (non irrigated), local variety 6.85 
Autumn HYV 15.55 
Winter (non irrigated), local variety 10.66 
Winter HYV 15.40 
6)   List of main crops 
Juang name Orya name Botanical name English 
bua (paddy) chaula  Oryza sativa paddy (rice) 
akayang kangu Pennisetum italicum millet 
kudu mandia Eleusine coracana finger millet 
jinjari gangei Sorghum vulgare sorghum 
soriso soriso Brassica campestris mustard 
juani maka Zea Mays Linn. maize 
baitalu boitalu Cucurbita maxima pumpkin 
kalar ruma Vigna unguicalata bean variety 
ramtila rasi; niger Guizotia abyssinica oilseed variety (ramtil, 
blackseed) 
saru saru Colocasia esculenta: / 
Dioscorea sp. 
coco-yams 
senai harada Cajanus cajan pulse variety 
sulur biri Phaseolus mungo black gram, pulse variety 
suturi  Vigna umbellata pulse variety 
7)   Money: Rupees, Dollars and Swiss Franks 
In 1998/99 40 Rs. were 1 US$.  
100 Rs. were 2.7 CHF. 
(The price of 1 kg rice on the local market of Keonjhar was 10 Rs.) 
8)   Definition of Variables 
The following definitions have been used for data collection and analysis: 
 
Adults, girls and boys: 
– Adults: men and women at the age of 14 and above. 
– Girls and boys: below the age of 14. 
 
Producers: 
Juang producers: 
– Females at the age of 14 and above are given the value of 1 as producers. 
– Girls at the age of 11 to 13 are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
– Females at the age of 60 and above are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
– Males at the age of 18 and above are given the value of 0.8 as producers. 
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– Boys at the age of 14 to 17 are given the value of 0.5 as producers, if not attending school, 
0.25 if attending school. 
– Males at the age of 60 and above are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
– Men and boys working in other households are calculated as producers of 0.8 if contribut-
ing to the family income. If they contribute only part of their income to the household, they 
are calculated as 0.4 producers. 
– Sick persons are given the value of 0.5 or 0 if unable to work. 
 
Higher ranking Gouda producers: 
– Females at the age of 14 and above are given the value of 0.8 as producers. 
– Girls at the age of 12 to 13 are given the value of 0.5 as producers, if not attending school, 
0.25 if attending school. 
– Females at the age of 60 and above are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
– Males at the age of 18 and above are given the value of 1. 
– Boys at the age of 12 to 14 are given the value of 0.5, if not attending school, 0.25 if at-
tending school. 
– Boys at the age of 15 to 17 are given the value of 0.8, if not attending school, 0.4 if attend-
ing school. 
– Males at the age of 60 and above are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
 
Lower ranking Gouda producers: 
– Females at the age of 14 and above are given the value of 1. 
– Girls at the age of 12 to 13 are given the value of 0.5 as producers, if not attending school, 
0.25 if attending school. 
– Females at the age of 60 and above are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
– Males at the age of 18 and above are given the value of 1. 
– Males at the age of 60 and above are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
– Boys at the age of 15 to 17 are given the value of 0.8, if not attending school, 0.4 if attend-
ing school. 
– Boys at the age of 12 to 14 are given the value of 0.5, if not attending school, 0.25 if at-
tending school. 
 
Santal producers: 
– Females at the age of 14 and above are given the value of 1. 
– Females at the age of 60 and above are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
– Girls at the age of 12 to 13 are given the value of 0.5 as producers, if not attending school, 
0.25 if attending school. 
– Males at the age of 18 and above are given the value of 1. 
– Males at the age of 60 and above are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
– Boys at the age of 14 to 17 are given the value of 0.8, if not attending school, 0.4 if attend-
ing school. 
– Boys at the age of 12 to 14 are given the value of 0.5, if not attending school, 0.25 if at-
tending school. 
 
Munda Producers: 
– Female at the age of 14 and above are given the value of 1 as producers. 
– Girls from 12 to 13 are given the value of 0.5 as producers if not attending school, 0.25 if 
attending school. 
– Females at the age of 60 and above are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
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– Males at the age of 18 and above are given the value of 1 as producers. 
– Males at the age of 60 and above are given the value of 0.5 as producers. 
– Boys at the age of 14 to 17 are given the value of 0.8 as producers, if not attending school, 
0.4 if attending school. 
– Boys at the age of 12 to 14 are given the value of 0.5, if not attending school, 0.25 if at-
tending school. 
– Sick persons are given the value of 0.5 or 0 if unable to work. 
 
Consumers: 
– Household members working for other villagers and provided with meals at their working 
place are considered 0.5 consumers. 
– Persons at the age of 12 years and above: value 1. 
– Persons at the age of 3 –11 years: value 0.5. 
– Persons below the age of 3 years: value 0. 
– Children eating in school: 0.25 if considered as half consumer, 0.5 if considered as full 
consumer. 
 
– Daily consumption of rice: approx. 0.5 kg. 
– 0.5 kg rice = 0.7 kg paddy. 
– Annual need per consumer unit: 182.5 kg rice or 260.61 kg paddy; incl. 10% seeds: 
286.671 kg paddy. 
 
The question about the daily consumption of rice was whenever possible directed to the 
women of a household, because they are responsible for cooking. Answers were given in the 
measurement of a local vessel, “mano”; this corresponds to approx. 0.65 kg rice. However, 
the size of these vessels varies, it may contain more or less than 0.65 kg rice. For calculations 
an average of 0.6 kg rice per mano was assumed.  
9)   Tree species sold as firewood (Chap. 3.4) 
Adina cordifolia (O = Koimo (Kurum) 
Aegle marmelos (O = Belo, J = Kuklap) 
Alangium salvifolium (O = Ankula, J = Ankala) 
Anogeissus latifolia (O = Dhaura, J = Kesen) 
Buchanania lanzan (O = Charo, J = Tarap) 
Croton oblingofolius or Croton roxburghii (O = Putuli, J = Sigen) 
Diospyros melanoxylon (O = Kendu, J = Teren) 
Diospyros sylvatica (O = Kalicha, J = Kalia jhalai) 
Ficus glomerata (O = Dimiri, J = Dumuri) 
Gmelina arborea (O&J = Gambhari) 
Hollarhena antidsenterica (O = Kudchi, J = Kiring) 
Homalium nepalense (J = Khakada) 
Impatiens balsamina (O = Haragoura, J = Benduli) 
Ixora pavetta (J = Guruba) 
Justicia gendarussa (J = Tartari) 
Madhuca indica (O = Mahul, J = Munnun) 
Ougenia oojeinensis (O = Bandhana)  
Phyllanthus emblica (O&J = Anla) ? 
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Poi Jamulia (?) 
Pongamia glabra (O&J = Karanj) 
Shorea robusta (Sal)  
Terminalia alata (O = Asan, J = Antanak) 
10)   Reserved tree species in the forests of Keonjhar Division in 1959 
1) Sal (Shorea robusta) 
2) Piasal (Pterocarpus marsupium) 
3) Sisoo (Dalberjia Sisoo and Dalberjia latifolia) 
4) Kendu (Diospyros melanoxylon) 
5) Gambhar (Gmelina arborea) 
6) Kurum (Adina cordifolia) 
7) Asan (Terminalia tomentosa) 
8) Kusum (Schleichera oleosa) 
9) Harida(Schleichera oleosa) 
10) Bahada (Terminalia belerica) 
11) Amla (Emblica officinalis) 
12) Ambo (Mangifera indica) 
13) Tentuli (Tamarindus indica) 
14) Mahula (Madhuca indica) 
15) Jack (Artocarpus integrifolia) 
16) Khair (Acacia catechu) 
17) Bandhan (Ougenia oojeinensis) 
18) Kangada (Xylia xylocarpa) 
19) Jamu (Syzygium cumini) 
20) Swam (Soymida febrifuga) 
21) Sarap (Caryota urens) 
22) Bheru (Chloroxylon swietenia) 
23) Arjun (Terminalia arjuna) 
24) Char (Buchanania lanzan) 
25) Dhaura (Anogeisus latifolia) 
26) Toon (Cedrela toona) 
27) Kochila (Strychnos nux-vomica) 
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